

RECREATIONS

OF

AN INDIAN OFFICIAL

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RECREATIONS  
OF  
AN INDIAN OFFICIAL

BY  
LIEUT.-COLONEL G. B. MALLESON,

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AUTHOR OF 'THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA.'

Homines amplius oculis quam auribus credunt; longum iter est  
per præcepta, breve et efficax per exempla. — SPENGLER

~~LONDON:~~

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TO THE

RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF DERBY.

WITH

RESPECT AND GRATITUDE.



## PREFACE.

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THE conditions of life in England are so different from the conditions of life in India, that I should not be surprised if the title ‘Recreations,’ applied to the literary labour of this book, were gently cavilled at. And yet no other title would represent so accurately the circumstances under which its contents were written. ‘In Europe,’ if I may be allowed to quote from my own reflections in another work—‘in Europe where there is so much to tempt a man into the sunshine and open air; where the streams invite the angler; the slopes of the mountains, the botanist; the forests, the sportsman; and where the merry laugh and innocent smiles of the daughters of the land invite all, it must require the virtue of a St. Anthony to persevere regularly in indoor studies.’ But in India, where the climatic conditions do not allow a man to bask too long in the sunshine; where the streams do not, except

in a few favoured localities, invite the angler ; where the botanist and the sportsman cannot always command fields for their enthusiasm ; and where the daughters of the land lead a life of seclusion, the necessity for indoor occupation is almost absolute. Of all such occupations, literary study is to me the most seducing, and in it I have ever found recreation of the most consolatory character. To the mind of a man capable of appreciating the great qualities of his contemporaries, there is, I think, much that is elevating in the attempt to present to the world a life-portrait of those by whose side and under whose orders he has served ; to show them struggling with difficulties but little known in England, controlling the wild tribes on the frontier, whilst striving to educate a population composed of diverse races, winning victories by force of character and power of dealing with men, and holding fast, amid all the storms of fortune, to their ideal of right and justice. The attempt to paint such a picture has been to me a recreation, which, whilst never interfering with the disposal of official business, or with participation in field sports, when the opportunity to indulge in them presented itself, has, more than any other occupation, sweetened my hours of exile.

Of the characters treated in this volume, three—Lord Lawrence, Sir Bartle Frere, and Sir Vincent

Eyre—are living. This has been suggested to me as an objection. ‘Why not,’ it has been urged, ‘wait till they are dead, before you give the story of their lives to the world.’ I am very much mistaken if I fail to give a conclusive answer to this query. Leaving out of consideration—though it is not without weight—the possibility that I might precede to the silent tomb the gentlemen whose lives I have studied, I would ask attention to the fact, that the events I have recorded have been performed out of Europe. For the period of the performance of those deeds, the actors were, so far as related to the politics of England, to all intents foreigners. Their lives glided by in the sandy plains and jungles of India, remote from the gaze of their countrymen, uncheered by the intellectual social life of which they read, and for which doubtless they often sighed. Occasionally, indeed, a great event, such as the Indian Mutiny, called a passing attention to the deeds by which their names were illustrated, but, except in rare instances, the interest thus excited was only momentary. They were, in very deed, foreigners in all that concerned Europe. Is it because, though thus foreigners, they were of English blood, that they must die before the story of their lives in India can be told to their countrymen?

Again, it is permitted to write contemporary history.

Mr. Kinglake has written, and is writing, a history of the Crimean War. Sir John Kaye has written, and is writing, a history of the Indian Mutiny. But, if we analyse these histories, what are they? They are the records of the actions of Englishmen, the majority of them still living, during two or three years of their lives. In what respect does the principle of recording the history of three years of the life of a living man differ from the principle of recording the history of his whole Indian career? If it be said that in neither case can the whole truth be told, I reply that it is during the lifetime of the actors that a conscientious historian is best able to tell the whole truth. This axiom has been put with great force by Sir John Kaye in the preface to the second volume of his great work. He says: 'It has often been told me, in reply to my inquiries, "Yes, it is perfectly true. But these men are still living, and the truth cannot be told." To this my answer has been: "To the historian all men are dead." If a writer of contemporary history is not prepared to treat the living and the dead alike, to speak as freely and truthfully of the former as of the latter, with no more reservation in the one case than in the other, he has altogether mistaken his vocation, and should look for a subject in prehistoric times.' This ruling applies with equal force to contemporary

biography. I can truly aver that were the three living subjects of my sketches not living, I should publish those sketches as they now stand, 'without one comma more, or one comma less.'

All the papers contained in this volume were written in India. That on Lord Lawrence appeared originally in 'Blackwood's Magazine,' three months after he had left Calcutta. The sketch of the career of the ancestor of Dyce Sombre first saw the light in an Indian newspaper, the 'Madras Mail.' The others, with the exception of the paper on Sir Bartle Frere, were contributed to the 'Calcutta Review' at intervals between 1867 and 1869. The sketch of Sir Bartle Frere's career was written in 1867, immediately after he had ceased to be Governor of Bombay, and had left India. It was intended for an English Magazine, but it did not appear at the time. I feel a peculiar pleasure in being at last able to place before the English public the career of a statesman in every way so worthy of their esteem.

With respect to the papers on Akbar and Madhajee Sindia, I have only to state that, whilst the first calls attention to the sound principles of administration by which the greatest of all the Mogul Sovereigns of India was guided, showing that he, the Mogul, was, in every respect, immeasurably in advance of his European

contemporaries, the second sketches the mode in which it was possible during the second half of the last century, for a very able Mahratta to obtain supremacy in India. It is, I think, indisputable that, had the life of Madhajee been spared for ten years, the English would have had to fight the battle for empire under far less favourable conditions than those by which the campaigns of Lake and Wellesley, against the successor of Madhajee, were characterised.

The story of the ancestor of Dyce Sombre may be interesting as showing how, under native rule, it was possible for a degraded adventurer of European birth, possessing neither conscience, nor courage, nor real ability, to attain a very high position.

G. B. M.

LONDON. *December 2, 1871.*



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# RECREATIONS OF AN INDIAN OFFICIAL.



## *LORD LAWRENCE.*

### PART I.

#### THE TRAINING.

JOHN LAWRENCE was born at Richmond, in Yorkshire, on March 4, 1811. His father, who was a man of great natural ability and considerable force of character, had proceeded in early life to Bombay in the suite of one of the commanders-in-chief; had joined on his arrival one of H.M.'s regiments as a gentleman volunteer; and had, not long after, obtained a commission. He bore a part in most of the struggles in which the British were engaged on that side of India; behaved with conspicuous gallantry at the battle of Sedaseer, and at the capture of Seringapatam, where, being then only a lieutenant, he commanded one of the storming-parties formed of volunteers. Of this party all the officers but himself were killed, and he was severely wounded in two places. For this service, but after the delay of a

year, Mr. Lawrence was promoted to a company in H.M.'s 19th Foot, and was for some years quartered in Ceylon. In 1815, at the time of the Waterloo campaign, he was a lieutenant-colonel in command of the Veteran Battalion, and governor of Ostend. Had he obtained promotion early in life, he would probably have gained considerable distinction, but most of his service was performed as a subaltern; and the mortification arising from long-delayed promotion, the effects of climate and wounds, all contributed to break down his health, and compelled him to retire from active service some time about 1821. He died in 1835, at the age of seventy-two years.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence had twelve children, eleven of whom grew up, and eight are still living. John was the sixth son. The eldest son died when he was but a child, and the four elder brothers being out in the world, John was, when very young, a kind of companion to his father, accompanying him in his walks, and listening to the stories of his Indian career. In 1823, being then twelve years old, he was sent to a school at Londonderry. He remained there, however, but two years; then, returning to England, completed the first portion of his education at a school at Bath. He had just attained the age of sixteen when an East India Director, an old friend of his father, offered him an appointment in the Indian Civil Service. But the boy was bent on following his father's career. Three of his elder brothers had already gone to India as

soldiers, and he had made up his mind that, if he went at all, he would go out in the same profession. The opportune return of his brother Henry on sick leave from India induced him to change his decision. Henry pointed out to him the immensely superior advantages of a civilian's career—the vast field for the exercise of energy and ability offered by that branch of the Indian service. He illustrated his argument by reference to himself, his slow promotion, his inferior pay, the absence of all prospect as an artillery officer. His arguments, supported by those of his father, and responded to by the strong common-sense of the lad, were successful, and John Lawrence went to Haileybury.

The decision was undoubtedly wise. Yet, judging from after events—from some of those, more especially, in 1857, the result of which depended upon the decision of the moment, and to which we shall allude in their proper place—we have no hesitation in affirming that an excellent soldier was thereby lost to his country, and that the honour which the career of Sir John Lawrence has brought to the Indian Civil Service, would have been reflected with not less lustre, had opportunity offered, by his achievements at the head of a British army.

Mr. Lawrence remained two years at Haileybury. He passed, indeed, the necessary examinations within the first twelve months of his entrance into that college, but he was compelled to remain there longer,

under the operation of the rule which laid down eighteen years as the *minimum* age at which a student could pass out. Although far from being an idle boy, Mr. Lawrence did not avail himself to the full of the opportunities offered him for securing a good education. He worked by fits and starts, was fond of athletic sports, and especially delighted in walking across country with a friend. He had, however, read a good deal in a desultory way, particularly history and biography, and was considered well-informed for his age. In his second Haileybury term he obtained a prize in history, and a prize in the Bengallee language; in his third term he was second in political economy, and again in the front rank in Bengallee; in his fourth he gained the gold medal for law, a third Bengallee prize, and was returned as 'highly distinguished' in other departments.

Mr. Lawrence left Haileybury in May 1829, being the third of his term for the Bengal Presidency; but he delayed his departure from England till the following September, in order to enjoy on his way out the society of his brother Henry, who was returning to his post of lieutenant in the Bengal Artillery. Mr. Lawrence has often been heard to speak in after years of the great advantage he derived from the presence of his elder brother in England at this critical period of his life—of the encouragement to exertion, the sound and rational advice, strongly enforced by good example, with which Henry was always ready, though

careful never to press it either with needless or tedious persistency.

Mr. Lawrence landed in India on February 9, 1830, and remained ten months in Calcutta. During this period he was frequently ill, and imbibed consequently so great a distaste for the country that an offer of 100*l.* per annum would probably have taken him home again. At last, however, he passed his examinations, and was reported qualified for the public service. He had selected the Upper Provinces in preference to Bengal as the scene of his future action, and was, at his own request, appointed to the Delhi territory, then a part of the border districts of the North-West Provinces. The time allowed for joining was six months; but Mr. Lawrence, travelling by palanquin, performed the distance, upwards of 900 miles, in eighteen days. This was then considered an extraordinary performance; although, in the present day, the space between Calcutta and Delhi, by a more circuitous route, may be traversed in sixty hours!

At the time of Mr. Lawrence's arrival at Delhi, that division of the country was considered to offer, in many respects, the best school for a young civilian. It was under the direct control of a resident and chief-commissioner and a commissioner. The political jurisdiction extended all over Rajpootana, the vast but somewhat wild and barren territories of many Rajpoot chiefs, besides all the country lying between the rivers Jumna and Sutlej. In this latter area were

five British districts, forming a tolerably compact division; but all the rest of the country was parcelled out amongst different chiefs, mostly, especially to the northward and eastward, Hindus or Sikhs, prominent amongst whom were the Rajahs of Puttialla, Jheend, Khytul, and Nabha.

The young civilians were, in those days, employed in various duties, sometimes in listening to the complaints of the tillers of the soil and the poorer inhabitants of the towns, at other times in negotiating with the chiefs of huge fiefs. They thus acquired experience in dealing with men, a thorough acquaintance with all the details connected with the tenure of land, and an insight into the customs and practices of the various orders and classes of native society. But these were not the only opportunities for obtaining knowledge of this nature. In those days many of the chiefs about Delhi still possessed in that city houses and gardens, to which they constantly resorted, partly to pay their respects to the representative of British power, partly to enjoy the pleasures and luxuries of social life. There were also living in Delhi, as permanent residents, old men of rank and family, who had served in some capacity or other in the Mahratta wars—men who had been employed in an irregular fashion under Sir Arthur Wellesley and Lord Lake—men who used to be fond of telling stories of those interesting days, and to whom the names of Mr. Seton, the first resident, Sir Charles Metcalfe, Sir David



Ochterlony, and Sir John Malcolm, were as household words. The intercourse of the British officials with men of this character and experience, the visiting them and the receiving visits in return, the patient listening to their inexhaustible stock of anecdotes relating to the past, tended greatly to the cordial good feeling between both races characteristic of those times. To the young civilian, alike willing and able to read the books of character thus open before his eyes, the lesson was one of incalculable importance, full of influence on his subsequent career.

Among those who more especially delighted in the opportunity thus afforded them of acquainting themselves with the character and feelings, so far as it was possible thus to ascertain them, of their native fellow-subjects, Mr. Lawrence was conspicuous. It is impossible to enter here into the details of those early days, interesting and instructive as they are. But more stirring events beckon us forward, and our space is limited. We must content ourselves with the bare statement of the facts, that for the first four years of his residence at Delhi Mr. Lawrence held, under the Resident, the office of assistant-judge, magistrate, and collector of the city and its environs, embracing an area of 790 square miles, and containing a population of 506,689 souls. At the end of this apprenticeship—which, as may be imagined, was no light one—Mr. Lawrence was selected for the charge of the northern division of the Delhi territory, the

chief civil station of which was Paniput, twenty miles from the large and important military cantonment of Kurnaul. Paniput has on three several occasions been the battle-ground on which the possession of India has been decided. On November 5, 1556, the illustrious Akbar defeated Hemu Adili, the Prime Minister of Mohammed Shah Sur Adili, and recovered the empire of his father Humayun; on February 13, 1739, the army of Mohammed Shah, King of Delhi, was utterly routed by the Persian invader, Nadir Shah; and again, on January 6, 1761, Ahmed Shah Abdali utterly defeated the Mahrattas under Sudaseo Rao Bhao and Wiswas Rao. Whether the traditions of these fierce encounters may have nourished a martial disposition among the children of the soil on which they took place, or whether other causes may have contributed to the feeling, this at least is certain, that the inhabitants of Paniput have the character of being turbulent, disaffected, and difficult to manage, beyond those of any of the towns and districts in the neighbourhood. The district itself possesses an area of 1,832 square miles, and a population of more than 486,000. Mr. Lawrence acted in charge of this difficult part of the country for two years. During the greater part of this period he was the only officer in the district. It was in bad order when he came to it, and the refractory classes were more than ever inclined to show themselves worthy of their reputation. But Mr. Lawrence was not intimidated by their manifestations.

He threw himself heart and soul into his work, and, supported thoroughly by his commissioner, he brought the district, at the end of two years, into the most perfect order. This had scarcely been accomplished when the appointment itself became permanently vacant. But here the rules of red-tape intervened. Mr. Lawrence, who had not been considered too young to bring the district into order whilst the allowances of the acting appointment alone were available, was pronounced to be far too junior to draw the full salary attaching to the permanent charge. He consequently reverted to his substantive office of assistant-magistrate and collector of Delhi, whilst the district which he had brought into order was made over to a civilian of long standing, who, having failed as a judge, was therefore considered qualified to undertake a far more difficult duty !

During his charge of this district Mr. Lawrence may be said to have completed his training as a civil officer. It was a difficult school, it is true, but in after life he had no reason to regret the severe apprenticeship. It facilitated all his subsequent labours, no matter how varied or how onerous. It made him thoroughly acquainted with the duties of administration, alike of a large town and an important agricultural district; it brought him in contact with the lower, as had Delhi more especially with the higher, orders of the community. Of the criminal classes and their habits he had obtained during this charge a large

experience. Coming daily into contact with the various agricultural races of that part of India, he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the peculiarities of the tenure of land, the circumstances of Indian agriculture, canal and well irrigation, as well as of the habits, social customs, and leading characteristics of the people. During this period of two years, in fact, Mr. Lawrence had, with the aid only of native subordinates, marked off boundaries between village lands, regarding which sanguinary feuds had gone on for generations; he had superintended the collection of the revenue, had charge of the treasury, sought out and brought to justice numbers of great criminals, managed the police, and, under the humble designation of magistrate and collector, had been the pivot upon which the whole of the administration revolved.

Mr. Lawrence did not remain long in his inferior position at Delhi. Three months after joining he was promoted to the grade of joint-magistrate and deputy-collector of the southern division, but appointed to act as magistrate of the city of Delhi itself. After acting for six months in that capacity, he joined his substantive appointment in the southern division. Here he obtained great experience of the Menas and Mehwatties, tribes of Mohammedans converted from Hinduism in the reign of Aurungzebe, and who are plunderers and thieves by profession. These curious races yet retain many of their old Hindu customs and traditions. Of nothing are they fonder than of discoursing of the

glories and pleasures of the days, when, to use an ~~old~~ adage of that part of the country, ‘the buffalo belonged to him who held the bludgeon.’ To add to the difficulties of such a charge, a severe drought affected the Upper Provinces, increasing greatly the sufferings of the people. But notwithstanding this—notwithstanding, also, the predatory and warlike character of the race, and the absence from the district of a single soldier—so excellent were Mr. Lawrence’s arrangements, that crime did not much increase during the season of suffering, nor was any violent outbreak attempted.

After administering this district for eighteen months, Mr. Lawrence was specially selected to be settlement officer of Etawah, situated on the left bank of the Jumna, adjoining Agra and Mynpoorie. This district had suffered much from the drought to which we have alluded, and its landed tenures were in considerable disorder. Mr. Lawrence lost no time in taking up his appointment. The district was then being surveyed in a scientific manner; the boundaries were distinctly laid down, and minute enquiries were instituted, in conjunction with the collector, as to the degree and the extent of relief to be afforded to the sufferers from the drought by the temporary suspension of the land-tax. Upon Mr. Lawrence himself, assisted by native officials, devolved the labour of superintending the detailed field-measurements on which the revised settlements were to be founded. This arduous labour, in

an almost tropical climate, succeeding as it did the unceasing exertions of eight years in Delhi and its vicinity, tried too severely his constitution. In September 1839 he was taken seriously ill of jungle fever, and for nearly a month his life was in great danger. At one time, indeed, he was given up, but he rallied; and, assisted by the great care and attention of two young military friends and a brother civilian, who nursed him by turns, he so far recovered as to be able to bear the fatigue of being carried into a boat and sent off to Calcutta. There again he had a relapse; but, recovering from that also, he proceeded to England, on February 28, 1840, on a furlough of three years.

Before those three years had nearly expired, important events had taken place in India. On November 2, 1841, there broke out in Cabul that insurrection which inflicted so terrible a stain upon our arms, which changed the policy of our empire, and which led some of the foremost of our Anglo-Indian statesmen to despair, for a time, of the fortunes of British India. During the entire period of this catastrophe Mr. Lawrence was in Europe; but before he returned, the good vessel of the State, tossed long and fiercely by the waves, had weathered their fury, and was once more riding in peaceful waters. The calm, too, was of a far more healthy nature than had been the deceitful repose of the time prior to the outbreak. We were again within our frontier, and, whatever danger might

threaten us, we could at least mass all our resources to meet it on our own ground.

Mr. Lawrence left England to return to India by the overland route on October 1, 1842. During his absence he had travelled a great deal, and had also suffered for some time from an illness so serious as to induce his medical advisers to doubt whether he would ever be able to stand the trying climate of India. However, he recovered and went out, though not alone. Before his departure, he had taken the most important and, for himself, the happiest step of his whole career, by marrying a lady who, in the labours, the dangers, and the triumphs that followed, was, in the fullest sense of the terms, his helpmeet, his solace, and his friend. Arriving with his wife at Bombay in the first week of November of that year, Mr. Lawrence found that a war had broken out in Bundelkund, and that the direct route to the North-West was thus barred to him. He accordingly took the road to Aurrungabad, and thence, *viâ* Ellichpore and Nagpore, through what was then a very rough country, unattended by servants, to Allahabad. On his arrival there, he found his prospects of employment very unsatisfactory. The troops had, indeed, returned from Affghanistan, but the country was overburdened by the plethora of officials whom the late calamity had summoned out from Europe. At length, however, after a series of acting appointments, one of which was in his old station of Paniput, Mr. Lawrence, more

fortunate than most of his contemporaries, settled down as magistrate and collector of Delhi. This was at the end of 1844, just two years after his return from England. In both of these charges Mr. Lawrence found that considerable improvements had been effected since he had left them; more particularly in the condition of the agricultural classes. He always attributed this improvement to the settlement of the land-revenue for a long term of years on favourable conditions to the proprietors and cultivators of the soil, and to the impetus which had thus been given to agriculture.

But whilst Mr. Lawrence was actively engaged on the scene of his earliest labours on Indian soil, events were hatching, destined in their future to affect alike his fortunes and the fortunes of his adopted country. On December 11, 1845, the long-threatened invasion of the Sikh army took place. Under the command of Raja Lall Singh and Tej Singh, the army, 50,000 strong, on that day poured across the Sutlej, not far from our frontier station of Ferozepore. With the exception of orders having been issued to hold the troops at Meerut, Delhi, Umballa, and at other stations on the frontier, in readiness for immediate movement, not a single preparation had been made to receive them, and India seemed at their mercy. But the same Providence which filled the hearts of their leaders with timidity and distrust, had given boldness and daring, such as in the face of an European enemy would have amounted to rashness, to the generals of



the English army. The first and chiefest credit for the victorious issue of the campaign is due to the officer commanding at Ferozepore, General John Littler. This officer had under his orders but one European regiment, four or five native corps, and a few guns. The Sikh army, crossing the Sutlej 50,000 strong, threatened his station. Littler at once consulted commanding officers of regiments. They gave him, in the sense of risking nothing, the most prudent advice. They recommended him to throw up all sorts of *impromptu* defences, to keep his troops behind these, and to hold Ferozepore till he should be relieved by a British army. Littler listened to them, thanked them, and determined to adopt a course exactly opposite. Early next morning he marched out at the head of his 4,000 men, took up a position opposite the Sikh army, and offered them battle. The result proved his thorough knowledge of Asiatics. The Sikhs, astounded at his boldness, and suspecting that he must possess resources of which they knew nothing, declined the combat, and moved on to Ferozeshuhr. A few days later the advance-guard of the Sikh army was repulsed at Moodkee by Sir H. Hardinge; and on the 21st and 22nd, a junction having been effected on the morning of the 21st with Littler, a desperate and hotly-contested battle ensued, which terminated in the repulse of the Sikhs at all points. Our army, however, was in no condition to pursue them; and they took up a fresh position on the river Sutlej, within our own

territory, in front of the little village of Sobraon, and commenced to fortify it strongly.

Whilst these events had been occurring, Mr. Lawrence had remained at Delhi. His labours, however, had been more than doubled by the warlike operations to which we have alluded. It had happened that the Governor-General, Sir H. Hardinge, on his way up country, had passed through Delhi in the November of that year, and had made the acquaintance of Mr. Lawrence. It was the constant habit of Sir H. Hardinge to accompany Mr. Lawrence in his rides about the interesting ruins of the imperial city. During these rides subjects connected with the administration of the country were discussed, and, amongst other things, Sir H. Hardinge consulted his companion on the subject of irrigation, then attracting a good deal of attention, and with reference to which Mr. Lawrence had had some experience during the drought of 1837. When, a few weeks later, the Sikh war broke out, Mr. Lawrence became at once busily engaged in collecting carriage for the army in the field, and in sending on to it supplies. After the battle of Ferozeshuhr, which was regarded all over India almost as a drawn battle, our supplies of ammunition, great and small, were reduced to so low an ebb as scarcely to be equal to the necessities of another fight. In the great magazine of Delhi, of so sad a celebrity in after years, the work of casting bullets and making up cartridges went on night and day. But the great difficulty was

to secure a supply of carriage. The country had been to some extent denuded of this important necessary, and the harsh treatment to which the owners of carts had in some cases been subjected, the insufficient payments that had been made, and the terror of the enemy which had reached Delhi, rendered those who remained unwilling to come forward. It was then that Sir H. Hardinge made a personal appeal, in his own handwriting, to Mr. Lawrence to use every possible effort to aid the army in this crisis. Mr. Lawrence nobly responded. By his personal influence, by judicious treatment, by good but moderate and certain payment, he succeeded in collecting five thousand carts. These, laden with commissariat and ordnance stores, were despatched with all haste to the army, which they reached in sufficient time to be made available for the operations which ended in the crowning defeat of the enemy at Sobraon, and the occupation of Lahore.

In those days the city of Delhi—the resistance of which for more than four months to our arms is of recent recollection—was nominally held by two weak corps of native infantry and a battery of native artillery. Throughout that life-struggle on the Sutlej, this city, the possession of which had so often been considered decisive of the fate of India—a city containing within its walls upwards of 150,000 inhabitants, more than half of whom were Mohammedans, a portion of it occupied by the titular king, the descendant of Baber and of Akbar, and by his dissolute court—was

as quiet and secure as any part of India, though scarcely two hundred miles from the seat of war. Mr. Lawrence, attended by a single native orderly, was in the constant habit of patrolling its streets, passing through, alike, its most crowded thoroughfares, its dirtiest lanes, and its most unfrequented alleys. The inhabitants had been acquainted with him for years ; they knew his character, his fearlessness, his prompt and quick decision. Those qualities were sufficient to overawe them.

In his evidence, given before the House of Commons some years later, Lord Hardinge stated that it was his experience of Mr. Lawrence's qualities in 1845-46 that first fixed his attention upon him, and induced him a little later to offer him an important political appointment. In the times that were coming upon him, the Governor-General had need of the best officers the Services of India could produce ; and it may be stated without fear of contradiction, that never in India was the faculty of selection exercised with greater discernment than on this occasion by Sir H. Hardinge.

Meanwhile Sobraon had been fought, Lahore occupied, Cashmere and Jullundhur annexed, and peace proclaimed. Cashmere was, indeed, sold to Rajal Goolab Singh for a million of money, but Jullundhu and the hill-tracts adjacent were destined to remain permanently annexed to British India. Those adjacent tracts comprehended Kangra, Noorpore, Nadown Kuloo, Spiti, and Lehoul, right up to the confines of Thibet. To administer this country, inhabited by various races—the warlike Sikhs of the plain and the hardy son

of the mountain, many of them Rajpoots, never before subjected to the sway of a European, but governed by their own people, and taught from infancy to regard the Sikh as the coming race of Asia—Sir H. Hardinge selected the officer whose energy had stood him in such stead in the terrible days of December and January. On March 1, 1846, Mr. John Lawrence received a summons to repair to Umritsur to see the Governor-General, preparatory to taking charge of the newly-acquired trans-Sutlej territory.

In the present day, when a class of politicians lose no opportunity of exalting the advantages of native rule, and of dwelling upon the preference evinced for it by the natives themselves, the spectacle offered by the cession of the Jullundhur Doab to the British, by its transfer from native to foreign rule, may perhaps be looked back to with some sort of curiosity. Certainly in no part of India could the experiment have been made with less likelihood of its resulting favourably to the foreigner. Of all races in India the Sikhs were the most martial, the most independent, and, never before having met with reverses, the least likely to renounce all at once the hopes of empire, which had become with them a faith. Yet to gather what their social condition had been and what it became—how they fared under their own people and how under the British, to which, after some experience, they showed the greatest attachment under trying circumstances—we have but to point to the leading features of the

public policy by which their connection with the British was signalised.

For three years, from 1846 to 1849, Mr. Lawrence was Commissioner of the Jullundhur Doab and the adjacent hill-territories. The principal reforms which he introduced during that period we will refer to in the order in which they took place. The first was the substitution of the payment of the land-tax in cash for its payment in kind, as had been the practice, in many instances, under the Sikh rule. It is true that, before this change had been tried, the agricultural classes dreaded its introduction, and some of them did not hesitate to express their dislike of it to the Commissioner. But Mr. Lawrence, after listening patiently to their remonstrances, pointed out to them that the new system would work to their advantage; that their assessments would be fixed and certain, calculated on the area of land in cultivation, instead of being dependent on the caprice of collectors or overseers. Still, clinging to their ancient customs, they pleaded against the experiment being tried; but Mr. Lawrence was too confident in the soundness of his views to give way to solicitations founded only upon prejudice. He caused a rough settlement of the province to be made, and then assessed each landowner according to his possessions at an equitable rate, considerably lighter in the main than that which had obtained under Sikh rule. The agriculturists, assured by this system of the entire possession of their crops, found that they

were able to realise by the public sale of them in the markets of the country a sum sufficient to leave them, after paying all the demands of the State, a far greater surplus than they had enjoyed under the old system. The relief to the people by this one transaction was calculated at from 15 to 30 per cent. on each man's payments, whilst the treasury received nearly if not quite as much as formerly. The difference had found its way, under the old system, into the pockets of the farmers of revenue, who sold off the products of the land, and accounted for their receipts months and sometimes years afterwards. The agriculturists were not slow in admitting the great advantage thus accruing to them.

Another and a most important reform was in the administration of justice. Under the Sikh rule there had been no written law. The unwritten penal code contained but two penalties, fine and mutilation ; imprisonment was unknown ; and there was scarcely any crime which might not be atoned for by a fine. Disputes regarding property were generally adjudicated upon by private tribunals ; but, as a rule, the people were the slaves of the farmers of the revenue. So long as the remittances to Lahore were regular and satisfactory, these farmers were but rarely called upon to account for the authority they exercised over life and property.

We have already pointed out the mode in which this system of arbitrary and all but irresponsible rule

—this *imperium in imperio*—was put a stop to by Mr. Lawrence. He supplemented this great work by bringing justice to the door of the people. By means of his assistants, selected from the civil and military services alike, he gave the artisans of the towns, the agriculturists, and the small landowners, a prompt and efficient remedy for any injustice perpetrated against them. He introduced a system of penal law, taken, indeed, from the English system, but simplified so as to suit the uncultivated comprehensions of the people over whom he ruled. These plain and simple rules, modified and added to according to the results of experience, were afterwards formed into a code, which, translated into the Punjaabee language, enabled every man to understand the nature of the rules to which he was bound to conform, and the penalty that would be enforced for any infraction of the law.

We are thus able to see how the two great blessings of a fixed and moderate assessment of the soil, and a prompt and sure system of justice, succeeding an assessment neither fixed nor moderate, and a system of justice neither prompt nor sure, should naturally incline the hearts of the people towards British rule. Still more was this likely to result when the Sikhs found these reforms accompanied by others—by the introduction of material improvements, of which their old rulers had never dreamed. Thus, Government monopolies, hitherto weighing with crushing power upon trade, were abolished; the excise system



was readjusted on a sensible plan; roads were made, bridges were built, and a police system introduced, having for its object the *maximum* of efficiency combined with the *minimum* of interference.

We have said that Mr. Lawrence held the office of Commissioner of the Jullundhur district for three years. But during that period several additional duties were likewise thrust upon him. Twice was he summoned to Lahore to act for and to assist his brother in the very difficult task of effecting, through the Sikh Durbar, a thorough reform of the fiscal system of the Sikh territories—a system based upon isolation, high preventive duties, and an excise levied on all articles, fatal to the development of the resources of the country, and ruinous to the finances of the State. It is no disparagement to the memory of the illustrious Sir Henry Lawrence to state that he depended in a great degree for the moulding of the measures necessary to carry out these reforms on the experience and ability of his brother John. The means by which they were effected partake of the marvellous. Lahore was the only place in the Punjaub occupied by British troops; the people were still jealous of their independence. And yet the wonderful spectacle was presented of a few British officers riding over the country, re-surveying and re-assessing the lands, attended only by a few native horsemen raised in the Punjaub itself! All this time, too, the Sikh Durbar, under whose orders they were nominally acting, was secretly engaged

in plotting for the restoration of the Maharanee, and the complete expulsion of the British from the country.

For his services when acting for and assisting his brother at Lahore, Mr. Lawrence twice received the thanks of the Government of India; and when, at the end of 1847, his brother was forced to leave for Europe on a longer period of absence on account of his health, it was generally believed that the acting appointment would be given to him. But Mr. Lawrence had previously expressed in more than one letter to Lord Hardinge his indifference for the acting appointment of Resident of Lahore. That nobleman, therefore, nominated Sir Frederick Currie, a member of his Council, and who had previously been Foreign Secretary, to the post.

Almost one of the first acts of the acting Commissioner was the deputation to Mooltan of the two officers whose murder by the troops of Moolraj led to the second Sikh war. It is probable that the outbreak at Mooltan would never have occurred, or that it would have been promptly suppressed, had Messrs. Agnew and Anderson marched thither with the Durbar troops, and familiarised themselves with the officers and men. No people are more impressionable than the Asiatics, over none is a moral supremacy sooner attainable by the display of qualities which they admire the more in others from not possessing them themselves. It is almost certain that had Messrs. Agnew and Anderson accompanied the Sikh soldiers,

most of whom, by the by, were hill-men, to Mooltan, they would have acquired over them such a mastery that the conspirators would not have dared to attack them, or, attacking, would have been repulsed. This, at least, was the opinion expressed at the time by Mr. Lawrence, who considered, moreover, one of the envoys as not well fitted for the part he had to play. As it was, the two officers proceeded by water, the men by land. They met a few miles only from Mooltan. The men had had no time to become acquainted even with the persons of the foreign envoys when the attack upon the latter took place. Under the trying circumstances that followed, they were easily suborned from their duty towards those of whom they knew nothing. The result is well known. Our officers were murdered; and Moolraj, with the secret encouragement of the Sikh Durbar, raised the standard of revolt, and thus precipitated the insurrection which, ever since the occupation of Lahore by the British, had been fomented and encouraged by many of the nobility of the Punjaub who had been apparently most friendly to our rule.

Mr. Lawrence was of opinion that the immediate march of a few British troops on Mooltan would have nipped the plans of the conspirators in the bud; and there can be no doubt as to the soundness of this view. The success of Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes's raw levies against the troops of Moolraj in the field shows how much might, at an early period, have been effected

by a handful of Europeans and a few guns. But the question was left to be decided, not by common-sense, but by military red-tape.\* Red-tape, being comfortably housed in the Himalayas, decided that it was too hot to move troops under canvas at that season of the year. The insurrection, therefore, was allowed to gather head, and, before our troops could be massed, had assumed a most formidable strength.

We pass over the military events which followed—the checkered fortunes of the troops who besieged Mooltan, the doubtful victory of Chillianwalla, the crowning mercy of Goojrat—and proceed to dwell upon the ordeal to which was subjected that province, which had been detached, less than three years before, from the kingdom of the Sikhs, and which during that period had been subjected to British rule, as understood and administered by Mr. Lawrence.

That officer had not returned many days to his district before he received intelligence of the murder of the two British officers at Mooltan. The force at Jullundhur itself then consisted of one European and four native regiments, a battery of artillery, and some irregular horse. There were, besides, other native corps or detachments at various points of the province, but no more Europeans. There were also two local

\* The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee, *dated* May 11, 1848:—‘The reply of the Commander-in-Chief has just been received by us. His Excellency is strongly opposed to the movement of British troops at this season upon Mooltan; and intimates his opinion that, as a military operation, it is highly inexpedient, if not impracticable.’

corps of military police, the 1st and 4th Sikhs—one composed of pure Sikhs, the other of hill-Rajpoots. These last were the only troops under the control of the Commissioner. The others were under the sole orders of Brigadier H. M. Wheeler, an officer of the Company's army, highly considered for his energy and strength of will, and who in after years obtained a melancholy celebrity as the commander of the ill-fated garrison of Cawnpore at the time of the mutiny. But Mr. Lawrence had never been accustomed to trust implicitly to the number of the troops in his province, however capable their commander.

When the intelligence of the events at Mooltan reached him, and he noticed that those events were not followed up by prompt action—or indeed, except on the part of Lieutenant Edwardes, by any action at all—he felt convinced that work of the most serious character would be cut out for him. Jullundhur, though annexed for three years to the British territories, was still, in the blood and feeling of its population, a Sikh province. Although the great mass of the people had recognised the advantage of the reforms introduced by Mr. Lawrence, there were still in the villages many disbanded soldiers, who looked back regretfully to the times when they were virtually masters of the country, and could lord it over the people. The successful revolt of Moolraj could not long be without effect upon these mischief-making elements of Sikh society, especially if religious

fanaticism were to bring its strong influence to bear upon their minds, by urging them to strike a blow for that reformed faith, the adherence to which had made the Sikhs a nation. The crisis came fully as soon as Mr. Lawrence had anticipated. In the month of May, Bhaee Maharaj Singh, a gooroo or priest, a well-known man in the country, began to collect several hundred followers on the north of the Beas, close to the British frontier. Mr. Lawrence, in concert with the Brigadier, at once caused all the fords by which he could cross into Jullundhur to be carefully guarded. At the same time troops were sent after him from Lahore. The Bhaee, alarmed for his safety, retreated towards Jung; but before the Lahore troops could arrive, he was attacked and defeated by the Kardar of the place, Meah Sahib Dyal, a staunch supporter of the British, and totally defeated. His followers who escaped slaughter at once dispersed.

The abortive result of this premature movement enabled Mr. Lawrence to complete his measures for securing the province in the event of a further outbreak. The delay in the operations against Mooltan favoured the machinations of the conspirators and disaffected all over the country, and rendered the position of Mr. Lawrence one of peculiar difficulty. In the month of August, one Ram Singh, son of a Rajpoot chieftain named Vizier Shama, the hereditary Vizier of Noorpore, a small hill-state which Runjeet Singh had absorbed many years before, assembled a

body of men at a spot commanding the entrance into the Kangra hills, and attacked and killed several subordinates in the customs department at Hajeepore. On this outrage becoming known, Mr. C. H. Saunders, one of Mr. Lawrence's assistants, in pursuance of instructions previously given him by his chief, made a requisition on the military authorities for some troops, and went in pursuit of the insurgents. Major Fisher, who commanded these troops, took the strong fort of Shahpore, occupied by the enemy, and drove them out of the country. Reinforced, however, by some Pathan levies, they returned, and, taking up a position on a narrow hill about a mile and a half south of the town of Noorpore, began to collect supplies from the surrounding country. But by this time Mr. Lawrence had arrived at Noorpore. He at once urged Brigadier Wheeler to attack the enemy's position. 'It will be a great object,' he wrote, 'to attack the insurgents as soon as possible.' At the same time, to prevent their escape, he wrote to Major Fisher, recommending him to watch the outlets by which they could retire. Had the troops been entirely at his disposal, he would have acted according to the dictates of his own convictions, and have attacked the enemy on the moment. But he had with him only a few Sikhs of the local corps, and unfortunately the Brigadier had expressly forbidden the officer commanding at Noorpore to detach any troops from that place.

Six days elapsed before the regular troops could be

assembled at Noorpore. Meanwhile Mr. Lawrence, and the officers who gradually joined him, enjoyed many opportunities of reconnoitering the enemy's position, though at the risk, often encountered, of being fired upon. At last he could wait no longer. On the morning of the 19th the position was attacked by the Sikh local corps, which had come up from Hooshiarpore under Major Hodgson, four hundred Rajpoots sent to our aid by the Rajahs of Mundee and Chumba, and the troops of the regular army under Major Fisher. The result was never doubtful. Ram Singh and his followers were driven with some loss from the heights; much captured property was recovered; and some British subjects, whom he had held in confinement, were released. Some few of the insurgents, owing to the density of the jungle, effected their escape; and amongst these, unfortunately, was the rebel leader himself. Mr. Lawrence and his assistant, Mr. Barnes, were present at the attack with the Rajpoots referred to. Indeed the operations were carried out under the advice of the former.

But other parties from outside still continued to threaten the tranquillity of the country. The people of Jullundhur were quiet and loyal, content with the English rule. Some of the nobles of the province had, as we have seen, sent their retainers to assist us. But the defection of Shere Singh on September 13, followed as it was by the raising of the siege of Mooltan; the rebellion of Chutter Singh, his alliance



with the Amir of Cabul, and the generally believed idea of his alliance with the Maharajah of Cashmere; the pressing letters sent by these men and by Moolraj to the Sikh army and the Sikh population, urging them to rise and fight for their faith—all these circumstances created some excitement among the people generally, and gave to every discarded placeman, every discontented official, and every fanatic, an excuse for conspiring against the British. Notwithstanding the ill success of the attempts of Maharaj Singh and of Ram Singh, risings continued to take place in the Baree Doab, the tract of country between Jullundhur and Lahore. These were promptly put down by Brigadier Wheeler and the Jullundhur troops. But in the following month Mr. Lawrence received information that the fort of Pathankote, not far from Noorpore, in British territory, had been attacked by about a thousand insurgents, collected in the Baree Doab and in the territories of Maharajah Goolab Singh, and having with them six guns. Pathankote was garrisoned by but fifty Sikhs and a few police. Mr. Lawrence at once hastened, with all the men he could raise, by forced marches, in the direction of Noorpore. But he had only arrived at Mackerian, on his way thither, when he learned that the enemy, alarmed at demonstrations made against him, had retired from Pathankote and retreated to Deenanuggur, within the territories of the Sikh Durbar. But Mr. Lawrence was determined to make them repent their

audacity. Requesting Major Simpson with six companies of the regular army, and Major Ferris with the Kangra hill local corps, to take up such a position as would effectually cut off their retreat, he marched from Mackerian on the night of November 25 with 300 Sikhs,\* 100 horse, and two guns, the whole commanded by Major Waller. Marching all night, he crossed the Beas and entered the Punjaub territories, whither the insurgents had retired. He came upon them between six and seven o'clock in the morning, just one hour too late to find them all asleep; but, noticing the smallness of Mr. Lawrence's party, they turned out to fight. A few rounds of grape, however, dispersed them. Their escape would have been impossible had the Kangra hill-corps taken up the position that had been assigned it. This, however, it failed to do, and the bulk of the enemy escaped by the ford it should have guarded. The district was, nevertheless, cleared of them for the time.

Mr. Lawrence hoped that by staying for a few days at Deenanuggur he might at once arrest some of the leaders of the insurrection, and pacify the district. But his difficulties seemed to increase every day. By this time, in fact, several of the hill-chiefs, seduced from their allegiance, had thrown off the mask and

\* Mr. Lawrence, in his account of these events, thus reports:—'The Sikh corps, though knowing they were going against Sikhs, evinced the greatest spirit and alacrity.' These men were raised in the villages of the Jullundhur Doab, and expressed the sentiments of their fellow-villagers.

pronounced in favour of the rebellion; whilst from every village, from every corner of the Punjaub, Jullundhur alone excepted, the old soldiers of the Khalsa were flocking to the standard of Chutter Singh. Encouraged probably by the attempt made against Pathankote, and believing that their success would rouse the Sikhs of the Jullundhur Doab in their favour, the Rajah of Muhlmore, the representative of the Katoch Rajahs, and the Rajah of Jeswun, lower down in the hills, rose in revolt, raised levies, and seized some Indian officials in the British service. In this crisis the action of Mr. Lawrence was prompt and vigorous as usual. He at once despatched Mr. Barnes, with half the Kangra hill-corps, to attack the Rajah of Muhlmore, ordering the other half to follow the next day. Whilst Mr. Barnes should be thus employed, he proposed to march himself, with four horse-artillery guns, 500 men of a Sikh local corps, two companies of the 71st N.I., and 70 horse, by Hajeepore, on Umb. This he did: but on reaching Umb he heard that the insurrection was gathering head, that the Jeswun Rajah had been joined by the Bedee of Oonah, and that the roads leading through the passes beyond Umb had been entirely destroyed. Notwithstanding this disheartening intelligence, Mr. Lawrence never for a moment forgot that, in fighting against Asiatics, the one way to victory is to move forward. He pushed, therefore, all the more resolutely on. Well it was that he did so. On reaching Dungoh,

one march beyond Umb, he learned that the Rajah of Duttarpore, another hill-rajah, whom he had hitherto believed faithful, had also joined the revolt, and had driven our policemen from the fort of Dungoh. Instantly Mr. Lawrence moved against that fort. This boldness had the desired effect. The enemy evacuated the fort and fled. Pursued by our men, many were taken, amongst them the son of the Rajah of Duttarpore. Mr. Lawrence, always averse to harsh measures, and anxious only to stifle the rebellion in the bud, made use of the capture of the son to procure the surrender of the father. One of the heads of the rebellion was thus lopped off. It soon became clear to him, moreover, that the hill-people had taken no willing part in the insurrection. ‘The heads of the villages,’ he reported, ‘joined us on the line of march, the majority declaring that they had neither joined in the insurrection, nor allowed their people to do so; others saying that those who had joined had been forced into the act.’ This conviction of the friendly feeling of the people only strengthened him in his determination to attack the real rebel, the Rajah of Jeswun, on the morrow.

On December 2 the fight took place—our men, composed entirely of Punjaub soldiers, advancing in two lines, one against the fort of Khurote, the other against the main force of the enemy, who occupied a hill above Umb. Both attacks succeeded: the fort of Khurote surrendered without much resistance; whilst

the enemy on the hill, after a desperate resistance, gave way and fled. This defeat so intimidated the third head of the rebellion, the Bedee of Oonah, the Sikh high priest, that he fled, accompanied by only sixty followers. Mr. Lawrence was urgent to follow him, but could not overcome the caution of the military authorities. On the same day Oonah was occupied, and the Rajah of Jeswun surrendered himself a prisoner. Whilst Mr. Lawrence was thus successful in the lower part of the Kangra hills, his assistant, Mr. Barnes, had not been less so in the northern tracts. With a wing of the Sikh corps, commanded by Lieutenant Gordon, he had completely defeated the Rajah of Muhlmoré, and had occupied his palace the following day. On December 4 tranquillity reigned in every corner of the Kangra hills and in the Jullundur Doab.

It is never very difficult in India, with strong battalions at one's command, to put down a rebellion in a native province. But the question assumes an aspect altogether different when the chief civil authority in the province, with only a handful of native troops at his disposal, has to improvise all the measures necessary for meeting risings at distant and even opposite points; when, in addition to his civil duties, he is called upon to exercise also the functions of general, of organiser, of chief commissary; when, in addition to this, he has to soothe the population, to feel the pulses of the chieftains, to insure by his own confident bearing

the loyalty of all those of the subject race with whom he may be brought in contact; when, too, unable to act over the entire province with the handful of regulars at his disposal, he has to depend, to combat Sikhs, upon Sikhs raised in his own territory and under his own auspices. This is no easy task; this is a work that tests the stuff of which a man is made; that is a programme to which neither the mere bookworm nor the epauletted booby would ever be equal; it is a labour requiring not only nerve but brains, not only courage but prescience, not only confidence in one's self, but the ability to inspire confidence in all around one. It needs energy of mind, quickness and readiness of thought, activity of body, power to endure fatigue, capacity to grasp in a moment the main points of the matter in hand, to press on steadily to the end to be achieved without being led away by subordinate details, however urgent they may be deemed by others. It was a task requiring the exercise of all these qualities that devolved upon Mr. Lawrence in the second half of that month of November 1848. His position, then, was of the most critical importance. Mooltan was holding out against the British; the veterans of the Sikh army rallied to the standard of the two Rajahs, Chutter Singh and Shere Singh, had advanced to the banks of the Chenab, and were threatening Lahore; the Affghan cavalry, making common cause with the Sikhs, had occupied Peshawur, and was advancing upon Attock; nearly

every Sikh chieftain of note or ability in the service of the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh had given in his adhesion to the leader of the insurgents; from his eyrie in Jummoo, Maharajah Goolab Singh, the most astute amongst the followers of Govind, was eagerly watching the course of events, ready, there can be no doubt, to take part against us should fortune frown on our arms. This was the position of events. The scale was evenly balanced. All the troops we could bring into the field were fully occupied in other portions of the Punjaub. Even the bulk of the brigade intended to guard Jullundhur had been moved under its general from that province into the Baree Doab. What if, under such circumstances, Jullundhur itself had risen? It is not easy to calculate the consequences of a successful insurrection in that province. The necessity to reconquer it would have been the least of the evils to which such an event would have given birth. The rise of Jullundhur would have crippled the movements of the army operating against Chutter Singh, and, in all probability, would have decided Goolab Singh to take part with our enemies. Our communications with the cis-Sutlej territories would have been risked, our native allies in those parts would have been sorely tempted, Lahore itself would have been in danger. From such consequences the British Government was saved, not by its resources in men and material, not by the number of its troops, nor by the successful strategy of its commanders in the field, but by the energy, courage,

forethought, and activity of the Commissioner of the province, Mr. John Lawrence.

‘The Sikhs,’ wrote that gentleman, in his own simple and modest style, when reporting to the Resident the suppression of the revolt, ‘attacked Pathankote on the 19th. On the 24th the Jeswun Rajah and the Bedee rose in the lower range of the hills. About the same time the Muhlmorie Rajah, in the upper range, also rebelled. The General was absent from the territory, and I and my assistant were necessarily obliged to act on our own responsibility to a considerable extent. By the 3rd of the ensuing month, or within thirteen days, peace and order have been restored throughout the territory by the capture or dispersion of the insurgents. This result has been effected with little loss of life, and hardly any expense to Government. Had we not thus promptly acted, I am convinced that the rebellion would have assumed a formidable aspect, and have cost blood and treasure to suppress. Many who had every intention of joining against us were paralysed by our movements, and the good intentions of the well-disposed were confirmed.’

Yes, indeed! Had he not thus promptly acted, the history of the second Punjaub war might have told a different tale. Yet such is the peculiarity of our national temperament, so little do we regard an issue not recommended to our notice by blood-shedding and slaughter, that whilst the unskilful movements of one military commander in this war have been chronicled



with a minuteness that leaves nothing to desire, the skilful and successful campaign of Mr. Lawrence in Jullundhur, conceived and carried out in strict accordance with the truest military principles, because accomplished 'with little loss of life, and hardly any expense to Government,' has been scarcely noticed. Not the less remarkable, however, was the skill that caused the loss of life to be so small—not less worthy of being recorded the results of that exercise of splendid energy, aided by the soundest judgment!

Thenceforth, throughout the campaign, tranquillity reigned in the trans-Sutlej territories of the British. The presence of the one man who had struck down rebellion on its first appearance, sufficed to preserve order and loyalty in the most recent acquisition of the East India Company. Assured by this tranquillity on their flank, and by it of freedom from hostile intervention on the part of the Maharajah of Cashmere, our military leaders were enabled, after a desperate contest, to pursue their plans to a triumphant conclusion.

The Punjaub, placed by the victory of Goojrat at the feet of Lord Dalhousie, was by him annexed—rightly and wisely annexed. He had really no alternative. It was impossible to restore the country to the minor Maharajah. The plan of ruling through the Sirdars had resulted in a rebellion which tested all the resources of the Anglo-Indian Empire. It was clear that, so long as the shadow of power should be left to the Khalsa, its members would intrigue to

recover the substance. Upon us would have devolved the necessity of maintaining bloated armaments, more expensive than the military occupation of the country, far more likely to lead to bloodshed. On the other hand, there was the example of the Jullundhur Doab to show, that it was possible to reconcile the people to our sway, and that the possession of an administration founded upon the purest principles of justice, free from the tyranny of the sword, and the exactions of native middlemen, would come soon to be esteemed by the people as more than a compensation for the government of their feudal lords. Those lords had appealed to the arbitrament of the sword. It had condemned them; justice and humanity made it imperative that thenceforth the conquered country should be administered no longer in the interest of the few, but for the benefit of the great mass of the people.

The fiat then went forth, and with it the announcement of the system on which the new province should be governed. There was to be a Board of Administration, composed of three members.

A Board no doubt is, as a rule, a cumbrous and awkward machine. The unity and decisive action which emanates from the mind of a single individual of great ability will certainly produce greater results in an equal time. But the difficulty in Lord Dalhousie's mind was to find such a man, due regard being had also to the claims and interests of those who had hitherto borne the most prominent part in our relations

with the province. By administering the country by means of a Board, Lord Dalhousie conceived that he would unite the political and military ability of Sir Henry Lawrence with the administrative knowledge of detail and experience which two able civilians would supply. It was with this view he appointed Sir H. Lawrence president of the Board, and Mr. C. Mansel and Mr. J. Lawrence members. The President had special charge of the political duties, Mr. Mansel of the police and judicial, and Mr. John Lawrence of the revenue and finance. On all important matters, however, the President and members were wont to meet and consult—the majority, in the case of a difference of opinion, carrying the day. Mr. Lawrence had not asked for a seat at this Board—indeed he had expressed a desire to be allowed to retain his old post as Commissioner of the trans-Sutlej territory; but he was informed that his services were required for the Punjaub, and, with the devotion to duty that characterised him, he submitted.

The account of Mr. Lawrence's connection with the Board of Administration, and of his subsequent career as Chief Commissioner, to be at all satisfactory, would require an article to itself. We must content ourselves here, unwillingly, with touching only on the details of leading interest. As member of the Board constituted in 1849, he repeated on a larger scale the administrative reforms which he had previously accomplished in Jullundhur. Prior to the rebellion, the Council of

Regency, established after the first Sutlej campaign, had been content to patch up the system, never very good, and then greatly deteriorated from its original plan, of Runjeet Singh ; to effect improvements in the details of that system, without violently disturbing its general framework. But the oppressive system which had, perforce, been tolerated by Sir H. Lawrence, when he was no more than adviser to the old Council of Regency, however it might be patched and amended, could not possibly be adopted as their own by the British authorities, burdened with all the responsibility of a ruling power. The work of the Board, then, was to destroy at once all that was iniquitous in the old system, replacing it simultaneously by a scheme of legislation which our experience at Jullundhur had proved to be well adapted to the genius and the interests of the people.

The Board commenced their proceedings by dividing the newly acquired territories into circles, at first four in number, but afterwards increased to five, each under a commissioner and the usual staff of subordinate officers. They then set about the various measures demanding immediate attention. These were, the protection of eight hundred miles of frontier within a few miles of hardy and fanatical tribes, who, in one sense of the expression, ‘neither feared God nor regarded man,’ the maintenance of internal peace ; the reorganisation of the administrative system ; the reform of the system of taxation and of excise ; the raising of a police force ;

the establishment of civil discipline ; the repression of violent crime ; the freedom of commerce, the fostering of agriculture, the development of the national resources ; and last—but perhaps the most important of all, and entirely dependent on the nature of the new system, and the spirit in which it might be accepted by the people—the foundation of a national life, different to the life of the past, all over the country.

Such was the programme of the Board. Nobly and energetically did they carry it out. The details we have no space to describe ; but inasmuch as they interest alike the statesmen of Europe and the statesmen of India, we trust they may yet, before long, find their way into print. It must suffice here to state, that out of the Sikhs themselves a frontier force was formed, which is justly considered the *élite* of the native army of India ; which has distinguished itself in a hundred fights on the frontier ; which was faithful among the faithless, and the soldiers of which emulated their European comrades in the terrible days of 1857 ; which has borne the British flag triumphantly in China and in Abyssinia ; which, as an auxiliary force, it is impossible to surpass. Internal peace was maintained by enforcing a general disarmament, by raising an effective police from among the people themselves, but mainly by bringing justice to the doors of the people, by giving them, in exchange for their old feudal system, terribly oppressive to the poor, a system which made all men equal before the law. The incidence of

taxation was made lighter, whilst it was scarcely less productive. The lands of the various districts were surveyed, and assessed on an equitable system. Trade was made free, and the incidence of the excise greatly lessened. Jails were built. A simple code of justice was introduced. Roads were made, and great works begun upon canals. So great, so various, and so sensible to the people were the reforms effected, that when, on February 4, 1853, the Board was dissolved, its members made over to their successor a people, the great mass of whom had in very deed changed their 'swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks;' who, from having been the most martial, the most independent, and the most turbulent of all the nations south of the great ranges to the north, dictating the law even to their own sovereigns, had become the most peaceable, the most pliable, the most contented!

Why was the Board dissolved? Why, in the arrangements that followed, was Mr. Lawrence preferred to his brother? Both these questions have given rise to much misrepresentation. It has been asserted, that whilst Sir Henry wished to maintain the influence of the aristocracy, Mr. Lawrence laboured to raise the yeomen and peasantry at the expense of the nobles. But this by no means represents the exact state of the case. The great difference between the two brothers was caused by the opposite views held by each as to the mode of dealing with the great fief-holders, and

generally with the lands which paid no revenue to the State under the Sikh government. In his sketch of the career of Sir Henry Lawrence, Mr. Kaye has produced a letter, written by Sir Henry, in which he affirmed that there existed between himself and his brother a difference on the question of the annexation of the Punjaub, and on the mode of dealing with native princes. But whatever might have been his views, Mr. Lawrence was never consulted regarding that annexation by Lord Dalhousie, nor did he ever express an opinion regarding it, partly out of deference to his brother's views, partly because he really did doubt the justice of the act; but when questioned as to its feasibility, Mr. Lawrence said that with resolution and prompt action it was feasible—and on this Lord Dalhousie decided to annex.

But the main question between the two brothers was the other. Sir Henry regarded the balancing of the income and expenditure of the province as altogether a secondary consideration; the support of the great fief-holders, in their untaxed condition, and even the increase of their possessions by lands free from taxation, being the first—both being in accordance with the custom of Sikh rule. But Mr. Lawrence argued that the resources available from taxation would not allow us to maintain a native system of government, together with the expensive English system which we had introduced. Whilst Sir Henry Lawrence desired to maintain the chiefs and native

gentry to a much greater degree in the possession of all the fiefs and grants which they held for service of every kind—some of it real, some nominal, some religious, and some charitable—Mr. Lawrence argued that, as it had devolved upon us to reduce the land-revenue, to abolish transit, import, and export duties, as well as cesses and the like, we were forced, to meet the loss of revenue thus caused, to curtail the claims and privileges of the upper classes. The services upon which those claims and privileges were founded, and which, under the Sikh rule, the chiefs were bound to render, were, under the English administration, no longer required, and establishments for that purpose were no longer necessary. Those chiefs could afford, therefore, to pay their share of the revenue; or, should they object to that, to relinquish lands granted for service no longer necessary or called for. Under Runjeet Singh, as in most native States, he argued, grants of this nature were not hereditary, nor even held during life, but were subject to the sovereign's pleasure, and were constantly undergoing change. Many instances might be adduced in which grants were resumed by Runjeet Singh himself as suddenly as they had been bestowed. The practical difficulty of continuing them, subject to no taxation, decided the question in Mr. Lawrence's mind. How is it possible, he asked, for us to maintain the large staff of civil and military officers considered necessary for the service of the Punjaub, in addition to the charges on account of



public works, and to pay for them from the revenues of the province, if those best able to contribute their quota are exempted on sentimental grounds unknown to their native rulers ?

It was this difference of opinion which split up the Board of Administration. Disagreeing on a point so vital, it was impossible that the two brothers should continue, with advantage to the country, members of the same administration. The time, too, had arrived when, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the machinery of a Board should make way for the rule of a single mind. At this crisis both the brothers, feeling the incompatibility of their working together, almost simultaneously tendered their resignations.\*

Lord Dalhousie, whose sympathies in this conflict of opinion had always been with the younger brother, accepted the resignation of Sir Henry ; and in February, 1853, Mr. John Lawrence was gazetted Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub.

A writer, one of those earnest men who made their own way in India, and whose career since 1846 was

\* The actual facts detailed were as follows:—Sir Henry suggested to his brother that he should ask for the Residency of Hyderabad, then vacant, as their remaining together in the Board would be attended with unpleasantness to both. Mr. Lawrence expressed his willingness to go there if he were sent, and wrote in this sense to the private secretary of the Governor-General. Sir Henry wrote also to Lord Dalhousie, expressing his opinion that it would be for the interests of the State if the Board were dissolved, and a single Chief Commissioner appointed in its place. Lord Dalhousie accepted the principle by nominating Mr. Lawrence as Chief Commissioner. Sir Henry was appointed agent to the Governor-General in Rajpootana.

passed in the Punjaub, and who throughout was one of the most trusted officers of the two brothers—we allude to Sir Herbert Edwardes—has thus tersely and vividly described the results of the five years' tenure of the office of Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub by Mr. Lawrence:—

‘ This post of Chief Commissioner,’ he wrote, ‘ lasted more than five years. Four of them were spent in perfecting the organisation of the civil government, and in improving the military and political relations of the frontier. They were years of Herculean labour, not only to the Chief Commissioner, but to every man under him, high or low. Alone in responsibility, alone in power, John Lawrence bent the full force of his character and energies to the elaboration of a complete machine. Sure never coachman sat firmer on the box, or held reins tighter, drove straighter, or lashed his team more unflinchingly to speed, in this weary world of man-driving and evil roads ! Alas for the toil and the sweat ! Alas for the kicking, and jibbing, and panting, and mud-flying everywhere ! Alas for the ceaseless cracking of whips ! Alas for the friction of hearts ! But we need only pity the rulers—the whites. Well was it for “ the darkies ”—the people. We doubt if India has ever seen a province with a civil government so strong, so simple, so wise, so moderate, so pure, so good to live under, as that of the Punjaub. Honour, all honour to coachman John ; and honour, too, to the team who pulled the coach.’

What he did in those four first years may thus be briefly summarised. Having at his disposal the frontier force already alluded to, he succeeded, after many struggles on their part, in conciliating those frontier tribes who had always been regarded as untamed and untameable. Since the annexation of the Punjaub they had continued the raids which under the Sikh rule had been habitual to them. But they met with such a reception at the hands of the frontier force, that many of them renounced their vocation of plundering, and took to the cultivation of land. It was impossible to secure to those eight hundred miles of frontier perfect immunity from attack, nor did the conviction of our superiority dawn all at once upon races whose ancestors from time immemorial had lived by the plunder of the dwellers in the plains. But by degrees they became convinced. Some took to agriculture; others entered our military service, in which they showed themselves unsurpassed as soldiers; others again, entered into agreements with our political officers. The work took time; but even in 1857, when we were beset by troubles, we found those border-warriors a source of strength rather than of weakness; for from the fastnesses of their hills came many of those gallant soldiers by whose aid the sepoy rebellion was put down.

Nor was he less fortunate in his external policy. By the weight of his influence he prevented a fratricidal contest, just then about to break out, for the

government of Bahawulpore, a Mohammedan State bordering upon Mooltan, and situate between the Great Desert and the Indus. A disturbance in Cashmere, caused by an attack made by Goolab Singh upon his nephew, was not allowed to make itself felt beyond the territory governed by the former. His alliance as the representative of the British nation was solicited by envoys from more distant countries. In the autumn of 1854, an envoy from the Khan of Khokan arrived to beg his aid against the Russians, who had then lately occupied a tract of country on the river Jaxartes or Seer. Mr. Lawrence, whilst treating the envoy with great consideration, gave him, with the consent of Lord Dalhousie, an answer similar to that which, many years later, he gave, as Viceroy, to the envoy from Bokhara. This answer was to the effect that it was not the intention of the British Government to interfere actively in the affairs of other States. But he received a more important embassy from the great Amir of Cabul, Dost Mahomed. The rupture of relations between our Government and that potentate, which had been a natural result of the part taken by him against us in the second Sikh war, had been healed, mainly by the able measures taken to that end by Colonel Herbert Edwardes, then Commissioner of Peshawur. In consequence of this restoration of amicable intercourse, the favourite son and intended successor of the Amir, Sirdar Hyder Khan, came, in the beginning of 1855, to Peshawur, to meet the Chief

Commissioner. A treaty was the result of the interview that followed. Its actual contents were unimportant, inasmuch as they merely bound the contracting parties to respect one another's possessions, and not to interfere in them—the Amir also engaging to be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies. They assume, however, another character, if we regard them as expressing the one strong ineradicable determination of the Affghan mind to contract no engagement which might bring our troops, under any pretext, into their country. The Amir was ready enough to profess himself the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies, so long as we did not insist upon assuming a similar position with regard to himself—so long, in fact, as we did not insert any clause which might give us the shadow of a right to interfere in his country. Those who argue so flippantly in the present day as to the expediency of our sending officers to train the Affghan troops for their imaginary contest with Russia, would do well to recollect that the Affghans themselves would by no means consent to such a measure; that the very proposition would create suspicions so great as to throw them into the hands of the Russians; that the one condition of friendship and alliance with them is absolute abstention from all interference in their affairs. Of this Mr. Lawrence had afterwards the fullest proof in the beginning of 1857, when he met the Amir himself at Peshawur, and, under instructions from the Governor-General.

proposed to send a British officer to Cabul as resident. Dost Mahomed then informed the Chief Commissioner that he would never agree to such a proposal; that his consent to it would cost him the support of all his nobility, and very likely his position in Affghanistan!

By intrusting to the native officials in the interior of the districts a considerable extent of authority in police and judicial matters, by rendering generally justice as prompt and effective as was practicable, and by a vigorous and careful system of supervision, contentment and satisfaction with the administration of the country were created. The people flocked to the courts, and exhibited a deep respect for the officers who were placed over them. The decrease in heinous crime was very remarkable, and the country became generally peaceful and secure. In 1856 the foundations were laid of an educational system, which has since borne good fruit. The police, too, was placed on a more efficient footing. In the Public Works department, presided over, under the Chief Commissioner, by the illustrious Engineer whose triumphant expedition to Magdala has excited the admiration of Europe, the great lines of communication, commenced under the Board, were brought to completion; branch lines were likewise opened out in several directions. A railway scheme, connecting Lahore with Mooltan and Delhi, was devised, and has since been carried out. The new Baree Doab Canal was nearly completed, whilst others were improved, en-

larged, and regulated as a source of income. The electric telegraph was laid down over all the great lines of the country; rural posts, for the conveyance of letters, were everywhere established; hospitals and dispensaries were built, the conservancy and drainage of great towns undertaken, arrangements for forest conservancy entered into; all this in addition to the public buildings required for civil and military purposes. The public buildings alone did not come under the supervision of Mr. Lawrence. As regards all the others, though the plans may have been drawn up by subordinates, his was the deciding *fiat*—his the keen glance that scrutinised the bearings of every proposal—his the resolute will which, when a plan had once been decided upon, insisted on its being carried out promptly and efficiently, without deviation from the course laid down—his, above all, the inspiring presence, dreaded by those only who felt that time and opportunity had been neglected, and that the consequences of that neglect they would have to bear.

To the financial system, conducted, under Mr. Lawrence, first by Mr. Edmonstone, and afterwards by Mr. Macleod, it is necessary to devote a few words. Since the annexation, 234,000*l.* had been taken off direct taxation; custom duties, except those on certain drugs passing the Kangra frontier, had been entirely abolished; excise duties had been restricted to three articles—spirits, salt, and drugs; effective measures had been taken to restore the salt-revenue, fallen into the

hands of middlemen, whilst rendering its incidence on the people lighter and equable.\* The other sources of revenue were stamps, post-office, canal-water rent, tribute, and miscellaneous. In 1857 the revenue, the incidence of which on the people had been greatly lightened, had so increased in elasticity in consequence of the greater wealth and security of the population, that its returns were but little less than at the period of annexation; whilst, without counting the regular troops and the cost of military buildings, the surplus of income over expenditure was 37,974*l.*—a result the more satisfactory when it is recollected that, in the course of that year, 539,995*l.* were spent on military works, and in extraordinary expenditure.

With the notice of this satisfactory result we must conclude the account of the peaceful period of Mr. Lawrence's administration of the Punjaub; its success had been most marked. With the most difficult frontier in Asia to protect and manage, he had maintained peace, had suppressed every hostile movement of the border-tribes, and had gradually brought home to the minds of the wild marauders that their own interests required them to live at peace with the British. Within the borders tranquillity had been maintained to an extent before unknown. Mr. Lawrence had, at the same time, extirpated highway robbery, suppressed Thuggee, and rooted out infanticide; he had built jails, to reform as well as to punish; he had freed

\* The monthly cost to the poor man did not exceed three farthings.



trade, made roads, improved and dug out canals; he had brought justice to the door of the poor man, and happiness to his hearth; he had founded institutions, making free provision in case of sickness for all who required it. In a word, strong in his force of will, in his determination to succeed, he had thrown all his energies into his duty, inspired others by his example, and thus so governed the new province that, when the crisis did come, the latest opponents of our power proved the supports upon which we could most firmly lean for safety.

These great merits were not unrecognised at the time. In February 1856 the Governor-General under whom he had so long served bade a final farewell to India. Before his departure Lord Dalhousie had offered to ask for Mr. Lawrence either a baronetcy or a K.C.B.-ship. Mr. Lawrence, however, was not an ambitious man. His means were but moderate, and he had no desire to leave a barren title to his son. He therefore expressed his preference for a civil Knight-Companionship of the Bath. With this he was invested in the beginning of 1856.

Here we must for the moment leave him, to refer, at no distant period, to the causes of that great movement which, bursting suddenly upon India, submerged our northern provinces, that portion only excepted of which Sir John Lawrence was the ruler. Then, too, shall we set ourselves to demonstrate how it was that the Punjaub weathered the storm.

## PART II.

## THE TRIAL.

PROBABLY in no province or district in India was there a fairer promise of peace, improvement, and internal tranquillity than in the Punjaub at the beginning of 1857. Thanks to the energetic though strictly defensive policy of the able administrator in whose hands, since the beginning of 1853, the sole direction of affairs had been placed, untrammelled by councillors below, and unfettered by restrictions above him, the long line of frontier, regarded for so many years by the marauding tribes of the passes beyond it as a legitimate field for their predatory excursions, had been for the time entirely tranquillised. The year 1856 had, indeed, witnessed some very daring attempts on the part of these marauders to re-assert their ancient authority. The Muhsood Wuzeerees, in particular, had perpetrated an extraordinary number of raids; the tribes on the western border had given trouble; the Bozdars had been singularly active; yet the retribution exacted for the robberies perpetrated by these wild borderers had been so prompt and effectual—the

power of the British to punish, to an extent quite balancing the advantage gained by the wrong-doer, had been so strikingly evinced—that the tribes in general had entirely ceased from offending, and at the beginning of the new year the most exposed roads on the frontier were safely traversed by the peaceful trader.

Tranquillity within the province was even much more assured. Ever since the general disarming of the population in 1849–50, the members of the military class among the inhabitants had been gradually adapting themselves to agricultural life. The abolition of transit duties, and of all import and export taxes between the Punjaub and the other portions of British territories in Hindustan, the making of roads and the opening out of canals, had had the effect of greatly increasing the area of cultivated lands, and of affording to a far greater number than before the means of an honest and peaceable livelihood. The great majority of that class, by constant disuse of arms, had to a great degree ceased to be lovers of war. At the beginning of 1857 they had especial reason to be satisfied. The harvest had been abundant and the market had been good; prosperity was widely spread; the taxes were light; there were no grievances; no desire for change; the Government was tolerant and popular, and its chief had, by his sympathy with the people, no less than by his strong and decided character, impressed the minds of all with the belief that in him they had a ruler as

willing as he was able, and as able as he was willing, to protect and befriend them.

There were, at the same time, other causes which contributed to the fair promise of prosperous tranquillity held out by the Punjaub at the beginning of 1857. During the course of his long and unbroken connection with that province, Sir John Lawrence had enjoyed abundant opportunities of filling many of the posts under him with officers in whom he had confidence, and whom he had selected solely from his belief in their fitness. It is true that some of the most distinguished civil officers in the Punjaub had been brought into it by Sir Henry Lawrence, and constituted there the disciples of a school which acknowledged him as their leader. But the loyalty of these gentlemen to their departed friend and chief not only did not lessen, but in some instances strengthened, the fervour which they brought to the discharge of their duties under his brother. Many of them, indeed, felt a deep-rooted regard for the one, second only to the strong affection by which they were bound to the other; whilst all had been trained to look upon the rigid discharge of their duties to the State as a part of that great commandment which has authoritatively been declared to be the complement of the greatest of all.

The able men thus at the disposal of Sir John Lawrence had been severally posted by him to the localities in the performance of the duties of which each would find the best field for the exercise of his talents. Thus,

'whilst the Lahore division was under the firm and able direction of Mr. A. A. Roberts, there were also at that capital two gentlemen who had been long associated with the Chief Commissioner, and on whose abilities he had learned, though in a different manner with respect to each, to rest with a secure confidence. One of these, Mr. Robert Montgomery, formerly his colleague in the Board, filled at that time the post of Judicial Commissioner of the province, exercising in that capacity a control over the administration of justice throughout the country, and ever ready to bring the weight of his strong and decided counsels to bear upon the deliberations of his chief in all matters connected with administration. The other, Mr. Donald Macleod, the Commissioner of Finance, had been endowed in a peculiar degree with the power of influencing men's minds, without men perceiving that they were influenced. His was the mild and persuasive manner, his the unruffled temper, the imperturbable presence of mind, which, apparently yielding at the outset, almost always succeed in convincing an opponent; his the benevolent heart that sought to win over a negligent officer to the proper discharge of his duties rather than dismiss him from his post—that endeavoured to find excuses even for those that sinned the most. This large-hearted philanthropy was far, however, from acting as a hindrance to Mr. Macleod's usefulness as a public officer; on the contrary, his influence was the greater for it, especially among the

natives; and Sir John Lawrence, who was well aware of this, felt in how great a degree the presence of Mr. Macleod at Lahore constituted a tower of strength to his administration.

It would be impossible to leave Lahore without alluding to the two other officers who occupied at this time the most confidential positions about the person of the Chief Commissioner—his civil and military secretaries. The first of these, Mr. (now Sir Richard) Temple, was not indeed in the Punjaub at the beginning of 1857. Having held for three years the office of Civil Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Temple had taken advantage of the bright promise of tranquillity prevailing throughout the country to make a brief visit of six months' duration to his native land. His departure would always have been a subject of regret, for Mr. Temple was not only master of a style remarkable for its vigour and lucidity of arrangement, but he had gained the reputation, which his subsequent career has shown to have been fully justified, of possessing great energy, untiring industry, and administrative qualities of a very high order. He was devoted to his chief, and was honoured in return by that chief's entire confidence. His absence from the scene of his labours, though, as we have said, always a subject of regret, seemed likely to be less felt in the quiescent attitude by which the dawning of the year 1857 was characterised. His temporary successor, Captain James, was one of the most rising of the civil officers

of the province, and in him Sir John Lawrence possessed a secretary worthy of his entire confidence. The military secretary of the Chief Commissioner, Major (now Major-General) J. D. Macpherson, had, at the time of which we are writing, filled that position for about five years. He, too, was a man of great energy and quick decision. He possessed, in addition, a simple directness of manner, sound views regarding military arrangements, and the power of impressing those views upon others. Above all, he was an honest man. Whatever might have been the opinions of his chief, not for worlds would he have altered or concealed his own, had he thought it for the public interests that they should be made known.

Of all the divisions of the province, the most important was that administered from Peshawur. The charge of this division had been assigned, therefore, to Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Edwardes, C.B. Long previous to 1857, this officer had gained a reputation which had made his name a household word in India. Rising originally by the exercise of literary abilities, he had shown, when the opportunity came, that those abilities were accompanied by great practical power. His marvellous achievements in 1848—when at the head of a rabble whom he had disciplined, and whom he had so attached to his person that they were ready to follow him to the world's end, even to fight against their own countrymen—excited in the highest places in India an admiration which found an echo all over

Europe, and especially in France. It is not too much to say that the daring of Lieutenant Edwardes helped to save the empire in 1848. By shutting up Moolraj in his fort, he delayed the outbreak of the Sikh nation till the cold weather, when we were better prepared to meet it. But for that action on his part, the leaders of the Sikh revolt would have repossessed themselves of a great part of the country, and would have enjoyed the opportunity of cutting up our troops in detail before an army could have been assembled to oppose them. It is hard to imagine where, under such circumstances, the battle for empire would have been fought, but most certainly it would not have taken place in the Punjaub.

A worthy companion of Edwardes, in some respects even a more remarkable man, was the Deputy-Commissioner of the Peshawur division, Lieutenant-Colonel John Nicholson. Tall in person, strong in body, possessing a piercing glance, and endowed with a manner which, whilst it commanded obedience, did not repel affection, Nicholson was born to be a leader of men. He had served in the Affghanistan war, and had been taken prisoner at Ghuzni. Many stories, not yet given to the world in print, are told by those who knew him well, of the dauntless energy and unyielding resolution which, even in those early days, characterised the young officer. Subsequently to the first Sikh war, in which he was engaged with his regiment, he was appointed, in conjunction with Captain Arthur



Broome, to discipline in the English fashion the levies of the Maharajah Goolab Singh of Cashmere. Shortly afterwards he entered the political service, gained the repeated thanks of the Punjaub Government for the energy and activity he displayed in 1846-7, and in the troublous times of 1848. At the close of that year, and in 1849, he served as political officer to the army of the Punjaub, taking part in all the actions which ensued. After the annexation he was placed in charge of the wild tribes on the western frontier of the Punjaub, and there his talents found full opportunity for their display. Those rude borderers, who had refused till then bodily obedience to any mortal man, gave in to John Nicholson. So completely did he combine power of will with those peculiar qualities, so rarely possessed, which steal the understandings as well as the hearts of men, that orders, which, had they been issued before his time, would have been disobeyed or evaded, were regarded by the uncivilised races under his rule as the inspired utterances of a superior being, and were carried out unhesitatingly. Such a man on the frontier was worth an army of ten thousand men. Sir John Lawrence well knew his value. He has often been heard to say, that of all the men with whom he has come in contact in the course of his career, there was not one who, in lofty conceptions, in firmness of will, in power of impressing others, in quick decision, and in all those manly qualities which contribute to form that rare combination, a man of

genius and a man of action, ever approached John Nicholson.

It is not necessary that we should enter at length into a description of the other officers who filled, at the beginning of 1857, principal positions in the Punjaub. In the course of our narrative we shall have more than one occasion to allude to the good services rendered by many. Some account, however, of those officers whose services were most prominent—and to whom, in connection with the action of the Chief Commissioner, we shall have most frequently to refer—seems desirable at the outset, if only that we may present to our readers, before the rise of the curtain, those to whom the chief parts in the drama about to be acted were allotted. To complete the clearing of the ground necessary to an unbroken narrative of events as they followed, we propose now to devote a few paragraphs to the elucidation of the position and numbers of the troops occupying the province at the time of which we are writing.

In the beginning of 1857 there were in the Punjaub, between Kurnaul and Peshawur, nearly 36,000 native troops of the regular army, of all arms, including artillery, cavalry, and infantry. With the exception of a few Punjaubees, about 2,000 in number, these were all men from Oudh, Bahar, and other parts of Hindustan. Besides these, guarding the frontier, were 13,430 irregular troops, cavalry and infantry, supported by 9,000 police levies. Of the entire

number of these two divisions less than one-fourth were Hindustanis, the remainder Punjaubees of the best description. Of the total native force in the Punjaub, amounting to 59,656 men, perhaps 20,000 were natives of that country, whilst nearly 40,000 came from Hindustan.

The European force consisted of eleven regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and about 2,000 artillery, constituting a total number of nearly 10,500 men. Of this force, however, more than one-half was massed at the extremities of the province, there being three regiments of infantry in the Himalayas, and three, with some artillery, at Peshawur. Of the seven principal fortresses, three—viz. Lahore, Govindgurh, and Mooltan—were held by Europeans; four, Phillore, Attock, Kangra, and Noorpore, by natives. The chief arsenal, that of Ferozepore, was at a station held by European infantry; the second was at Phillore, guarded by native infantry. The European troops were thus distributed: at Peshawur, two regiments of infantry, the 70th and 87th, two troops of horse-artillery, five companies of foot-artillery, and two light field batteries; at Nowshera, one regiment of infantry, the 27th Foot; at Lahore, one regiment of infantry, the 81st, two troops of horse-artillery, and four companies of foot-artillery; at Govindgurh, a company of foot-artillery; at Ferozepore, one regiment of infantry, the 61st, two companies of foot-artillery, and one light field-battery; at Mooltan, a company of foot-

artillery ; at Sealkote, one regiment of infantry, the 52nd, one company of foot-artillery, and a horse light field-battery ; at Rawul Pindee, one regiment of infantry, the 24th Foot ; at Umballa, one regiment of cavalry, the 9th Lancers, and two troops of horse-artillery ; at Dugshaie, one regiment of infantry, the 1st Fusiliers ; at Kussowlie, the 75th Foot ; at Sabathoo, the 2nd Fusiliers ; at Jullundhur, the 8th Foot, and a troop of horse-artillery. In addition to this, one regiment, the Bombay Fusiliers, came into the Punjaub from Sinde, in detachments, at different periods between the 17th June and the end of July. We should do but scant justice to this part of our subject were we to omit to state that the brigade at Peshawur was under the orders of Brigadier Sidney Cotton, a gallant, high-spirited soldier, a great favourite with the troops, and ever ready to sacrifice to the public good his own pretensions to command in the field. Brigadier Stuart Corbett, a plain, straightforward soldier, commanded the brigade at Lahore. The senior officer in the Punjaub, Major-General Reed, C. B., commanded the Peshawur division. Next in authority to him was Major-General Gowan, who filled a similar office at Lahore.

Thus, at peace without, and tranquil within—occupied by about 60,000 troops of all arms, and 9000 military police—its civil districts presided over by some of the ablest men in the country, and its military divisions commanded by selected officers—the whole

watched by the keen glance of the illustrious civilian who had so entirely identified himself with the province—whence was danger to come to the Punjaub? Nothing in the shape of such danger could be foreseen in 1856, for it did not then exist in any composite form. The surface was quiet all over India. The annexation of Oudh had been accomplished without provoking an audible murmur from the people, and without convincing the Home authorities, notwithstanding the strongly-expressed opposite opinion of Lord Dalhousie, of the necessity of adding one English soldier to the army. The Persian war, undertaken at a distance from the shores of Hindustan, was drawing to a close, its operations having been marked by events creditable to the soldiers alike of India and of England. No sign foreboding disaster was visible. Every quarter presented the appearance of a permanent and enduring prosperity.

And yet beneath the horizon of this glittering brightness there lay a dark cloud, growing ever blacker and blacker, daily becoming more and more charged with the noxious vapour, the emission of which was to signalise 1857. The native soldiery, always proud of their position and of their numbers, had not witnessed without emotion of a peculiar character the various changes which had occurred during the twenty years preceding that date. By their prowess, as they thought, England had been delivered from Affghanistan by their daring, three great provinces, one

of them the germ of an empire—Sinde, the Punjaub, and British Burma—had been added to our dominions. They believed these things; they had been taught to believe them by their officers and the Government. But simultaneously with the gradual adoption of this belief they witnessed likewise the power which for a century had been exercised by their officers, gradually transferred to the central bureau of the Commander-in-chief. By degrees, in fact, they began to see that a petition sent direct to head-quarters was able to prevail against and to overturn the discipline exercised by their own officers.

With the pride engendered by these gradual revelations there was mingled a suspicious dread of the science which Western enterprise had just introduced into their land. Steamers, railways, telegraphs, whilst astonishing them as to the means—which they, ignorant, were unable to comprehend—of their progression, had given birth in their minds to an undefined dread as to the effect which these changes, so marvellous, so rapid, to them so difficult to explain, might work upon themselves.

Whilst their minds were yet thus under the predominating influences of a pride unduly exalted and a suspicion vaguely excited, the whisper spread through their ranks that it was intened to attack their religion; that, to effect this purpose, recourse would be had, not to any overt process, but to that underhand and mysterious agency which, by an art seemingly magical,

had already roused their dread to the full as much as it had excited their surprise. The greatest care, it was murmured amongst them, had been taken to convert them in spite of themselves; to force them, by depriving them of their Hinduism, to become suddenly Christian; and this not by missionary enterprise or any outward display of force, but in the ordinary performance of their ordinary duty. The instrument selected to carry out this conversion was a new cartridge, said to be greased with cow's fat and hog's lard, the act of biting which would entail the loss of their caste, and, with it, the dethronement of their religion.

This idea, which, so far as it related to the actual manufacture of greased cartridges, was founded on truth, acted as a lighted match applied to a powder magazine. Instantly there was a blaze. Combinations not to use the new cartridge were formed in every regiment. Each day's post carried letters from the sepoys of one regiment to their brethren in another, full of details as to the new weapon intended for the destruction of their souls. Suspicion, aroused by the discovery, became more and more alive to the smallest acts on the part of the authorities, themselves still ignorant of the impending danger. To the sepoys, the suspense which followed their first discovery, and the issue to them, not indeed of greased cartridges, but of others of the familiar pattern—though wrapped, unfortunately, in paper of a different colour—must have seemed almost insupportable. It gave them time, however, to organise

—to come to a general conclusion on no account to use any cartridges that might be issued to them.

Such being the resolution at which they had arrived, no long period, in the ordinary course of events, could elapse before they came into contact with their superiors. The crisis was not delayed. Commencing in February by an outbreak at Berhampore, in Bengal proper, it was followed by an explosion at Barrackpore, and finally culminated, on May 10, in the insurrection of Meerut and the capture of Delhi.

With the exception of Umballa, at which station a disinclination to use the new cartridges had been shown during the month of April, the native troops stationed in the Punjaub had not evinced, up to this period, by any outward sign, the smallest inclination to make common cause with their countrymen to the eastward. Sir John Lawrence, however, had been no inattentive observer of the events that had occurred during the earlier months of the year. Not indeed that he, more than any one else, divined the extent to which the disaffection would eventually spread. He had a right to suppose that the Government of India, so soon as it had traced the disaffection in question up to a certain cause, would endeavour by all the means at their command to remove the ill feeling. And when they, not however till the middle of February, telegraphed instructions to the musketry schools at Umballa and Sealkote to prohibit the use by the sepoys of the obnoxious cartridges, and subsequently



declared their belief that further danger had been removed by the disbanding of the 19th N.I., and by the punishment meted out to Mungul Pandey—he, distant from the spot, concerned in the laborious exercise of the administration of his own province, might be excused for believing that the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief of the day had reasons for their confidence sufficient to override the vague fears which still continued, notwithstanding, to agitate his mind. Sir John Lawrence believed in his heart that the Hindustani sepoys were somewhat disaffected; but he was not the less aware that the national disposition was, although uncertain, in the main easy and pliable; and that, whilst it was always possible that the sepoys might show their discontent by some overt act, they were yet specially amenable to the influence of tact and delicate handling. From the scene of the first outbreak in Bengal he was too distant to judge, from the demeanour of the sepoys, how far the means adopted had attained the required end. Nothing was to be inferred from the behaviour, in no respect differing from ordinary custom, of the Hindustanis in his own province. On his own Punjaubees he could place, he knew well, the fullest reliance.

The incessant labour of mind and body which had devolved upon Sir John Lawrence during his eleven years' continuous service in the Punjaub had not been without effect upon his constitution, and he had been compelled, since his appointment as Chief Commis-

sioner, to spend a portion of each hot season in the hills of Murree. He had adopted this course with the less hesitation, because that station is but forty miles from Rawul Pindee, itself one of the most central positions in the Punjaub, whence he was able to exercise a more immediate control over the several divisions of the province than was possible even from Lahore. In the early part of 1857 he had, however, contemplated taking a run into Cashmere, which he had never seen; and it was in the hope that events might so calm down as to permit him to take this relaxation that he left Lahore for Rawul Pindee in the month of April.

On his way to Rawul Pindee, Sir John Lawrence stopped for a few days at the military station of Sealkote. An incident of his visit there, which has given rise to extraordinary misstatements and to the most delusive conclusions, may here be mentioned. One of the Chief Commissioner's objects in remaining at all at Sealkote was to ascertain, so far as was possible, the feelings of the native troops on duty at that station—it being the headquarters of a school of musketry. Attending this school were detachments of different Hindustani regiments, and one detachment from a Punjaub corps belonging to the frontier force. Sir John took an early opportunity of being present at the practice of these detachments with the new musket (the Enfield), and, as far as concerned the Hindustani troops, he could not discover from their manner or

demeanour that anything was wrong. Private inquiry led to the same result. But from the men of the Punjaub corps with whom he personally conversed, he heard a strong expression in favour of the new musket, and no objection to the cartridge, though he particularly alluded to it. Their favourable expression was based upon the superiority of the new musket for mountain warfare. Sir John wrote accordingly detailing the conclusion formed from his inspections, to the Governor-General, Lord Canning. He could scarcely have imagined at the time that this expression of an opinion regarding the soldiers of the force under his own orders—an expression fully justified by the result—would be converted by party malevolence into an approval of the issue, to the disaffected regiments of the line, of the fatal greased cartridges.

From Sealkote the Chief Commissioner proceeded to Rawul Pindee. He had scarcely arrived there, however, when the account of the mutiny at Meerut and the seizure of Delhi was flashed to him by the telegraph. It took him by surprise, indeed, but it was a surprise which nerved him to immediate action. His first care was to telegraph his advice—advice repeated in his letters—to the Commander-in-chief to march at once, with all the troops at his disposal, upon Delhi. The military advisers of General Anson did not concur in this respect with the Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub. They brought numberless professional reasons, each of them doubtless based upon some excellent

military principle, to prove that it would be madness to march in the direction of Delhi. Fortunately, however, for India, the instinct of Mr. Lawrence found a readier echo in the mind of the Commander-in-chief than did the counsels of his advisers. Summoning from the hills all the European troops whom he could collect, he marched at once towards Delhi; and though he died on the way, his successor was able to reap the fruits of his decision, and, by the victory of Budlee-ka-Serai, impart to the wavering levies of our allies fuller confidence.

To Lord Canning himself, Sir J. Lawrence telegraphed advice of the energetic character suited to the emergency. At the distance from Calcutta at which he was, it was impossible that he could do more; and the advice itself was not less valuable, and not less intrinsically sound, because the same ideas had presented themselves to others besides himself. It is less to his advice, however, than to his action, that we would desire to refer. There he was, forty miles from the Murree hills, in an excellent position doubtless whence to regulate all the movements in the Punjaub, and especially on the frontier, but at a distance from the great scene of contest in Hindustan. The news of the insurrection had come upon him with all the surprise and suddenness of an earthquake. What, then, was his first action?

On the eastern bank of the river Sutlej, their territories contiguous to those of the British, and in

one direction approaching a limit not very distant from Delhi itself, ruled the two Sikh chieftains of Puttialla and Jheend. The former was the greatest in wealth and authority among the Sikhs, and the latter came second only to him in position and power. Seeing at a glance the influence which these chieftains would be able to exercise on the progress of events, Sir John Lawrence lost not a day in calling upon them, and upon others of smaller note, as feudatories of the British, to arm their contingents, and to employ them to support British authority. ‘Never,’ we quote from the Punjaub Administration Report for 1856–58—‘never was an appeal more nobly responded to. The Rajah of Jheend was actually the first man, European or native, who took the field against the mutineers. He openly declared at once that he should decide with the British, under whom he had lived happily for fifty years.’ The Maharajah of Puttialla, the Rajahs of Nubha, of Khylore, and of Kupportullah, and, indeed, with two exceptions—the Rajah of Busahie and the Nawab of Bahawulpore—all the tributary chieftains in the Jullundhur Doab and the cis-Sutlej states, followed his example, and in a very brief time the country between Delhi and the Sutlej was effectively held by the contingents of these native princes for the English. The victory of Budlee-ka-Serai—a consequence, as we have seen, of Sir John Lawrence’s advice to General Anson—came just at the right time to confirm the loyal feeling of the chiefs, and to give

to their retainers confidence as to the result of the campaign.

Having thus promptly and successfully made every possible arrangement for the preservation of English interests in the vicinity of the scene of action, Sir J. Lawrence turned his thoughts to the not less pressing necessity comprehended, in the first instance, in the securing of the Punjaub itself from the action of the mutinous troops; in the second, in making fast the doors of our frontier against the wild border tribes and the one powerful nation immediately beyond it.

On leaving Lahore *en route* to Rawul Pindee, Sir John had left behind him the two principal Commissioners, Messrs. Montgomery and Macleod, and his military secretary, Lieut.-Col. Macpherson. The news of the Meerut outbreak, and its first results at Delhi, reached Lahore on May 12. Almost simultaneously with its arrival, Captain Richard Lawrence, a brother of the Chief Commissioner, and who commanded two police battalions and some police cavalry at that station, received a hint from a moonshee (native clerk) of the Thuggee department, serving under his orders, that the sepoys of the garrison were infected with a mutinous spirit. Captain Lawrence immediately imparted this intelligence to Colonel Macpherson, who, impressed with its importance, at once waited upon Mr. Montgomery, and suggested to him that the native troops should be forthwith rendered powerless for mischief by being deprived of their percussion-caps. The news of

the Meerut outbreak and its consequences would certainly, he argued, reach the native lines within the next thirty hours; the importance of being beforehand with the sepoys was therefore self-evident. Mr. Montgomery felt the full force of Colonel Macpherson's argument. At a consultation which took place immediately after this interview, Captain Richard Lawrence suggested the stronger measure of the immediate disarming of the troops. It was imagined, however, that a proposal so decided and so sweeping would not meet the concurrence of the Brigadier; and it was finally resolved that Mr. Montgomery and Colonel Macpherson should proceed to that officer's quarters to propose to him simply that the sepoys should be deprived of their percussion-caps. This course was followed.

Brigadier Corbett was a plain, straightforward, downright soldier. The proposition made by Mr. Montgomery found in him therefore a willing listener. He only doubted whether it might not be advisable to take a more decided course. He determined however, in the first instance, to think well over it. A few hours later he came to the conclusion at which Captain Richard Lawrence had arrived before him, and wrote to Colonel Macpherson that he was determined to act thoroughly and disarm the sepoys. This determination was undoubtedly quickened by the information imparted to Captain Lawrence, that the sepoys of the garrison were of one mind with their Meerut brethren.\*

\* This account is based upon the official reports printed in the Blue-books.

A prompt opportunity fortunately presented itself. A parade of the whole brigade had been ordered for the following morning for the purpose of hearing read out to it the Governor-General's proclamation regarding the outbreak at Barrackpore. No change was made in any of the arrangements made for this purpose; but no sooner had the reading of the order ceased, than, by a simple manœuvre, the native troops were brought face to face with the guns—European infantry on either flank. The order to pile arms was then given and obeyed. Thus, by a simple movement involving no bloodshedding, the capital, with its vast stores, its treasure, its fort, its commanding position, and the immense prestige attaching to its peaceful retention, was rendered secure. Three thousand native troops known to sympathise with the mutineers, and to be prepared to cast in their lot with them, had laid down their arms before 500 men and twelve guns. Not only had Lahore been saved, but the danger resulting from their presence in the province had been lessened by four-fifths. To complete his work, and to render the fort of Govindgurh secure against attack, Mr. Montgomery despatched thither the same evening a company of the 81st Foot in native pony-carts. They reached it in time to make the fort secure against any possible attempt of the mutineers.

The measures adopted at Ferozepore, a station but fifty-four miles from Lahore, and noteworthy as being the seat of the principal arsenal in the Punjaub, were



neither so prompt, so well-considered, nor so successful. The news of the events at Delhi reached that place also on the twelfth, and a general parade of the troops followed equally on the morning of the 13th. But there ended the consonance with the course followed at Lahore. Instead of resolving to disarm the native troops, it was determined only to march them out of the station. The consequences were bloodshed and disorder, the firing of chapels, mess-houses, and bungalows, and an attempt on the magazine. Nevertheless order was at length restored, one native regiment was disarmed, and though the other succeeded in escaping, it lost several of its men in its flight, whilst others threw away their arms to escape the more readily. 'Unfortunately,' adds the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, in his report, 'errors did not end here; for when at a date subsequent to the above occurrences' (those just recorded), 'the tenth Light Cavalry were disarmed, their horses were not taken away. When, however, the taking of the horses was insisted on at last, the troopers had a full opportunity of concocting their plans for an outbreak; for the order about the horses, instead of being kept secret, was formally copied, and circulated in the regimental order-book.'

The magazine and arsenal of Ferozepore were, however, secured. Nor were the British less fortunate in being able to obtain possession of the Phillore magazine. General Barnard, who commanded the division

of which Phillore formed one of the military posts, on hearing of the occurrences at Delhi, had at once telegraphed to the authorities at Jullundhur to arrange for the safety of the arsenal. Brigadier Hartly, who commanded there, at once despatched a company of the 8th Foot and some artillery to take possession of it. This they successfully accomplished, and thus happily were secured to the English the two places whence they were enabled to draw the materials wherewith to take Delhi.\*

Whilst thus, by the energy of some of his lieutenants, and despite the mismanagement of others, Lahore itself, Govindgurh, the strongest place in the Punjaub, the two great arsenals, and the country lying between the Sutlej and the revolted city, had been secured, Sir John Lawrence himself, still at Rawul Pindee, was anxiously engaged in communication with his frontier officers, first, for the safety of the province on that side; afterwards, for the concentration of our European force in such a manner that, after having rendered revolt within the frontier next to impossible, it might add its weight to that of the handful of men then about to besiege more than double their own number in the city of the Mogul. For a right understanding of the exact progress of the Chief Commissioner's efforts in this direction, and their results, we must transport ourselves to Peshawur.

\* 'To show the immense importance of this arsenal, together with that of Ferozepore, it is sufficient to observe that from them were derived the means of taking Delhi.'—Mr. Temple's Report, May 25, 1858.

We have already stated, that in the beginning of the year 1857 perfect peace reigned in the Peshawur valley. Not only were the border-tribes quiescent, but so good an understanding prevailed between our Government and the great Amir of Cabul, that, under instructions from the late Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, an embassy, composed of Major and Lieutenant Lumsden and Dr. Bellew, had been permitted by him to proceed to Candahar. Independently of the troops belonging to the Punjaub Field Force proper, there were then at Peshawur and its vicinity about 2,800 European troops, eighteen guns, and a mountain-battery. The Hindustani troops numbered about 8,000. The Peshawur brigade was, as we have stated, under the immediate command of Brigadier Sidney Cotton; but the divisional commander, General Reed, had likewise his headquarters at that station. In civil charge of the frontier was Lieut.-Col. Herbert Edwardes. Closely associated with him, in public life as in private friendship, was the Deputy-Commissioner, Lieut.-Col. John Nicholson, who had just then been transferred from Bunnoo.

On the night of May 11, a message, addressed to no one in particular—flashed off probably after the mutineers had mastered the city—announced to the authorities at Peshawur that ‘sepoys from Meerut had arrived at Delhi that morning, and were burning the houses and killing the Europeans.’ The next morning, a more authenticated telegram from the Brigade-

Major at Meerut informed them that the native troops were in open mutiny, whilst the Europeans were under arms defending the barracks. On the receipt of this last intelligence, Nicholson at once proposed to his chief the formation of a movable column of picked troops to put down mutiny in the Punjaub. Edwardes agreed, and the two civil officers at once made their way to the Brigadier, and laid their proposition before him. To it Brigadier Cotton gave his cordial assent, and procured that of the Major-General. It was then arranged that, in anticipation of the approval of the Chief Commissioner, the Guide Corps should be moved from Murdan to Nowshera, there to join the 27th Foot. At the same time the 55th N. I. was to be marched to solitude at Murdan; whilst the 64th N. I., notorious for many years for its mutinous tendencies, was to be broken up into three detachments, and sent to the frontier outposts.

Amongst the officers on the frontier who constituted the strong supports of the Chief Commissioner, and who shared all his confidence, we have hitherto forbore to mention one who, whether we regard his daring courage, the confidence with which he inspired his troops, his soldierly abilities, or his unselfish and retiring nature, possessed all the qualifications of a hero. If there was one point in the character of Brigadier Neville Chamberlain which excited his friends to anger, it was that he took no thought of his reputation. However brilliant were his achievements,

he would tell in his despatches the most unvarnished tale, and, so far as he could help it, would let the world hear no more. He cared as little in fact for the reputation which is based upon newspaper articles as for an honour not spontaneously bestowed. He would as soon have laid himself out for the one as have toiled for the other. His code, indeed, was one of the simplest. He brought his best abilities to the performance of his duties, and never looked that a service should be rewarded, which he considered the nation had a right to claim at his hands.

Neville Chamberlain commanded the Punjaub Irregular Force, consisting of three light field-batteries, one garrison company of artillery, five regiments of cavalry, six of infantry, and the Guide Corps, which combined both. When the telegram from Meerut reached Peshawur, he happened to be at Kohât, thirty-one miles distant. The Peshawur authorities proposed at once to invite him to a council of war, to deliberate on the line to be adopted. This was accordingly done, and, on May 13, Chamberlain arrived at Peshawur.

Meanwhile the Chief Commissioner had received at Rawul Pindee, by telegraph, an account of the conclusion at which the three officers had arrived at their first meeting. He instantly replied by expressing his full approval of their proceedings. As, however, it was believed at that time, not by him alone, but by every man of note in the country, that the recapture of Delhi would be an affair of but little difficulty, if

the siege were vigorously pushed at the outset, he forwarded to the Commander-in-chief a copy of the resolutions at which the three officers had arrived, with a request that he would confirm them. This was necessary, as the Chief Commissioner did not possess the power to order any movement of the European garrisons of the Punjaub on his own authority. So long as the Commander-in-chief should be within reach of communication, it was clear that all references must be made to him. Whilst, therefore, on this occasion, he expressed by telegram his warm approval of the formation of such a column as that proposed, he informed Colonel Edwardes that the scheme had been sent to the Commander-in-chief with the view to obtain his sanction thereto. He apprised him at the same time of the successful disarming of the troops at Lahore.

This reply of the Chief Commissioner reached Peshawur the very morning that Neville Chamberlain arrived at that place from Kohât. It at least assured the members of the council of war about to assemble of the thorough appreciation of their chief, with reference alike to the character of the revolt and to the means by which it was to be encountered and suppressed. At 11 o'clock they met, and, after a short discussion, came to the following conclusions: 1st, That the command of the entire force in the Punjaub should be assumed by General Reed, in close communication with the Chief Commissioner, whose headquarters he should join; 2nd, that a movable column

of thoroughly reliable troops should be formed at once at Jhelum; 3rd, That the fort of Attock should be secured; 4th, That a levy should be made of one hundred Pathâns, under Futteh Khan, a tried soldier, to hold the Attock ferry; 5th, That Brigadier Chamberlain should be sent to confer further with the Chief Commissioner; 6th, That Lieut.-Colonel Nicholson should be deputed as political officer with the movable column. These proceedings were at once reported by telegram to the Chief Commissioner; and, in writing more full details, Colonel Edwardes suggested the speedy enlistment of troops from among the frontier tribes, to fill the gaps likely to be created by the defection of the Hindustani troops, infantry as well as cavalry.

Never has it fallen to the lot of any public man to hold a position requiring more delicate handling and more quick decision than that occupied at this moment by Sir John Lawrence. Once assured that our troops were on the road to Delhi, that the rulers of Jheend and Puttialla had taken up arms on our behalf, his greatest danger lay at Peshawur. Fortunate was it for the empire that he had gone to Rawul Pindee, within easy distance of the post of danger and difficulty, and whence he could learn daily the events which had occurred but a few hours before. Able as were his lieutenants, he had taken a wider view than any one of them. He had arrived, within a few hours of the receipt of the fatal news from Meerut, at the con-

clusion that the entire native army was tainted. One of his first acts had been to warn the Commander-in-chief regarding the troops at Umballa, and to recommend their immediate disarming, as otherwise it would be equally dangerous to take them to Delhi or to leave them at Umballa. The conviction which prompted him thus to tender his advice to the Commander-in-chief had not reference simply to regiments stationed at Umballa. It might be necessary, he felt, to carry out the process of disarming in all the Hindustani regiments. It was clear to him, from the proceedings of the council of war at Peshawur, that, whatever might be the individual opinions of some of its members, they did not as a body take a full view of the danger to be apprehended. They had recommended, indeed, the formation of a movable column of picked troops, but they had forgotten apparently that Peshawur would thereby lie exposed to the mercy of the Hindustanis. Sir John Lawrence at once perceived this omission. It was incumbent upon him, in the situation he occupied, to take into consideration every possible eventuality, and to be prepared for it. No one was more profoundly convinced than he of the importance of holding Peshawur. Great stress has been laid upon the assertion that, at a subsequent period, he expressed an opinion in favour of the retirement of our troops behind the Indus. But, in point of fact, he never said or wrote anything of the kind. What he did write, taking, as was his custom, a wide



view of every possible contingency, was simply this: that in case our army were to retire from Delhi—a contingency always possible, in the opinion of many probable, and certain, if it did happen, to cause a general uprising of the Sikh nation—it would be necessary for our troops to cross the Indus and concentrate at Lahore; that, in anticipation of such a move being eventually necessary, the women and children of British regiments should be at once sent across that river, so as to leave our troops free for whatever action might be required. These expressions comprise all that Sir John ever gave utterance to, regarding retirement from Peshawur; and we make bold to assert, that whether we regard the opinion he formed from a military standpoint, or submit it to the test of pure common sense, it will bear the ordeal. He wished to place it in the power of the chief military authority to concentrate the greatest number of troops on the decisive point of the scene of action. The preliminary measure was simply proposed as a measure of precaution, such as would enable the troops at Peshawur to act promptly and on the shortest notice.

But at the time of which we write, Sir John had no thought of authorising a retirement from Peshawur. On the contrary, he deemed it so absolutely essential that that important district should continue under the charge of a man upon whom he could thoroughly rely, that whilst he confirmed all the other proceedings of the council of war—whilst he authorised General Reed

and Brigadier Chamberlain to come to Rawul Pindee, and even telegraphed the same evening for Colonel Edwardes to join him there—he refused his consent to the clause which would have authorised Nicholson to join the movable column; he refused it, because he deemed his presence then at Peshawur necessary for the safety and preservation of the place. More than that, before Colonel Edwardes left Peshawur for Rawul Pindee, he received the Chief Commissioner's authority to raise a thousand horse from the Khans in the Derajât—a number which, two days later, he doubled.

The first act of the Chief Commissioner, after the arrival of Colonel Edwardes and his companions at Rawul Pindee, was to submit to the Commander-in-chief by telegraph the names of three officers from whom a selection might be made for the command of the movable column. The names sent in were Brigadier Sidney Cotton, a most valuable officer, but whom it was difficult to spare from Peshawur; Brigadier Chamberlain, in every respect excellent, and whose command of the frontier force suggested him for this particular service; and Colonel Nicholson, untried in command, but possessing all the qualities of a leader of men. The Commander-in-chief promptly telegraphed back his selection of Brigadier Chamberlain, and conferred upon him for the purpose the rank of Brigadier-General.

Meanwhile at Peshawur affairs were approaching a

crisis. The news of the events had Delhi had begun to be whispered amongst the natives, and had even reached the ears of the frontier chiefs. To these it had already appeared that the contest would assume a more than doubtful aspect, even at Peshawur itself. They showed this impression in a manner not to be mistaken. Colonel Nicholson applied to those known to be most friendly to aid him to raise the levies authorised by the Chief Commissioner; he received, however, but scant assistance. Of the two thousand men authorised, he was unable to collect one hundred. It was clear that, in the eyes of these men, the position occupied by the British was full of peril. The Sepoys with their arms appeared stronger than the men who allowed them to retain those arms.

Brigadier Cotton and Colonel Nicholson had, up to this moment, adopted every possible defensive measure. The treasure had been removed to the fort, a European garrison placed within it, the Residency rendered capable of resisting an attack. But in times such as those of which we write, purely defensive measures only encourage an enemy, especially if that enemy be Asiatic. The events at Peshawur formed no exception to this rule. In proportion as our defensive arrangements progressed, the conduct of the Sepoys became more and more pronounced, their disaffection more clear. Treasonable communications were intercepted, and when, on May 21, Colonel Edwardes returned to

Peshawur, he found the state of affairs 'gloomy to a degree.'

Gloomy enough were they, indeed. The movable column, composed of the 27th Foot, the Guide Corps, and some regiments of Sikhs, hereafter to be noticed, had already marched, and the European force at Peshawur and its vicinity had thus, and by other minor movements, been reduced to little over 2,000 men. On the other hand, there were in the station five regiments of native infantry, one of light cavalry, and two of irregular cavalry, composed in an overwhelming proportion of Hindustanis. Of these it was known that four regiments, three of infantry and one of cavalry, were deeply tainted with disaffection. There was another mutinous regiment, the most mutinous of all, at the three frontier outposts; and another, quite unreliable, at Murdan. Everything showed that an outbreak was impending. But even were it not immediately to break out, the fact of having upon our frontier a mutinous army of our own soldiers, threatening ourselves, was positively to invite attack from the wild borderers beyond it, convinced that our hour was at hand.

There was, however, a material difference between the situation of Peshawur and that of other stations where Sepoys had been disarmed, which lent quite another aspect to the act of disarming there. In the neighbourhood of other stations the population had been long

accustomed to our rule ; it had become unwarlike and mercantile ; the interests of the majority of its members were identified with, and were dependent on, our own. Except in the rare cases of a newly-acquired country like Oudh, or the vicinity of a disappointed and wealthy intriguer as at Cawnpore, it required only the presence of a small body of European troops to disarm the sepoys, and at the same time to be free from the immediate fear of any overt act of hostility on the part of the people. But it was far otherwise at Peshawur. There we were in the presence, in the immediate vicinity, of an enemy with whom we had been for seven years in continual warfare ; whose depredations had been suppressed to a great extent by the efforts of the very sepoys now rising against us, and who had it in their power now, by accepting the friendship offered by those sepoys, to cause us incalculable injury, to harass the movement of our columns, to render the defence of the frontier a matter of great difficulty, the despatch of troops to Delhi impossible. This was the consideration, doubtless, which inspired the local commanders at Peshawur with an unwillingness, at the outset, to break with the sepoys ; this the reason which weighed mainly with Sir J. Lawrence, when, in his wise forethought for the future, he conned over the line of conduct it would be necessary for him to adopt in the double event of a repulse from Delhi and a rising on the frontier, and which, finally, determined

him to authorise that policy of boldness, which, in all difficult circumstances, is the safest and the best.

Colonel Edwardes returned to Peshawur on May 21, armed with full authority from the Chief Commissioner to assume the responsibility of directing the disarming of the native troops. It was indeed time for vigorous measures, for the aspect of the independent borderers betokened rather an impression on their part that it was soon to be all over with us, and there was little doubt but that even the semblance of a temporary triumph on the part of the sepoys would enlist them amongst our enemies. That very same day Colonel Edwardes received intelligence of the revolt of the 55th N.I. The news of this would, he felt sure, be speedily conveyed to the sepoys at Peshawur, and would probably invite them to immediate action. This decided him. He saw that it was necessary to act, and to act on the moment—to use the powers entrusted to him, and, breaking finally with the sepoys, to make a bold appeal to the martial instincts of the border-population. He therefore proposed to Brigadier Cotton that three regiments of sepoys and one of regular cavalry should be paraded and disarmed at daylight the following morning, leaving the least doubted regiment of sepoys and the two corps of irregular cavalry, not entirely tainted, to perform the duties of the station. Brigadier Cotton entered cordially into the arrangement. The troops were paraded the next morning, and manœuvred so as to bring them under the guns of the artillery in

front, and the musketry-range of the European infantry on either flank, whilst border-levies, arrived from Kohât, moved on their rear. They were then ordered to lay down their arms. They obeyed without the smallest hesitation.

Thus passed from Peshawur, from India, its greatest danger. The demeanour of the border chiefs on the occasion afforded the strongest proof of the success of the policy adopted, of the danger which most certainly would have resulted had the sepoy's resisted the order. Some of these chiefs were in Peshawur at the time. They accompanied the Commissioner as he proceeded to the parade-ground; but their hearts were not with him. They had before refused their levies, and now they came 'to see which way the tide would turn.'\* But no sooner had the disarming been successfully accomplished than these very men became the loudest in their congratulations; their numbers on the parade-ground multiplied exceedingly. They were convinced that the victory was not to be to the sepoy's; they resolved to cast in their lot with the English. Thenceforth recruits flocked in from beyond the border. By one bold act we discarded our sepoy's, to find, from amongst the ranks of former enemies, soldiers better, braver, more trustworthy, the representatives of a manlier type of the human race.

Brigadier Cotton followed up his successful disarming of the great majority of the native garrison of Pesh-

\* Colonel Edwardes's Report.

awur by sending a force to subdue the revolted 55th N.I. at Murdan—a service, thanks to the daring of Colonel Nicholson, who was present as political officer, successfully accomplished. A few days later the three detachments of the mutinous 64th N.I. were disarmed at the outposts. Other happily conceived measures completed the arrangements for securing the frontier. Thus the armed inhabitants were formed into a militia, and gained to our cause by good pay; the property of deserted sepoys was allowed to be appropriated by the captors; and the best feeling was cultivated with the heads of the tribes supposed to be at variance with us. A sort of enmity was thus established between the sepoys and the borderers; whilst such was the effect of the revival of our prestige, that one morning three hundred offenders of the Mullikdeen tribe, which had been in disgrace and under blockade, marched from their hills into cantonments, armed to the teeth, saying they had come to fight for us and to be forgiven. Colonel Edwardes at once accepted their services, and they became the nucleus of one of the new Punjaub regiments. This movement was independent of, and additional to, the successful efforts at recruiting made all along the border.

To Sir John Lawrence this making fast the main door of his province, to a great degree by the aid of Punjaubees, was a matter of very great satisfaction. It was not only that the safety of the frontier was secured, but that the troops raised in the Punjaub



might be depended upon. One part of India, and that the part possessing a population the most warlike and the most enured to arms,—the part, too, in which he exercised paramount authority—was with us. This was now beyond a doubt. The sepoy of the regular army, powerful as they were in numbers, and still ripe for mischief, had lost much of their prestige; the few Hindustanis in the regiments of the Punjaub Irregular Force could be weeded out without difficulty; whilst in the loyalty and goodwill of the population Sir John possessed the means of raising such a force as would enable him to spare a proportion of his European garrison to aid in striking at the heart of the rebellion still vaunting itself in Delhi. He had never, from the first moment, lost sight of this great object. The Guide Corps, cavalry and infantry, had been despatched on the first note of alarm, by forced marches to Delhi, and had accomplished the five hundred and eighty miles that intervened in twenty-one days. No sooner had the safety of the frontier been assured, and the trustworthiness of the Punjaubees ascertained, than other similar movements were directed. Sir J. Lawrence sent the 4th Sikhs from Hazara, the 1st Punjaub Infantry from Bunnoo, the 1st Punjaub cavalry and two squadrons of the 2nd and 5th. All these arrived at Delhi before the end of July. At the outset of the campaign, the European troops stationed at Umballa and in the Himalayas, and who constituted nearly one-third of the entire European force which we have

spoken of as garrisoning the Punjaub, had been sent to Delhi. These were soon after followed by a wing of the 8th Foot from Jullundhur, and a wing of the 61st from Ferozepore. The force that remained did not exceed 7,000 men, and to these were entrusted the forts of Lahore, Govindgurh, and Attock, the two arsenals of Ferozepore and Phillore, the Peshawur valley, and such important positions as Sealkote, Rawul Pindee, and other stations. In the actual state of things in the Punjaub, with very many native regiments not yet disarmed, and others, though disarmed, requiring to be watched, it was impossible, at the moment, to weaken still further the European force in the province. Until, therefore, the movable column should have done its work, the Chief Commissioner was forced to have recourse to other measures in order to assist our army before Delhi. These showed alike the magic of the influence he had acquired over the native princes, and his power of moving the population. The first was evidenced not less by the manner in which the chiefs of Puttialla, Jheend, and Nubha had come forward to aid us, than by the conduct of the ruler of Cashmere, Goolab Singh, and of his son, Rumbheer Singh. Goolab had agreed, on the requisition of Sir John, to furnish us with an auxiliary force of 2,000 men. He died, however, before those troops had set out. But his successor, Rumbheer, at once expressed his willingness to adhere to the arrangement. The contingent therefore, numbering 2,200 men, afterwards reinforced

to 3,000, left Cashmere in July, Captain Richard Lawrence accompanying it as political agent, and arrived in time to render good service at Delhi. But we derived from this aid even more political advantage than material strength; for it demonstrated very clearly that the Maharajah of Cashmere, who bore to the north-east of the Punjaub relations similar to those which the rulers of Puttialla and Jheend bore on the south-east, was decisively on our side.

Even greater advantages in a political point of view were reaped from the friendship which had been cemented by the Lahore Government with the ruler of Cabul. We have already mentioned that, at the beginning of the year, the two brothers Lumsden and Dr. Bellew had been sent to Candahar in the character of envoys. Scarcely had they arrived there when the mutiny broke out. At once the war-party in Cabul urged the Amir, Dost Mahomed, to action, pointing out to him the facility with which Peshawur could be recovered. At this crisis Colonel Edwardes re-opened negotiations with Cabul. These renewed in the mind of the Amir the impression as to the non-aggressive character of our policy which the interview held in the beginning of the year with Sir J. Lawrence at Peshawur had then stamped upon it. He rejected, then, the advice of his fanatic councillors, and sent letters 'expressing, with striking Oriental phrase, his sympathy with our disasters and his fidelity to our cause.' The moral effect of this loyal conduct was very great

all along the border. It was the more striking, as we had in former years grievously sinned against this man, sending an expedition to drive him from his throne, and shutting him up for some years as a prisoner in Loodhiana. But he had been much struck with the simple straightforwardness which characterised the Punjaub policy; he saw, too, that we were in earnest; he knew our resources; and he probably judged that a collision with us, even when we were embarrassed with our sepoys, would scarcely procure for him any material advantage.

In addition to the contingent furnished by the Maharajah of Cashmere, and to the troops already mentioned, Sir J. Lawrence hastened to despatch to Delhi new levies as fast as they could be raised. Thus, learning that artillerymen were greatly wanted in the besieging camp, he sought out all the old Sikh gunners who had fought against us in 1858-9, and sent off 300 of them at once. To the same destination he despatched 1,200 Muzbee Sikhs to serve as pioneers. These men were at the time working as labourers on the Baree Doab canal. They constituted, in the main, the pioneer force which was so useful after our troops penetrated into Delhi. We may add that the corps formed of these men rendered subsequently efficient service in China, and has recently covered itself with glory in Abyssinia. One of his lieutenants, Mr. Montgomery, likewise raised and sent off a body of cavalry which served to form the nucleus of Hodson's

Horse. One siege-train had been despatched in May from Lahore. Sir John sent off another of first-class calibre from the arsenal of Ferozepore, in the month of July, under the escort of a Belooch battalion furnished by Mr. (now Sir Bartle) Frere, then Chief Commissioner of Sind. An irregular force, under General Van Cortlandt, of a thousand men was sent to reconquer and occupy the Delhi districts to the rear of the besieging army. A newly-raised corps of Punjaubees was likewise sent to Meerut to enable the authorities at that station to despatch part of the European regiment at that station to Delhi. Thus, even in those early days, the Punjaub had contributed to make available for the siege of Delhi five battalions of European infantry, one regiment of cavalry, a large body of artillery, seven battalions of Punjaub infantry, three regiments of Punjaub cavalry, a corps of pioneers, a contingent of Sikh artillerymen, two siege-trains, and auxiliary corps from Puttialla, Jheend, Nabha, Cashmere, and minor rajahs, amounting to 8,000 men.

To enable him to contribute thus largely to the force before Delhi, Sir J. Lawrence had proceeded rapidly, after the safety of the frontier had been assured, in raising new Punjaabee levies to fill the place of the Hindustanis who had been disarmed. On May 13, four native regiments had been deprived of their arms at Lahore; on the 14th, two at Ferozepore, one of which, however, mutinied and fled to Delhi; on

the 22nd, four at Peshawur; on the 23rd, one regiment had been destroyed in its mutinous flight from Murdan; on the 26th, one was disarmed at Nowshera; on June 10—thanks to the vigour, energy, and self-reliance of one man, Major (now Major-General) Crawford Chamberlain, then commanding the 1st Irregular Cavalry—two Hindustani regiments had been disarmed; and, on the 15th, the last remaining corps at Umballa submitted to the same fate. The account of these disarmings, combined with the proneness of the officers of the native army to believe in the loyalty of their own men so far as to permit them to retain their arms, provoked outbreaks at other stations. Thus, on June 7 and 8, four regiments mutinied in the Jullundhur Doab, and fled to Delhi; on July 7 the 14th N. I. broke out at Jhelum, only, however, to be crushed by the European force which the Chief Commissioner had sent down from Rawul Pindee to disarm them; on the 9th, a wing of the 9th Cavalry and the 46th N. I. mutinied at Sealkote, and committed some murders. They were, however, nearly all destroyed by Nicholson, who, to intercept them, made the famous flank-march from Umritsur to the Trimmoo Ghât—upwards of forty miles—with H.M.'s 52nd Foot, and a battery of artillery under Major (now Brigadier-General) Bouchier. The same fate met the disarmed 26th N.I., who murdered their commanding-officer on July 30, and attempted to escape to Delhi. On August 19 the 10th Light Cavalry went off from

Ferozepore to Delhi; and, on the 28th, the 51st N.I., though deprived of their arms, mutinied at Peshawur, but met with condign punishment. The other regiments were all disarmed by the movable column on the following dates: on June 25, two in the Jullundhur Doab; on July 7, one and part of another at Rawul Pindee; on July 8, one at Umritsur; on the 12th, one at Hooshyaspore; on the 14th, one in the Derajât; on the 15th, one at Umballa. Of the 36,000 Hindustani troops who were in the Punjaub at the beginning of the year, just one-half had broken out into open mutiny; of these a considerable number had been destroyed, but some had escaped to Delhi. Of the remaining moiety, 13,000 had been disarmed without resistance, and 5,000 had remained firm in their allegiance. The 13,000 disarmed men constituted an encumbrance, over which, as had been shown by the examples of the 26th and 51st N.I., it was necessary to keep guard. For this purpose the presence of other troops was necessary. It is not too much, then, to assert, that although 5,000 out of the original 36,000 remained faithful, the effect of the disaffection of the others was to diminish the power of the Punjaub garrison for active service to at least the extent of the full number of its native troops.

To supply the gap thus created the Chief Commissioner's energies were directed at a very early period of the crisis. For although the actual disarming and mutinies took place at intervals between May 13 and

August 15, Sir John Lawrence had, from the first, ceased to place the smallest reliance upon any of the Hindustanis, and had contemplated the necessity of replacing them by men raised in his own province. We propose now to relate the measures to which he had recourse for this purpose.

It had become clear to the Chief Commissioner, about May 17, that the native troops in the Punjaub might be depended upon. He had then under his orders, serving as infantry or as organised military police, eighteen battalions of Punjaubees. He at once directed the raising of four additional companies to each battalion, intending that these additional troops should form the nuclei of new regiments. At the same time he called in all the men on furlough, and directed that all the Sikhs who had been enlisted into the Hindustani regiments should be drafted from those regiments and formed into a separate battalion. The enrolments for the four additional companies progressed very rapidly; and no sooner had they been completed, than the same number of companies were separated from the original battalion and constituted a separate corps, its numbers being raised as quickly as possible up to 960 men. In this manner eighteen new battalions of infantry were speedily raised. Of these, eight were completed in June, seven in August, two in September, and one subsequently. An additional Goorkha regiment was raised in May, 1858. Additions were made in June, 1857, to the Guide Corps of 200 men,



and to the police of 5,592. Besides these, there were raised, mostly in June, July, and August, 1857, levies of 9,700 horse and 9,600 infantry. No difficulty was experienced in raising these levies. All classes, except the Sikhs from the Manjha—the portion of the Punjaub of which Lahore and Umritsur are the great cities—and who hesitated till after the fall of Delhi, flocked to our standards. There was a want rather of horses than of horsemen, whilst the men who came for that service were unsurpassed in all the qualities of light cavalry soldiers. It has been officially computed that the total number of Punjaubees actually raised by the Chief Commissioner for service during the mutiny amounted to 47,351.\* Of these, 34,000 were raised in 1857. These were used to replace the 36,000 men of the old army, all but 5,000 of whom had failed us. There remained yet 13,000 of the old force to be watched—a necessity which hampered considerably the movements of our Europeans. Many of the new troops were at first retained in the Punjaub. By doing this, the Chief Commissioner was enabled to reinforce the army before Delhi with old and well-seasoned soldiers.

But whilst thus engaged in taking effectual mea-

\* These numbers are the result of a most carefully made return. But, besides these, if we calculate the native contingents, amounting to about 8,000 men, the Punjaubees who had belonged to Hindustani regiments, and who remained faithful, and the recruits who flocked to other corps in Hindustan, the total number supplied by the Punjaub could not have been short of 80,000 men.

asures to raise such a force as would supply the void made by the defection of our native army, Sir J. Lawrence was not the less intent upon carrying out those other important measures necessary for the safety of the country. Prominent amongst these were the measures necessary for the organisation and progress of the movable column. It will be recollected that this column was originally organised at Peshawur on May 13, and that, a few days later, Brigadier Chamberlain had been appointed to command it. It was originally to have consisted of H.M.'s 27th Regiment from Nowshera, the 24th Foot from Rawul Pindee, a proportion of European artillery, the Guide Corps, the 4th Sikh Regiment, the Kumaon battalion composed of Goorkhas, the 1st Punjaub Infantry from Bunnoo, the 2nd from Dehra Ghazee Khan, and the 5th, also from Bunnoo. The cavalry were to be formed of the 16th Irregulars from Rawul Pindee, a wing of the 2nd Punjaub Cavalry from Kohât, and the Mooltan Horse from Dehra Ishmael Khan. The various members of this force had not, however, assembled at Wuzeerabad before it was weakened by the recall of the 27th Foot to Peshawur, in consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs in that station subsequently to May 17; and by the despatch to Delhi of the Guide Corps, the Kumaon battalion, and the 4th Sikhs. To supply the vacancies thus caused, so as to fit the column for active operations, General Chamberlain arranged with the Chief Commissioner that it should be aug-

mented by the troops from Sealkote, consisting of H.M.'s 52nd Foot, the European artillery, the 35th N.I., a wing of the 17th Irregulars, and a wing of the 9th Cavalry. Thus strengthened, the column marched into Lahore on the 3rd June. Here it disarmed the mutinous 8th Cavalry, and, after halting for a week, resumed its march, *viâ* Umritsur, for Jullundhur, where the weakness of the Brigadier of that district in declining to disarm the troops had caused much anxiety to the authorities. The column reached Umritsur on the morning of the 10th, in time, indeed, to secure that important city against the machinations of the Jullundhur mutineers, but not in time to aid in the repression of a revolt, encouraged to break out by the weakness of the military authorities, and not pursued after it had broken out. Thence it marched quickly in the direction of Jullundhur. But before it reached that place an important change had taken place in its command. Colonel Chester, Adjutant-General of the army, had been killed in the action of Budlee-ka-Serai, before Delhi, on June 8. General Chamberlain was at once appointed to succeed him. The question then arose, who was to succeed General Chamberlain? It was a question of great moment, pregnant with vast consequences, and its solution lay with the Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub. Sir John had then but recently returned to Lahore. Positive authority to appoint any one in particular indeed he had not. But the Commander-in-chief was dead.

His acting successor was at Bombay. The acting Commander of the forces had just reached Calcutta, with which city all communication was cut off: there was actually no authority on the spot superior to his own. A weak governor would, under such circumstances, have allowed himself to be overborne by the military authorities. There were, possibly, not wanting men who counselled General Gowan, become by General Reed's departure for Delhi the senior officer in the Punjaub, to declare the province to be under military law. But if that were the case, General Gowan had too great a regard for duty, too entire a confidence in the great civilian under whom he was serving, to listen to any such advice. The Chief Commissioner had impressed his spirit upon all with whom he had come into contact, and it was to his large experience and tried strength of character that the authorities, military as well as civil, turned to guide them into smoother waters.

Sir John Lawrence, then, cut off from all communication with Calcutta, felt that he was called upon to save the Punjaub at all hazards—to act as if he were dictator. He was the more strengthened to follow this course by the knowledge that he had sufficient authority for whatever he might do. The last telegram received from Calcutta before communication had ceased altogether, had conveyed to him the promise of Lord Canning's support in every measure he might think necessary for safety.

Thus virtually dictator, and suddenly called upon to appoint to the command of the movable column the officer whom he might consider the very best qualified in such an emergency, Sir John Lawrence was true to his own convictions and to his strong sense of duty. He took John Nicholson, a regimental captain, though a lieutenant-colonel in the army, and made him brigadier-general. It was a bold, an unprecedented act—an act which he well knew would cause much jealousy and ill-feeling. The officers senior to Nicholson, one of whom at least was most capable, could not but feel aggrieved at being thus superseded by an officer for many years in civil employ. But Sir John believed he had but one duty—to appoint the best man. He believed Nicholson to be the best man: it would have been contrary to his nature to appoint any one else. Though Nicholson had been but little heard of as a military combatant in actual warfare, he had assisted in many campaigns, and he was known to Sir John to be accustomed to deal with men, and to be endowed with the gift of gaining over them a rare mastery. He was known to possess, too, a character resolute to inflexibility—a genius as competent to devise as quick to execute. The result fully justified the selection. In the course of a few months Nicholson gained a reputation as a military leader far more real, well-founded, and enduring than the reputation of any other soldier engaged in the suppression of the mutiny. But for this man Delhi would not have fallen; and yet—noble example of our bureaucratic

system !—Delhi scarcely had fallen when there came from Sir Colin Campbell an order to revoke his appointment. The act, however, was Sir John Lawrence's own. He it was who took upon himself the responsibility of a nomination which was the main cause of the taking of the rebellious city. With this point, however, is connected another question, the dealing with which entailed even greater responsibility upon the Chief Commissioner, and called for the highest exercise on his part of the virtues of self-denial and self-reliance.

By the third week of July the effective European force in the Punjaub, including the troops with the movable column, the sick, and the convalescent, had fallen to about 5,200 men. Of these, perhaps 1,500 were sick and convalescent.\* Of the fifteen new Punjaub regiments, five had been completely disciplined, and during the month eight more were reported ready for service. But there still remained 13,000 unarmed sepoys to be watched, and, in addition, 5,000 still armed, and believed to be faithful, but whose loyalty would not, in all probability, be proof against any reverse to our arms. The movable column under Nicholson had meanwhile done good work in disarming regiments at Jullundhur, and among its own body, and had cut up the Sealkote mutineers at Trimmoo Ghât. The work of disarming in all other parts of the province had been completed. The movable column was

\* Half of the English troops at Peshawur were sick.

therefore so far free in that it had no overt enemies to combat. It was still necessary, however, to overawe malcontents, and to present visibly to the eyes of the population that the Chief Commissioner still possessed a force ready instantly to override any opposition that might threaten.

This was the more necessary, because, in the latter part of July, the long delay of our army before Delhi had not been without its effect upon the minds of men in the Punjaub. We have already alluded to the unwillingness evinced by the Manjha population to enlist in our service. This unwillingness had existed from the first; but the feeling which caused it—the doubt in our ultimate success—was now spreading. In the East, during a time of danger and excitement, it is impossible to stand still. If a man or a nation does not advance, he falls back. In August, the authorities in the Punjaub were in the position in which it was necessary to make a choice between the two courses. Untoward rumours had arrived from the direction of the Jumna Doab and from Bengal; our army lay stationary before Delhi; in the Punjaub we were holding our own indeed, but in a great measure by means of Punjaubees. The idea, then, had begun to steal over the minds of a great portion of the population, that our success at Delhi was not, after all, so certain, and that, if we were not successful there, they would find themselves in alliance with the losing side.

Such was the state of feeling rising in the Punjaub, and known to the Chief Commissioner to be rising, when he received a communication from General Wilson, commanding our forces before Delhi, announcing that unless he were largely reinforced from the Punjaub he would not be able to hold his position, much less to assault the city. In the face of the continual reinforcements received by the rebels from Bareilly, Neemuch, Jhansie, and Mhow, the troops hitherto sent by Sir J. Lawrence had done no more than enable the besieging General to maintain his position. He no longer entertained hopes of any help from below. From the Punjaub, and thence alone, could he look for assistance; if that were not forthcoming he must abandon the siege. That, at least, was the programme he laid before the Chief Commissioner.

The effective force of Europeans at Sir John Lawrence's disposal, deducting the sick and convalescent, had, as we have said, been reduced at this period to 3,700 men, a force not more than sufficient to maintain order in the Punjaub, even when the majority of the Punjaubees were on our side. But Sir John had now to consider whether the risk was greater that the 18,000 Hindustanis still in the Punjaub, and possibly the Punjaub itself, would be tempted, by the further departure of European troops, to rise—or that the maintaining these troops in the Punjaub might cause the retreat of our army from Delhi, and, with it,



the entire loss of our prestige, and the consequent desertion of all our native soldiers. Now Sir John had from the very first moment indicated Delhi as the heart of the rebellion—as the place which must at all hazards be recovered. He had pressed the movement against Delhi on General Anson when that able officer was opposed by all his military advisers ; he had continued to press it equally on his successors,\* and to protest against any retrograde movement. Everything, in his opinion, depended upon the operations before Delhi. Peshawur would have been a light sacrifice to insure the concentration of all our forces for such an object. And now, when he was asked to decide which risk he would run—the risk of rebellion in the Punjaub, or retreat from Delhi—he felt he could not hesitate, but that, at all costs, the great principle of warfare must be rigidly enforced—the concentration of all our means on the decisive point of the scene of action.

It is true that he did not arrive at this decision hurriedly, or without full and patient consultation with his advisers—without examining the state of affairs from every possible aspect. From this circum-

\* Lord Granville stated in the House of Lords that Sir J. Lawrence ‘was willing to make terms with the King,’ implying thereby, whilst the King was yet in Delhi. But no such implication can be deduced from Sir J. Lawrence’s action. The King offered to negotiate, proposing to surrender the place into our hands. Sir J. Lawrence, in reply, expressly stipulated that the King should first quit the city, and should prove himself guiltless of Christian blood. He would not, for a moment, that our efforts to take the city should be relaxed.

stance have arisen some misconceptions. No one was so thoroughly acquainted with the exact state of the Punjaub as the Chief Commissioner. Those able men whose advice he asked could not have been, and were not, so completely cognisant of all the ramifications of native thought and feeling as himself. On his shoulders, too, lay all the responsibility of a decision on which depended the fate of an empire. There is no doubt but that at this conjuncture some of the most trusted councillors of the Chief Commissioner were urgent in their advice to send more troops to Delhi. That was precisely the advice which Sir J. Lawrence himself would have given had he too been only a councillor. But there is a vast difference between a subordinate tendering advice and a responsible officer arriving at a decision. Men with military instincts had doubtless fixed upon Delhi as the strategic point which was the key of the military position. But so likewise had Sir John before any one else. He was now called upon to decide, not simply whether the troops before Delhi should be reinforced, but whether, to reinforce them, he should risk the safety of a province upon whose quiescent attitude the safety of the empire depended. He was called upon for this decision at a time when 18,000 Hindustanis were still at large within its limits—when doubts were spreading as to our ability to succeed—when the least repulse would, he knew well, have converted into determined foes, not only the population of the Punjaub, but many of the troops

who were then fighting by the side of the British. It was to do that which no great general will ever commit himself to except under the direst necessity—to deliver a battle, defeat in which must be absolute ruin. It was to risk the retention of the Punjaub, and with that the lives of all in the Punjaub, on the result of the operations before Delhi. No one knew the feelings, the hopes, the secret aspirations of disaffected men amongst the Punjaubees so well as he. No one, therefore, could be so competent a judge of the actual position.

He came after some reflection to the determination to brave that danger, to encounter that risk—to send all his available troops to Delhi, leaving the Punjaub unprotected. Some of those who advised him to this decision have, after the lapse of years, claimed for themselves the credit of its having been arrived at. Perhaps if they were to place on the other side of the account the bad advice which they also tendered, and which was not followed, they would admit that the balance was not altogether in their favour. But even in this case the credit is not their due. The decision was solely the decision of Sir John Lawrence. He received advice from many; he balanced probabilities, he contrasted the risks, and he came—slowly, perhaps, but very decidedly—to the conclusion that less danger would be incurred by denuding the Punjaub of troops than by leaving the position before Delhi uncertain for the want of those troops. It was upon his shoulder

not upon the shoulders of his councillors, that the responsibility rested. Whatever credit may be due to them for holding an opinion which he also shared, and for pressing it upon him, he alone is entitled to the credit, as he alone would have been responsible for the blame, if blame there had been, of the decision.

We have said that Sir John arrived perhaps slowly at that decision. Had it been otherwise he would have been less entitled than he now is to the admiration of his fellow-countrymen. The dangers attending either determination were so evenly balanced—they were seen so vividly by Sir John himself—that it was impossible for him to arrive on the moment at a definite conclusion. The decision which he came to was undoubtedly correct, but it was, notwithstanding, within a very little of ending in a catastrophe.

‘When,’ wrote Mr. Temple in the report relating to the mutiny, ‘week after week and month after month passed away and the rebellion was not put down, the Punjaubees then began to think that the British power could hardly recover from the repeated shocks it was sustaining. The accumulating odds against us seemed insuperable. When detachment after detachment of Europeans went out of the Punjab and none came in; when the success of the mutineers reached through the land; when cantonment after cantonment in Hindustan was destroyed and deserted by its soldiery, who rushed to Delhi; when incendiary letters arrived figuratively indicating the

position of the British in India, and saying that "many of the finest trees in the garden have fallen," that "white wheat had become very scarce, and country produce very abundant," that "hats were hardly to be seen, while turbans were plentiful,"—then the Punjaubees began to feel how utterly isolated we were, and how desperate was our cause. Their minds passed from confidence to doubt, then to mistrust, and then to disaffection. This last symptom had begun to set in when Delhi fell.'

Yes; and if Delhi had not fallen! If our assault, as seemed advisable to some of those about the general commanding, had been followed by a retreat even after a lodgment had been made at the Cashmere Gate! or if, in the daily contest that followed for the possession of the city, the enemy, gathering heart, had driven us back to our position outside the town!—where, under such circumstances, had been the Punjaub, where its gallant chief, where its European population? Contingencies such as these had been considered by Sir John Lawrence, and it was in the face of them that he decided to act the boldest, the most unselfish part—to risk all on success before Delhi, and to reduce the chances of failure to their lowest, by sending not only his best troops, but the man whom he esteemed as a soldier more highly than any other man in India to command them. The result vindicated his prescience. The arrival of the movable column gave General Wilson the strength he desired; but an assault would

not even then have been attempted had not that movable column been commanded by John Nicholson.<sup>1</sup>

The departure of the movable column for Delhi towards the end of July left in the Punjaub hardly more than 4,000 Europeans of all arms, including those sick and unfit for duty. Of these, three regiments were in the Peshawur valley, but so reduced by sickness that for the active work of a campaign they could not muster more than 1,000 bayonets; one regiment held Lahore; one, sent by Mr. Frere, with great self-denial, from Sind, held Mooltan and Ferozepore; and one furnished detachments to hold Rawul Pindee, Umritsur, and Jullundhur. From the regiment at Lahore, the 24th Foot, between 200 and 300 men were taken, to form with 400 Punjaubees and some mounted levies a column which, for all practical purposes, should be still movable. These indeed constituted the only troops available for such a purpose, for the rest were absolutely required to watch, in the case of Peshawur, the frontier; in other cases, the disarmed native troops. They were but a feeble resort in case the news of the further diminution of the European force should kindle into a flame the feelings to which our continued perilous position every day added consistency and strength.

The fears entertained by the Chief Commissioner

<sup>1</sup> 'The Chief Commissioner does not hesitate to affirm that without John Nicholson Delhi could not have fallen.'—Mr. Secretary Temple's Mutiny Report.

that something of this sort might ensue were quickly realised. General Nicholson's force crossed the Sutlej on July 30. Early in September a conspiracy was discovered in the hills near Murree and in lower Hazara just in time to prevent its being carried out. The inhabitants of that part of the country are nearly all Mohammedans. Though in general well affected to our rule, and infinitely preferring it to that of the Sikhs from which we had rescued them, the spectacle of Delhi so long defying our power, of the province emptied of its European garrison, tempted them beyond their power of control. The opportunity to strike a blow for their independence was not to be foregone. All their preparations were accordingly made; the date on which the rising was to take place was fixed upon. Provided that Delhi did not fall by September 10, the Hazara was to rise.

It is curious that not only the population of the district named were aware of the plot, but some of the servants of the officers at Murree were consenting parties thereto. The favourite orderly of the Assistant Commissioner had assigned to himself the duty of presenting the chiefs of the conspiracy with his master's head, and there is little doubt but that he would have attempted it. The secret was, however, divulged by one of the petty chiefs of Hazara—whether to save himself, or because, perhaps, he doubted the success of the plot, may not be accurately known. This at least is certain, that he sent his wife

to inform Lady Lawrence, who was then at Murree, that unless Delhi were to fall within a week, there would be a general rising in Hazara. Lady Lawrence lost no time in conveying the information to Mr. Edward Thornton, the Commissioner of Rawul Pindie, and to the officials at Murree. These at once took measures to baffle the conspirators. It was quickly discovered that the statement was true; but by the timely arrest of the leaders, terror was struck into the rank and file, and no outbreak took place. The fact, however, is noteworthy, as showing that the deliberations of the Chief Commissioner prior to the despatch of his last available troops to Delhi, were not unnecessary. Those deliberations were the result of the knowledge he possessed, that the denuding of the province of British troops would encourage the disaffected, and would, if not checked by success at Delhi, ultimately rouse the whole country.

His convictions on this head were still more strongly justified a few days later. On the evening of September 14, the very day of the delivery of the assault upon Delhi, 'a Mohammedan official of the postal department arrived at Lahore from Goghaira, came before the Chief Commissioner, and reported, with somewhat of a malicious twinkle of the eye, that all the wild and predatory tribes inhabiting the jungle country between Lahore and 'Mooltan had risen.'<sup>1</sup> Questioned further, he declared that the number of

<sup>1</sup> Punjab Military Report, p. 16.



insurgents amounted to 125,000 men. This statement was of course exaggerated, but it seemed to the Chief Commissioner to be, nevertheless, tolerably certain that a rising of a formidable character had taken place. He knew the inhabitants of that part of the country to be a wild, pastoral race, strong of body, impatient of control, and likely to listen to the tales of designing men. At the moment they had indeed but few arms, but they were contiguous to the independent state of Bahawulpore, which, alone almost of the native states bordering on the Punjaub, had displayed an unfriendly, if not a hostile spirit, ever since the outbreak of the mutiny. It seemed to Sir John to be on that account only the more necessary to act on the moment, in order to crush an insurrection which delay must make formidable. Within three hours, therefore, of receiving the message we have adverted to, one company of European infantry, 200 Sikh cavalry, and three guns, were despatched in the direction of the headquarters of the insurgents. It was a small force, but the celerity with which it was despatched compensated for its paucity of numbers and caused them to be enormously multiplied in the eyes of the native population. The fact that they were sent at all, utterly inadequate as they were to meet the enemy had he advanced to encounter them, showed a confidence in ourselves which had a wonderfully depressing effect upon the insurgents. Instead of making the forward movement which alone

could have insured the success of their plan, they took refuge, on learning the advance of our men, in the almost impenetrable jungles which constituted their normal habitation. Fully impressed with the necessity of using every effort to crush this rebellion at once, Sir John, by no means content with the movement of the small body of troops he had already sent, exhausted all his energies to bring up others to support them. His utmost efforts could not collect more than 1,500 men of all sorts. With these, however, he insured the submission of the disaffected country.

This was the last attempt on the part of any of the tribes inhabiting the Punjaub to revolt against our dominion. We may be pardoned, then, if for a few minutes we dwell upon the manner in which it was met. What other man in India, we may ask, on being informed that 125,000 men had risen in insurrection close to his capital, would have sent 300 men, two-thirds of whom were natives, to move against them? Yet it may be confidently asserted that the despatch of those 300 men caused the collapse of the rebellion. Their numbers were not known to the enemy—they were therefore multiplied enormously; the insurrection was ‘scotched,’ and retired into the jungles to be ‘killed.’ If, on the other hand, the Chief Commissioner had acted as cold-blooded prudence would have counselled—if he had waited to draw together a force really sufficient to meet the rebels—it is scarcely possible to exaggerate the dan-

gers to which he would have been exposed. The rebellion, unchecked, even at first unopposed, would have gathered head, would have received fresh accessions from every part of the province, would possibly have culminated in a general insurrection overwhelming Lahore in its onward progress. It did not attain this magnitude solely because Sir J. Lawrence sent out 300 men to oppose it; not, indeed, because he considered that number adequate for the purpose—he knew well it was not; but because, thoroughly convinced of the advantage of moral force in Asiatic warfare, he knew that an advance of any number, however small, would paralyse the rebels. He sent 300 men, because he had no more that could be spared—just as, if his circumstances had been more straitened, he would have sent a hundred, or even fifty.

We have stated that this rising was the last attempt against the British power in the Punjaub. The fact that it occurred at all, so soon too after the threatened insurrection in Hazara, showed conclusively that a spirit of disaffection had possessed the minds of a large portion, principally the Mohammedan portion, of the people of the Punjaub; that they believed our last hour to be at hand. It was the opinion of the Chief Commissioner, that if the fall of Delhi had been delayed some time longer, or if any misfortune had happened to our army before the place, this belief in the decadence of the fortunes of England would have become general, and we should have had

to rely upon our own soldiers alone. But Sir John's foresight and selfnegation, his promptitude and decision, averted the chances of any such result. By sending the bulk of the movable column to Delhi, with Nicholson as its commander, by himself so appointed, he took the steps which made the fall of Delhi possible. It was this, and this alone, that enabled General Wilson to detach a force under that same Nicholson to destroy the enemy in the field of Nuz-zufgurbh ; this, and this alone, that induced him, contrary to the counsel of some of his advisers, to risk an assault upon Delhi. In this assault again it was Nicholson—Nicholson of the Punjaub—who was the leading and guiding spirit ; he who, struck down by a mortal wound after he had forced the Cashmere gate, sent from his dying bed the loudest and deepest remonstrances against retiring—for retiring was talked of. All these aids, so powerful in their working, so essential to success, without which we must have failed, may be clearly traced to the abnegation of the man, who, occupying then the most important position in the country, dwelling amongst a race whom delay or ill-success would have roused into deadly enmity, decided to strip his own province of all the troops really available for movement, to send them to the decisive point of the war, retaining only a number barely sufficient to garrison his strongholds and guard his magazines. Who, then, can deny that to this man, primarily, the fall of Delhi is due ? Who can deny that

the master of that ship, the safety of which was near imperilled, even whilst he kept his own crew on board, mainly contributed to the safety of the entire fleet, because, setting aside all selfish considerations, he sent almost all his own sailors to destroy the fire-ship that was making havoc among the other vessels of the squadron? If it be true that the peculiar character of a nation is most forcibly illustrated by the action under difficult circumstances of her foremost sons, then indeed has England peculiar reason to be proud of the man who saved the Punjaub, who contributed so much to the fall of Delhi! Never, we may say, were the English virtues of calm and cool courage, quick decision, unselfish devotion to the accomplishment of a great public end, more conspicuously displayed than during the five months succeeding May 13, 1857, by Sir John Lawrence. Those qualities constituted a beacon even to the best and most capable of his lieutenants, an example to all who came in contact with him, or who heard of his doings, an impassable barrier to the designs of traitors. Give what credit we may to the other members of the Commission, and many of them deserved nobly of their country, he was the key-stone of the arch: he pulled the strings of every negotiation; to his quick and prompt decision the suggestions of all those about him were subordinated. None knew better than he when to slacken the rein, when to make an officer aware that the most trivial act had not escaped him. To Montgomery, Macleod, and Roberts,

at Lahore; to Edwardes at Peshawur; to Chamberlain and Nicholson at the head of the column; to Barnes at Umballa; to Lake at Jullundhur, and to some others, he gave almost unchecked liberty of action, for none knew better than he, that if left to themselves they would exert all their energies to weather the storm. But he retained, nevertheless, in his own hands the power to mould and to direct all their efforts to one common end, so that the action of one district should be as far as possible harmonious with the action of the district nearest to it; and that thus, when the time for a combined movement should arrive, the several parts of the machine, each more or less dependent on the other, should be found in working order.

From the date of the complete reoccupation of Delhi by our troops, September 20, the anxieties of the Chief Commissioner regarding the safety of the Punjaub were at an end; for although the Goghaira rebellion lingered for a few days later, it was never afterwards formidable. The dangers to which a little more delay in delivering the assault would have given birth, disappeared after the successful capture of the rebel city, and the fidelity of the population became thereby more than ever firmly riveted. It was still necessary, however, to continue the work, till then so successfully carried on, of raising and disciplining levies to reinforce the columns which were sent after the fall of Delhi to complete the resubjugation of the

country. In this respect the Chief Commissioner's efforts did not relax one whit, and he soon found that the success of our arms had the effect of attracting the Sikhs of the Manjha—who had, till then, for the most part held aloof—to our standards. But other and not less important duties speedily devolved upon him. A principal consequence of the recapture had been the transfer to the territories already under the Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub of the district of which Delhi was the capital, constituting an extent of 13,975 square miles containing two and three quarter millions of population, who paid to the State an annual revenue of 800,000*l*. He had, in fact, to undertake the work of reconstruction.

After the capture of Delhi, the general commanding the besieging forces had not at once replaced the city under civil jurisdiction, but had consigned it to the care of a military governor. But it was soon found that every consideration prompted the expediency of reorganising within it that civil administration which the siege had interrupted. This was accordingly done, and in the early part of 1858, the city resumed much of the appearance by which it had been before characterised. Meanwhile the petty chiefs who had sided with the King, and lastly the King himself, were brought to a fair and patient trial. Never, perhaps, after so treacherous a revolt, was there evinced a greater absence of bloodthirstiness and desire for vengeance. The districts of Delhi were

brought under the operation of that code which had proved so successful in the Punjaub—the civil police machinery was restored, the customs' lines were re-established, the education machinery reorganised; and whilst fines, and in some instances confiscations of property, were enforced upon notorious rebels, those who had remained faithful were proportionately rewarded. Following the example given when the Punjaub was annexed, one great measure of precaution was strictly enforced. The entire population was disarmed. Before the month of April, 1858, 225,000 stand of arms, besides forty cart-loads not enumerated, were delivered up to the police. So effectual were these measures, that in his report of the first six months' administration, the Chief Commissioner was enabled to state that order reigned in the Delhi territory—an order, too, obtained not after the fashion of Warsaw!

We have now endeavoured to illustrate, faintly and feebly we are well aware, the part played by Sir John Lawrence in the eventful drama of 1857. By his countrymen at the time he was universally regarded as the statesman who had saved not only the Punjaub, but Upper India—as the one man of whose conduct it might be said, that it evinced a thorough acquaintance with his position and the means at his disposal, and an energy that would make the most of every point capable of being turned to his advantage. After the lapse of eleven years, the general opinion of the public has confirmed this verdict. Subjecting



Sir John Lawrence's conduct during that critical period to the most crucial of all tests, it is difficult, we might even say impossible, to point the finger to one single act of importance, and say, 'This or that might have been better done.' At this distance of time, his action on the spur of the moment appears to be exactly the action which would have resulted from long consideration. We see him quick, cool, collected, at the outbreak of the mutiny, drawing his resources to himself, feeling the temper of the frontier tribes, yet not hesitating to send some of his most reliable troops to Delhi—urging the independent chieftains to evince by prompt action their loyalty to the State—indicating to the Commander-in-chief the vulnerable point in the enemy's position. We see him looking the danger boldly in the face; and, contemplating the possibility of simultaneous action on the part of the borderers and the sepoys, secretly determining the measures to be adopted in the case, and only in the case, of that then not improbable contingency. Having, by his influence with the independent chiefs, secured his communications with our army before Delhi, we see him turning his attention to Peshawur, where, by bold action, and in concert with his lieutenants, he replaces the discarded sepoys by the wild borderers whom they had been drilled to oppose, and rallies to the British standard more than 40,000 troops of a better quality than those we had lost. The frontier difficulty is no sooner solved than we see him engaged in the double

labour—most difficult with the means at his disposal—of putting down the sepoy in the Punjaub, and reinforcing our troops before Delhi. Of the former, 18,000 are destroyed, 5,000 remain faithful. Then, although the action would cost him the flower of his troops, and expose the Punjaub to imminent peril, leaving him but 4,000 European troops, of whom 1,500 were sick and invalids, for the whole province, we see him resolving to send the last available man to Delhi—deeming, and rightly deeming, that as the fall of that place was all-important, everything should be risked to assure it.<sup>1</sup>

To render success as certain as possible, we see him taking from his military civilians the man whom he knew to be equal to any duty, however arduous, though he was but a regimental captain, and sending him, as commander of those reinforcements, to Delhi.

When, after these troops had departed, and the Punjaub, had been left, as it were, to take care of itself—for the 2,500 available Europeans were scarcely sufficient to guard the frontier and the magazines—he is suddenly informed that an insurrection of 125,000

<sup>1</sup> The following anecdote can be vouched for: Impatient at the slow progress made by our troops, and strongly impressed with the idea that the fate of the empire depended upon the early fall of Delhi, Sir John said one day to Rajah Tej Singh, the most influential of all the Punjaub chiefs, 'I think I ought to go there myself.' Tej Singh looked at him for a few minutes, and then said with emphasis: 'Sahib, send the best man you have, or any number of them, but don't go yourself. So long as you stay here, all will go well; but the moment you turn your back, no one can say what devilry may not take place.'

men has broken out in the vicinity of Lahore, how do we see him meeting the difficulty? Does he abandon his garrisons, mass his troops, summon the wild borderers to his assistance? Far from it. Still cool, determined, prompt, he sends out, on the instant, the one company of Europeans that could be spared, backed by a few artillerymen and 200 horse. Of all his actions in the mutiny, not one is grander than that—not one betokens more surely the real greatness of the man, the possession of the capacity to see, the decision to act, the knowledge that, in war, promptitude and daring are worth battalions of soldiers, and make and unmake kingdoms.

We say then, advisedly, that the verdict—the universal verdict—of his countrymen at the time is more than confirmed by the sedate study, eleven years later, of the events upon which that verdict was founded. Sir John Lawrence of the Punjaub must ever stand out as one of the foremost characters of Anglo-Indian history—as the self-made, hard-headed, strong-willed, conscientious, consistent man, who, tried in all circumstances, was ever found equal to all. It is impossible always to avoid contemporary jealousy. But, in the case of Sir John Lawrence, jealousy, though as rampant as ever, has been unable to lay hold of any prominent point of his career, and say, ‘For that at least he has been praised beyond his deserts.’ To such shifts, indeed, has that jealousy been reduced, that it

has been fain to concentrate all its venom upon one single sneer—to impute it as a crime to this self-made man that he was really the hewer and architect of his own fortunes, and not rather ‘the accident of an accident,’ ‘the tenth transmitter of a foolish face.’ It is sufficient to say of such a sneer, that it stamps the mental calibre of those who make it; it adds to the sympathy felt by every generous heart for the illustrious civilian, who

rose

Without one art that honour might oppose.

England was not neglectful of the services rendered in 1857–8. Sir John Lawrence was created a G.C.B. in 1857, and a baronet, with a pension of 2000*l.* per annum, the year following. The Punjaub, aggrandised by accession of territory, was in 1858 transformed into a lieutenant-governorship under the man who preserved it. Sir John, however, did not hold his new title long. The incessant work of previous years had told upon him; the labours of 1857–8 brought matters to a climax. In 1858 he occupied himself in reconstituting all that the mutiny had shaken or overthrown, and in remedying evils which the outbreak had revealed. Having done this, he left India, never intending to return to it.

Here, for the present, we leave him. Still not idle, for he was appointed at once a member of the Indian Council; still active, energetic, charitable, he settles down to fill the *rôle* of a country gentleman, happy in

his family, happy in the esteem of his fellow-countrymen,—happy in the new spheres of usefulness that constantly opened out to him,—happy more especially in this, that, though settled in England, it was still in his power to be useful to India.

## PART III.

## THE CROWNING OF THE EDIFICE.

THE principal events of the viceregal career of Sir John Lawrence by no means represent the vast importance of that career alike to the governing and the governed. For in India the great and perhaps altogether the most difficult part devolving upon a Governor-General, especially in matters of foreign policy, is not to incite, but to restrain. This was emphatically the case during the five years which have just passed away. The great merit attaching to the administration of Sir John Lawrence appears to us to lie in the fact that he secured for the empire five years of prosperity and of nearly unbroken peace, and that he took full advantage of that peace and that prosperity to carry out the great works initiated by his predecessors, to initiate others of scarcely less magnitude, and to place the tenure of land in provinces long subject to arbitrary and despotic rule on a sound and satisfactory basis. But for the peace which he, with two slight exceptions, maintained, he could not have accomplished any of these great undertakings. His internal policy bears thus to his foreign policy the relation that effect bears

to cause. It is the latter, then, that in the first instance we must be prepared to consider.

No clear or distinct view can be taken of the foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence unless we connect it with the reappearance of Russia as an Asiatic Power. Whatever may be the merits or demerits of Sir John's policy, that policy has been decided upon and carried out with a full knowledge that Russia has been and is making rapid strides in the conquest of Central Asia—that she has occupied Samarkhand, and is marching by the route which Alexander followed when he aimed at the Indus. The policy adopted by Sir John Lawrence has been variously described according to the views and inclinations of those who have written or spoken of it. By those who believe that it is the destiny of England to move onwards—that a long continuance of the *status quo* will be the signal for the decline of her power—it has been stigmatised as a policy of inglorious and fatal inaction. By others, who believe in its wisdom, it has been spoken of alike as a policy of 'masterly inactivity,' and as a policy of 'defence and not defiance.' Now this is a most important question. It is not too much to say that the future of British India depends upon the policy we may adopt with reference to the action of Russia in the East. The system initiated by Sir John Lawrence has, it is true, given India already five years of peace and material prosperity. But if that system be a wrong system—if it be clogged with all those inherent

vices to which its enemies are constantly drawing attention—if it be inglorious to the British name, and fatal to British interests—if it has sunk us to the lowest depths in the estimation of the people of Central Asia and our own subjects and tributaries, as its opponents say it has, then it will be impossible to deny that those five years of prosperity have been dearly purchased, and that a continuance of the system must end in our ruin. It is thus, we repeat, a most important question—a question that demands the most careful consideration. Before, then, we pronounce an opinion on the policy adopted by Sir John Lawrence, we propose to review very briefly the progress made by the Russians. Proceeding, then, upon the idea that the progress of Russia in Central Asia has for its ultimate object an attack upon British India, we shall proceed to enquire as to the courses we might have adopted, which we might adopt still, to check them; and to examine in some detail the system inaugurated and steadily pursued by Sir John Lawrence.

The Cabul expedition of 1839–41 had been undertaken to act as a counterpoise to the supposed aggressive designs of Russia upon that country. Although that expedition resulted in defeat, disgrace, and loss of prestige to us—a loss of prestige which the occupation of Cabul by Generals Pollock and Nott in 1841 did not entirely remove—yet for many years after its conclusion but little was heard of the designs of Russia in the East. There can now be no doubt that, whatever



hopes may have been entertained by the Emperor Nicholas prior to 1839 on the subject of an eastward extension of his empire, he abandoned or suspended them subsequently to that period, deeming, possibly, either that the time had not arrived when a blow for the possession of Hindustan could be struck with success, or that the previous possession of Constantinople would increase tenfold the resources at his disposal for striking such a blow, and would in itself be more easily attainable. His efforts in an easterly direction were confined, therefore, to breaking down the barrier presented by the heights of the Caucasus, by the subjugation of the race of warriors by whom those heights had till then been held and defended.

These efforts were continued with greater or less vigour till the breaking out of the Crimean war. On the whole the Russian attacks were not very successful. The strongholds of the Caucasus were held by the mountaineers, and in many a sharp contest the illustrious Schamyl could boast that he had put the Russian legions to flight. The Russians, on their part, accounted for their scanty success by alleging the dislike of their generals to bring to a speedy conclusion a war at once so profitable to themselves and so fruitful in appointments to those concerned in it. Under the actual circumstances it was regarded by Europe without jealousy, being looked upon rather as a means of affording a convenient exercise-ground for the

Russian army, than as being likely to open out new fields of aggrandisement.

In 1854 the Emperor Nicholas, deceived by the aspect of affairs, and holding too cheaply the position acquired by the Emperor he regarded as a *parvenu*, struck his blow for Constantinople. It failed. But, though it failed, the results of the war were not altogether disastrous to Russia. The capture of Kars more than balanced, in the minds of the people of Persia, Arabia, and Central Asia, the effect of the loss of Sebastopol. From the peace negotiations the Russians drew still greater advantages. Whilst the representatives of the French Emperor exhausted courtesy and compliment to make of the enemy with whom they had been so lately contending a sure and fast friend, England, incapable of looking beyond Europe, abandoned the trans-Caucasian provinces to the mercy of Russia, and left to that Power an unchecked and uncontested supremacy in the waters of the Caspian.

The results of this policy soon made themselves abundantly manifest. Freed by the peace of Paris from the Crimean war, abandoning avowedly her designs upon Turkey, Russia almost as avowedly declared her intention thenceforth to labour at extension in the direction of the south-east. Nearly simultaneously with this demi-official avowal, about 150,000 troops were hurled against the passes of the Caucasus.

This time there was no mistake. The troops were

inured to war; the generals had been tried in the then recent campaign of the Crimea, and the *mot d'ordre* had been passed from St. Petersburg that there was to be no playing at soldiers. Under such circumstances the result was never for a moment doubtful. Less than three years after the conclusion of the peace of Paris, Schamyl was a prisoner, the strongholds of the Caucasus had been stormed, and the mountaineers who had so long bidden defiance to Russia, to avoid submission to the conqueror, had fled from their native homes, and sought refuge in the dominions of the Sultan.

All this time Russia had been gradually, almost impalpably, working her way across those low undulating plains which lie between the Alatan range and the river Seer or Jaxartes. Creeping up gradually to the banks of this river, she prepared in 1863, or, as Prince Gortschakoff declares, she was forced by circumstances, to make a spring beyond it. The Khanate of Khokand, with a population of three millions, was the first object of her attack. The capture of the important city of Chemkend brought her into collision with the troops of Bokhara—a collision which resulted in the defeat of the latter and the capture of Tashkend. For the moment Russia was satisfied with these conquests; but in 1866 the war was renewed, the town of Khojend, the key of the Jaxartes, captured, and the Khanate of Khokand entirely subdued—one-half of the conquered country

being at once incorporated by the conqueror, the remaining moiety placed under the administration of a native chief, dependent upon Russia.

That country had now become the nearest neighbour to Bokhara. Under the pretext of protecting his recently acquired territories, the newly appointed commander, General Kaufmann, established a fortified post at a point almost within reach of Samarkhand. This constituted a challenge which the Amir of Bokhara could not refuse without sacrificing his independence. He accepted it and was beaten. The consequence has been the occupation of both Samarkhand and Bokhara by the Russian troops. By the latest accounts the Russian outposts were within two hundred and sixty miles of Balkh. The distance by road from Balkh to Peshawur *viâ* Cabul is less than four hundred miles. The events of the last few years, the aggressive Russian policy, which has for the moment culminated in the capture of Bokhara, has reduced the distance between the British and Russian outposts to less than seven hundred miles.

This, at least, is the actual numerical distance, but practically it is much less. For the districts of Balkh and Kunduz, which lie between Bokhara and the frontier of Affghanistan, would follow without a struggle the fortunes of Bokhara. The invader who possessed Bokhara would have little difficulty in establishing himself in all the countries which were tributary to, or dependent on, that kingdom. Practically,

then, the only country between the Russian outposts and the British frontier which would offer opposition to the foreign invader is the country bounded on the north by the Hindoo Koosh, on the east by the Suliman range, on the west by Khorassan and Persia, on the south by Beloochistan—and that is the country known as Affghanistan.

This consideration invests Affghanistan with very great importance, and imposes upon us the necessity of reviewing the affairs of that country during the past four years, with special reference to the action taken by the late Viceroy of India in dealing therewith.

Six months before Sir John Lawrence assumed the government of India, Dost Mahomed, the able ruler whose firm and energetic character had imposed his will on the people of Affghanistan, and whose stern justice had gained their confidence, died at Herat. He was succeeded by his third surviving son, Shir Ali Khan, then forty years of age. This succession was at once recognised by Sir William Denison, then acting as Governor-General, pending the arrival of Sir John Lawrence.

We will not complicate the story of the events that followed by the introduction, more than we can avoid, of names foreign to an English ear. It will suffice to state that, although all the brothers of the new Amir acknowledged at the time the validity of the act by which he succeeded his father as ruler of Affghanistan, many months did not elapse before, one after another.

they rose in rebellion against him. The contest that followed may be said to have raged without any material intermission from the month of April 1864, three months after the arrival of Sir John Lawrence in Calcutta, to the month of December 1868. It has therefore been conterminous with the rule of Sir John Lawrence. In fact, during the entire period of his holding the office of Viceroy, Affghanistan—the only important kingdom between our frontier and the Russian outposts—has been subjected to all the horrors of a desperate and bloody civil war.

It is scarcely necessary for us to state more than the result of this war. Shir Ali Khan at first succeeded in striking a severe blow at the rebels by defeating them in the decisive battle of Kughbaz on June 6, 1865. But the loss of his favourite son in this battle ‘clouded all the joy of victory,’ and plunged the Amir in such a state of lethargy that for months he paid no attention to his affairs. In this state he remained at Candahar, indifferent to all around him; not roused to action even by the intelligence that his enemies, regathering heart and reinforced by levies from Turkistan, were marching upon Cabul, and that his own friends were falling off from him on every side. But at last, when his lethargy had seemed to have attained the condition almost of confirmed lunacy, the news of the occupation of Cabul by the rebels excited him to action. He levied troops, marched towards Cabul, occupied Kelat-i-Ghilzi and Ghuznee, and then

advanced to meet the Turkistan army. On May 10 he assaulted it with great vigour in its intrenchments at Shekhabad. Though several times repulsed, he returned again and again to the assault, and it is stated his perseverance was on the point of being crowned with success when his Candahar followers suddenly went over to the enemy. This decided the battle, and Shir Ali fled towards Ghuznee, followed only by 500 horsemen.

The result of this defeat was to place upon the throne of Affghanistan the eldest brother of Shir Ali, Mahomed Afzul Khan, then about fifty-six years old. Shir Ali, however, by no means acquiesced in his elevation. Fleeing to Turkistan, he managed to levy a force of about 24,000 men, and with this threatened to march upon Cabul. But his nephew, the son of the Amir in actual possession, with a true military instinct deserving of success, advanced against the vanguard of the invading army, separated by a day's march from the main body under Shir Ali. He encountered it on September 13, 1867, at Killa Alladad, and completely defeated it. Shir Ali, utterly disheartened, fled into Turkistan.

But his brother, Mahomed Afzul, did not long survive his victory. He died on the 7th October following it. Nor, although the next brother in order of birth, Mahomed Azim Khan, succeeded to the supremacy, did he hold it long. In January 1868 Shir Ali left Turkistan for Herat, advanced on Candahar in the

month of June following, and was received by the people as a deliverer. On August 21 the Bala Hissar was stormed by his generals, and he was proclaimed ruler of Affghanistan. He himself shortly took up his residence in the capital, and the most recent accounts inform us that he has succeeded in inflicting upon the only remaining adversary possessed of power and influence a complete and crushing overthrow. Indeed, the next claimant to the throne has since taken refuge on British territory. All the authorities combine in believing that the power of Shir Ali may now be regarded as firmly established in Affghanistan.

The five years' civil war in that country has thus resulted in consolidating the power of the chieftain originally nominated as the successor to Dost Mahomed, and in either ridding the country of his rivals, or in satisfying the feudal lords of their incapacity for the office of supreme ruler. The Shir Ali of 1869 is thus stronger, more influential, more to be dreaded as an enemy or to be courted as an ally, than the Shir Ali of 1864. It is requisite for British interests that the ruler of Affghanistan should be strong, that he should possess a dominant influence over his nobles, and that, fulfilling these conditions, he should be friendly to us. Now, apparently, those conditions have been fulfilled. Shir Ali is strong and influential. It is for us now to enquire whether the policy of Sir John Lawrence towards Affghanistan in her nearly five years of anarchy



and civil war has been of such a nature as to make it the interest of the ruler of Affghanistan to be our friend or our enemy.

For, in whatever light we may regard the progress of Russia in Central Asia, this is the all-important consideration. With a friendly Power on the Hindoo Koosh, occupying the mountainous country intervening between that range and our frontier, any invasion of India by Russia could have but one result. We do not believe that any other result would ensue if that Power were gained over for the moment by Russia; yet undoubtedly such an alliance would enormously increase our difficulties. It is our interest, therefore, so to act with reference to Affghanistan that the ruler and people of that country may be brought to regard their interests with respect to Russia as identical with our own, as governed by the same principle, and standing or falling according as they may or may not be identified the one with the other.

Now, to secure this great result, it is obvious that the first end which it should be the aim of our policy to accomplish is to instil into the minds of the Affghans complete confidence as to the purity of our intentions. It is essential that they should be absolutely certain that under no circumstances will we be tempted to advance our present frontier, to annex one rood of their territory. So long as the faintest suspicion is implanted in their minds that we intend to repeat, even on the smallest scale, the policy of 1839,

they will continue to distrust us. They will judge us according to our acts. We may protest as much as we like about the purity of our intentions, and those intentions may be as pure as the driven snow, but if we advance even a mile beyond our present frontier, confidence will be impossible. We have already shown<sup>1</sup> that when, in February 1857, in obedience to the instructions of the Governor-General of the day, Sir John Lawrence, then Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub, met the Amir, Dost Mahomed Khan, at Peshawur, the Amir distinctly refused to allow an English embassy to proceed to Cabul, stating that the fact of his sanctioning such a scheme would most certainly undermine even his great influence with his chiefs. He added that nothing lay more at the heart of the Affghans than that we should abstain from all interference in their internal affairs, and that nothing would more surely rouse the nation as one man than any such interference. He with difficulty consented to allow a mission to proceed to Candahar; and it is a fact that, during their residence in that city, the officers of the mission were in imminent danger of their lives. The Affghans, in fact, recognise our present frontier as our rightful frontier; but nothing would so surely convince them of our intention to extend it as any move, even the slightest, material or diplomatic, in the direction of Central Asia.

This being the case, we will now proceed to examine

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* Part I. p. 52.

the policy of Sir John Lawrence during those five years. We shall take the opportunity of adverting specially to the temptations by which he was assailed, by which, in all probability, his successor will still be assailed, to act otherwise—to act, in fact, in a manner which, by identifying us with one or other of the rival parties, would force us to interfere in the internal affairs of the country.

When Sir John Lawrence assumed the viceroyalty of India, British interests were represented at the Court of Cabul, in accordance with the treaty of 1857, by a native agent. After Sir William Denison had recognised Shir Ali, that Amir transmitted to our Government, through our native agent, the following propositions :—

(1) That he should be furnished with six thousand muskets.

(2) That his eldest son might be alluded to in correspondence as the Heir-Apparent.

(3) That a certain Mohammedan, who had been sentenced in Calcutta to seven years' transportation for receiving stolen property, and whose brother was a high official at the Court of Cabul, should be pardoned.

These propositions were brought to Peshawur by our native agent in person, accompanied by a chief in the confidence of the Amir. Our Government refused the muskets, but granted the two other conditions. Our agent did not then return to Cabul, but remained

at Peshawur, leaving the British agency at the capital in charge of a munshi or secretary.

When the civil war broke out the strictest instructions were given by the Governor-General that whilst in no case an asylum should be refused to political refugees, yet that care should be taken to prevent the hatching of any plots in our territory against the existing Government. In fact, the principle was to be enforced of combining hospitality to men who had been unfortunate with the strictest loyalty towards the actual Government of our neighbour. This principle was strictly acted upon throughout the war.

When, in the beginning of 1866, affairs began to look bad for Shir Ali, and his son, Meer Ibrahim, was actually being besieged in the Bala Hissar, the munshi attached to the British agency was sounded by that prince as to the probability of Shir Ali obtaining material aid from the British. The question was put in the most astute and diplomatic manner. Meer Ibrahim assumed that the force then besieging Cabul, and which had been raised in Turkistan, was secretly supported by the Amir of Bokhara and the Russians; and he asked whether that circumstance would not induce the British Government to come to the aid of Shir Ali. The munshi prudently replied that his instructions did not allow him to discuss the question. He transmitted it, however, to the British Commissioner at Peshawur. A few days later and Shir Ali's cause was apparently lost for ever. The

munshi, at an audience to which he had been summoned by the victorious brother, congratulated that prince on the part of the British Government on his success. This act on his part was at once disavowed by the Governor-General, who thus wrote : ‘ It should be our policy to show clearly that we will not interfere in the struggle ; that we will not aid either party ; that we will leave the Affghans to settle their own quarrel ; and that we are willing to be on terms of amity and goodwill with the nation and their rulers *de facto*.’ Sir John did not, at this period, regard the cause of Shir Ali as lost.

About the same time the chief of the family of the late Shah Soojah, on whose behalf we had entered Affghanistan in 1839, applied to the Government of India for a loan to enable him to endeavour to recover possession of that country, or, in default of that, for permission to undertake an expedition for that purpose whilst he still remained a British pensioner. He based this request on the rumour which had reached him that our treaty with the ruler of Affghanistan had lapsed. It is almost needless to state that this petition was not listened to by the Government of India. The heir of Shah Soojah was, amongst other things, informed that any interference on his part, or on the part of any member of his family, in the internal affairs of Affghanistan, would lead to the cessation of his pension.

Meanwhile, the cause of Shir Ali having been

apparently lost—that prince having fled to Turkistan—and Mahomed Afzul Khan having obtained complete possession of Affghanistan, Candahar and Herat for the moment excepted, the munshi in charge of the British agency at Cabul was authorised to present himself to that prince, and to offer him the usual congratulations. Encouraged probably by this, Mahomed Afzul wrote to the Governor-General to notify his accession to power, and to express a hope that the British Government would continue to manifest towards himself the friendship it had formerly shown to his father. The reply of the Governor-General was characterised by the same determination not to embroil his Government in the internal affairs of Affghanistan, by which his previous minute had been marked. He expressed his sorrow for the calamities which had befallen the great house to which the Amir belonged, and the wish of himself and his Government that the country should constitute itself under the strong rule of a representative of that house. But he added that, having already recognised Shir Ali, who still maintained his position in Candahar and Herat, it would be inconsistent with the fame and reputation of the British Government to cancel its recognition of that prince. He concluded by stating that if the course of events should bring the whole of Affghanistan under the sway of Mahomed Afzul, he would be at once recognised as *de facto* ruler by the British Government.

It would not appear that this letter was altogether satisfactory to the Amir, for we find him during the year, either by himself or through his brother, endeavouring to press his claims upon the British Government. First he strove to cast all the blame of the recent proceedings upon Shir Ali. When the Governor-General declined to act as arbiter in such a case, he then held before the British agent the certain prospect of a Russian invasion of Affghanistan. To this the Governor-General replied that Russia and England being friends, Russia would certainly not attack a country allied with the British. In the course of the following winter Shir Ali was defeated and fled to Herat. Thereupon Mahomed Afzul again renewed his application to the Government of India. In complete accordance with his previous policy, Sir John Lawrence, after expressing his sorrow for the continued dissensions in Affghanistan, stated that so long as Shir Ali held Herat he must recognise him as ruler of that district, but that he was equally prepared to recognise Mahomed Afzul as ruler of Cabul and of Candahar. He also proposed to replace the munshi by a Mohammedan gentleman of rank. This was carried out a little later in the year, although, in consequence of the death in the interim of Mahomed Afzul, the agent was accredited to his successor, Mahomed Azim Khan.

When, after a brief struggle, Mahomed Azim was overthrown, and Shir Ali, on September 11, 1868,

made a victorious entry into Cabul, the policy of the British Government continued to be regulated by the same cautious and guarded principles. The Amir himself expressed no dissatisfaction at the recognition accorded to his rivals when they actually had possession of the kingdom, but repeatedly urged his strong desire to renew friendly relations with the British Government. On one or two occasions, indeed, he complained that we had not assisted him in his contest for empire, and had shown him no sympathy in his misfortunes. But these complaints were of a sentimental and informal character. They were invariably accompanied by references to the friendship that had of late years so happily existed between the two Governments, and by emphatic declarations that he had never swerved from that friendship, nor looked to any other Power for support. To prove the truth of these asseverations, and to cement still further a good understanding between the Governments, he gave the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaub to understand, that it would be to him a matter of great pleasure if the Viceroy would accord him an interview on the frontier.

To a wish so freely and so spontaneously expressed Sir John Lawrence at once responded, and a letter from the Viceroy to that effect was despatched to Cabul. But before it reached its destination the face of affairs in that capital had altered. It had become clear that Shir Ali would have to fight one more



battle before he could consolidate his authority. Once again recruited in Turkistan, the nephews of the Amir were marching on Cabul from the westward, and his presence was indispensable to ensure their repulse. He felt he could not, at such a crisis, make a journey to Peshawur without risking his recently acquired authority. He therefore was compelled, unwillingly, to decline the interview.<sup>1</sup> The negotiations which preceded it brought about, however, a better understanding than had before existed between Shir Ali and the British Government; whilst the events of the preceding five years satisfied him that under no temptation would that Government avail itself of the internal feuds prevailing in Affghanistan to advance beyond its own frontier, or to do more, whilst those feuds continued, than recognise the *de facto* ruler of Affghanistan, whoever he might be.

This, then, was the policy, the generous and common-sense policy, pursued towards Affghanistan during the five years when Russia was pushing her conquests towards the south-east, and whilst Affghanistan was torn with anarchy. This was the policy pursued, in spite of taunts from the party of action that it was an inglorious policy, in spite of opinions expressed by

<sup>1</sup> This interview, the reader may remember, actually took place a few months later with Lord Lawrence's successor. Lord Mayo, with that tact and courtesy for which he is so remarkable, conducted it to a successful issue; and, under his auspices, our relations with Affghanistan promise to be placed upon a most friendly and secure basis.

men acquainted with the India of twenty years ago that it was a feeble policy. Many and various have been the alternatives proposed. Some have advocated the extension of our own frontier, and the occupation of the valleys of Khost and Khurram, a position which would virtually command Cabul. Others, again, have insisted that we should supply Shir Ali with European officers, guns, small arms, ammunition, and a large subsidy. Others, that we should accredit a European envoy to the Court of Cabul. Others, that we should establish, at any cost, a dominant position at Cabul, so as, by diplomatic means, if possible, to bring about a quasi-protectorate of the country; to cover our western frontier by the occupation of Quetta; to recover our lost ground in Persia, by sending our capital into that country, and drilling and officering her armies. In fact, the burden of all the amendments to the course adopted by Sir John Lawrence is that we should interfere, in some shape or other, in the internal affairs of Affghanistan.

Now, the principle of Sir John Lawrence's policy has been non-interference. Knowing, from the mouth of the late Amir, Dost Mahomed, the shrewdest and most experienced Asiatic ruler of the present century, how bitterly the princes and people of Affghanistan would resent any interference in the internal affairs of their country, that the very suspicion of such interference would reawaken long-buried animosities, and would annihilate all confidence in the disinterested-

ness of our motives, Sir John Lawrence has tried the effect of an honest and loyal conduct, announced to the Affghans beforehand, and steadily adhered to under all circumstances, and in spite of every temptation to act differently. The civil war consequent upon the death of Dost Mahomed had been predicted by that Amir himself, and foreseen by everyone familiar with the past history of the country. But no one could foresee (it has only recently been indicated at all certainly) which of the rival candidates would obtain the supremacy. It is easy to see, then, what a store of troubles we should have laid up for ourselves if we had assisted any one of the contending parties during their desperate struggle. If, for instance, we had sent material aid to Mahomed Azim when Shir Ali was a refugee in Turkistan, that aid might indeed have enabled Mahomed Azim to repulse, for the moment, the attack made upon him by his brother, but it would have shown him to the Affghans as a man resting upon the support of infidels, and this alone would have sufficed to ensure his fall; it would have invested the name of Shir Ali with a halo of popularity, and have had the certain effect of turning the eyes and hearts of the people of Affghanistan towards Russia as their deliverer. The same effect would have been produced had we assisted any one of the brothers. It would have cut off the possibility of friendship between the Affghans and ourselves. Any such interference, in fact, would have recalled vividly

to the minds of the Affghans the days of Shah Soojah. Nor, if we had only deputed a British envoy, would their suspicions have been excited to a less degree. For no maxim has become more familiar to Asiatic minds than this—that the arrival of an envoy is but the prelude to the despatch of an army; nor would the Affghans have failed to recall the fact that the peaceful mission of Burnes was followed, after a very short interval, by the warlike preparations of Sir John Keane.

Sir John Lawrence, moreover, had no great faith in the stability of character or capacity for ruling of any of the sons of Dost Mahomed. The eldest, Mahomed Afzul, showed himself, during the brief period of his rule, utterly incapable of controlling the nobles or of conciliating their support. He was devoted to the forbidden pleasures of the wine-cup, and devoid of all real capacity. The second son, Meer Azim, by his oppressive exactions and tyranny, managed, in a few months, to alienate all classes from his rule. The third son, Shir Ali, the reigning Amir, is a man of no steadiness of character; he is liable to sudden impulse, and is a slave to his caprices. The lethargy, amounting almost to insanity, into which he fell after his first victory, lost him for the time the kingdom; whilst his subsequent harshness towards his ablest followers drove them to conspire against him. It is true he is for the moment victorious, and, the country being exhausted by a five years' contest, the chances

are in favour of the permanency of his rule. But we have seen how he, when seemingly crushed, rose again from the dust; and, considering the number of brothers and nephews who still decline to recognise his supremacy, no one dare predict that he may not be hurled from power as rapidly as he gained it. Looking to these chances, to his character, to the character of his brothers, the conclusion seems unavoidable that the British Government would have been mad to identify itself with the cause of any one of them.

What, we may ask now, has been the result of the policy actually pursued—the policy of non-interference? It has certainly gained for us the confidence of the Affghan people. They cannot help admitting that, at a period when every temptation was offered to us to do what we liked in their country, we have scrupulously adhered to our engagements. They are convinced that we are satisfied with our present frontier; that our professions of a disinterested regard for their independence and friendship are so far sincere, in that we look upon their independence as the best guarantee for the safety of our own frontier, and their friendship as the surest mode of hindering and defeating any designs that Russia may harbour against ourselves.

Whilst our policy of non-interference has thus been appreciated by the Affghans, from the three Amirs who have by turns ruled in Cabul during the last five years to the mountaineer to whom freedom is

life, it has not less benefited ourselves. Instead of squandering our resources, as we must have squandered them had we interfered, they have been zealously hoarded. All the possible routes by which an invading army could enter the Punjaub have been carefully scanned, and the position of our arsenals, magazines, and fortresses has been regulated accordingly. Lahore, which, in the course of the current year,<sup>1</sup> will be in direct railway communication with Calcutta, and—except for a space of 161 miles—with Bombay likewise, will be joined also to the Indus and Peshawur. The campaign of last October in Hazara showed how quickly a force could be concentrated for mountain warfare on the frontier, even without a railway, and the completion of the line from Lahore to the Indus will render this still more easy. We have, besides, on the frontier, troops inured to fighting in the passes; we have mountain-trains and mule-batteries; we have men acquainted with every inch of the country. These men, these troops, these batteries, are ready for action on the ground which they know, and which an enemy must pass over before he can invade Hindustan. Every one of these advantages would have been lost by interference in the affairs of Affghanistan.

Even if we were prepared to sacrifice the friendship of the Affghans, and to extend our frontier by occupying the valleys of Khost and Khurram, we should still lose by the arrangement. We should greatly

extend a frontier already 800 miles in length; we should plunge into an enormous expenditure for new cantonments and new forts; our native troops would not appreciate the long absence from their families thus entailed upon them; and, though we might command Cabul, our troops would be positively cut off from employment on those other invading lines, which, under such circumstances, a Russian enemy would probably take.

In another manner, likewise, our resources have been greatly husbanded. Sir John Lawrence's policy of non-interference has secured peace and prosperity to the empire. The full extent of the advantages thus reaped by the people of Hindustan, and by the English and foreign traders dwelling in the country, will be more fully detailed when we come to discuss his internal administration. It will suffice here to indicate that if we had become embroiled in a frontier war, not only would internal reforms and the construction of remunerative public works have been postponed, but confidence would have fled from the bazaars and the money markets, the Government would have been driven to borrow at high rates of interest, the value of all property would have fallen, and encouragement would have been afforded to all the plotters and discontented in the country.

We may then not unreasonably conclude that a policy which has given the country five years of almost unbroken peace, which has succeeded in

convincing the most suspicious nation in Asia of the sincerity of our non-aggressive professions, and has thus given cause to that nation—itsself the only independent barrier between us and the Russian outposts—to feel that in case of an attack from the north they can identify their cause and their interests with our own—we may, we say, conclude that such a foreign policy, tested by its results, has been a prudent policy—a policy which, far from lowering the *status* of England, has immeasurably raised it in the eyes of the people of Central Asia.

The policy displayed towards Affghanistan will appear the more sound when we recollect the opposite policy pursued towards the peoples of Central Asia during the same period by Russia. In 1864 the Khan of Khokand sent an envoy to the Governor-General, demanding aid against the Russians. To entertain such an idea would have been madness, for Khokand is watered by the Jaxartes, and was conterminous with the Russian frontier. The Khan was accordingly informed by letter that his country was too distant to be aided, and he must look to his own resources for the maintenance of his power. In 1866 Khokand had virtually ceased to exist as an independent Power. The next country on the route to India is Bokhara. The Amir who ruled it was, in the same year, brought into hostile collision with Russia, and was defeated. He then applied to us for aid, though reluctant to do so in consequence of the base murder, nearly thirty years



before, of our envoys Stoddart and Conolly, a murder yet unavenged. But if we could not aid Khokand, neither, for the same reasons, could we assist Bokhara. We could do neither without embroiling ourselves in the affairs of Central Asia, without engaging in a war with Russia, a war in which all the advantages would be on the side of our enemy. We were compelled, therefore, to refuse the assistance asked for. Since that period Bokhara has virtually succumbed. We could not aid those Powers, on account of their distance from our frontier, by reason of the fact that their preservation was not necessary to our welfare, and because, likewise, if we had been foolish enough to waste the resources of Hindustan to save them, we probably should not have succeeded. But it is far otherwise with Affghanistan. That country is on our frontier; it is our advanced post; we dare not allow it to fall into the hands of Russia. Who can believe, then, that, with the examples of Khokand and Bokhara before it on the one hand, and the proofs, the positive proofs, of our non-absorbing policy on the other, Affghanistan would hesitate as to the side on which, in the event of a Russian invasion, she would cast the weight of her power?

For the benefit of those who may care to note the precise opinions of Sir John Lawrence himself on the subject of our frontier policy, we extract a passage from the speech he made on the occasion of the farewell dinner given to him by the civil and military

services in Calcutta, in which he fully expressed his own views on this important question:—

‘I have been taunted,’ he said, ‘with maintaining a policy of inaction and supineness, and with indifference to the progress of events in Central Asia. I emphatically deny the allegation. I have very carefully watched all that has gone on in these distant countries. It is true that I have resolutely set my face against any proposal which, in my judgment, appeared to have a tendency to draw the Government of India into active interference in the affairs of Central Asia. I feel sure that it will prove, unless circumstances change entirely, a cardinal error if we take such a step. Such interference must, sooner or later, involve us in hostilities there, either with the people or with their enemies—probably with both. Our true policy is to avoid such complications; to consolidate our power in India; to give to its people the best government we can; to organise our administration in every department on a system which will combine economy with efficiency; and so to make our government strong and respected in our own vast territories. On the western frontier we should be especially strong and ready, but without interfering in the internal concerns of the adjacent hill tribes, except when it becomes necessary to do so, in order to maintain peace and security. Active interference in the complications of Central Asia would almost certainly lead to war, the end of which no one could foresee, and which would involve

India in heavy debt, or necessitate the imposition of additional taxation, to the impoverishment of the country, and to the unpopularity of our rule. On the other hand, by standing fast as long as may be possible on our own border, we can be ready to meet invaders with advantage. Invasion may never come, but if it do come, it should find us well prepared to repel it. If we send agents into remote countries where the government is rude, and the people bigoted and lawless, we subject them to ill-treatment and insult, which we must be prepared to punish by force of arms. I know how strong and how admirable is the spirit of enterprise and devotion which would prompt hundreds of my countrymen cheerfully to incur such risks; but we must look to the national consequences that may result, and I for one cannot say that they justify sanction to such undertakings.'

The great merit we claim for the foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence with respect to Affghanistan is this: that, without wounding the national pride of that suspicious people, whilst even soothing their susceptibilities, and holding firm throughout to the pledged word of the British Government, he made it abundantly clear to them that, in the event of an invasion from the north, their independence as a nation is bound up with the cause of the British; that only by a faithful adherence to their alliance with us will they be able to preserve that independence intact. We are ourselves satisfied, and we think the candid reader who has

followed us so far will admit, that under none of the alternative plans favouring interference, diplomatic or otherwise, in the affairs of the Affghans, would such a result have been possible.

We have devoted so long a space to the explanation of the foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence on our north-west frontier, not only because that policy has been, as it were, the key to his internal administration, but because we are confident that the retirement from office of one so firmly pledged to that policy, with whom it was a conviction not to be shaken, will give encouragement to the party of action to renew their efforts. We must now turn for a brief period to the consideration of the working of that policy on other points of the empire.

When Sir John Lawrence arrived in Calcutta in January 1864, he learned that an envoy had been despatched by his predecessor to the Government of Bhootan, a mountainous country lying to the north of the extreme eastern possessions of British India, in order to negotiate for the cessation of the frequent kidnapping of British subjects carried on by the Bhootanees on the frontier. Three months later, intelligence arrived that the mission had failed, that our envoy had been grossly insulted in open durbar, and only allowed to depart on the condition of signing a treaty whereby a portion of the British territory adjacent to Bhootan should be made over to that country.

This was a result always to be expected from the despatch of a mission to a barbarous or semi-civilised nation. The envoy is always liable to be killed, as were Stoddart and Conolly at Bokhara; to be imprisoned, as were Mr. Rassam and his fellow-captives in Abyssinia; or to be grievously insulted, as were Mr. Eden and his companions in Bhootan. Any one of these results entails on the Government employing the envoy very serious consequences. They must either put up with humiliation and disgrace, or they must go to war. Those who are so clamorous in favour of the despatch of a European mission to Cabul would do well to remember the contempt that was heaped upon us by the inhabitants of Central Asia for failing to avenge the deaths of Conolly and Stoddart, and the expense, trouble, and in one case the loss of life, entailed by the expeditions to Bhootan and Abyssinia.

With respect to Bhootan, Sir John Lawrence exhausted every expedient to avoid hostilities, and at the same time to redeem British honour. He suspended the annual payments or rents theretofore made on behalf of certain lands at the foot of the Bhootan range held by the British Government, declaring those lands to be forfeited; and he gave the Bhootan durbar three months to consider whether they would comply with the terms of which the insulted envoy had been the bearer, failing which, further measures would be taken.

The Bhootan Government continuing indifferent to the threats of the Governor-General, and offering no satisfaction or apology, Sir John Lawrence was forced, towards the close of the year, to carry into execution the alternative he had announced. He accordingly sent a force into the country in four columns, to occupy the four points commanding the fertile ranges whence the Bhootanees drew their supplies. The occupation had been successfully accomplished, and the expedition triumphantly concluded, when the commander of one of the columns allowed himself to be driven by a contemptible force of the enemy from the position he occupied. This mishap, however, only delayed the day of reckoning. In a few months the recaptured post was stormed at the point of the bayonet, and before the end of the year the Bhootanees, dispirited and humbled, had agreed to all our terms, had restored the treaty they had forced from our envoy, and had given material guarantees for their good behaviour for the future. From these material guarantees, consisting of the low lands which supplied them with food, we agreed to return them a certain percentage of the produce in money, to enable them to live. By this arrangement, which was ignorantly carped at at the time, we retained in our hands the power of at any moment bringing them to their senses by stopping their supplies. We should here state that so determined was the Governor-General to leave in the hands of the Bhootanees no trophies of their temporary

triumph over our troops, that, against the advice, it is said, of more than one member of his Council, he insisted on the restoration of the guns, which had been abandoned by our soldiers in their retreat from Dewangiri. When military red tape seemed to magnify the difficulties attendant upon the carrying out of this course, he wrote with his own hand a letter to the officer commanding our most advanced party—an officer whom he knew well, and upon whose energy and daring he felt he could rely—and authorised him to act. An advance was at once made, and in a few days the guns were restored.

On no other point of our enormous frontier has any decided political action been called for during the past five years. In British Burma, however, an opportunity has been offered of carrying out on a smaller scale, and on a less important frontier, the principle of non-intervention by which the policy on our north-west frontier has been characterised. In 1866, two years after Sir John Lawrence had assumed his office, a rebellion broke out in Mandalay, the newly built capital of the independent Burman Empire. This rebellion was headed by two of the King's sons. They, with their followers, suddenly surrounded the Summer Palace, and put to death the Crown Prince, with two other princes and one of the ministers found therein. The King, for whom the same fate was intended, had made a timely escape on foot, accompanied by some of his queens, to the large palace within the city walls.

The success of the rebels was, however, but temporary. Their first act was to besiege the city palace, but the arrival of a body of loyal troops compelled them to raise the siege. They then seized the royal steamer, and proceeded in it to within eighty miles of the British frontier, hoping to raise fresh troops. Being attacked *en route* by two Burmese steamers which had just arrived from Rangoon, they continued their course into the British territory, and surrendered to the British Chief Commissioner, Sir Arthur Phayre. It is a curious illustration of the anarchy which underlies all Eastern despotism, that the son of the murdered Crown Prince, on his father's death, took up arms at once, not against the murderers, but against the King, hoping, doubtless, to reap some profit from the general confusion. He was, however, after some time, defeated, captured, and finally, on the failure of an attempt to release him, executed in 1867. Our agent at the Court of Ava, Captain Sladen, succeeded in rescuing from the same fate others who had been implicated in the revolt. The King of Burma had been, apparently, so far sensible of the loyalty of the conduct of the British Government during the insurrection that, in November 1867, he acceded to a proposition, repeatedly and vainly urged upon him by Sir A. Phayre, and again pressed upon him by that able officer's successor, Colonel Fytche, to reduce all the frontier duties to a uniform rate of five per cent., and to abolish all royal monopolies, except those on earth-oil, timber, and precious stones. He at the same time



gave his sanction to the deputation of Captain Sladen and other officers to the Chinese frontier, to endeavour to reopen the trade between China and Burma, estimated some years ago at half a million sterling, but now quite extinct. In both these instances the conduct of the King has been questionable. He has not adhered to the commercial treaty, almost all the old monopolies having been retained. The expedition under Captain Sladen left, indeed, Mandalay for Bhamo in a royal steamer on January 13, 1868. It reached Bhamo in due course, and after a vexatious delay of a month proceeded to Pousee, within eight miles of the frontier Shân town of Mauwye. Here all sorts of obstacles were placed in the way of its further progress. These, however, having been overcome, the party advanced through the Shân states to Momein, their journey through these states resembling an ovation. At Momein they remained a month and a half. We might pause, had we time, to dwell for a brief space on the tempting description of this town and the surrounding country, given by one of the non-official members of the expedition. But we must confine ourselves to state, that the prospects of the renewal of the trade are described as being most encouraging, provided only that the opposition of the Burmese authorities can be overcome. The expedition has just<sup>1</sup> returned to Rangoon, rich at least in experience, and sanguine as to the future.

On the extreme west of our possessions in India, in

<sup>1</sup> 1868-9.

the Persian Gulf, some complications have indeed ensued, but they have one and all been brought to a satisfactory termination, thanks to the loyal policy of our Government. The threatened raid by the Wahabee Amir on our ally the Imaum of Muscat, has yielded to the attitude taken up by the British Resident, Colonel Pelly; and though it may be said that Muscat has passed through two revolutions during that period, one of its sovereigns having been murdered and the other dethroned, our relations with it were suspended only for the period when the complicity of one of its temporary sovereigns in the murder of his predecessor and father was generally believed. Our alliance with that state has for its object the protection of commerce and the suppression of piracy and the slave trade in the Gulf. These objects have been steadily adhered to. Indeed, so lately as 1867, some important chiefs who had engaged in a predatory attack on a neighbouring province were punished by heavy fines, and the forced surrender of all their armed boats. It may be truly asserted that never was British supremacy in the Persian Gulf more recognised than at the present moment. The operations against the slave trade have been distinguished by equal activity, the Sultan of Zanzibar having, under the auspices of the British Government, taken the most stringent measures for its suppression.

We have described at some length the more salient points of the foreign policy of the past five years;

because, we repeat, the foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence has been the key to his internal administration. By this we mean that the reforms he accomplished in the administration of the country would have been impossible had he followed any of the aggressive lines of policy which were thrust upon him from so many and such influential quarters.

Prominent amongst those administrative reforms may be mentioned the settlement of the land tenure question in the important provinces of Oudh and the Punjaub. Sir John himself evidently regarded this settlement as the crowning measure of his viceregal career. At the public dinner given to him prior to his departure from Calcutta he thus alluded to the subject: 'It is,' he said, 'a source of much satisfaction to me to feel that the important questions connected with the tenure of land in Oudh and the Punjaub have been brought to a settlement.' That settlement was a source of satisfaction to Sir John because it was a means of blessing to hundreds of thousands of our native fellow-subjects. We do not propose to enter at any length upon a subject which has been the cause of acrimonious controversy. The object we have in view will be better attained by a recital of the bare facts, leaving it to the unprejudiced reader to draw his own conclusions therefrom. With regard to Oudh those facts may thus be briefly stated:—

When, in 1858, the capture of the city of Lucknow had placed the province of Oudh at the feet of Lord

Canning, that nobleman, to punish the large landowners for their rebellion, authoritatively declared that they had forfeited their title to the soil. In order, however, to establish in the province a landed aristocracy holding directly from the British Crown, Lord Canning subsequently restored the confiscated estates, for the most part, to the ancient holders, called talúkdars, but upon the entirely new tenure of direct and complete dependence on the British Crown. In this way the act of confiscation, intended originally as a punishment, became the means of attaching the talúkdars of Oudh to the British Government.

When, towards the close of 1858, the greater part of the talúkdars had tendered their submission to the British Government, and received back their estates, Lord Canning set himself to devise such a settlement as would secure the property to the talúkdars, and at the same time preserve the village occupants from extortion. In the first instance, what is called a summary settlement was made, to be in force for three years, by which time, it was hoped, the regular settlement might be effected. All the subordinate rights in the land were reserved to be dealt with by the regular settlement.

It so happened, however, that the Chief Commissioner of Oudh for the time being, anxious to calm the minds of the talúkdars, fearful lest the reservation of any rights whatever might breed discontent and mistrust, believing too that the summary settlement

had been conducted with the greatest possible care and in accordance with the principles laid down by Lord Canning, on the completion of that settlement in six months, declared it to be final; he declared, that is to say, that no one should be considered to have any right in the soil of Oudh whose title had not been recognised under the summary settlement. It could not but happen, and it did actually happen, that a settlement intended only to be temporary, carried out in the brief period of six months, and suddenly on its completion declared to be permanent, should perpetrate some injustice. But it was declared to be law, and the reason for not reopening it for a rehearing of undoubted claims was thus summarily stated by the Chief Commissioner: ‘The Chief Commissioner cannot see the use of giving the village proprietors hopes of a rehearing at next settlement, if, after having then ascertained, what everyone knows already, that they are the rightful proprietors of the soil, we are to tell them that our policy will not permit us to recognise their claims.’ The question lingered, unsettled, during the remainder of Lord Canning’s incumbency of office, and Lord Elgin died before any formal decision had been arrived at. The matter was, in fact, still pending when Sir John Lawrence arrived in Calcutta as Viceroy.

Sir John early directed his attention to the subject. He found that while Lord Canning had conferred large rights on the talúkdars, he had expressly stipu-

lated that all existing rights should be respected. It appeared clear to him that this stipulation would fail to be carried out if those whom he regarded as hereditary tenants were, by a stroke of the pen, deprived of their hereditary rights, and placed in the position of tenants-at-will. It appeared to him, in fact, that it would be a monstrous injustice. Almost the first question he put to the Chief Commissioner had for its object to ascertain what measures had been adopted for the preservation of the rights of the hereditary tenants. To this question the Chief Commissioner replied, in the first instance, by stating that the tenants in question had only a sort of modified right, which the talúkdars would not object to maintain; but, about three weeks later, he wrote to say that his former letter had been founded on a mistake, for he had ascertained that the *status* of hereditary tenant was unknown in the province of Oudh—that, in fact, no such rights existed. Upon this reply, Sir John Lawrence, not satisfied that any sufficiently searching enquiry had been made on the subject, and convinced that the previous action of the Oudh administration had prevented any claimants from coming forward, directed that provision should be made for the ‘impartial hearing of all such claims.’

Such was the beginning of what is known as the Oudh controversy. It originated, we have seen, in a determination on the part of Sir John Lawrence to do justice to all classes, to slur over the claims of none. Many hard things were said of him at the time; but

if we reflect that all he ordered was ‘enquiry’—enquiry as to the validity of certain rights—we shall be unable to resist the conclusion that he was most unjustly abused. For either the enquiry was necessary, or it was unnecessary. If it was necessary, that is at once a justification for having entered upon it; if unnecessary, then the views of those who opposed him would receive by its failure the stamp of indisputable correctness. One thing at least is clear, that it would have been highly unjust to adjudicate regarding the claims of thousands without full and sufficient enquiry.

We do not propose to follow, step by step, the course of the enquiry; it will suffice if we state the result.

It was ascertained beyond a doubt that whilst, under the old *régime*, the power of the landlord was absolute—the tenant possessing no power of appeal against enhancement of rent—yet that, practically, fixity of tenure very generally ruled with respect to a certain class of tenants. These were the descendants of expropriators, the clansmen of the talúkdars, Brahmins, and Rajpoots, and long-established and substantial cultivators. But although these classes enjoyed for the most part hereditary privileges, it was made abundantly clear that these privileges were based in no way upon the law of the land, but were due to the favour of the landlord and to the custom of the country. At the same time, it had to be taken into consideration that, under its native sovereigns, the province of Oudh

was subject to continual anarchy, and it appeared legitimate to conclude that privileges long enjoyed, though only by the favour of the landlord, in an almost lawless society, ought now, when an order-enforcing rule was inaugurated, to be secured by law to those who had enjoyed them. This, at least, was the view taken by Sir John Lawrence, and he determined that, so far as lay in his power, justice should be done to all classes.

It was not, however, till the middle of 1867, and after much recrimination on the part of the advocates of the talúkdars, that the matter was finally settled. In the beginning of 1866 a new Chief Commissioner had been appointed to the province, and by the exertions of that gentleman a settlement was arrived at on the following terms: 1st, That no new rights were to be created by the Government of India; 2nd, That the privileges heretofore allowed as an indulgence to all cultivators who had once been proprietors of lands should be confirmed and placed on a legal footing. It was, moreover, declared that all cultivators should be entitled to consideration on account of improvements made by them, if any attempt were made by the landlord to oust them or raise their rents.

This, then, was the result which Sir John Lawrence obtained for the cultivators of Oudh, by his energy, persistence, and strong sense of justice, in spite of the opposition of the servants of his own Government, and, for a long time, of the talúkdars themselves. It was



a result which ensured the goodwill of the poorer classes and the tranquillity of the province, which preserved to men who had once held, and, under the anarchical native government of Oudh, been dispossessed of, large properties, the smaller privilege of still renting a portion of those lands at a fixed rate, not liable to enhancement, and made them free in their own persons from all fear of ejectment; which promoted the best interests of the land, by securing to all cultivators, even to the tenants-at-will, compensation for the improvements they might effect in the land held by them from the landlord. This last security constitutes undoubtedly the groundwork of a system advantageous alike to landlord and tenant, to the land and to the Government, and which might be advantageously extended over the country. It seems certain that but for his energetic action and determined perseverance one-fifth of the cultivators of Oudh, the ex-proprietors, would have been reduced to the *status* of tenant-at-will, and no encouragement whatever would have been held out to cultivators of any class, liable as they were to enhancement of rent or ejectment, to spend any portion of their hard-earned gains in the improvement of their holdings. The policy of Sir John Lawrence, whilst confirming to the talúkdars the rights guaranteed to them by Lord Canning, has given new life and fresh energy to the cultivators of Oudh, and has, at the same time, renewed and refreshed their soil.

In the Punjaub, a similar policy, though starting

from an opposite point, has been pursued. It had happened that when the first regular settlement was made in the Punjaub, as soon as possible after the annexation of that province, the rights of the hereditary tenants had been recognised with the full consent of the landlords. But, meanwhile, under the fostering rule of the British, the value of land increased, and by degrees the old landlords came forward to claim the right to the absolute disposal of their own lands. The question culminated in 1868. The claims of the landlords were supported by many of the officials of the Punjaub, and there can be little doubt that if they had been brought forward twenty years earlier, they would in many cases have been substantiated. But it appeared to Sir John Lawrence and to those who thought with him, that it would be highly unjust to disturb a settlement which had lasted for twenty years, which had guaranteed certain rights to the occupier, and on the faith of which the occupier had made those improvements in the land which had so greatly augmented its value. The landlord himself had spent no money on the land. Under the Sikh rule, and at the time of annexation, he regarded the question of occupancy as a question of minor importance. It was only after we had guaranteed to the cultivator, with the landlord's consent, a right of permanent occupancy under certain conditions, and after the fulfilment of those conditions, that the landlord came forward and preferred claims to the absolute

disposal of the land. The landlord, in fact, previously careless and indifferent, came forward to claim the right of reaping the fullest advantage from the labour of his tenants, and from the money spent by them on the land. Because Sir John Lawrence resisted this monstrous demand—because he showed himself determined to continue to the cultivators the rights guaranteed to them—he was charged with a design to sweep the landlords from the face of the earth. It is clear, we think, from the foregoing brief narrative, that such a charge could only have been preferred from a non-appreciation of the point at issue. Sir John made no attack upon the landlords; he simply defended the cultivators, the thews and sinews of the country, from being reduced to the position of serfs; he protested against their being handed over *en masse* to the tender mercies of the landlords, after having for twenty years enjoyed a certain limited right in the soil. According to his position, the *status* of the landowners was not worse than at the time of the annexation, whilst that of the cultivators has been greatly improved. For our parts, we cannot too much admire the firmness and sense of justice which successfully resisted the very serious and retrograde attempt to reintroduce the worst evils of the feudal system into our frontier province. That Sir John had no hostility to landlords as landlords is proved by the fact that almost the last act of his Government was to place in the hands of the talúkdars of Oudh the

easy means of effecting improvements in their property, and to restrain, in the interest of the whole body, the power unadvisedly granted to the head of a family, of alienating his whole property for the benefit of unworthy favourites.

His action with respect to the land was not confined to Oudh and the Punjaub. Before he left, a Bill was with his sanction introduced into the Council to grant to the cultivators in the North-West the power of effecting improvements in their holdings, and to insure them compensation for such improvements in the event of their being ejected. In the present state of the law, no tenant, even in times of drought and distress, has the power even to sink a well without obtaining first the express permission of his landlord.

Amongst other principal measures by which the administration of Sir John Lawrence has been strongly marked, we may mention irrigation works, military and other works, railways, telegraphs, the cultivation of cotton, sanitation, education, and the elevation of the poor. To these, as well as to his financial policy, we shall now briefly refer.

Perhaps in no country in the world is there a greater absolute necessity for irrigation works than in India. There are, all over the country, vast tracts of soil naturally arid, intersected by no river, and dependent for their power to produce a crop upon the regular downfall of the periodical rains. In the event of a deficient fall of rain, or of its early cessation, the

inhabitants of these districts are reduced to distress, often even to famine. Visitations of this nature, when they have come, have led to the most terrible calamities. The loss of revenue to the state thereby caused, great as it has sometimes been, sinks into utter insignificance when contrasted with the enormous amount of mortality, of suffering, and of misery which has resulted from them. Of late years, the impossibility of entirely warding off such results, after the rainfall has proved deficient, has become apparent, and Government has been forced to seek for other means of providing beforehand against the chances of such deficiency. Such means obviously suggested themselves in irrigation. Before the time of Sir John Lawrence, the necessity for introducing a scheme of this nature throughout the country had never, apparently, been fully appreciated by the Government of India. It is true that under the rule of Lord Dalhousie the Ganges canal had been completed and brought into operation. The Ganges canal, however, even if its construction had been as correct as in some respects it was faulty, would have benefited only one narrow strip of the country, and that not the part of it in which artificial irrigation was most required. In point of fact, however, owing to the nature of its construction, the benefits derivable from the Ganges canal are as yet only to be attained in a small proportion. The Jumna canal, the work of the Moguls, is very useful to the districts through which it passes,

but to those alone. In the Punjaub, the Baree canal, the work of Sir John Lawrence when Chief Commissioner of the province, has been fruitful of advantage to the cultivating classes. But these were isolated cases. Before the time of the viceroyalty of Sir John Lawrence no organised system of irrigation for the whole country had been decided upon.

It is only fair to those who preceded Sir John to state that in their time the subject had been thoroughly discussed, and the ground cleared for action. It happened, moreover, that, about the time of his assuming power, the influential parties who had long and noisily advocated the formation of private companies to undertake great works of irrigation, suddenly collapsed. The Orissa Irrigation Company, the commencement of whose operations had been heralded as the foundation of a new era, an era which should welcome the introduction of British capital into the country, suddenly confessed that the small amount of British capital with which they started had been exhausted, and that, unless the Government would assist them with funds, they must stop their works. No true friend of the people of India ever regarded this collapse as a subject for real regret. It is obvious that so important a matter as the supply of water to millions should not be left to the mercies of a joint-stock company hungry for dividends. No scheme would more surely lower the people to the position of bondholders to men who could give or refuse the first

necessity of life. The collapse of the supporters of so-called British enterprise was therefore in more ways than one an advantage. It cleared the ground for the action of Government, and it helped that Government to the resolution to retain a question so important and so vital in its own hands alone.

The action of Sir John Lawrence in the matter was likewise further stimulated by the terrible famine which occurred in Orissa in the year 1865-6. To his personal responsibility for the terrible results of that famine we shall refer further on. It must suffice to state here that if there ever was a spectacle which would have induced a Government to seek out, as promptly as possible, some means of providing for a deficiency of the rainfall, it was the spectacle of nearly three-quarters of a million of human beings dying from starvation, dying before the very eyes of the Government, without it being possible for that Government to save them from a fate so terrible.

But, whatever may have been the intentions of his predecessors, whatever may have been the stimulating action by which he was influenced, the credit of devising, partially carrying out, and leaving for his successor to finish, a grand scheme for generally irrigating the country, and thus rendering future famines impossible, belongs entirely to Sir John Lawrence. After a long correspondence with the Home Government he at length succeeded in forcing his views upon the Secretary of State, and he did not rest till he ob-

tained the sanction of that high official, first, to extend irrigation to every part of India liable to seasons of drought; secondly, to carry out the necessary works by the direct agency of Government; and, thirdly, to provide, by loans, all sums required to meet the outlay in excess of the amount available from the surplus revenues.

To carry out his scheme a separate branch of the Public Works Department has been organised, large additions have been made to the establishment of engineers, and the most careful discrimination has been exercised as to the part of the country to which the operations should extend.

It would be tedious to follow, step by step, the course pursued by the new department in all its branches. At the end of three years we find the arrangements completed for cutting a new canal to water the arid country between Agra and Delhi; Rohilkhund surveyed for irrigation purposes, repairs and improvements being carried out in the Ganges and Western Jumna canals without any interference with their actual power of supply; a new canal designed for the tracts of country west of the Jumna canal; a remodelment of the Baree Doab canal projected; a project considered for utilising the waters of the Beas, the Chenab, and the Indus; arrangements completed for intersecting the province of Oudh by canals, to communicate on the one side with eastern Rohilkhund, on the other with the North-Western



Provinces, and uniting with the canals of Tirhoot. Arrangements have likewise been considered for establishing lines of navigable canals, communicating with one another, on the whole series of works projected in Oudh, the North-West Provinces, and the Punjaub. In this manner continuous canal communication will eventually be established along a length of more than eight hundred miles.

Nor have the other parts of India been omitted. Arrangements are greatly advanced for the purchase from the Irrigation Company of the works commenced in Orissa, and projected on the river Soane; several great works have been carried out in Bombay; an extension of the canals derived from the Godavery, Kistnah, and Pennair rivers, in the Madras Presidency, has been projected; works have been restored in Mysore, and commenced in the Central Provinces; whilst in the well-watered provinces of Bengal and British Burma, arrangements have been made for the erection of embankments to secure the country from the river floods. All over our Indian possessions, in fact, the foundations have been laid of a system of which it has been truly said that it will be hereafter regarded as among those which have been most fruitful of good to this great country, and with respect to which it will be remembered that it was only possible to lay those foundations because the resources of the country were not squandered and wasted in useless wars, but were wisely husbanded to be spent for the

permanent benefit of the people whom Providence has placed under British rule.

If we turn now to military works, we shall see the same vigour and energy, the same determination to produce useful rather than showy results, by which the irrigation scheme is characterised. At seven of the principal stations in India new barracks for the troops of two and three storeys have been erected; at almost every other station they have been planned or are in progress. These barracks have been designed on one uniform plan, the object being to procure for the men the *maximum* amount of light, air, comfort, and, consistently with the usages of military life and the requirements of military discipline, of space likewise. They do not consist merely of sleeping-rooms; the ground-floors—in India the coolest floors, and always salubrious in the daytime—being designed as recreation-rooms, workshops, prayer-rooms, &c. The recreation-rooms are provided with newspapers, books, billiard and bagatelle tables, and with innocent diversions of every kind. Nothing, we are confident, has tended so much to the improved health of the soldier as the erection of these fine barracks supplied with the rooms we have described. The soldier has work, reading, recreation, everything a reasonable man can require, without, unless he be on duty, exposing himself to the rays of the tropical sun. Outdoor amusements are equally available whenever they can be enjoyed with impunity. Arrangements have been

made likewise for lighting up all these barracks with gas—in itself a most appreciable boon for men obliged to turn in at an early hour. In some barracks this reform has already been carried out.

Nothing proved more fatal to the lives of our women and children during the mutiny than the want of some fortified place to which they could repair on the first signal of alarm. Few who recall to mind the terrible catastrophe of Cawnpore will fail to imagine how different would have been the fate of our countrywomen had a stronger place been open to receive them than the two thatched barracks, in the midst of an open plain, to which they actually repaired. There are none, then, we may safely affirm, who will not rejoice to learn that, under the auspices of Sir John Lawrence, the recurrence of such a catastrophe has been rendered impossible. At almost all the stations occupied by British troops, especially at those in the vicinity of railway stations, small fortified posts have been planned, to which the sick, the women, and the children can betake themselves during an emergency. At larger stations, containing magazines or important stores, these fortified posts assume to a greater extent the character of a regular fortification.

Other important buildings, such as new powder manufactories, adapted to the improvements effected in that article, bullet manufactories, tanneries, and even in some instances quarters for officers, have been built or planned. An arrangement, originally intro-

duced by Lord Strathnairn, for employing European soldiers on road-making in the Himalayas, has likewise been carried out, to the great benefit of the troops, whose remarkable health and good conduct whilst so employed are unique in the history of India.

Amongst the civil works to which great prominence has been attached during the past five years we may especially mention the roads in Rajpootana and Central India, the improvements effected in the prisons, in the navigation of the Hooghly, and in the Calcutta port; the encouragement given to the plan for bridging the Hooghly, the sanction to the project for tunneling the Indus at Attock, and the erection of lighthouses on the eastern part of the Bay of Bengal. The question of river embankments, already referred to, is included under this head. And it deserves to be remarked that all the works that have been accomplished, including the non-productive military works, have been pushed on when there was every temptation to a Governor-General to economise, when our finances were at a low ebb, and when even the Secretary of State endeavoured to persuade the Government to slacken their energies in this particular. But Sir John knew too well the great need of India in this respect to listen to delay. Everything has therefore been pushed on with the utmost haste consistent with efficiency of workmanship.

We turn now to the railways. In this department, the main credit that can accrue to any Viceroy must be due to the vigour and energy with which the works

in progress may be advanced, and the sagacity he may evince in determining the direction which new lines ought to take. The railways in India are provided for by a capital subscribed by the public, but on which interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum is guaranteed by the Government. This system had been found in some respects inconvenient, and under the rule of Lord Canning an attempt had been made to substitute for it a system of subsidies. But the difficulties of raising money in this way were found so great that in 1866 a return was made to the guarantee system, and this will doubtless remain undisturbed for the future. Under the operation of this system, it will devolve upon the Government to provide the interest of the money laid out on all the lines for several years to come. Only when the profits of any line exceed five per cent. will any attempt be made by that line to reimburse the Government for the sums thus advanced. The great lines in India are, however, so remunerative that the reimbursement in full will be merely a question of time. The system, too, has this advantage, in that it enables Government to exercise a certain control over the several companies, the want of which, in a country like India, might have led to serious complications. It must be admitted, however, that this control is not so complete as might be desired.

The principal events connected with the railway administration of Sir John Lawrence may thus be stated:—In 1865, 116 miles of the Great Indian

Peninsula line, connecting Bombay with Calcutta, were opened. There were, in 1869, only 161 miles of roadway between the metropolis of India and its chief port on the western coast, and in the following year the whole line was made available for railway-traffic; in 1865, the line connecting Lahore with Mooltan, 208 miles in length, was opened to the public; in August 1867 the line, 223 miles in length, connecting Allahabad with Jubbulpore; in 1867, 54 miles, and in 1868, 120 miles, of the Delhi railway, were opened, thus connecting by rail Calcutta and Umballa, a distance of nearly 1,200 miles. In the course of 1870 this line was extended to Lahore and Mooltan, thus uniting Calcutta to the most important fortress on our north-western frontier. In 1867 Cawnpore was joined by rail to Lucknow, whilst before Sir John left India a chord line of the East Indian railway, joining the main line on the northern side of the Rajmahal Hills, was partially opened. The Eastern Bengal railway, leading towards the sanitarium of Darjeeling, and to the rich tea-countries of Assam and Cachar, has likewise been authorised to extend its line to a distance of forty-five miles. The railway connecting Calcutta with the new port of Canning has been taken over by the Government.

To the many projects discussed we have not space to refer. Under the instructions of the Secretary of State, received in 1867, a line connecting Benares

with Oudh and Rohilkhund was sanctioned, and the operations on it have already commenced. On the recommendation of the Government of India, this line has been likewise extended to Allygurh, a station on the East Indian Railway. Sanction has also been accorded to the construction of a line connecting Calcutta and Lahore with Peshawur. The advisability of this line in preference to others which were proposed was questioned at the time. Sir John himself was strongly in favour of completing, in the first instance, the connection between Mooltan and the great seaport of Kurachee, by constructing a railway from the former place to Kotri on the Indus, right through the province of Sind. He argued that it was far more necessary to open out a land-locked province like the Punjaub to the sea than to construct a railway which could never pay—which would only be useful in the event of Russian aggression. He did not believe in the probability of Russian aggression, at least for many years to come, and he thought it would be wiser, in the first instance, to attempt to develop the resources of the noble province he had so long ruled over, and the extent of which no one knew so well as himself. But those who see in every action of Russia a settled design to invade Hindustan carried the day, and the Secretary of State gave the preference to the frontier line, stipulating that this line was to be the property of the Government. The operations upon it have already begun.

We have made no allusions to the series of noble bridges spanning rivers beside which, in breadth, in depth, and in volume of water, the finest rivers of Europe assume the proportions of streams. We well recollect how it was confidently asserted, before railways were introduced into India, that it would be impossible to erect bridges over the Ganges, the Jumna, and the Soane, especially over the latter, with its extreme breadth in the rainy season, and its constantly shifting sands. There are now three magnificent bridges over the Jumna, and one over the Soane. There has been no reason yet for spanning the Ganges; but an attempt will shortly be made to bridge her principal arm, the Hooghly, near Calcutta, and there can be no doubt of its success. In every part of India the art of the engineer has asserted its triumph over the obstacles of nature.

This, of course, would have happened under any Governor-General, and we only allude to it by the way. For Sir John Lawrence, however, and undividedly for him, we claim the merit of carrying out a great and most necessary reform in the system of railway travelling, affecting the health, the comfort, and convenience of the poorer millions of our native fellow-subjects. Prior to his arrival in India, the harsh treatment and want of consideration for the third-class passengers had been most marked. They were huddled into their carriages as cattle are huddled into their pens, with this difference only, that in the



case of the natives, no care was taken to ascertain whether the carriages could hold all the number thrust into them. The Government of India had no power actively to interfere in such a matter, such subsidiary arrangements being left by law in the hands of the railway company. The urgent remonstrances of Sir John Lawrence had, however, very great weight; and by the introduction of a new class of carriage called the intermediate class, inferior to the second and superior to the third, which cannot be overcrowded, the comfort of natives travelling by rail has been greatly increased.

To sum up. During Sir John's five years' incumbency of office 1,556 miles of railway have been opened, and about thirty millions of capital have been spent; the number of passengers has increased from a little over nine millions per annum to nearly fourteen millions. In 1863 the gross earnings came to 1,720,000*l.*, the net receipts to 780,000*l.*; in 1868 they had swollen respectively to 4,487,112*l.* and 2,337,300*l.*, whilst the net annual payments had been reduced in the same period from 1,400,000*l.* to 800,000*l.* In fact, everything connected with the railways speaks of efficiency and progress.

Turn we now very briefly to the improvements effected in forest management. These may be said to date from the month of March 1864, when rules were for the first time laid down for the management of all forest business under the Government of India.

The necessity for forming a separate department in connection with forest management had been proved by the enormous consumption of wood required by the railway in the upper provinces for fuel, and by the very sensible diminution of the supply in consequence. The most energetic measures were required to introduce a scientific system for the planting of young trees to supply the places of those that had been cut down, and to organise a regular method of supply. For this purpose an inspector-general of forests was appointed; trained foresters have been imported from Europe; permission has been granted to officers on leave to study forestry in Europe, and young men have been sent from England to the Continental forest schools to be trained for employment in India, a plan which the Government of India has requested may be continued annually. At the same time, young men inured to the climate have been apprenticed in this country.

If the progress during the last five years has not been so rapid as might have been expected, and if the financial results have not, as yet, fully realised the expectations of the authorities, it must be remembered that the more accessible forests had been indented upon to so great an extent that, when the new department commenced its labours, they were much impoverished, and that it will be necessary to nurse them for some years to come. The principles of forest management were, moreover, new to all, and had to be

learned *ab initio*. The foundations of a successful system have, however, been laid, the principles of forest management are better understood, and the necessity of exercising a control over the forest resources has been generally acknowledged. It only requires the exercise of the same judgment and energy on the part of the forest officers, and of patience on the part of the authorities, to secure in a few years a forest revenue that shall be by no means contemptible, and a supply of wood for all purposes such as may be considered practically inexhaustible.

The telegraph is another of those great departments in which the progress during the past five years has been unprecedented. In this case, moreover, the progress has not been the result of the advancing prosperity of the country, but is the consequence of the care and attention paid to the department by the Government. When Sir John arrived in Calcutta, perhaps no other department was in so unsatisfactory a condition as this; when he left, no department was more efficient. The change has been made noiselessly, without any show of introducing a grand reform; it has followed the simple practical measures of reform introduced by Sir John Lawrence. The success of those measures is but another proof of the plain practical bent of his mind, of the directness of his purpose, of his preference of the useful to the showy.

The improvements during the last five years may thus be summed up. Whilst the increase in the length

of lines comprises only 505 miles, the total length of wire has risen from 11,661 to 22,567 miles, or nearly double. The cumbrous tariff, which varied with the distance to be travelled over, has been replaced by a simple system, according to which a message can be carried from one end of India to the other for one rupee, or two shillings; the average time of transmission has been greatly reduced; practical facilities have been offered to the public for sending messages to any part of the world; whilst the errors in the delivery of Indo-European messages has fallen from 38 per cent. in 1863, to 3 per cent. in 1868, at the same time that for Indian messages they do not average more than 1 per cent.

The civil war in America had given a great stimulus to the cultivation of cotton in this country, and great efforts had been made by the mercantile community and others to induce the cultivators of the soil to apply all their energies to the improvement of the Indian crop. Many facilities had also been afforded by the Government for the experimental sowing of the best sorts of foreign seeds in various soils. The result of these experiments was duly reported to the Secretary of State. But it appeared in the course of time that something more was required; that it would be desirable to constitute a link between the cultivator and the purchaser, and so to systematise the transactions between both. In a vast country like India it is always difficult to find out what is doing in every part

of it, and communication between districts is often so uncertain that it is possible that abundant crops of the same article should prevail in parts of the country not very distant the one from the other, without the inhabitants of either being aware of it. To remedy this defect—to bring the principal lands where cotton was cultivated under the survey of one mind—Sir John Lawrence appointed a Cotton Commissioner for the Central Provinces and the Berars in 1866. This appointment proved so useful in its results, that two years later the cotton-fields of the North-West Provinces were brought under the superintendence of the same gentleman. Sir John Lawrence has been sometimes accused of being hostile to the mercantile interests of the country. Yet we see him here giving his sanction to an appointment which, more perhaps than any other, opened out opportunities of legitimate enterprise to the merchant, and which foiled the plans of the speculator. Those who have had any experience of the extent to which gambling in cotton was carried on in the earlier days of the civil war in America, how many fortunes were gained and lost in the speculation, will scarcely regret that Sir John should have, by the appointment we have referred to, limited the action of the mere speculator, and, whilst encouraging that of the legitimate trader, have insured to the cultivator some share in the benefits of a rising market.

It may with truth be affirmed, that prior to the arrival of Sir John Lawrence in India its sanitary

condition had been entirely neglected; the country had been left, in that respect, without legislation. The consequences of this neglect were an utter unconcern on the part of high as well as low respecting a matter of vital importance to the lives of all. In the metropolis itself, the markets, the hospitals, the conservancy arrangements, had reached a condition below which it was difficult to fall. Nor was this all. In one of the principal hospitals of the city the spectacle had been allowed to pass unnoticed of a naked lunatic chained to a post in the very centre of the building, among the wretched sick, whose agonies were further disturbed by his unchecked howlings.

These and similar horrors had been passively suffered, without, apparently, one single effort having been made to bring about a better order of things. The very Sailors' Home, the only place in the town in which our seafaring countrymen could find a decent refuge, was situated in the worst part of the town, surrounded by dens of panders and prostitutes, of drink and debauchery, to whose owners licences had been granted to carry on their infamous trade. But Sir John had not been two months in India before he laid the foundation-stone of a better system. He established a new Sailors' Home in the best part of the town,—the money being provided partly by private subscriptions, to which he contributed munificently; partly by the proceeds of the sale of the old Home; partly by a grant from Government. He directed the formation in the

three Presidencies of Sanitary Commissions for the special object of searching out abuses such as those we have described, and proposing measures for their reform. These Commissions, existing in one form or another during his tenure of office, have been indirectly of the greatest advantage. Possessing no executive power, they have nevertheless brought to the notice of the authorities evils which had long been unchecked—a state of insanitation affecting Europeans as well as natives which had even been fostered. At their suggestion a scientific examination of the drinking water at all the stations has been instituted, and this has already borne abundant fruit. It has been proved beyond a doubt, that the carelessness prevailing as to the use of water for drinking purposes had been a prolific—perhaps the most prolific—cause of disease. Every sanitary question is now forwarded for their opinion, and the fruits of their counsel has been manifested in the decrease of sickness and mortality, alike in the barrack and in the jail, in the town and in the cantonment.

Another important subject to which his peace policy afforded him leisure to turn his attention is the education of the masses. It has been stated, and we believe it to be true, that the increased grant on this account during his tenure of office amounted to about 50,000*l.* per annum. We have not space to state in detail all that he accomplished in this respect. It will suffice if we indicate the direction in which his efforts tended.

It was his great wish, in this as in all other acts of his rule, to reach the masses of the people. None knew better than he, from bitter experience in bygone days, how those masses are tyrannised over, alike by the landlord and the petty trader. Uncultured and uneducated, they commence their course of life in bondage to the former, and end it loaded with the chains of debt to the latter. From such a vassalage no amount of legislation could raise those poor men. It was education alone that could elevate their condition, physical as well as moral, and it was to education accordingly that he had recourse.

Nor was this advantage confined only to the men. Female education was subsidised first in the Punjaub, and afterwards in the other provinces of the empire. Perhaps of all measures affecting the permanent good of the higher class of the natives of India this is the most important. So long as the wives of opulent landlords and rich merchants remain uneducated, so long will the husbands make no effort at all to break the bonds of obsolete customs. In an Indian household the wife is all-powerful. Though she may not appear in public, she pulls the strings which regulate the conduct of the husband. He dare not attempt any strange course, or adopt any new device, without consulting her and obtaining her approval. Even though he may have renounced for his own part the superstitions of Hinduism, he is always careful, when he returns to the threshold of his house, to conform to



its rites and tenets. This it is which has made the progress of the European reformer in India so slow ; but it may be accepted as an undoubted fact, that if the wives were once gained, the husbands would only be too glad to follow.

Acting, we do not doubt, on this conviction, Sir John Lawrence has encouraged, as far as he could, the cause of female education. In 1864 he authorised a grant of 800*l.* a-year for that purpose in the Punjaub. This grant was increased the following year by another of 1,000*l.* ; but the attention of the officers concerned was drawn to the necessity of endeavouring rather to lead than to drive, of acting quietly and unostentatiously, and, in no case, of exercising their influence to cause an official pressure upon the natives such as they could not resist. In 1867 a circular was addressed to all local governments and administrations on the subject. In this the Supreme Government declared it to be unadvisable for it to assume the entire responsibility of initiating and carrying out measures for this object, but announced at the same time its readiness to grant liberal assistance, to an indefinite extent, to any scheme based on the general co-operation of the native community. This offer was eagerly accepted by most of the local governments and administrations, and efforts were made, in the first instance, to provide normal schools for female teachers. In the following year the sum of 1,200*l.* per annum for five years was placed at the disposal of each of the local governments to

establish such schools in the three presidency towns. The work is at least well started, and requires now only to be vigorously maintained.

Whilst female education has been pushed on in this manner, every other branch of the department has felt the effect of the energetic influence at the head of the Government. The department has been reorganised all over India; a branch has been introduced into Burma; scholarships have been sanctioned, and great efforts have been made to induce the people to interest themselves in a cause fraught with so much benefit to themselves and to their children.

Amongst other matters of prominent interest which have been pushed forward during the past five years, but for separate comment on which we have no space, we may mention:—the reorganisation all over the country of the police; the establishment of charitable dispensaries and civil hospitals in British Burma; the complete reorganisation of the subordinate judicial department; the establishment of a Chief Court of Justice in the Punjaub, and the appointment of Recorders in Burma, a Judicial Commissioner in Sind, and Government law-officers in various parts of the country; the organisation of a system of meteorological observations along the coast of the Bay of Bengal and at the port of Calcutta. The list is by no means exhausted; many other reforms have been carried out, which, though in themselves important,

may perhaps be regarded as possessing minor interest for the general public.

We proceed now to notice the financial operations of Sir John Lawrence's administration. During this period of his rule, whilst the revenue has increased by about five millions sterling, the expenditure has been augmented only by four. This, in itself, may be regarded as a satisfactory result; but it will be seen to partake very much of that nature, when we state that the increase of expenditure has consisted in a great degree of an increase of salaries, consequent on the fact that the value of every article of necessity in the country has greatly increased. The sound basis on which the financial condition of the country rests may be inferred from the fact that, after charging the whole expenditure for barracks, irrigation works, special fund works, new transport ships, and the construction of the India House in London, against the ordinary revenues, there has been a net deficit of little more than two millions and a quarter. But the expenditure for the past three years on account of irrigation and special fund works has alone reached nearly two and a half millions; whilst the construction of Indian transport ships has amounted to more than a million; the payments on account of the India House to nearly half a million; and upwards of four millions six hundred thousand pounds have been spent in the five years on account of barracks. All these constituted extraordinary expenditure. Deducted from the

grand total, they would leave 6,300,000*l.* as the amount constituting the excess of income over ordinary expenditure in the five years just elapsed.

We do not propose to enter into a detailed account of the financial measures introduced during this Viceroyalty, mainly because, for these, the Finance Minister, not the Viceroy, is directly responsible. We will merely indicate the opinions entertained by Sir John Lawrence on several of the propositions that were discussed. A large party, for instance, advocated the expediency of imposing taxes which would reach all alike, their imposition being apportioned according to the consumption of each, rich as well as poor. In the eyes of these men, an increase of the salt tax and an imposition of the tobacco tax have found the greatest favour. But in the East salt is an article of the first necessity to the poor man, and tobacco is his solitary luxury. Ground down in many parts of India by his landlord, compelled to unremitting labour to support his life and the lives of those dependent upon him, the increase of taxation upon articles so necessary, the first to his existence, the second to the enjoyment of the few minutes of relaxation open to him, would, it seemed to Sir John Lawrence, have legalised oppression of the kind least to be borne. He knew these men well; he had seen the difficulties against which they had to struggle, the privations to which they were subjected, and he determined to protect them against a legislation ruinous to

them, ruinous, therefore, to the best interests of the country. It appeared to him that the imposition of such taxes was not justified by a solitary political consideration. For, whilst these wretched peasants were staggering along under a load of taxation such as nearly bent them to the earth, the wealthier middle classes, thriving under our rule and because of our rule, were absolutely untouched. They did not contribute a single stiver to the general revenues of the country, and only in the large cities were they assessed in a small amount for the payment of the police who protected their persons and their property. It was upon these men, in the opinion of Sir John Lawrence, that any new taxation ought to fall. He always contended that for India the perfection of direct taxation was an income tax, attended with exemptions below a certain income. It was his opinion that the incidence of this tax should be extremely light, but that its machinery, adapted to the people, should be working, so that, in the event of pressure, or in times of emergency, it could be increased at once to the desired extent. During his incumbency of office, however, the experiment in the form he would have preferred was not attempted.

We think we have now exhausted the list of the principal measures which his firm maintenance of peace enabled Sir John Lawrence to carry out during his five years' tenure of office. But for that peace all those great measures of irrigation, military and remu-

nerative public works, the education and elevation of the poor, the protection accorded to the cultivators, the opening out of new lines of railways and telegraphs, the encouragement of cotton cultivation and sanitation, would either not have been attempted, or they would have obtained a very much smaller degree of attention. Any effort made to extend the frontier of the empire in the north-west would most decidedly have claimed the undivided attention of the Governor-General and his Council. They would have had no time to attend to internal improvements. What is of even more consequence, they would have had no money. The carrying out of the least in magnitude of the schemes of the advocates of action—the occupation of the valleys of Khost and Khurram—could not have been accomplished at a smaller annual rate than two millions sterling. The money thus spent in five years would more than have swallowed up the amount laid out in great works of irrigation, railways, telegraphs, and the others we have enumerated. The uncertainty consequent on a state of war would have penetrated likewise to all the marts of India, and would have given encouragement to the disaffected everywhere. It would, whilst increasing our expenditure, have diminished our revenue. And, we may ask, for what? The answer is plain. To bring about a state of affairs on the frontier less secure, less durable, in every respect less satisfactory, than that which now exists. And to accomplish this result we

should have sacrificed all that internal material progress which we have endeavoured to describe.

It is not that Sir John Lawrence was ever neglectful of the honour of his country. The policy of his predecessor forced him into the necessity of chastising the insolence of the rulers of Bhootan, and most thoroughly did he lower their pride. He was a warm advocate of, he assisted so far as lay in his power, that expedition into Abyssinia which, carried out by a Tory Government, remains a monument of splendid foresight and masterly handling. Even towards the close of his career as Viceroy, he directed an expedition against some of the tribes on our frontier, which might have led, which all engaged in it hoped would lead, to a repetition of the Umbeyla campaign—that is, to hard fighting and much loss. But in this Sir John displayed his usual prudence. He made our force so strong that the enemy were paralysed, and fell back without fighting, giving in to all our demands. It surely argues a greater conviction of our supremacy in the mind of an enemy when he yields without fighting, than when, as at Umbeyla, he makes constant and repeated assaults on our position, deeming himself in those wild regions our equal. The after consequences of that campaign, almost bloodless though it was, cannot be doubted. Those who best know the frontier, civilians as well as soldiers, declare that its effect on the offending tribes cannot fail to be lasting.

It has been our object in the foregoing narrative to

show the uses which Sir John Lawrence made of the peace which he maintained. No account of his vice-regal career would, however, be complete without some reference to the great calamity by which the country was visited in the early part of it. We allude naturally to the famine in Orissa. Into the details of it we shall not enter. It will suffice merely to state that Orissa is a province on the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal, under the administration of the Lieutenant-Governor of the province of that name. Towards the close of 1865, the press and the missionaries had declared that famine, or at least great scarcity, was inevitable in Orissa, and had pressed upon the local government the necessity of importing grain. The members of the local government did not, however, believe in the famine, and being most of them pseudo-political economists, they pinned their faith in the axiom that a demand would always create a supply. No arguments could shake their faith in this great doctrine, although, having spent all their lives in Bengal, they must have been aware that for eight months of the year the south-west monsoon rendered very precarious all traffic with Orissa by sea, whilst the rains prevented communication for four months by land. Sir John Lawrence, who by no means shared their opinions, felt a vague sort of anxiety on the subject, notwithstanding the assurances of the local government, based upon reports from the spot,



that his fears were groundless. At last the Lieutenant-Governor himself visited Orissa. He returned in the month of March 1866, and reported to the Supreme Government that there was no prospect of famine; that there would be local scarcity and distress; but that to meet this special measures of relief had been carried out; that there was no necessity even for advancing money to the Orissa Irrigation Company; and that the natural fluctuation of prices had been sufficient to attract food to the districts in which it was scarcest.

This opinion, formed on the spot by the functionary responsible for the condition of the province, was of so decided a nature as to permit Sir John Lawrence and his councillors to proceed to Simla, free from any very great anxiety with respect to Orissa. But they had scarcely reached that place before Sir John's doubts returned, and he again mooted the question of the importation of grain. Letters in the various newspapers, which appeared about this time, aided to shake his confidence in the information he had received from the Lieutenant-Governor. His anxiety, however, was not shared by his councillors. These saw, on the one side, the vague and instinctive fears of the Governor-General, who had never visited the province, and who personally knew nothing of it; on the other, the positive assurances of the Lieutenant-Governor, who had recently visited the province, and

who was receiving daily reports from the officers in it. The result was, that the views of the Lieutenant-Governor were sustained.

Those views were held by the Lieutenant-Governor up to the moment when it became impossible to doubt the famine, and when it was too late to throw in grain in any quantities. Up to June 10, the Lieutenant-Governor had persisted that there would be no famine, and yet famine was even then in the land. The fact was, the Supreme Government was misled, undesignedly of course, by the ruler of the province in which the famine occurred, and who had given them all along the most positive assurances, based upon personal knowledge, that the famine was a myth. If we condemn Sir John for not acting on his instincts, we must affirm the proposition that no Governor is justified in accepting the reports of his subordinates. The fears based upon his instincts by Sir John were not felt by any of his colleagues. Had he acted arbitrarily, had he overridden his Council, he would have acted in direct opposition to the opinions of all the men of special experience in the country—and yet the event showed that he would have acted rightly. There is no doubt that had he stood alone, with no colleagues whom it was incumbent upon him to consult, he would have so acted. This was felt so strongly in England that it drew from Lord Cranbourne the remark that the Governor-General would have done better had he had no Council. This opinion will be

endorsed by all who have paid any attention to the unsatisfactory mode in which the cumbrous machine of Governor-General and Council worked during the five years of Sir John Lawrence's incumbency.

The fact is, that the Supreme Council in India requires in the Governor-General rather a master than a colleague. It has, however, been too much the tendency of recent legislation to place the Viceroy and his councillors more on a level of equality. This plan has not been found to answer badly when the Governor-General has been a nobleman, supported by a powerful political party at home; but under plain John Lawrence, who had risen from the same level as themselves, who had risen so high above them all, it caused oppositions and dissensions such as were felt far beyond the circle of the Council itself. It was just the sort of opposition that would have been looked upon as natural if Sir John Lawrence had been the immediate successor of Warren Hastings. Like that illustrious Governor-General, he, too, was brought into contact with men who, springing from the same level, though outstripped in the race, too much regarded themselves as his equals. Men who base their opinions upon the experience acquired by themselves in a long career in India are always unwilling to resign or to modify those opinions in deference to convictions founded upon the similar experience of another. And as in India there are at least two schools of thought holding principles in every respect opposite the one to the other, it follows

that when the disciples of these opposite schools meet at the same council board there can be no common ground between them, their principles being *ab radice* opposed. When the Governor-General belongs to one of these schools, and some of his councillors to the other, the difficulties of unanimity are increased. It has often been said that Sir John Lawrence is the last Anglo-Indian Viceroy. It may be so; and indeed, if ever there should arise from the ranks of the noble Indian services a statesman whose merits shall entitle him to sit in the seat of Hastings and of Lawrence, we can well believe that he himself would pause, and weigh, and ponder, ere he committed himself to accept a position which would most surely expose him to the half-hearted support—nay, even to the strenuous opposition—of some of those, at least, with whom he would be called upon to sit in council.

If physiognomy afford any insight into character, Sir John Lawrence is one of the highest order of nature's nobility. It is impossible to look at that square head, those deep-set eyes, the capacious forehead, the kindly smile lending an air of graciousness to features in themselves stern and rugged, without being greatly impressed in his favour. It is a head which expresses power, sincerity, deep convictions, thorough earnestness of purpose. This feeling is immensely strengthened when you enter into conversation with him. His views may not, indeed, be always your views, but they evidently express the

deep convictions of the speaker, and they are invariably supported by reason and argument. If the subject be India, you see how completely he is acquainted with every detail connected with its political situation—the position of the native princes, of the army, of the frontier; how thoroughly all the arguments offered in opposition to his own policy have been examined; what a deep conviction there is in the mind of the speaker as to the correctness of the course which he, after long consideration, has adopted. You see before you, in fact, a most honest, conscientious, and able Indian statesman, possessing greater experience of the mode of governing Asiatics than any living man; you find him provided with a reason—and though you may not agree with it, it is always a solid reason—for the line of conduct he has pursued in every particular; and you rise from your interview impressed with a conviction of his knowledge and sincerity, satisfied that you have been talking with one of the grandest men that ever lived—with one to whom, looking at his entire career, posterity will assign one of the loftiest pedestals in the temple of fame.

As a politician and an administrator, we believe Sir John Lawrence will always be regarded as one of the greatest men India has ever trained. Socially—and it is this which has made him so many enemies—he did not always raise himself to the level of his position—that is to say, with the best will in the world he made social mistakes such as those to whom they

referred rarely pardoned. He forgot men's names and faces ; he shook hands with the wrong man, and gave a distant bow to him to whom he should have been cordial. He did not mix with the crowd at his parties, but generally spent the evening in talking with anyone who had the assurance to address him. The fact is, he disliked large parties ; he was naturally shy and reserved, and he was too glad to allow people to do exactly as they liked under his roof. But these social mistakes were never forgiven—nay, in some cases they were treasured up against him to the hour of his departure. Then, again, although he was the most liberal of men—although he entertained munificently, and spared no expense in his household arrangements—although the amount expended in charity was enormous—yet his refusal to give a cup to the races, and some mistakes made by the members of his earlier staff, of which he himself had no knowledge, gave to the grumblers and cavillers an opportunity of which they eagerly took advantage. The mistakes alluded to were remedied at the earliest opportunity by a change in the personal staff, but their effect long survived. The solid armour of Sir John's own character was not, indeed, really penetrated by any of the darts by which he was assailed. That armour was proof against the most formidable attack ; it could not be injured by weapons, sharply pointed though they might be, hurled ' by the feeble hand of Priam.' But there were many such Priams.

It is strange that the greatest enemies of Sir John, himself a civilian, should exist in the ranks of the covenanted Civil Service. As a body, these grudge him alike the opportunities he has enjoyed and the honour he has gained. They are heartily glad that he has gone. This feeling is strong in Bengal proper, but it exists, in greater or less intensity, all over the country. We can only attribute it, on the whole, to the jealousy entertained by men generally of those who rise from their own level to a superior position, of which we have in England a striking example in the malignity with which the literary world has attacked the career of Mr. Disraeli. In the case of Sir John Lawrence it is perhaps not remarkable that the members of his own service who have shown towards him the least sympathy are, in some cases, men whom he has himself advanced, and advanced in spite of the public opinion hostile to their claims.

In the ranks of the army Sir John has many more admirers than in the body of the service to which he belonged. It is not that he has gone out of his way to do anything for the army. On the contrary, perhaps no previous Governor-General has endeavoured so much as he to divert the higher political appointments to the Civil Service. This has been keenly felt. It has not, however, been resented in a paltry spirit. On the contrary, even those who have seen the claims of inferior men preferred to their own have

done full justice to the conscientious motives of the Governor-General. They have recognised his absolute right to decide in such matters according to his own convictions of what was befitting, rather than according to their fancies. And even when they have personally suffered, they have not failed to admire the determination to act according to his own lights, without favour or affection, which has been one of the most marked characteristics of Sir John Lawrence's career. They have detected, moreover, in all his actions, that quick *coup d'œil*, that power of acting on the moment, of grasping a plan embracing many simultaneous operations, which so strongly marks a great military commander. His strong sense of justice has not less commended itself to their admiration; and they have appreciated to the full that superiority to petty routine which has prompted him to ask the advice of a junior officer, surrounded though he might be by the dullest mediocrities in the country.

By the native landowners Sir John, though really their greatest benefactor, was not appreciated. They regarded all his efforts to educate and raise the *status* of the cultivators as attacks upon themselves. They did not correctly appreciate the fact that to improve the condition of the masses was indirectly to benefit themselves. They adopted, therefore, that shibboleth so common among Anglo-Indians, 'What has he done for *us*?' and although he had in reality given them peace and prosperity—although he had taxed them but



lightly—although he had opened out to the best amongst them opportunities of public service—yet, because he had refused to tax the masses to their advantage, they replied, ‘Nothing,’ and condemned him.

It is necessary to a complete conception of the character of the late Viceroy that we should allude to one particular feature of it which is not generally known. We refer to the manner in which he regarded the criticisms of the public. We do not hesitate to assert that Sir John was extremely sensitive to the attacks of the press. This is easy to account for. He had not been trained in that rough public life through which an English statesman has to hew his path. As a young and rising civilian the press had never referred to him but to praise him. As Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub he had been held up by the press to the public as a pattern administrator. After the terrible events of 1857, the English press vied with the Anglo-Indian in endeavouring to do him honour. It was only after he had become Viceroy, after he had reached the highest point to which a subject could rise, that the tone of the Indian press changed. Then he was attacked; then he was loaded with abuse; then the merit of his past achievements was rudely plucked from him; then he was told that it was not he who had saved the Punjaub in 1857, but his subordinates in spite of him. These attacks were made, it is true, after he had refused to tax the masses rather than the rich; after

he had expressed his determination to protect the coolie labourer against ill-usage from his employer, the planter; after he had pronounced against an aggressive policy in the north-west, and in favour of a limited measure of tenant-right in Oudh. Sir John felt these attacks, and winced under them; they annoyed and vexed him, but not one of them affected his policy. No prospect of their cessation, and of a torrent of praise in their stead, altered a single measure in favour of which his convictions had been enlisted. Nothing more, perhaps, intensified the hostile feeling to him on the part of those to whose interests he would not subordinate his policy, than his practical indifference to public abuse.

And yet, notwithstanding this, when the day arrived for his departure from the country in which he had served with so much honour—which he had been, under Providence, the means of saving in 1857—a feeling of compunction seemed to steal over very many for the manner in which they had opposed him in his viceregal office. Some few, indeed, held as much aloof as they could consistently with the position they occupied, preferring to make their court to the rising sun; but the heart of the mass of the European population turned towards him with affection and reverence. The hearty cheers which greeted him as he stepped on board the vessel that was to convey him to the steamer told him that he had earned the respect which was not to be bought, that all calculations of self-interest had

given way to a reverence for the honest sincerity by which his rule had been characterised. Calcutta has seldom echoed back a more enthusiastic cheer than that which responded to the generous call of the new Viceroy as the yacht upon which his predecessor stepped was unmoored. There were few dry eyes on the landing-place; there were few who did not feel that a greatness, purely Anglo-Indian—a greatness in which they as Anglo-Indians could sympathise, in which they had a share—had departed from them.

This, we are confident, was no transitory feeling. It will increase with every year of his absence. Never will the memory of his long and varied career be forgotten. It will serve for ever as an example to those whom he left behind—to those who may follow him—an example to do their duty. And if, in the course of time, either by changes which cannot now be foreseen, or by a departure from that sure and steady line of policy with which his name will ever be associated, our north-west frontier should become the seat of war, or the fate of India should depend upon the result of a battle at Candahar, at Herat, or on the Hindoo Koosh, the thoughts of all will recur to the memory of the Anglo-Indian civilian under whose rule our resources were husbanded, our position maintained though not extended, and who was able, in the five years of his viceroyalty, to lay the foundation of a system of advancement, moral as well as material, such as cannot fail to knit together, and ultimately to unite, the

interests of the two branches of the great Aryan race, and to open out to the people of Hindustan a prospect of general education and enlightenment such as will give them knowledge, and with knowledge power—the surest guarantees against the oppression under which they and their forefathers have been ground down for centuries.

## *THE PRINCIPLES OF AKBAR.*

(WRITTEN IN 1867.)

OF the many thousands who visit every year the city of Agra, of the hundreds of thousands who poured into it last November<sup>1</sup> to witness the splendours of the vice-regal reception, held, if not in the ancient halls of the Moguls, yet on the plains which surround their whilom capital, there must have been some at least to whose imaginations the past, speaking out from marble tombs and deserted palaces, appealed with a force more than sufficient to drive away even the gorgeous spectacle of the present. There were few, we will hope, so unimaginative upon whose spirits the aspect of bygone grandeur, so plainly visible in the great buildings of Agra and its vicinity, did not make some impression. To a large majority of yearly visitors, indeed, in a greater or less degree, as they survey the splendid ruins of Futtehpoore Sikree, or the marble halls of the magnificent palace in the Fort, whence the edicts of the Emperor gave law from Affghanistan on the north-west to the extremities of Bengal to the eastward, whence he ruled Cashmire and administered even some portions of the Dekkan, this question must always present itself: ‘Who were these great sove-

<sup>1</sup> 1866.

reigns, these mighty monarchs, whose names are still household words among the Mohammedans of Hindustan, and the greatness of whose conceptions is evident to us by these magnificent monuments, by these splendid palaces, at which we, natives of another continent, claiming for ourselves almost a monopoly of civilisation, can gaze only with mixed wonder and delight? Who and what were these men? What means did they employ to conquer, to administer, to raise these lasting monuments of their sway?’

Who were these men? Who, at least, was the chiefest and greatest amongst them? The answer is to be found in the very name of the city in which the idea first occurs to the enquirer. Agra is but the old Hindu designation of the once capital of the empire of the Moguls. Under their dynasty it received another and a more significant name—a name that told the world who he was that had made it great, who had raised it from the lowly position of a Hindu village to the proud elevation of capital of Hindustan. That name was Akbarabad, the city of Akbar—of Akbar, the glory of the Moguls.

It is not our intention, on this occasion, to enter into a history of the place which Akbar thus delighted to honour—though that is a task which has never yet been attempted, and which loudly calls for a historian—nor do we propose even to offer a detailed account of the exciting events of the reign of that great monarch, each of them demanding long and

patient investigation. Be it rather ours to examine the system which succeeded so well with him personally, to glance at the principles by an adherence to which he built up, in a few years, a mighty empire—an empire which he transmitted intact to his son, and which he fondly hoped would descend as a complete inheritance to his latest posterity.

We are the more encouraged to take this view because it is beyond question that, whether we regard the liberality of his views, his love of justice, his care for his subjects, none of the monarchs who reigned over Hindustan ever approached Akbar; because likewise if we compare him with contemporary European sovereigns, he gains immensely by the comparison. So highly indeed are his elevation of mind, his freedom from prejudice, his grand conceptions considered even in the present day in the West, that his system of administration has been referred to as that which his English successors to the empire of Hindustan ought to study and follow. ‘Those who rule in India,’ wrote to us not long since an illustrious statesman, ‘should take lessons from Alexander and Akbar.’

Jeellal-ood-deen Mahomed Akbar, the grandson of Baber and seventh in descent from Tamerlane, eldest son of the Emperor Humayun and his wife Hamya-Bénou-Begum, was born on October 14, 1542, at Amer-kôt in the valley of the Indus. It was as an exile, and amid the inhospitable sands of an arid desert, that he first saw light. His father Humayun, though he

had succeeded peacefully to the inheritance of Baber, had, after ten years of almost constant warfare, finally succumbed, in 1540, to the superior strategy and influence of Shir Khan Sûr, and, having been defeated in a decisive battle on the Ganges near Canooj, had fled for his life to Lahore. Humayun, however, was doomed to experience the truth of the apophthegm that gratitude is but a sense of favours to come. It has but little respect for the past. A fugitive and helpless, all chance of recovering power seeming impossible, he found himself everywhere an unwelcome guest. From Lahore he fled to Sinde, thence, after some fruitless attempts to possess himself of Bukkar and Sebwān, to Jodhpore in Central India. Repulsed here, and fearing to be delivered up to the great antagonist of his family, Shir Shah, he attempted to make his way to Amerkôt, a fort in the eastern desert of Sinde. The horrors that attended his march to that place can scarcely be exaggerated. ‘Before he quitted the inhabited country,’ says Elphinstone, ‘the villagers repelled all approaches to their water, which was to them a precious possession; and it was not without a conflict and bloodshed that his followers were able to slake their thirst.’ But in the desert itself they had to endure greater sufferings than these. Sometimes it was absolute want of water, sometimes it was the attack of enemies. Exhausted and debilitated, suffering the horrors of thirst in all their terrible reality, one by one his followers succumbed. When at last he



came in sight of Amerkôt but seven of his party remained alive. Even then he was haunted by the fear that the chief of that place, who was a Brahmin, would refuse him admittance—a refusal which, in his case, would have been equivalent to death in its worst form. The reply, however, was happily favourable, and he was saved.

Not many weeks after his arrival Jeellal-ood-deen Mahomed Akbar was born. So straitened were his father's fortunes that, instead of the costly presents to his friends, customary on the birth of an heir to the house of Timour, he distributed amongst them his solitary possession, one pod of musk, accompanying the gift, however, with the significant wish that like the odour of that perfume, so might his son's fame be diffused throughout the world.<sup>1</sup>

It can well be imagined that the youth of one so highly bred, and born in circumstances so lowly, should be indeed stormy. The delights of ruling, once enjoyed, could never in those days be lightly given up; and even Humayun, abandoned by all but his Hindu protector, still dreamed of the palaces of Delhi and the lost sceptre of Hindustan. The thirteen years that followed the birth of Akbar were thus years of incessant warfare. The young prince may truly be said to have been bred up in arms. He was scarcely three years old when he was exposed to a hostile fire under the walls of Cabul. Thrice, before he had lived ten

years, was he the prisoner of his uncles, bitterly hostile to his father and to himself. But freeing himself in 1551, after the final defeat of his uncle Camran in that year, he joined his father, placed himself under his orders, and finally accompanied him in that triumphant march which, commencing at Cabul in January 1555, and culminating in June with a great victory over Secundur Sûr at Sirhind, terminated in the autumn in the capture of Delhi, and the restoration of Humayun to his ancestral throne. A few months later Humayun died, and his newly recovered territory, still bleeding from the contests for its possession, devolved upon his son Akbar, then but a few months over thirteen years old.

When this event occurred Akbar was in the Punjaub. He had been sent thither shortly after the defeat of Secundur Sûr at Sirhind—a battle in which he had so distinguished himself, and so greatly by his example animated his soldiers, that, it is said, ‘they had forgotten that they were mortal.’ There had accompanied him, nominally as his second in command, but really as his tutor and adviser, Behrâm Khan, a Turcoman by birth, distinguished for his talents, and whose fidelity to the cause of the legitimate representative of the House of Timour had been proved upon many a battle-field. On hearing of the death of Humayun, Akbar at once assumed all the ensigns of royalty. He found, however, that he had entered at best upon a disputed inheritance. Almost simul-

taneously with his accession to the throne, there came the news of the loss of Cabul and a great part of Affghanistan ; scarcely later, the startling intelligence reached him that Hému, the Hindu general of the last representative of the House of Sûr, had taken Agra and Delhi, and was preparing to consummate his victories by a march into the Punjaub. Behràm Khan, however, was equal to the occasion. Accompanied by the youthful Emperor, himself eager for the contest, he marched in the direction of Delhi, encountered Hému at Paniput—the second great battle of that name—utterly defeated and took him prisoner. After the battle we meet with a striking trait in the character of the young prince. Behràm had doomed Hému to death, and he wished that the prince should earn the title of ‘Champion of the Faith,’ by striking the first blow at one whom he deemed an infidel. But Akbar refused to strike a wounded enemy. He was deaf alike to the persuasions as to the entreaties of his general. And it was with a grief which his tender age prevented him from showing more openly that he beheld the irritated Behràm strike off the captive’s head with his own hand, exclaiming as he did so, ‘Ill-timed compassion will lose you an empire.’

We must bestow but a cursory notice on the military achievements that followed, singling out those only for special notice which serve to cast some ray of light on the character of our hero. The defeat of Hému had restored to Akbar the cities of Delhi and Agra, and

had left him leisure to turn his undivided attention to the troops of Secunder Sûr, then threatening him in the Punjaub. A campaign of eight months sufficed to quell this uprising, to deprive the insurgent leader of his strongest fortress, and to force him to retire to Bengal, to which the House of Sûr considered that they possessed a hereditary right. During this period, however, the virtual ruler was Behràm Khan. Akbar was still too young to take upon himself administrative functions, and he deemed it still prudent to submit himself to the counsels of one who was at least devoted to his dynasty and to his person. Nor can it be denied that the severe, stern, and resolute sway of the Turcoman nobleman was eminently adapted for troublous times. When, however, by the submission of the country, a merciful and consolidating policy had become desirable, and the counsels and conduct of Behràm still ran on in a course of stern and vindictive cruelty—when Behràm himself, ignoring the rising intellect of the young prince, still continued to treat him as a dependent and a nonentity—the cry of the country to be rid of a policy of severity and sequestration found an involuntary echo in the inmost thoughts of its monarch. Akbar, however, was pre-eminently of a noble and generous disposition. Behràm had adhered to his father in all his calamities; he had bound his fortunes to his own when his green youth prevented the possibility of his making head alone against the storms that threatened him. Even at this time he

did not doubt that the very faults which called forth the complaints of his nobles were the result of a too great zeal for his dynasty. Soon, however, he came to find that he would have to choose between his people and his minister. The persecution of private individuals, their banishment, often even their death, at the instance, often by the sole orders, of Behràm, caused a mistrust and discontent amongst the people, which even Akbar would soon have found it difficult to allay. Not even the most intimate friends of the king were safe against the minister's vengeance. Behràm in fact was virtually king, exercising his authority in a manner that tended to alienate the affection of the people from the rule of the Moguls. Once convinced of the dangerous tendencies of his minister's administration, Akbar felt that it was necessary for him to act promptly. He accordingly proceeded unexpectedly to Delhi, and issued an edict announcing his resolution to govern henceforth by himself, and enjoining on all the great officers of the empire to obey no orders but his own. Behràm, on his part, sensible of his helplessness in such a position, endeavoured first to mollify the king. But Akbar felt that it was better for him to be no longer connected with one who had so long enjoyed the sweets of power, and who had so misused its possession. He answered Behràm's submissiveness, therefore, by an exhortation to him to retire from power, and to seek, in a pilgrimage to Mecca, forgetfulness of the troubles and fatigues of a political career.

The sequel of this episode gives us another insight into that particular feature of Akbar's character which tended so much to his success. Behràm appeared to comply with the requisition, but, proceeding towards the Punjaub, raised the standard of revolt. Akbar marched against him, totally defeated him, and pursued him with such vigour that he was forced to throw himself on the mercy of the Emperor. In those old days—days in which stern retribution was considered to be the right, almost the duty, of the conqueror; when bloodshedding amongst competitors for power was a normal state of affairs—an ordinary man would have at once rid himself of so valiant a rebel. He indeed who should have sentenced him to simple death without torture or deprivation of sight would have been considered merciful. But Akbar was no ordinary man. He abhorred the shedding of blood in itself, still more especially deliberate slaughter, and his heart was sensible to noble and generous impulses to a degree that is uncommon even in this civilised nineteenth century. He could not endure the idea even of wounding the *amour propre* or of lowering the pride of one who, though he had slighted his orders and defied his authority, had once been his guardian and his friend. Instead, therefore, of receiving Behràm as a conquered enemy, he met him as his old comrade—as one whom he delighted to honour. He sent his nobles to receive him, seated him on his right hand, and bestowed upon him a dress of honour. Having proved his own ability

and felt his power, he no longer even hesitated to offer him employment and honours. Behràm, however, wisely reverted to the idea of a pilgrimage to Mecca. He was accordingly honourably conducted to Guzerat, but when about to embark thence for Arabia he was stabbed by an Affghan, whose father, years before, had been killed by his orders.

With the removal of Behràm from office there began the real contest for empire rather than the reign of Akbar. He was then scarcely eighteen years old, but he had been raised in the best of schools—the school of adversity. His personal appearance must have been very prepossessing. He is described as strongly built and handsome, delighting in the chase and manly exercises, but never so happy as when an occasion presented itself to indulge in acts of generosity and benevolence. His manners were most fascinating, and he always comported himself as a monarch. From prejudices, even from religious prejudices, he was absolutely free. To his love of justice and the means he took to enforce it we shall refer further on.

His task after the death of Behràm was no light one. Even then he was little more than chief among his nobles. Succeeding as he did to an empire won by force of arms, there was then no check but the power of the strongest to the action of individual ambition. The idea of services rendered, of personal acts of valour, the consciousness likewise of abilities, all tended to hold out to a man in those days of despotism

illimitable visions of power. Akbar thus found that, even in the ranks of his own victorious army, there were men who needed the lesson he had given to Behràm before they would be content to acknowledge him as the master whom they were bound to obey. It took him seven years to read them this lesson—so in fact to found his authority that his simple *fiat* should be regarded as a decree that must be carried out. Many were the contests with rebellious nobles and corrupt administrators within that period; but it was not less the clemency of the king after each victory than his energy, his valour and activity during the campaign, that tended to his ultimate success. Magnanimity on the part of a conqueror appeals with irresistible force to those instincts from which there are few natures so base as to be absolutely free. But at the age of twenty-five he was in reality master. Then it was that he determined to attempt the execution of the scheme that had been long maturing in his mind—a scheme prompted by a noble ambition—the desire of consolidating the various kingdoms of Hindustan into one great empire, so governed by sound and equal laws that a contented people would always be ready to rise up as one man against a foreign invader. For such a task there has seldom been born one more qualified than Akbar. An instinctive sense of right added to a profound judgment, a liberality based upon the truest kind of charity, a consummate knowledge of character, and a power of influencing others, combined



with activity, courage, and great military ability to fit him for the work of conquering and consolidating an empire.

The first step was to establish his authority in the territories he had acquired. This, we have seen, he accomplished. The second, to conquer the ancient dominions of the crown—to make them solid, compact, and self-adhering. With this object in view he first turned his arms to the great country of the Rajpoots—Rajpootana—with the rulers of parts of which—notably with the Rajah of Jaipore, who himself, his son, and his grandson held commands in the imperial army—he was in alliance. Oodypore alone had the hardihood to resist his army. But though Chittore, the then capital, was stormed, the Rana himself, and, after his death, his gallant son, Rana Pertab, refused submission to, and alliance with, the Emperor. All the other states of Rajpootana, however, recognised his authority. That once recognised, attachment to his person and his dynasty always succeeded. The reason was that his enlightened principles followed in the track of his army. No sooner had opposition to his authority ceased, than the wise laws insuring justice and toleration to all healed the wounds which conquest had opened, and reconciled populations to his sway. He knew no respect of persons. The Hindu had an equal chance with the Mohammedan for the great offices of state. The gorgeous temple stood side by side with

the graceful mosque—monuments of his toleration. Nay, to such an extent did he carry his wise liberality that when, in pursuance of policy, he married two Rajpoot princesses, the daughters of the Rajahs of Jai-pore and Meywar, he built for their use, within the fort of Agra, an edifice in the style and architecture of the Hindus, adorned with the emblems which they held sacred and suited for the performance of their worship. To avoid, however, giving occasion of offence to his Mohammedan subjects, the building was designed so as in its exterior to have all the appearance of a mosque.

The tone of the government of Akbar at this period, and the manner in which it was regarded by the Hindus themselves, is best illustrated by a letter which one of the princes of Rajpootana addressed to his great-grandson, Aurungzebe, on the occasion of the imposition by the latter of a religious tax—the Jezia, or poll-tax on infidels, which Akbar had abolished. ‘Your royal ancestor, Jeellal-ood-deen Akbar,’ wrote the Hindu prince, ‘whose throne is now in heaven, conducted the affairs of this empire for fifty years with firmness and justice, watching over the tranquillity and happiness of all classes of his subjects, whether they were followers of Jesus, of Moses, or of Mohamed; whether they were Hindus, or materialists, or believers in accident or chance. All enjoyed, to the same degree, his favour and protection; and thence it is that the various populations

under his rule, in gratitude for his paternal care, have decreed to him the title of “Benefactor of Mankind.” When we reflect that this letter, written by one of an opposite belief to that of Akbar, was addressed, many years after his demise, to the bigoted great-grandson in whose eyes it must have appeared the strongest condemnation of his ancestor, we cannot refuse our belief in the genuine feeling which prompted it, or in the reality of the sentiments it ascribes to the great Emperor. Can we too not gleam from it this great lesson, illustrated as it is by the careers of the tolerant great-grandfather and his fanatical descendant—the last of whom imperilled and lost for his descendants by that unyielding fanaticism all that the first had gained for them by his liberality—that the twin sisters, tolerance and charity, are the true foundations on which alone can rest an edifice that is to endure?

Most certainly in the case of Akbar this broad and liberal policy bore rich fruits. The admission of Hindus—strangers in race and alien in religion—to the command of his armies, to the government of his provinces, concurrently with Mohammedans, acquired for his government the confidence of the entire Hindu community. To the Rajah of Jaipore, Man Singh, Akbar was indebted for some of his most brilliant triumphs. It was a Hindu minister, Todar Mull, who introduced that financial system which bears his name. Under his advice, Akbar lightened the burdens that weighed upon agriculture; he abolished the capi-

tation tax upon the Hindus, a tax upon meetings for the performance of religious ceremonies, and very many other imposts that pressed more especially upon the poorer portion of the population. But the Emperor did more even than that. Finding that great hardship resulted to the agricultural interests, as well as loss to the revenue, from the absence of a fixed principle upon which to levy the land-tax, he, after the most careful enquiry, took the average of the rates of collection for the ten years between the fifteenth and twenty-fourth year of his reign, and fixed that as a permanent settlement for the ten years to come. On all his officers he enjoined strict integrity, justice, and consideration. His instructions to his collectors of revenue, on whose judgment and discretion so much was depending, deserve to be recorded:—‘The collector must consider himself’ (we extract from the *Institutes of Akbar*, a work compiled under the Emperor’s direction by his able minister Abool Fazil) ‘the immediate friend of the husbandmen, be diligent in business, and a strict observer of truth, being the representative of the chief magistrate. He must transact his business in a place to which everyone may find easy access, without requiring any go-between. . . . His conduct must be such as to give no cause for complaint. He must assist the needy husbandmen with loans of money, and receive payment at distant and convenient periods. When any village is cultivated to the highest degree of perfection, by the skilful management of the head

thereof, there shall be bestowed upon him half a *biswah* out of every *beegah* of land, or some other reward proportionate to his merit. . . . Let him learn the character of every husbandman, and be the immediate protector of that class of subjects. . . . Let him promote the cultivation of such articles as will produce general profit and utility, with a view to which, he may allow some remission from the general rate of collection. . . . In every instance he must endeavour to act to the satisfaction of the husbandman.' We might make more extracts to the same purport. Throughout his Institutes, indeed, there breathes the same spirit—an emphatic love of justice, a desire for the welfare, not of one particular class only of his subjects, but of the entire people—a determination to lighten, as much as possible, the burden of taxation, to eliminate from it every element of, or excuse for, oppression, thus welding the people into one great family, to each member of which was accorded perfect liberty of conscience, entire freedom of action within the limits of the laws.

But Akbar's great scheme comprehended something much more than the enforcement of rigid justice, and the assurance of complete tolerance to his subjects. He encouraged literature, the arts, and sciences. Every labour which depended upon intelligence met with his full and hearty support. He appears to have felt that the great and certain end of education was to free mankind from every sort of pre-

judice. His intimate friend Feizi, a Mohammedan, devoted himself to the study of Hindu literature and science, to an enquiry into every branch of the knowledge of the Brahmins. The same nobleman translated the four Gospels into Persian. Akbar received and honourably treated at his court Christian missionaries. A Christian priest, called Padre Farábatún, was invited thither expressly to undertake the instruction in the Greek language of some Mohammedan youths. Schools of every sort were encouraged, devoted with admirable impartiality to Hindu and Mohammedan literature, and to these the youth of both religions were invited, to receive 'education according to their circumstances and particular views in life.' The Court itself was a rendezvous for men famed for their accomplishments and literary knowledge.

It was impossible for Akbar, however, to devote, during the first twenty years of his reign, as much leisure as he could wish to the development of the arts and sciences. He had before him that task without which he believed his work—the great work of his lifetime—would be incomplete—the welding into one empire of all the peoples of Hindustan. Many of the earlier years of his reign therefore were spent in warfare. To enter into the details of this warfare is not necessary for our purpose; it will suffice if we give only the results. In 1573 he conquered Guzerat. Three years later he proceeded against the descendants of the Affghan family of Shir Shah Sûr in

Bengal. Here, after a desperate contest, he succeeded in establishing his government in 1577; but it was not till 1592 that he definitely annexed that rich province to the empire. In the interval he had crushed the rebellion of his brother, Mirza Hakim, in Cabul—extending, as was his wont, on its conclusion, pardon to the revolted prince—and had succeeded in conquering Cashmire, even then known as the Paradise of Hindustan. Soon after he was engaged in a terrible conflict with the inhabitants of the Eusafzie country, who gave him more trouble than all his other opponents. In the course of the campaign his army met with some most severe checks, and several of his most valued officers were slain; amongst them Rajáh Bír Bal, so well known to posterity for his wit and conversational powers, whose loss was severely felt by the Emperor. In the end, these daring mountaineers were humbled, though never absolutely subdued. From 1587 to 1592 he was engaged in establishing his authority in the basin of the Indus, in West Affghanistan and its immediate dependencies. Finally he turned his arms against those kingdoms of the Dekkan which had rejected his overtures and refused to submit to his authority. His lieutenants, however, were handled so severely in this campaign that the Emperor was compelled, in 1599, to repair in person to the spot; the fall of Ahmednugger, soon after his arrival, and of Aseergurh some months later, broke up all the plans of the enemy, and enabled the

Emperor to return triumphantly to Agra in the spring of 1601.

Thus then was completed the outer shell of the Empire of Akbar. All Hindustan, from Cashmire to beyond the Nerbudda, from Assam to the Suleyman range, obeyed his law. With the exception of the Dekkan, his empire may be said to have been consolidated in 1592. This monarch, whose justice, whose wisdom, whose care for his people, have passed into a proverb, had then the opportunity for which he had striven so long—the opportunity of so promoting the happiness of his people, of so instructing his nobles, of so clearly demonstrating to all the advantages of his system, that the empire, founded on a basis so solid, might endure to his latest posterity.

Undoubtedly he did accomplish great things. An admirable system of justice, a contented population, entire religious freedom, an unstinted support of the arts and sciences, with a view to their being employed for the development of the country, an universal system of education, free and open to all, irrespective of religion or creed; these were undoubtedly great blessings—blessings which the European nations of that day were far from enjoying. Compare Akbar with his European contemporaries. Compare the enlightened Mohammedan of Hindustan, who shrank from blood and executions, with the sovereigns of our own England, who lived during the same period. Compare him with the ferocious Henry VIII., the



selfish and ambitious regents, Somerset and Northumberland, with bloody Mary! Contrast the universal tolerance of Hindustan with the fires of Smithfield! Even Elizabeth herself would suffer by the comparison. The decapitation of Essex stands in no favourable light by the side of the pardon of Behràm, while the feeling which prompted the death of the Queen of Scots could never have arisen in the spirit of the man who condoned the rebellion of his brother. Look again at France, for fifty years of the same period under the despicable government of the most contemptible of men—the three last sovereigns of the House of Valois; at Spain, then the leading state of Europe, crushed and trampled upon by the brutal bigotry of Philip the Second! What a contrast do the two names present! Had the enlightened Akbar succeeded to the throne of Charles V., who can doubt that that great country would have taken a foremost place in all that nourishes the vitality and tends to the advancement of a nation; that she would never have known the degraded position to which she has now fallen?

He must have been no ordinary man who, thus virtually making himself master of Hindustan—for he can scarcely be said to have inherited it—so fashioned his own conduct, so impressed his ideas upon those about him, that he brought it to the pitch of excellence we have described, so greatly, so far greatly, in advance of his European contemporaries. In reading

the account of the results of his administration, and in perusing those Institutes inspired by his spirit and his genius, it is impossible for us not to give our full and free consent to the opinion already referred to, nor to say, 'Not India only, but every country in the world, should be ruled on the principles of Akbar.'

And yet we are forced to admit that the vast fabric which he raised, beautiful in so many points, possessing in itself such varied perfections, wonderful if we regard it, as we ought, as the work of a despotic sovereign three hundred years ago, contained nevertheless within itself the certain germ of failure. We allude not to the vast extent of empire. Adding immensely as this did, especially in that rude age, to the difficulty of the ruler, it was not the fatal worm which gnawed at the very root of the mighty fabric. If we admit that the principles of Akbar were based on the soundest ideas of humanity and justice; that he did, indeed, insure the happiness of his subjects; that he encouraged institutions which, if persisted in, would have roused their better instincts, we must still admit that there was one thing wanting, and that the want was fatal as well to the excellence as to the success of the system. The fault was this—that he himself was the keystone of the arch which he had raised. Take away the keystone, and all the materials, rich and valuable as they were, lost at once their coherent power. The weak point of the system, in fact, was this—that everything centred in Akbar; that though

so long as he survived to control and carry it out it succeeded admirably, it was liable to succumb and fall with his demise. In a word, it was not in the power of this Akbar to decree that he should be succeeded by a second Akbar—by a man equal to himself in liberality, in love of justice, in the power of influencing his fellow-men. Granting that his principles were the principles which the governing power in Hindustan ought always to follow, yet his system provided no security that they would be carried out by his successors. His subjects, in fact, possessed no guarantee, no certainty of belief, that on his death oppression would not take the place of justice, or that liberality and order would not be displaced by bigotry and misrule. It was, as we have said, a system that centred and was bound up in the life of Akbar.

Some idea of this must have flitted occasionally before the mind of the great sovereign of Hindustan before he quitted the scene in which his own beneficence had reaped triumphs and victories so rare. The affection and partiality of a parent could not have entirely blinded his eyes to the vicious propensities of the son who was destined to be his successor, to whose care he would have to resign those numerous peoples whose material interests he himself had watched so tenderly. More than once a rebel against the paternal authority, pardoned, as Akbar was wont to pardon all enemies, Selim had nevertheless continued to show such an absolute viciousness of

temperament that even his friends could not contemplate his succession without dismay. When he ordered a man who had offended him to be flayed alive, to the horror of his father, Akbar might well ask himself whether such a man could fit in as the keystone of his arch, as the supporter and maintainer of his system. The result showed how fatal was the defect inherent in that system. Although under his immediate successors, Jehangire and Shah Jehan, the empire which he virtually founded maintained, in a great measure, its outward form of grandeur, yet the government of his great-grandson, the bigoted Aurungzebe—himself in all his conceptions the very opposite of Akbar—dealt it a blow from which it sickened and died. We might even go further with respect to its internal advancement. That indeed ceased with Akbar.

When, therefore, we are told that India ought to be ruled on the principles of Akbar, we ought to beware of confounding the immortal principles which it was his glory to initiate three hundred years ago with the system which, it seems, it was impossible for him to avoid. Though we may admire ever so much those principles, we should take heed ere we called even for an Akbar—with the system indispensable to an Akbar—to put them into action. Under the circumstances of such a rule, viewed even in its most favourable light, the country may indeed attain temporarily to a very high degree of prosperity, its material interests may be well cared for, the intel-

lectual life of its people may be fostered and stimulated, but it is impossible that the system can last. Sooner or later the inevitable hour will arrive when sensuality and tyranny take the place of government and just administration to such an extent that the last state of the people becomes even worse than the first. It was the system of which Akbar was but an accident that led to those devastating wars which ravaged India for a hundred years—which impoverished her people, threw her back in the scale of civilisation, until in the beginning of the nineteenth century she was far behind the nations whom she had immeasurably surpassed in the seventeenth.

Far be it from us to affirm that Akbar himself was responsible for such a result. It was his glory that, in spite of the despotic system which was then inevitable, he laid the foundations of his government so firmly that, though they were often shaken, sometimes much loosened, his dynasty continued to rest upon them for nearly a hundred and sixty years after his death.\* The system, however, is incompatible with human progress. It failed in Europe as much as it failed in Asia. It ruined the Stuarts of England and the Bourbons of France. In Hindustan it led by certain steps to the predominance of the strongest and the government of the sword.

Need we contrast such a government with that

\* Elphinstone dates the extinction of the Mogul empire from the third battle of Paniput, in 1761.

under which we are all living—a government which, however it may fall off in some respects, at least offers to the people the material advantages presented by that of Akbar, whilst it is free from the death-warrant of an ephemeral existence? Is not the certain conviction that such blessings as universal toleration, an equal administration of justice, perfect equality in the eye of the law, a discriminating taxation, are not dependent upon the life of one man, but are fixed and settled institutions which governors cannot arbitrarily alter—is not such a conviction a real boon and a solid consolation even to those who would naturally prefer a native dynasty? We know that a very eminent European writer, who, travelling in the disguise of an Asiatic, associated with Asiatics on terms of equality, and who thus came to hear and to learn their real sentiments, has lately told the world that the natives of India would prefer a bad native to the best European government. It is possible that this may be so. It is probable, we think, that among the ignorant and the bigoted, the superstitious and the unlettered, some such idea may prevail. But it is impossible that it can have any *locus standi* amongst those who, availing themselves of the advantages which education has placed within their reach, have studied the history of their country. These cannot but see that a system which requires an Akbar to be its prop possesses no inherent or permanent vitality. It is not every year that an Akbar comes into the world. It is but once

in a thousand years that such a man is born on the footsteps of a throne. Can the advantage of being governed by such a prince, great as he was undoubtedly, be weighed in the balance against the two centuries of misgovernment that followed his demise?

It is not perhaps surprising that those who have had no personal experience of misgovernment, and but little of oppression—who have never suffered from the exactions of military license, or from the ruthless tyranny of court favourites—should point to the reign of Akbar as an indication of the sort of governor which Hindustan, if left to itself, would produce. But it is impossible to base any sound argument on the administration of but one man out of many. We cannot sever the man from the system. That system gave India Akbar, but it gave it also Aurungzebe, and the successors of Aurungzebe. It is certain that the effect of the measures of Aurungzebe was to loosen the bonds of union which the wisdom and liberality of Akbar had knit together to form his empire. It is too a remarkable fact, and one which we must never lose sight of, tending as it does to show the retrograde and debasing effect of despotism on the human mind, that the bigotry of Aurungzebe endeared him far more to his Mohammedan co-religionists than did the liberality of Akbar; and that even in the present day it is the memory of Aurungzebe the persecutor, far more than that of Akbar the beneficent, which Mohammedan writers delight to honour.

We admit, indeed we glory in admitting, that there was much, very much, in the conduct and the sentiments of Akbar that is worthy of the earnest attention of the present rulers of Hindustan. Many of his precepts they have already literally followed. In this respect, indeed, they may be regarded as his legitimate successors. Far more than any of the native sovereigns who came after him have they endeavoured to emulate his liberality, his toleration, his encouragement of education, his hatred of tyranny and oppression. In some respects they may not have acted up to the greatness of his mighty conceptions. An impartial observer, noting what he did and what they have attempted, could not fail to be struck with the fact that, whereas Akbar was able, within a very short period of his reign, to conciliate the complete confidence and regard of his Hindu subjects, those feelings with respect to the English have been but of slow and tardy growth. Nor is this difference to be explained by the assertion that in the case of Akbar it was a native governing natives. Akbar in Hindustan was almost as much a foreigner as we are. 'Of all the dynasties that had yet ruled in India,' writes Elphinstone in his account of the reign of Akbar, 'that of Tamerlane was the weakest and most insecure in its foundations. The houses of Ghazni and Ghor depended on their native kingdom which was contiguous to their Indian conquest; and the slave dynasties were supported by the continual in-



flux of their countrymen ; but, though Baber had been in some measure naturalised in Cabul, yet the separation of that country under Camran had broken its connection with India, and the rival of an Affghan dynasty turned the most warlike part of its inhabitants, as well as of the Indian Mussulmans, into enemies. *The only adherents of the House of Tamerlane were a body of adventurers, whose sole bond of union was their common advantage during success.*' How was it then that this foreigner, with his body of adventurers to support him, succeeded in that particular point in which we have so generally failed, viz., in conciliating the affection of the people? We believe that the reason simply was, that he did not give all the offices in the state to that body of adventurers. He had, on the contrary, Hindus to command his armies and to govern his provinces. He made as little distinction on account of nationality as of creed. Had a satrap misgoverned a province in his time, as the late Rajah of Mysore misgoverned Mysore in our own, Akbar would undoubtedly have displaced that Rajah, but he would have sent a Dinkur Rao to succeed him. It would thus have been impossible to misconstrue his motives, or to accuse him of lust of territory or of tyranny. It is true that we profess to be animated by the same motives ; that we declare it to be our sole object to educate the natives of this country to self-government ; it is a fact that by slow but gradual steps they are being admitted to the higher offices of the state. And

we conscientiously believe, however it may seem to some who may think our steps too slow, too uncertain, sometimes even retrograde, that this is the real tendency of our government. The result depends mainly, if not entirely, on the progress made by the people of Hindustan. We cannot doubt that one great reason which prompted Akbar to confer the high offices of state upon Hindus was on account of the greater ability, the stricter integrity, that they displayed. But the world is advanced much now since the days of Akbar. The successors of the adventurers who followed Clive are better administrators than the adventurers who followed the son of Humayun. It is for the people of Hindustan to point the moral. Let them show themselves in all things capable; let them cast aside those prejudices which weigh them down with the weight of ignorant ages; let them show themselves as enlightened as the most enlightened monarch of Hindustan, and it is certain that they will then no longer have to complain that India is not, even in this respect, governed on the principles of Akbar.

*SIR VINCENT EYRE.*

(WRITTEN IN MARCH 1867.)

THERE are few who would deny that when, in his romantic interview with Sidonia at the roadside inn, the youthful Coningsby expressed his opinion that the age of adventurers was past, he simply gave utterance to the prevailing sentiment of the age, to a conviction deeply implanted in the minds of the nation of which he was supposed to be a member. Certainly nine hundred and ninety-nine men out of every thousand would have been prepared to endorse the remark. Not so, however, with the reply which that observation called forth from Sidonia. The apophthegm that ‘adventures are to the adventurous,’ would seem to the prosaic Englishman of the nineteenth century terribly out of date. It would at once take his mind back to the more stirring periods of European history, to the times of tilt and tournament, of Cavalier and Roundhead, or to that last outburst of poetic enthusiasm—the forty-five. Were it possible even for his mind to turn to that great Eastern land, in which for so many years the adventurers of Europe found a congenial field, it would only be to reflect that, with the suppression of European rivals,

and the establishment on the ruins of the Mogul and Mahratta empires of the order-loving and order-enforcing British authority, the power of individual action must have been greatly compressed, and the chances of 'adventure' become indeed few and far between. From the majority of our countrymen the reply of Sidonia, therefore, would have met more criticism than approval.

We are certain, nevertheless, that that reply evinced a profound knowledge of human nature. Adventures are still to the adventurous. The man who is content to spend his energies in amassing wealth, or in purely literary labour, will probably descend to his grave without one incident in his career likely to touch the heart or to rouse the sympathies of a community. It is equally possible that the active duties of an active life may have little effect upon some natures; that, though placed among stirring scenes, a man may content himself with the bare performance of his duties, without caring to step one inch beyond them. Some may not feel the capacity, others not possess the inclination, for adventure. But there are few who have lived many years in India who will deny that, sooner or later, the opportunity for adventure will present itself; that, when it does come, though some may allow it to pass, there are others within whose breasts the old fire of English chivalry still burns strongly and brightly, and who spring forward eagerly to seize and to use it. The events even of the last ten years have

abundantly proved that adventures are still to the adventurous.

If we were to seek a period during which more than in any other in the last few years the truth of this apophthegm might be illustrated, we should take the period of the Indian mutiny. It would need but a very cursory examination of the history of that period to elicit the fact that the men who had distinguished themselves before, who had shown themselves adventurous on former occasions, came forward to a man to increase their previous reputation and to add to their old honours. We need but mention the names of the Lawrences, of Outram, of Chamberlain, of Nicholson, of Havelock, and of the subject of this sketch—amid many others—to show the truth of this assertion. Others again, to whom no opportunity had been granted before, eagerly seized it when it came. The exploits of all of these have never been known, probably never will be known, to the world. Deeds of great coolness and daring, performed under most trying circumstances in isolated places, have been to a certain extent overshadowed by the more striking achievements of the leaders of our armies. To the Government of India the credit is due that in many, we believe in most, cases, the daring and able men who have so distinguished themselves have been sought out and rewarded. The history of their achievements has, however, to be sought for in the reports which lie buried in the archives of Government offices. Were

these unearthed and examined, and the stories of personal adventure carefully extracted, there is more than one Government servant, now mixing quietly and unostentatiously with his fellows, whom the public would mark out as a hero.

It is scarcely possible—at least it would require more time and leisure than we have at our command—to seek out the services of such men. The time may, and we hope will, come when it may be otherwise. We need scarcely repine at the delay, inasmuch as it affords us the opportunity of presenting to the public a sketch of the career of those whose great deeds are known and acknowledged, but with regard to whose personality—to the promise of which the performance was the fulfilment—the public is in utter ignorance. This is a task which in the case of military men is comparatively easy. Their deeds are written in the public despatches, and in the published journals of contemporaries. The Blue Book is a safe guide to a fair and impartial decision. And, supplemented, as this often is, by personal knowledge and the experience of living comrades, it becomes possible to draw up a narrative at once full, accurate, and connected, without the necessity of diving into the dusty pigeon-holes of record offices.

Of all the adventurous acts of those stirring years 1857 and 1858, there was not one that entailed more responsibility on its projector, that was more prudently yet more daringly conducted, or the failure of which

would have produced graver consequences, than the march to the relief of Arrah by Major Vincent Eyre. Its success changed at once the aspect of the campaign. To use the words of Sir Cecil Beadon, then Secretary to Government, it ‘virtually suppressed rebellion in Shahabad.’ ‘If acts of devotion to one’s country,’ wrote Sir James Outram to Major Eyre in 1857, ‘entitle to the cross, then surely the devotion you displayed at Arrah to your country, and the advantage that resulted to the country from that act, ought to secure it to *you* of all men.’ Yet, although this great achievement is not forgotten, the chief actor in it would seem to have been lost sight of. In the shower of rewards lately poured out, his name at least has not appeared. He himself has retired from the service; his active military career has apparently closed for ever. Still with India, with the victories of 1857, with the first great act which checked the success, and dealt a fatal blow to the machinations of the till then triumphant insurgents, must his name ever be connected. If he has not obtained the full meed of reward to which that victory entitled him, the fault is not his. He has still the consolation of feeling that by his bold march and prudent daring he saved the lives of thousands, and enabled the Government, assured by his conduct of the safety of Bengal and Behar, to turn every energy to the suppression of the mutiny in the North-West. We have alluded to the estimate formed of Major Eyre’s conduct on that

occasion by Sir James Outram. It is, however, interesting to know that this was but the crowning act of an adventurous career; that it was, if we may so speak, the consequence of his antecedents; that the Eyre of Arrah was but the development of the Eyre of Affghanistan. That our readers may see and judge of this development, that they may note the early promise, matured subsequently by mental training, till opportunity, presenting itself in 1857, was eagerly seized at and used to so great an end, we purpose devoting a few pages to a sketch of his career.

Vincent Eyre was born on January 22, 1811. He was descended from the Eyres of the Peak, a very old Derbyshire family, noted for its loyalty to the Crown during revolutionary periods. His direct ancestor, Colonel Thomas Eyre, commanded a body of horse at Marston Moor, and is described in the family records as having thrice encountered Oliver Cromwell in single combat, forcing his retreat, and dying of wounds then received.

Eyre was educated at the Royal Grammar School, Norwich, under the Rev. Dr. Valpy, of classic fame. Among his school contemporaries who have since become distinguished (though several years his senior in age) were Rajah Brooke of Borneo, Sir Archdale Wilson of Delhi, and the ill-fated Colonel Stoddart of Bokhara.

In December 1828, having completed his course in the Military College at Addiscombe, he received his



commission as second lieutenant in the Bengal Artillery, and landed in Calcutta on May 21, 1829. Among his fellow-passengers were Dr. Marshman, the great Serampore missionary, and Ensign Lugard, now better known as Sir Edward, the Under-Secretary of War. Lord W. Bentinck was then Governor-General of India, and rigid economy was the order of the day. The fiat had just gone forth for extensive reductions in the Artillery, whereby Eyre found himself, on arrival, a supernumerary on the regimental list, with the very dreariest prospects of promotion.

Those were, indeed, depressing times for young officers who felt an interest in their profession. From the close of the first Burmese war and capture of Bhurtpore in 1826 to the beginning of the Affghan campaign in 1838—a period of twelve years—there reigned (with a few unimportant exceptions) an interregnum of profound peace, during which a cloud of despondency hung over the armies of India. Economy had, in fact, been carried to a pernicious excess, and operated, along with other causes, with evil effect on the *esprit de corps* of both officers and men. To young officers of ardent temperament a prolonged adherence to regimental duty, under such circumstances, seemed little better than an utter stagnation of existence; hence arose that almost universal longing and striving for staff and civil employ, whereby many regiments came soon to be deprived of their best

officers, for whose scientific and general attainments a demand had been created by the necessities of the public service in the Revenue Survey and other civil departments of the state. But, although some such tempting opportunities of escape from regimental *ennui* and thralldom offered themselves to Eyre, he preferred to stick by his corps, finding a sufficiency of useful and profitable occupation in his books and professional pursuits, as well as in watching over the welfare of his European soldiers, a sphere of duty wherein he ever continued to feel a peculiar interest.

In 1831 it was his good fortune to make the acquaintance, afterwards ripening into intimacy, of Henry Lawrence, then a captain of Artillery, and commencing that useful public career which carried him onwards from the humble office of revenue surveyor to be Governor-General of India elect. They first met at the death-bed of an intimate friend and brother officer, who had been brought up with Lawrence as a foster-brother, and who, had he survived, bade fair to emulate the greatness and goodness of the latter.

At the close of the same year, while cruising off the Sandheads in a pilot schooner, Eyre had a narrow escape from foundering in a hurricane, the dismasted vessel being lifted, by a happy combination of wind and waves during the spring-tide, over a dangerous reef into deep soundings, just when its destruction had seemed inevitable.

On promotion to first Lieutenant in 1837, Eyre was posted to the Horse Artillery, with which he served until summoned in 1840 to proceed to Cabul as Commissary of Ordnance, for which post he had been specially recommended by the Commandant of Artillery to Lord Auckland's Government.

The Affghan war had just passed successfully through its first stage. Our victorious troops held the country they had won, in trust for the legitimate ruler, Shah Shoojah, whom we had reinstated from his exile at Loodiana. A new force, organised by English officers, was in course of construction, wherewith to maintain the puppet king upon his throne, after the contemplated withdrawal of the British army of occupation. The dethroned sovereign, Dost Mahomed, unable to keep the field against the latter, had surrendered himself to our Envoy at Cabul; and, although occasional signs of discontent and latent disaffection were still apparent among tribes and amidst localities long characterised by turbulence and misrule, sanguine hopes were entertained that the Affghan nation at large, making a virtue of necessity, would become more and more alive to the advantages of a settled government, under the sovereign we had restored to them, and of a permanent alliance with so powerful a neighbour as British India.

As every petty chief in Affghanistan possessed his fortified stronghold, consisting usually of four lofty and substantial mud walls, flanked by strong bastions,

well-pierced with loopholes for marksmen, and capable of resisting field artillery, it was deemed advisable to maintain always in readiness for immediate service, in the chief arsenal at Cabul, a small movable siege-train of iron 9-pounder guns for breaching purposes. These, together with mortars, ammunition, and miscellaneous military stores, carried on half a hundred wheeled-carriages, a thousand camels, and eighteen elephants, constituted Eyre's charge on the line of march from Ferozepore to Cabul, his escort consisting of a regiment of native infantry, and a detachment of Her Majesty's 13th Foot. Accompanying the convoy were General Elphinstone, proceeding to take up his command of the troops in Affghanistan, and sundry officers of his staff, including the since famous Henry Havelock, just appointed Persian Interpreter.

Ferozepore was at that time our most advanced military station in the North-West, and Henry Lawrence, as political officer in the Cis-Sutlej States, made it his head-quarters. He was assuredly the right man in the right place for such a crisis, as was then at hand, and had recently given evidence in an admirably written tale, entitled 'The Adventurer in the Punjaub,' not only of high literary ability, but also of a practical insight into the character of our Sikh neighbours, which was just then as rare as it was valuable, and which he was fortunately in a position to turn to the best account. Eyre obtained from him much useful information for future guidance, and heard him for the

first time broach that great scheme for establishing an asylum in the hills for the children of British soldiers, with which the name of Lawrence has since become enduringly associated.

The Punjaub territory, across which Eyre's route lay, had changed rulers five times within the past eighteen months; only one month having elapsed since the seizure of power by the existing usurper, Shir Singh, an illegitimate son of the famous old lion, Runjeet. A large and formidable disciplined army of Sikh soldiers, backed by a powerful artillery, occupied the neutral ground between the British force in Affghanistan and its basis of operations in North-Western India; but, fortunately for us, that army, although ambitious in the highest degree to try conclusions with the British, was just then too busily occupied with its own domestic quarrels to avail itself of the tempting opportunity to obstruct our line of communications.

Nevertheless, the false and hazardous nature of our military position beyond the Indus was becoming daily more and more evident to the most ordinary observers, nor was it without serious forebodings of coming disaster that men saw the command of our forces in that quarter handed over to a crippled sexagenarian officer, who had been thirty years out of employ, and whose corporeal infirmities alone, whatever might be his supposed qualifications, so palpably unfitted him for a post requiring the fulness of mental and bodily vigour. It is but fair to admit that

General Elphinstone was a chivalrous and high-minded gentleman, possessed of many very excellent qualities of head and heart, which, if called prominently into play at an early period of his life, might have secured him a career of honour and renown. It was, however, his evil destiny to prove himself the Sabinus of the British army in Affghanistan, while it was reserved for Mahomed Akbar Khan, the fugitive son of the deposed ruler, to enact to the very life the part of Ambionix, the Gaul, as described by Cæsar ‘*De Bello Gallico V.*,’ and very recently by his Imperial biographer, Napoleon III., in book III., chapter viii., of his ‘*Life of Cæsar.*’

Passing the deposed Amir, Dost Mahomed Khan, *en route* to his place of exile in Calcutta, the convoy reached Cabul on April 28, without misadventure, though the difficulty attendant on the transit of heavy iron siege-guns and their *impedimenta*, through a long succession of rugged mountain passes, possessing no regular carriage-road, imposed no trifling amount of exertion and fatigue on the troops, who were obliged to bring manual labour to the task wherever the narrow defiles proved so precipitous as to be insurmountable for draught cattle.

The new career upon which Eyre now entered, in a country so full of interest as Affghanistan, possessing the advantage of an European climate, and peopled by races whose sturdy independence of manner and of character offered an attractive contrast to those of

India, was hailed by him as a most agreeable escape from the heat and monotony of the latter country. Many of his most cherished friends had preceded him thither, and were holding posts of trust and responsibility. Among them were d'Arcy Todd, the envoy at Heerat; Colonel Stoddart, at Bokhara; Arthur Conolly, at Kokan; and Richard Maule, in Kohistan.

The latter was the first to welcome him at Cabul, having ridden seventy-five miles for that purpose through a wild and unsettled country, disguised as an Affghan. Maule and Eyre had been friends from early boyhood, had passed through Addiscombe together, and had been shipmates to India. When Eyre planned a house for himself at Cabul, he arranged that one select corner of it should be set apart as 'Maule's room,' to be ever available for his friend on the shortest notice. In building this house Eyre's chief difficulty had been to find qualified masons for the purpose; that class being monopolised by the Department of Public Works for Government purposes. One day, however, to Eyre's surprise, a common kitchen servant, who had accompanied him from India, volunteered his services as head mason, and promised to provide competent builders among the Indian camp-followers, if intrusted with the superintendence of the work. Eyre consented to give him a trial, and the arrangement turned out a perfect success. Before winter set in the house was fit to inhabit, and was admitted to be one of the best built in

Cabul. Yet, among the whole of these volunteer masons, hardly a man had been bred to that particular work, an example of the natural versatility of our Hindu subjects when encouraged by circumstances to shake off, for the nonce, the trammels of caste and custom.

About this time news reached Cabul from Bokhara that Eyre's old school-fellow, Colonel Stoddart, who had proceeded thither from Persia on a mission of mercy to mediate with the king for the release of Russian captives, and had, by his plain speaking, excited the anger of that capricious tyrant, had contrived to make his peace, and been restored to liberty and outward favour. Sir W. Macnaghten was anxious that he should avail himself of this favourable opportunity to escape from so hazardous a position, but Stoddart felt honourable scruples about leaving his post without direct instructions from the English Foreign Office to which he owed primary allegiance. During this propitious interval, Eyre found means, through a Jewish Moollah of Cabul, to open a correspondence with his early friend, who replied in a cheerful strain, confident that the long hoped-for letter of recall would soon arrive to enable him to depart with honour from the scene where he had already suffered so much, and where he was destined soon to yield up his life.

As chief of the Ordnance Commissariat in Affghanistan, the responsibility devolved on Eyre of providing



and maintaining a sufficient supply of the material of war for the efficient equipment, on a war footing, of the British army of occupation and of the Shah's local forces. The chief arsenal was in course of erection at Cabul, on a spot which had been selected by the authorities, before Eyre's arrival, in a small fortified enclosure adjoining the entrenched cantonment; whilst dependent upon it for supplies of guns, ammunition, small arms, tools, implements, camp equipage, and miscellaneous articles of equipment, were the garrisons of Candahar, Ghuznee, Jellalabad, Kelat-i-Gilzee, and their respective outposts. The Delhi magazine, 800 miles distant, being the nearest source of supply, and itself mainly dependent on the arsenal of Fort William, 900 miles farther, the expense of transport on camels of such heavy articles as shot, shell, and small arm ammunition, was prodigious, and contributed to render war in that distant region a most ruinous pastime.

Moreover, as our forces in Affghanistan were liable at any time to find themselves cut off by the Sikhs from their base of operations in India, it was desirable to make provision for such a crisis by storing up in the Cabul arsenal a large reserve supply, calculated for, at least, two years' consumption. The country itself could be depended on to yield but little in the shape of a local supply of military stores, although Eyre's attention was, from an early period, directed to ascertaining its capabilities in that respect, urged thereto, on the score of economy, by repeated letters from the

Military Board of Fort William. Eyre accordingly spared no pains to make himself acquainted with the natural resources of the country, and to render them available for the military requirements of the State, but his labours in that direction were curtailed, and all difficulties solved in a manner not less summary than unexpected.

On November 2, 1841, the Cabul insurrection burst forth with the suddenness of a volcano, though not without the usual premonitory symptoms of such catastrophes; but the tale is too well known to need repetition. The delay, however, of one week, or even of one day, might have made a wonderful difference in the results which followed; for November 3 had been fixed for the departure of the envoy to take up his new appointment as Governor of Bombay, and General Elphinstone, who had tendered the resignation of his command, was to have accompanied him. In such case the chief political authority would have devolved on Sir A. Burnes, who would have immediately occupied the Residency, and have thus escaped assassination in the city where he had fixed his abode; whilst Brigadier Shelton would have succeeded, as senior officer, to the temporary command of the troops; and both men were better qualified to shine as principals than as seconds in their respective spheres of action. The youthful fervour and ambitious spirit of Burnes had chafed with ill-disguised impatience under the control to which he had so long been subjected, and it

was believed by his friends that he merely bided his time to remedy much that he viewed with disapprobation both in the policy and practice recently pursued, and whereof he had been an unwilling, though necessary, agent. Shelton, with all his faults of temper, was undoubtedly a brave, skilful, and energetic officer, and would probably have acted with that promptitude and decision, the want of which in poor Elphinstone led to such disastrous results. What a field for useless conjecture is presented by the supposed contingency of just a few hours' delay in the outbreak, and the altered consequences to Central Asian politics and to British Indian history of a successful stand at Cabul and a suppression of the insurrection!

But it was otherwise ordered. The crisis found us utterly unprepared. Mars was reposing on his laurels, unconscious of the net that had secretly been cast around him. An early winter of unusual severity had set in, and, in all the fancied security of external peace and a submissive, if not friendly, population around him, the envoy had denuded Cabul of his best troops. These, under the gallant Sale, had started for their winter quarters at Jellalabad, with what seemed the easy task before them of punishing, *en route*, some refractory Gilzies who had occupied the Khoord Cabul pass, as their best mode of protesting against what they, perhaps truly, deemed an act of injustice, whereby they had been deprived of their customary stipends as keepers of the Eastern passes—a measure

of unwise economy to which the envoy had been driven by the repeated calls of the Indian Government to retrench expenditure.

Sale encountered a more vigorous opposition than he had expected, but forced the passes, and, having patched up a hollow truce with the Gilzies, eventually lodged his troops in safety behind the walls of Jellalabad; not however without an effort of General Elphinstone to recall him to Cabul, where his aid had meanwhile become urgently needed. But it was too late, for, encouraged by the outbreak at the capital, the whole country had risen in arms.

On receiving the order of recall, Sale summoned a council of war at Gundamuck, who decided that a return through the passes under existing circumstances was impracticable, and poor Elphinstone was left to battle with the difficulties of his position as best he could.

These were increased tenfold by the appalling fact that no sufficient supply of provisions had yet been laid in, and that even the existing supply was stored in a detached fort, affording no secure shelter, being open to attack from neighbouring strongholds, and difficult to defend as an outpost against the overwhelming numbers that suddenly threatened the entrenched cantonment on all sides. Still further to complicate the poor General's embarrassments, while yet in doubt as to the possibility of successfully maintaining his own position, which combined all imaginable disadvantages

for defence in such an emergency, he was called upon to divide his force for the protection of the king, who occupied the Bala Hissar, or royal citadel, about two miles distant; and thus it happened that Captain Nicholl, the senior artillery officer at Cabul, and who commanded the noble old 1st Troop 1st Brigade of Bengal Horse Artillery, got separated with four of his guns and two-thirds of his men from the main force in the cantonment, where officers, men, and guns were most cruelly needed. His senior subaltern, Lieutenant Waller, remained in the latter with two guns, but being disabled by a severe wound in the very first day's fight, the *onus* of artillery command devolved upon Eyre, who thenceforth took the lead in all active operations of that arm, both in the field and around the extensive lines of defence; his only available subaltern being Lieutenant Warburton, commanding the Shah's Native Artillery, consisting of 80 Punjaubees, of doubtful fidelity. These men, with the exception of about 30 English Horse Artillery gunners belonging to Waller's field guns, constituted the whole artillery force for defending an *enceinte* comprised within 4,000 yards of low parapet.

Heretofore, anticipating no enemy, no guns had been mounted on the works; but not a moment was now lost by Eyre in placing every available gun in the best flanking position, ready for immediate service. The six iron 9 pounders, which had accompanied him from Delhi, now came into most opportune use, and,

together with three 24-pounder field-howitzers, one 12-pounder ditto, and three  $5\frac{1}{2}$  inch mortars, formed the entire artillery reserve at hand. Henceforward, Eyre scarcely knew what it was to rest. Day and night, his whole time was actively occupied, either in superintending the fire of the batteries, or in regulating the duties of his own department, which had now become excessively heavy, or in heading the two Horse Artillery guns in the numerous sallies against the enemy. It was necessary that he should be literally ubiquitous; and, so far as the issues of the struggle depended on the artillery, there was assuredly no cause for despondency.

The insurrection was inaugurated, as usual, on such occasions, with murders and assassinations on all sides. Isolated British officers, political and military, were the first victims. Burnes, Broadfoot, Rattray, and Maule fell at their respective posts during November 2 and 3. Eyre felt Maule's death most keenly, for they had been almost as brothers from boyhood. Colin Mackenzie, then a Captain and Assistant Political, narrowly escaped a similar fate, but, aided by a small native guard, he heroically defended his quarters in the heart of the city against an armed multitude, until the night of the 3rd, when, seeing no hope of relief, he succeeded, by a marvel, in withdrawing to cantonments with the greater part of his men, and was thus spared to bear a conspicuous part in the coming struggle.

Looking back on those eventful times, when the name of Colin Mackenzie first became familiar as a household word to Englishmen, and recollecting his varied claims to notice as a soldier, linguist, and an Indian diplomatist of the genuine heroic type, and how favourably his nobility of character and chivalrous bearing impressed all, even the Affghans, with whom he came in contact, we cannot but marvel and lament that a man of his mark, so obviously qualified for high political employ among impressible oriental races, should have fallen short of that eminence, for which, in early life, he seemed so surely destined.

Nothing, perhaps, testifies more clearly to the craft wherewith the people of Cabul had succeeded in lulling the British with a false security, than the unsuspecting manner in which, up to the very last, so many of our public officials had domesticated themselves in the heart of that city. But it is probable that all their efforts to dislodge the British army from its entrenched position would have been as unsuccessful there as at Candahar and Jellalabad, but for the early loss of the Commissariat fort, with its whole stock of provisions, on which the troops were well known to be dependent. Eyre, in his narrative of military operations at Cabul, fully describes the blunders and mishaps through which this important post was sacrificed, and adds :—

‘It is beyond a doubt that our feeble and ineffectual defence of this post, and the valuable booty it yielded, was the first fatal blow to our supremacy at Cabul, and

at once determined those chiefs, more particularly the Kuzzilbashes, who had hitherto remained neutral, to join in the general combination to drive us from the country.'

It is unnecessary that we should dwell upon the details of the desperate struggle of our troops to maintain their position after the failure of their supplies, further than they serve to illustrate the subject of our memoir. Mere passive resistance to the attacking foe was now out of the question. In order to eat, it was necessary to sally forth and fight day by day. Wherever rations for man and beast were likely to be found within reasonable bounds, thither a raid was directed, and generally with a successful result. But, inasmuch as such stores were invariably laid up in fortified strongholds with lofty mud walls and flanking bastions pierced for musketry, and courageously defended by excellent marksmen, these adventurous expeditions, even when most successful, were fruitful of disaster, in the loss of valuable lives they occasioned.

Some of those forts required to be breached with Eyre's iron guns before an entrance could be effected, and his gunners were often shot down in battery by an unseen foe while so employed. On several occasions the enemy turned out in immense force to oppose the troops on the open plain, when Eyre invariably volunteered to lead the two Horse Artillery guns into action, and contributed his full share to the successes then gained—successes which, had the final issue of



the struggle been equally triumphant, would perhaps have been deemed worthy of record among the brilliant deeds of British arms in the East.

Subsequently, when General Pollock re-conquered Cabul, his chief engineer (now Sir Frederic Abbot) minutely surveyed the scene of operations, and thus reported thereupon to Government: ‘One glance at the accompanying plan is sufficient to show the extreme faultiness of the position. The cantonment appears to have been purposely surrounded by difficulties; indeed, a stranger might suppose that many of the mud-forts, approaching so closely to the walls, must have been built for the express purpose of besieging it.’

At length, on November 22, while assisting with some artillery to drive the enemy out of the walled village of Beymaroo, whence supplies had often been obtained, Eyre was severely wounded by a rifle ball, and disabled from further service in the field. On the following day occurred a serious disaster to our arms, which proved decisive of the fate of the Cabul force. Brigadier Shelton, after failing in an attempt to dislodge the enemy, who had turned up in great force on the neighbouring heights of Beymaroo (which position commanded the cantonment), found himself compelled to make a movement of retreat, leaving one gun in their hands. This, however, was soon re-captured by a party of our troops who gallantly rallied for the purpose, and had reinforcements been then promptly poured out from cantonments, the day might have been

retrieved; but, unhappily, no such vigour being displayed, the enemy returned to the charge in increased numbers, and with renewed energy; a prolonged and desperate conflict ensued, and our troops, finding themselves exposed to a deadly fire from concealed skirmishers, suddenly lost confidence, broke their ranks, and fell back in disorder down the hill, during which movement the unlucky Horse Artillery gun, being overturned on rough ground, was abandoned to its fate, and the Affghans obtained a fatal triumph.

Meanwhile, Eyre lay stretched, helpless and anxious, on his bed. It was the first time that the guns had gone into action without an officer at their head. On that day Serjeant Mulhall, a trusty and skilful subordinate, commanded them in the field, as the presence of Lieutenant Warburton was necessary within the lines to keep due control over his native artillerymen, as well as to direct the fire kept up from the guns in position. As the tide of battle swayed to and fro, Eyre could distinctly hear the defiant and often exultant shouts of the Affghans, sometimes approaching so near as to excite intense uneasiness. The troops had been absent from 2 A.M. till 1 P.M. About this time the door of Eyre's room flew open, and Colin Mackenzie rushed in, his pale and haggard look sufficiently announcing a tale of disaster. His faint and exhausted appearance excited apprehensions that he must be wounded, and, on opening his coat, a bullet dropped out, which had struck his shoulder, fortunately without

penetrating the bone, though he felt its effects for several days. Eyre afterwards learned from eye-witnesses of the scene how bravely his friend had acquitted himself throughout the trying scenes of the day. But for further particulars we must refer to the sixth chapter of Eyre's book, wherein he has endeavoured to render justice to all concerned. His criticisms on the battle are unfavourable to the tactics of Brigadier Shelton, and seem to represent faithfully the general impression produced on those present, and to be borne out by the acknowledged principles of modern warfare. But, however that may be, it must be admitted that the brigadier was inadequately supported during the crisis of the action, when a prompt despatch of reserve troops from the entrenchment might have turned the tide in his favour, and that he cannot justly be held responsible for a failure which he strove so bravely, though ineffectually, to avert.

But, despite of this disastrous check to British arms, the troops might doubtless have held fast their position through the winter, save for the ever-pressing necessity of taking active offensive measures to procure supplies. Hence arose the important question whether to abandon the entrenchment and occupy the Bala Hissar with the king, or to enter into negotiations with the Affghan chiefs for a safe retreat from their country under the most favourable terms procurable. Unfortunately, the latter alternative was adopted. The impossibility of providing for the safe transport of

the sick and wounded naturally operated as a bar to the bolder though desperate course, which had been more than once suggested, of a winter retreat, at all hazards, through the passes of Jellalabad.

Accordingly, on December 11, the British envoy, accompanied by his three assistants, George Lawrence, Colin Mackenzie, and Trevor, sallied forth, in accordance with a previous arrangement, to meet the leading chiefs on the open plain. Pre-eminent among the latter was Mahomed Akbar Khan, son of the deposed ruler—a man of fierce though noble aspect, and of a resolute but crafty spirit, naturally embittered against the English, who had driven himself and family into exile, and who at that moment held his father and wife as hostages in Hindostan.

The meeting, though sufficiently discordant in its elements, passed off amicably, and the terms of a treaty were agreed upon, whereby the envoy bound his Government to withdraw entirely from Affghanistan, and to restore the banished Amir, the first step to its fulfilment being the suspension of hostilities, and the immediate withdrawal of the detachment of British troops from the Bala Hissar. The latter measure was accordingly effected on December 13 and 14, though not without some manifestation of treachery on the part of the chiefs, and some consequent loss of life.

The chiefs next demanded the immediate evacuation of all the forts around the cantonment garrisoned by the British. Most of these had been secured with a

heavy sacrifice of valuable lives, but were now surrendered for the sake of obtaining, in return for the sacrifice, a prompt supply of provisions, which had become most urgently needed by the famishing troops and camp-followers.

On the 22nd affairs took a new turn. Mahomed Akbar made secret proposals to the envoy, which seemed to offer a tempting door of escape from present difficulties and from further humiliations. The chiefs had already shown a disposition to evade some of the conditions of the treaty, and to impose others still harder of acceptance, and the aspect of affairs seemed altogether so desperate that the envoy was beguiled into, acceding to a private interview with Mahomed Akbar for the purpose of arranging a scheme, whereby he hoped to sow division among his enemies, and retrieve past misfortunes. The sequel is well known. The unhappy envoy was entrapped, and assassinated by Mahomed Akbar's own hand, on the very scene of the interview, and almost within sight of the garrison. Lawrence, Mackenzie, and Trevor were carried off to the city—which the latter did not reach alive, being cut down by some of the fanatics who thronged the road—and thus terminated this ill-omened attempt to outwit the wily chiefs of Cabul. The final catastrophe was fast drawing nigh.

Sir William Macnaghten had exercised special powers which died with him. Eldred Pottinger, the hero of Herat, was the next senior surviving political officer,

and, therefore, the responsible head of the mission. At the general's urgent desire he reluctantly consented to become the medium of communication with the treacherous chiefs, although still disabled from a severe wound received at Charakar at the beginning of the insurrection. Eyre devotes an interesting chapter to the heroic defence of that outpost, and to the adventurous escape of Pottinger and Haughton, both of whom, though grievously maimed and crippled by wounds, contrived to make their way safely to headquarters through 130 miles of a rugged and hostile country. On arrival in cantonments they were taken by Eyre to his own house, and carefully tended throughout the remainder of the struggle.

Notwithstanding what had so recently occurred, negotiations were renewed with the chiefs, who demanded fresh hostages for the fulfilment of the treaty. Pottinger in vain protested against any treaty whatever. A council of war decided that no other course remained. What followed is too remarkable to omit. Four married hostages, with their wives and children, having been required by the chiefs, certain officers were invited in an official circular to undertake the risk. The following were the replies, as given by Lady Sale, in her Journal: 'Lieutenant Eyre said, if it was to be productive of great good, he would stay, with his wife and child. The others all refused to risk the safety of their families. One said he would rather put a pistol to his wife's head and shoot her; and

another that his wife should only be taken at the point of the bayonet; for himself he was ready to perform any duty imposed on him.'

On this passage the 'Naval and Military Gazette' thus commented: 'Channing, in his eloquent and philosophic analysis of the character of Napoleon, has felicitously defined three orders of greatness, in the last of which he assigns a place to the great conqueror of Europe. Following the spirit of that great thinker, we cannot but recognise in Lieutenant Eyre's noble reply a higher tone of feeling than can be traced in the answers of either of his gallant comrades. Therefore, while we may award to the latter niches in the same order with Napoleon, our acquiescence in the sentiments of Dr. Channing leads us to hail in Lieutenant Eyre's conduct on this occasion the lineaments of that *first* order—moral greatness—through which the soul defies all peril, reposes an unfaltering trust in God in the darkest hour, and is ever ready to be offered upon the altar of his country or of mankind.'

Then came the retreat, with its attendant horrors, rivalling those experienced by the French in their winter march from Moscow. Eyre's wound was still intensely painful, and incapacitated him from mounting a horse without assistance. To quote his own words: 'Deep snow covered every inch of mountain and plain with one unspotted sheet of dazzling white, and so intensely bitter was the cold as to penetrate and defy the defences of the warmest clothing.' The ther-

mometer stood at several degrees below zero ; and men's beards were coated with icicles. There was a mingled multitude of 4,500 fighting-men (including 700 European soldiers) and 12,000 native camp-followers, with their women and children. Their route lay through the Khoord Cabul pass, ' a truly formidable defile, about five miles from end to end, shut in by lofty hills, between whose precipitous sides the sun, at this season, could dart but a momentary ray.' There, half concealed behind rocks and bushes, eager hordes of armed Gilzies lay in ambush for their prey. The scene that ensued may be more easily imagined than described. The treachery of the chiefs was but too evident. Perched securely on high, the foe defied all attempts to silence or dislodge them. It was necessary to run the gauntlet of their fire ; and not less than 3,000 souls perished in the attempt.

Eyre and his family, consisting of wife and a little boy, emerged safely from the gorge ; the latter, being strapped to the back of a faithful Affghan servant on horseback, had a very narrow escape, owing to the horse falling and throwing them both off when in the very middle of the pass. To crown the misfortunes of the day, snow began to fall, and thousands had to pass the night without shelter, food, or fire. Only four small tents were saved, under which some of the women, children, and wounded found refuge. Eyre and Lieutenant Mein sat up all night in attendance on their dying friend Sturt, of the Engineers, who had



been mortally wounded in the pass. At her husband's side his youthful bride also kept watch with them. She was the daughter of the gallant Sale, and well worthy of such a sire. To assuage Sturt's burning thirst, Eyre and Mein were obliged to wander, alternately, through the camp in search of fire to melt a cupful of snow, and often before they could regain the tent the contents had frozen again into a hard mass. Sturt did not survive the night, and was buried at early dawn. Mein's disinterested devotion to his wounded friend in hurrying back to save him at the risk of his own life, and dragging him through the pass under the enemy's fire, was justly extolled by Sir Robert Peel in Parliament, who quoted the scene *verbatim* from Eyre's book.

Meanwhile, Mahomed Akbar, like a vulture watching his prey, scanned every movement of the force from the neighbouring heights. Shortly after the retreat commenced, he had demanded that Pottinger and two other officers should be given up as hostages, and prompt compliance had been yielded. But still he was not satisfied. The ladies, married families, and wounded officers were next required to be made over to his care, an assurance being given to the general, that by such a mark of confidence alone could the chiefs be induced to provide for the wants of the force, and to restrain their followers from acts of hostility.

The general himself, in a memorandum which he

subsequently drew up, thus explains his own motives : ' I complied with his wish, hoping that as, from the very commencement of negotiations, the sirdar had shown the greatest anxiety to have the married people as hostages, this mark of trust might elicit a corresponding feeling in him.'

Eyre, on receiving a verbal order to prepare for the departure of himself and family, sought the general, in order to hear it from his own lips. The poor general was greatly distressed, but, warmly pressing his hand, urged him to mount and be off, as the escort sent by Mahomed Akbar was impatient to start; so there seemed to be no alternative. Mahomed Akbar, although suspected of treachery, was then professedly our ally, with whom a treaty existed. Hostilities were therefore at end, so far as he was concerned. It was pretended, on his behalf, that the Gilzie chiefs on the previous day exerted themselves in vain to restrain their followers. Captain Nicholl now commanded the artillery in person, and Eyre felt that his own presence could no longer be of any service to the force. His obvious duty was to obey the general's wishes at all hazards; he therefore departed with the new batch of hostages, consisting of seven officers, ten ladies, and twenty-two children. Among them were Ladies Macnaghten and Sale. Counting, then, seven officers left behind at Cabul, and three made over on the march, the chiefs had now gained possession of seventeen

British officers, nominally as hostages for the fulfilment of the treaty.

We have already alluded to General Elphinstone as the Sabinus of the British force in Cabul. It has, indeed, been often remarked that history repeats itself; but we know of no instance more remarkable than the perfect historical parallel between the occurrences of 1841-2 in Affghanistan, and those described in Book V. of Cæsar's Commentaries 'de Bello Gallico.' First, there was the sudden insurrection of the Gauls, just as the Romans were settling in their winter quarters; their leader, Ambionix, an exact prototype of Mahomed Akbar in savage and successful duplicity. Next, the Roman general Sabinus, another Elphinstone for indecision, entering into precisely the same sort of hollow treaty with Ambionix as did the English general with Mahomed Akbar. Next, the protest of Cotta (Eldred Pottinger), before the council of war, overruled. Finally, the retreat with a cumbersome train of baggage and extended line of troops; the general's misplaced confidence in Ambionix; the attack on his front and rear in a narrow valley; the confusion of the Romans from want of proper arrangements; their desperate though fruitless valour; Sabinus (Elphinstone) seeking a conference with Ambionix (Mahomed Akbar) *in order to save the troops*; his treacherous detention, and the final annihilation of his army. On the other hand, we have the 'illustrious' garrisons of Cicero and Labienus,

represented by those of Sale and Nott, maintaining their isolated posts firm and undaunted against all opposition ; signalising themselves on all occasions by a similar display of patience, skill, and valour, until at length relieved by the advance of Cæsar (Pollock) with his overpowering army, under whose auspices all previous disasters were amply retrieved, and the Roman invincibility satisfactorily re-established.

As Eyre's narrative has now been long out of print, and the attention of our countrymen has begun once more to be directed towards the regions of Central Asia and the rapid extension of the Russian power in that quarter, we have deemed it not altogether inopportune to refresh the memories of our readers with some of the most striking particulars of this old and overtrue tale, which, just a quarter of a century ago, was perused with thrilling interest by all the civilised world.

Eyre and his associates in misfortune remained as captives in the hands of Mahomed Akbar during eight and a half months, Eyre occupying his leisure in recording, on such scraps of paper as he could collect, the strange and stirring incidents which he had witnessed, while yet they were fresh in his own memory and in the minds of his fellow-captives, from whom, as well as from such public and private documents as had been saved and were within his reach, he industriously gleaned many important and interesting particulars. His chief object in these labours was to

place, as far as in him lay, the whole unvarnished truth before the British public at the earliest practicable opportunity. He thus wrote to a friend: 'I feel well assured that the more my statements are sifted, the more clearly will their truth be established in all essential points. Heaven knows I would give my right hand that such events as I have described had never occurred; but, having occurred, why should I conceal them? Is the loss of an army nothing? Can our national interests be advanced by glossing over such unheard-of calamities and disgrace?' In another letter he thus expresses himself: 'I wrote my narrative because it was at the time very doubtful whether any of the chief actors would survive, and I felt an anxious desire that, should we perish in captivity, the public might be able to judge properly of the respective merits of all concerned. I can boldly assert that there is not a sentence which I do not believe to be strictly true.'

Perhaps few narratives written under such circumstances have so well stood the test of time,<sup>1</sup> or have met more general and lasting approval. We have little doubt that honest old Gascoignes the poet, who underwent some similar experiences in his youth during the wars in the Low Countries in the sixteenth

<sup>1</sup> On one occasion, during his visit to Europe in 1855-6, Eyre happened to be looking over the bookshelves of a bookseller's shop in Paris, when he suddenly came upon his own work, translated into French. It is impossible to imagine a more pleasing surprise to an author than such a discovery.

century, very accurately expresses Eyre's feelings in regard to his volume on Cabul in the following stanza from the poem entitled 'the Fruites of War':

Go, little booke! God graunt thou none offende,  
For so meant he who sought to set thee forth,  
And when thou comdest where soldiers seem to wend,  
Submit thyselfe as writte but little worth.  
Confesse withal that thou hast bene too bolde  
To speak so plaine of haughtie hartes in place,  
And say that he which wrote thee coulde have tolde  
Full many a tale of blouds that were not base.

The story of the captivity was appended to Eyre's narrative in the form of a journal, and may still be read with interest. We must content ourselves with a few of the more prominent episodes. On the fourth day after their surrender to Mahomed Akbar they were joined by the general himself, with Brigadier Shelton and Captain Hugh Johnson, and learned with profound dismay and grief that the remainder of the force had been gradually shot down in the passes, the chiefs having played them false even to the end, notwithstanding all the concessions that had been made. It was evidently Mahomed Akbar's game to hold his captives as trump cards wherewith to extort from the British Government better terms for himself and country than he could well hope to obtain by any other means at his disposal. Hence they found themselves, on the whole, well treated, although their anxieties were kept alive by the fact that a small, though influential, section existed among the Gilzie

chiefs who made no secret of their inclination to put the whole party to death; and whose debates on this momentous subject were often carried on in tones sufficiently loud to be overheard by their intended victims.

Their first place of confinement was the fort of Buddeeabad, in the district of Lughman, a stronghold of one of these same Gilzie chieftains, having walls twenty-five feet high, and lofty flanking towers, surrounded by a *faussebraye* and deep ditch. Here they remained three months, during which they were allowed to exchange letters with their friends in Jellalabad, where Sale still maintained his defensive position. On February 19 they were alarmed by a violent rocking of the earth, accompanied by a loud subterranean rumbling sound; the lofty parapets around them fell in with a thundering crash; the dwelling-house waved and tottered like a ship at sea, and all within it simultaneously rushed out into the central courtyard, to find their terror-stricken Affghan keepers upon their knees, ejaculating loud prayers to Allah for protection. It seemed as though the last day had arrived. Eyre had a narrow escape from being crushed to death by a mass of the wall, under which he chanced to be standing while tending his horse, which he had been permitted to retain.

The same earthquake levelled in a few seconds the walls of defence which Sale's force had, with continuous labour, repaired and strengthened at Jellalabad. But

the Affghans were unprepared to take advantage of the chance thus offered. On April 9 tidings reached the captives that Mahomed Akbar's camp had been surprised by Sale, and his force completely routed, and on the following day they were hurried off towards the mountains, after a sharp debate among the chiefs on the expediency of destroying them at once.

Poor General Elphinstone, in his already shattered state of health, could ill bear up under the fatigues and privations he had to undergo, and died at Tezeen on April 23, 'a happy release for him,' says Eyre, 'from suffering of mind and body. Deeply he felt his humiliation, and bitterly regretted the day when he resigned the home-born pleasures of his native land to hazard the reputation of a proud name in a climate and station for which he was physically unfit.'

The body was forthwith forwarded by Mahomed Akbar to General Pollock (by that time at Jellalabad) for honourable interment—a tribute of respect to a fallen foe highly creditable to the Affghan chief.

On the following day Captain Colin Mackenzie was despatched on a mission to General Pollock, taking with him the first portion of Eyre's narrative. After perusal by General Pollock, it was forwarded by the latter to Lord Ellenborough's private secretary, and eventually to England for publication. Colin Mackenzie's journeys to and fro proved full of peril, for, although disguised as an Affghan and escorted by a well-known and popular sort of Rob Roy, or freebooter,



named Buttee, in the pay of Mahomed Akbar, whose knowledge of that wild mountainous country and its still wilder inhabitants stood him in good stead, he was in frequent and imminent danger of discovery and consequent death from parties of wandering Gilzies, whom they unexpectedly encountered, and who persisted in being unpleasantly inquisitive regarding the suspicious-looking traveller, with his face and form so closely muffled up in the folds of his turban and large sheepskin cloak, leaving his eyes scarcely as visible as those of the roughest Skye terrier, and whom it was necessary to palm off as a sick chief of Peshawur sent by Mahomed Akbar under Buttee's escort to his native place. One glimpse of the white skin beneath his wide Affghan trousers (which he found it next to impossible to prevent from rising above his knee) would have been his death-warrant. But Heaven protected him.

The propositions whereof he was the bearer were, that the British general should treat with Mahomed Akbar as the acknowledged head of the Affghan nation; that there should be an exchange of prisoners, including all on each side; that the British should retire from Affghanistan; and that General Pollock should pay down a handsome *douceur* in money. In case of these arrangements being effected, Mahomed Akbar would be glad to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the British. This, however, was only his public message, but, in secret, Mackenzie

had been desired to ascertain if a private arrangement could not be made, to the effect that General Pollock should ensure an amnesty to Mahomed Akbar and his followers for the past, and that the British Government should bestow on him a large jagheer. In this case he would willingly assist Pollock in reconquering Affghanistan.

Mackenzie returned from his mission on May 3, without having opened any prospect of release for the captives, although the negotiation, as far as it went, had been of a friendly nature. He was immediately despatched a second time with more moderate proposals, but again returned with an equally ineffectual result. On May 23 Mahomed Akbar removed all his captives from the Zauduk valley to a fort in the vicinity of Cabul. Here Mackenzie had nearly died of typhus fever, the result of his recent fatigues and exposure. Mahomed Akbar selected Major Colin Troup as his next envoy, and he was absent in that capacity from the 10th to the 27th of July, but brought back no definite reply. Pollock was, in fact, busy in preparing for an advance on Cabul, with stringent instructions from Lord Ellenborough to proceed with his military preparations without reference to any negotiations. Meanwhile, typhus fever and dysentery spread alarmingly among the captives, and, on August 7 Captain John Conolly breathed his last. His brother, the celebrated Arthur Conolly, had but recently been decapitated at Bokhara, after having been

confined at the bottom of a dry well, in company with Colonel Stoddart, for eighty days, without change of raiment.

On August 23 nine officers of the Ghuznee garrison joined the Cabul captives. Among them was the brave young Nicholson, destined to a brilliant career in the Punjaub, and a hero's death sixteen years later in the moment of victory at Delhi. He now became Eyre's messmate, and beguiled the hours with animated details of the scenes he had witnessed during the ineffectual defence of that fortress; with him, too, was Dr. Thomas Thomson, since risen to eminence as a botanist and a traveller. On August 25 all were hurried off towards Bameean, *en route* to Kooloom in Ozbeg Tartary, with a threat held out that they would be sold into bondage on arrival. Eyre and Mackenzie were both at this time too ill to travel on horseback, and were packed into a pair of panniers to balance each other on each side of a camel, a mode of travelling for invalids which their miserable experience on that memorable journey did not enable them to recommend for general adoption, except in cases where the penalty of torture has been incurred.

They had a strong escort, consisting of some 400 Affghan soldiers, deserters from the British service, under one Saleh Mahomed, their former subadar. Their route lay over the steep mountain-passes of Suffed Khak, Oonai, Hajeeguk, and Kaloo, the latter attaining an altitude of 13,400 feet, whence Eyre

describes the view as 'presenting a boundless chaos of barren mountains, probably unequalled in wild terrific grandeur.' The valley of Bameean, beyond the Indian Caucasus, was reached on September 3.

And now, at the very time when hope began to yield to despair in all their breasts, and a life of wretched slavery seemed their inevitable lot, aid came from an unexpected quarter, and their speedy deliverance was at hand. Eyre thus tells the story in a letter to a friend in Calcutta:—

'On Sunday, September 11, Saleh Mahomed, having received a positive order from Mahomed Akbar for our immediate march to Kooloom, our desperate condition induced Pottinger to tempt him with the offer of a bribe for our release. Captain Johnson volunteered to be agent in the matter, and found him more accessible than was expected. This man had hitherto kept aloof from every attempt at friendly intercourse with the prisoners, towards whom his manner had been invariably haughty and his language harsh. Great, therefore, was our astonishment to learn that he had been seduced from his allegiance to Mahomed Akbar and bought over to our side.

'Meanwhile, the rapid advance of the two English armies upon Cabul, and the probable defeat of Mahomed Akbar, led us to expect that chief's arrival among us as likely to happen at any moment. It was, therefore, necessary to be prepared against any sudden surprise. The Hazaret chiefs in the valley were

sounded and found favourable to our scheme. The men composing our guard were gained over by a promise of four months' pay. A new governor was set up over the Hazaret province by Major Pottinger, the existing governor being too much in Mahomed Akbar's interests to be trusted.

'On September 16 the country was considered sufficiently safe to admit of our setting out on our return towards Cabul. We had only proceeded a few miles when a messenger met us with news of General Pollock's victory over Akbar, which cheering intelligence was shortly afterwards confirmed by a note from Sir Richmond Shakespear, who was hastening to our assistance with 600 Kuzzilbash horsemen. On the 17th we recrossed the Kaloo pass, and encamped about three miles from its base. We had been here about two hours, when horsemen were descried descending the pass of Hajeeguk. Instantly Saleh Mahomed's men were on the alert and formed up in line. Judge of our joy when the banner of the Kuzzilbash was distinguished streaming in the air, and imagine, if you can, with what emotions of delight and gratitude we eagerly pressed forward to greet our gallant countryman, Sir Richmond Shakespear, who soon came galloping up to where we stood. For the first time after nine miserable months of thralldom we felt the blessedness of freedom. To God be all the glory, for He alone could bring it to pass!'

There was still some danger that Mahomed Akbar

might intercept their flight, but at Shakespear's suggestion, Pollock despatched Sale's brigade to meet them at Kot-Ashroo. All doubt was then at an end; they were once more under the safeguard of British troops, who lined the heights of Suffed Khâk, and who raised hearty cheers of welcome as the procession threaded the pass; among them most conspicuous rode the gallant Sale, with his long-lost wife and daughter by his side.

On the 21st Pollock's camp at Cabul was reached, where the Horse Artillery guns fired a salute in honour of the event, and thus happily terminated the tragedy of the Cabul insurrection.

The events of those days have still such a thrilling interest for British readers that we have been tempted to linger perhaps too long over that portion of Eyre's career in connection with which his name first became familiarly known. It was his strange destiny to witness the 'Alpha' and 'Omega' of the downfall of the old sepoy army; for it is now generally admitted that the first seeds of the mutiny of 1857 were sown in the Cabul campaign. In allusion to this, Kaye, in his 'Sepoy War,' declares: 'The charm of a century of conquest was then broken. The sepoy regiments, no longer assured and fortified by the sight of that ascendant star of fortune which once had shone with so bright and steady a light, shrunk from entering the passes which had been the grave of so many of their comrades. It was too true; the Seiks were tampering

with their fidelity. Brahmin emissaries were endeavouring to swear them with holy water not to advance at the word of the English commander. Nightly meetings of delegates from the different regiments were held, and perhaps we do not even now know how great was the danger.'

Before leaving Cabul, Eyre, through a strange accident, recovered his friend Maule's Bible, on the flyleaf of which the owner had thus written, as if prophetically, two days before his murder: 'In case of my death I wish this book to be sent to my mother, or nearest living relative.' No Mohammedan will knowingly destroy the Word of God, and it is remarkable that Arthur Conolly's Prayer Book, wherein he had entered a touching record of his sufferings and aspirations in the well at Bokhara, was, after the lapse of many years, left at the door of his sister's house in London by a mysterious foreigner, who simply left word that he came from Russia, but of whom no trace could be discovered after a most diligent search.

Returning with Pollock's force to India, Eyre was posted to the new troop of Horse Artillery, raised to replace the old first troop, first brigade, which had perished in the Affghan passes, and with whose services at Cabul he had been so intimately associated. In his public report to the commandant of the Artillery regiment, Eyre, speaking of the siege, thus writes: 'The gunners, from first to last, never once partook

of a full meal or obtained their natural rest: of the hardships and privations undergone it would be difficult to convey an adequate idea. Throughout the last struggle all eye-witnesses concur in testifying to their stubborn valour.'

While attached to the new troop at Meerut, Eyre originated what is believed to have been the first 'soldiers' club' ever established, having for its object the suppression of drunkenness by providing for the soldier, when off duty, the means of sober and suitable recreation and refreshment. For this purpose Eyre hired a house conveniently situated to the barracks, which, with the aid of his brother officers and of small monthly subscriptions from the members, he fitted up with suitable furniture, and supplied with books, magazines, and popular games, and where tea, coffee, and other harmless beverages could be obtained when wanted. It soon became popular among the men, and contributed greatly to the reduction of crime amongst them. The value of such clubs has now been generally recognised.

On the news reaching India that Joseph Wolff was on the point of starting to Bokhara to ascertain the fate of Stoddart and Conolly, and wanted some officer to accompany him, Eyre at once offered his services; but his letter failed to reach Wolff in time; it will, however, be found in the published memoirs of that enterprising though eccentric Jew missionary.

Eyre remained with his troop until December 1844



when he was appointed by Lord Ellenborough, ever prompt to seek out promising officers and to reward good service, commandant of artillery in the new Gwalior Contingent, raised after the dispersion of Sindia's Mahratta army in the battles of Maharajpore and Punniar. The new force consisted of four batteries of native field artillery, one battery of garrison artillery, two regiments of irregular cavalry, and seven regiments of native infantry; the whole forming a very complete and serviceable brigade. All the English officers being picked men, the Gwalior Contingent soon acquired a reputation for the highest efficiency of which native troops were susceptible; and, as an instance of the loyal and soldierly spirit existing among them up to a late period, it is worthy of record that Eyre's artillery twice volunteered for foreign service, expressing their readiness to proceed either to Persia or Burmah, and received the thanks of Government, conveying 'the satisfaction with which the Governor-General in Council has learnt the soldierly spirit evinced by these men.' Their prowess and professional efficiency were, however, destined to be tested in a very undesirable and unexpected fashion during the sepoy war of 1857-58, by which time a lamentable change had 'come over the spirit of their dream;' for, led on by General Ram Singh, a chivalrous old Rajpoot subadar of Eyre's artillery, the Gwalior Contingent succeeded in turning General Wyndham's flanks at Cawnpore, obliging him to retreat with great

loss, and it was generally admitted that their triumph on that occasion was mainly due to the accurate fire of their guns.

Shortly after Eyre's arrival at Gwalior his sympathies were enlisted on behalf of the Portuguese native Christians, of whom numbers had been thrown out of employ by the disbandment of the Mahratta force, wherein they had served as non-commissioned officers, buglers, and drummers, but who had been suddenly reduced, with their families, to destitution. Eyre made a strong appeal to the public on their behalf, which met with an immediate response. A sum exceeding 600*l.* was received from various parts of India, and, with this amount in hand, Eyre conceived and carried out the bold project of establishing a small Christian colony in the valley of Deyra Dhoon at the base of the Himalayan range, and three hundred miles from Gwalior.

The scheme met with liberal support from the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces and other high functionaries. Lands were forthwith purchased, and forty families, numbering 120 souls, left Gwalior for the land of promise, under the guidance of Father Felix, a worthy Italian monk of the Franciscan order, who volunteered his services. Contrary to general expectation, these poor men, on arriving at their destination, set to work with a good will at the novel task of building and ploughing. They found all the necessary materials ready prepared. To each

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family forty begahs (about fourteen acres) of land were assigned, besides a plough and yoke, a pair of bullocks, a cow, two pigs, one sheep, and a small stock of fowls. In a wonderfully short space of time a neat little village sprang up, with its church and school-room; and Father Felix proved himself just the man to gain all hearts, and to stimulate his flock to exertion. Before many weeks had passed he thus wrote: 'Nous avons déterminé, de commun sentiment, de nommer cette nouvelle colonie, ou pays, "Eyre-town." Je vous prie donc de ne pas vous y opposer.'

But Eyre *did* oppose it, suggesting instead the name of 'Esapore,' or the 'Abode of Christians,' which was adopted accordingly.

For about three years the little Christian colony struggled on under his fostering care, during which the colonists kept up a brisk fire of correspondence with Eyre, appealing to him in all their troubles and difficulties. Unfortunately, the climate proved less salubrious than was expected. During certain months a malarious fever prostrated their strength, and a murrain destroyed a large portion of their live stock, although they still continued to eke out a decent subsistence from the produce of their fields, and by the sale of eggs, poultry, and butter to the residents of the neighbouring hill sanatorium of Mussoorie. Eventually, owing to the continuance of the above causes, they gradually found it more advantageous to transfer themselves permanently to the hills, and thus the scene

of their early labours became in process of time a flourishing tea-plantation in other hands. But the great object had been meanwhile gained of permanently rescuing the Christian families from destitution, and the example set of the practicability of forming such colonies led, ere long, to the establishment of another in a more salubrious locality, which it is believed still flourishes.

About this time Henry Lawrence's great scheme for a hill asylum for soldiers' children assumed a definite form, and he paid Eyre the compliment of placing his name on the 'committee of reference.'

They had for some time past corresponded on the best mode of overcoming the difficulties attendant on any attempt to render the asylum available for the children of our Roman Catholic soldiers, who formed so large a proportion of our European army in India, and whose claims to impartial consideration Eyre had strenuously advocated, not without some practical effect, although, as might be expected, there was a strong party utterly opposed to any concession.

In addition to his artillery duties, Eyre carried on, for several years, those of executive engineer of the Gwalior Division, and the pretty Gothic freestone church, whose tall pinnacled tower still gives a home-like character to the British cantonment near Gwalior, was of his design and execution. The interior suffered considerable damage from the mutineers in 1857, who destroyed all the coloured glass and woodwork, a very

fine organ, and a remarkably handsome carved-stone pulpit, turning up also the encaustic tiles of the floor. In 1854, Eyre was selected to accompany the Maharajah Sindia on his travels in the North-West, and thus witnessed the opening of the Ganges Canal, meeting there his friend Henry Lawrence for the last time, who spoke with intense disapproval of the annexation policy then in fashion, and did not conceal from Eyre his apprehensions that danger would soon accrue from it and find us unprepared.

In May 1855, in consequence of failing health, Eyre proceeded on sick leave to England. There he soon drew public attention by two lectures, at the Royal United Service Institution and before the British Association, on the subject of metallic boats and floating pontoon waggons for naval and military purposes. As the Crimean war was then in progress, his suggestions attracted the notice of Government, who twice deputed officers of both services to witness Eyre's experiments, and with favourable results on both occasions.

Early in February, 1857, Eyre returned to Calcutta. He found people just beginning to feel uneasy regarding certain incipient symptoms of disaffection among the sepoys. The Maharajah Sindia of Gwalior chanced to have just arrived on a visit to the Governor-General, and closely questioned Eyre as to the opinions entertained in England about the seizure of Oudh. This was delicate ground, but Eyre replied that it was

a subject upon which our public men were not agreed, and that, while many approved, a large party viewed it with regret, as tending to disturb the minds of native princes. Whereupon the Maharajah with great animation exclaimed, ‘ Ah ! that is the truth, they reason rightly.’ Just a year previous Eyre had chanced to find himself seated at a *table d’hôte* in England, next to a very intelligent young native gentleman from Lucknow, who initiated a discussion on the same subject, and stated his confident belief that, ere twelve months should elapse, the whole of Oudh would be in open insurrection. It is not unlikely that this well-informed prophet may have been the since notorious Azimoolah.

Having been posted to a horse field battery at Thyet Myo, in Burmah, Eyre proceeded by sea to join it, and on March 20 reached his destination, three hundred miles up to the river Irrawady. By that time news had come from Bengal of mutinous outbreaks in the native regiments at Berhampore and Barrackpore. Two months later a telegram summoned Eyre with his battery to Calcutta, to assist in suppressing the mutiny which had burst out with terrific violence at Meerut and Delhi, and was spreading like wildfire over the North-West Provinces. On the night of June 14 Eyre found himself once more anchored off Calcutta. On that very day his old friends of the Gwalier Contingent had followed the fatal example

set by the regular army, and had risen against their English officers, many of whom fell victims.

On landing the next morning in Fort William, Eyre found symptoms of alarm amounting almost to panic pervading the European community. In fact, a clergyman, with his wife and family, had actually taken refuge on board the 'Tubal Cain' during the previous night, in expectation of a rise among the natives. Within the fort itself he found the town major employed in swearing in volunteers, and preparation making to hang a state prisoner, in the ex-King of Oudh's employ, who had been detected in tampering with the sepoy's of the garrison. Next morning, however, the prisoner effected his escape from under the very noses of his European sentries, and the King of Oudh himself was arrested. On June 17 Sir Patrick Grant arrived from Madras as commander-in-chief, and while passing Eyre's ship received three cheers from the artillerymen. It was a favourable omen that he should be thus greeted on arrival by the identical company of Artillery which had been mainly instrumental in suppressing the Barrackpore mutiny in 1824.

After several days of uncertainty, Eyre transferred his men and guns on July 10 to the 'Mutlah' flat, in tow of the 'Lady Thackwell' river steamer, with orders to proceed to Allahabad. Their battery horses had been left behind in Burmah, to follow when opportunity offered. Meanwhile, many tragical events had

been occurring in the North-West, especially at Jhansi, Neemuch, Fyzabad, Cawnpore, Allahabad, and Bareilly, where mutiny and massacre had been the order of the day, although the energy displayed by John and Henry Lawrence in the Punjaub and in Oudh appeared to have in some degree stayed the progress of the insurrection. But the fate of India seemed trembling in the balance.

On July 25, while approaching the military station of Dinapore, the steamer picked up an English gentleman from a small boat, who announced that the three native regiments there had risen in mutiny at 2 P.M. on that day, and presently a bend of the river presented the dismal spectacle of burning houses in the distance. At 6 P.M. Eyre landed to offer his services to General Lloyd, and, at his desire, disembarked three guns until those despatched in pursuit of the mutineers should return. On the following day came sad tidings from the neighbouring station of Segowlee, that Major Holmes, commanding the 12th Irregular Cavalry, who had been most successful in his efforts to maintain order in that district, had been murdered, together with his wife, by some of his own men. Mrs. Holmes was that same daughter of Sir Robert Sale who, as Mrs. Sturt, had been Eyre's companion in captivity at Cabul.

Re-embarking his guns, Eyre proceeded up the Ganges to Buxar, which he reached at 3 P.M. on the 28th. Here he was informed that the Dinapore



regiments, having crossed the river Soane, were besieging the civilians of Arrah, in a house which had been, with fortunate foresight, fortified and provisioned by Mr. Vickars Boyle, a civil engineer. The mutineers were led by Baboo Koonwar Singh, of Jugdespore, a brave old Rajpoot chief of good family, great energy of character, and extensive influence, who had now assumed the title of Rajah, and had drawn towards his banner the whole fighting population of Behar, a province which supplied the sepoy army with some of its best soldiers. It was then suspected, and has since been well ascertained, that Koonwar Singh had been for months past carrying on an active correspondence with the disaffected regiments scattered over the Lower Provinces, and, had not his daring schemes been prostrated at an early period, the whole of Bengal and its dependencies would soon have been in a blaze of mutiny and rebellion, from Benares to Chittagong; and who can say what might then have been the issue?

At Buxar was a valuable Government stud, and about thirty miles higher up the river was a branch stud at Ghazeepore, on the opposite bank, where also was stationed a strong native regiment held in check by only one weak company of the 78th Highlanders. Eyre at once saw the importance of preventing the Dinapore mutineers from crossing the river, and as Lord Canning had recently telegraphed to Patna expressing great anxiety for Ghazeepore, Eyre steamed

up thither to land a couple of guns under his only subaltern.

In exchange for this timely aid, the officer in command at Ghazepore allowed Eyre to take twenty-five Highlanders, with whom he forthwith returned to Buxar, greatly to the relief of the stud officers and other English inhabitants of that place. It most fortunately happened that, in the brief interval, the 'James Hume' steamer had arrived at Buxar to take in coal, having on board 160 of H.M.'s 5th Fusileers under Captain L'Estrange. To that officer Eyre at once despatched a note, proposing that they should join forces for an immediate attempt to relieve Arrah. L'Estrange promptly replied in the affirmative, stipulating only that Eyre should send him a written order to that effect, taking on himself the whole responsibility.

This Eyre did not hesitate to do, and, in like manner, made himself formally responsible for the detention of the two Government steamers.

Early on the morning of July 30, guns and troops were disembarked, and arrangements made for a march to Arrah, distant about 48 miles to the east. At the same time, the 'James Hume' was despatched to Dinapore with a letter to General Lloyd, informing him of the intended movement and inviting his co-operation. The field force thus extemporised consisted of three guns with 40 artillerymen; 154 of H.M.'s 5th Fusileers, with six officers, two assistant surgeons, and seventeen volunteers, one of the latter

being the joint-magistrate of Ghazeepore, Mr. J. H. Bax, and three officers of the Stud. The twenty-five Highlanders were left behind with orders to return to Ghazeepore by the first opportunity. Eyre appointed as his staff officer, Captain the Hon. R. H. Hastings, a most fortunate selection, as it proved, for his indefatigable exertions, zealously backed by the other Stud officers and volunteers, contributed largely to the success of the expedition. The knowledge of the district possessed by Mr. Bax, his coolness and determination, together with his influence with the natives in procuring carriage, rendered his presence with the force of no small advantage.

By 5 P. M., everything was ready for a start. The guns were drawn by bullocks, taken, together with their native drivers, direct from the plough. The reserve ammunition and commissariat supplies were drawn on common country carts, and through Mr. Bax's exertions four elephants were contributed by the Dumrao Rajah, for conveying tents and bedding. It was the rainy season, and the roads were very heavy; so that the poor bullocks, unused to such labour, moved provokingly slowly, and frequent halts were necessary to enable laggards to close up; hence it was break of day ere the first encamping ground, at Nyah Bhojpore, was reached. At the twelfth mile, a mounted spy, in the service of Koonwar Singh, was intercepted, and was brought in wounded. This proved that the enemy were on the alert, and that

circumspection was necessary. The march continued till the night of the 31st, when the discovery of more hostile scouts operated as a caution to halt till day-break.

On August 1, when near Shahpore, the dismal tidings came from Dinapore that a detachment of 400 men, which had been sent from that station for the relief of Arrah, had fallen into an ambuscade near that town, and been driven back with the loss of half their number. Eyre, however, resolved to push on and strike a blow to restore whatever prestige might have been lost. Four miles farther on, a bridge had been cut through and rendered impassable for guns; but after an hour's detention the damage was sufficiently repaired, and the force bivouacked for the night outside the village of Goojrajgunje, posting a strong guard to protect the bridge, beyond which a picket of the enemy was known to be posted.

At daybreak on Sunday, August 2, the force again advanced, and had just cleared the village, when bugle notes were heard sounding the 'assembly' in a wood which bounded the view about a mile ahead, and through which lay the direct road to Arrah. We quote Eyre's own account of what followed, as published in the appendix to the third edition of Gubbins' book on the 'Mutiny in Oude,' where it has lain buried long enough, and whence we are desirous of exhuming it:—'Eyre halted his force to reconnoitre. The enemy now began to show themselves in what

seemed overwhelming force. Not content with occupying the wood to our front, large bodies were seen to extend themselves along the woods on either flank, with the evident intention of surrounding the little force opposed to them. To bring matters to an issue, Eyre drew up his force on the open plain, and offered battle. The three guns opened fire to the front and flanks, causing the enemy to screen themselves as much as possible behind broken ground. From this they opened a heavy fire of musketry, and Eyre ordered forward skirmishing parties of the 5th Fusileers to retaliate. The superiority of the Enfield rifles now became apparent. Galled by their accurate fire, the enemy gradually fell back to the shelter of the woods. Meanwhile, Eyre directed the full fire of his artillery on the enemy's centre, with the view of forcing a passage through the wood. They scattered themselves right and left, leaving the road clear, and under cover of the Enfield rifles, the guns and baggage were promptly moved forward and pushed through the wood before the enemy could again close his divided wings. Emerging from the woods, the road became an elevated causeway, bounded on either side by inundated rice-fields, across which the baffled enemy could only open a distant fire. Finding their intentions thus frustrated, they hurried back to intercept the force at Beebeegunge, distant about two miles ahead, where they had effectually destroyed a bridge, and completely commanded the approaches to it by breast-

works, and from the houses of the village. Eyre again halted his force to refresh the men and cattle, within a quarter of a mile of the bridge, and sent out scouts to search for a ford across the river Bunas, which separated him from the enemy. No ford was discovered; and as it was plainly impossible to effect a passage over the bridge, Eyre determined on making a flank march to the nearest point of the railway embankment, distant only one mile, along which there was a direct road to Arrah. This movement was for a time masked by the guns, which opened a brisk fire upon the village, while the infantry and baggage pushed forward in the new direction. But, no sooner did the enemy discover the manœuvre, than they hastened in great numbers to intercept the force at the angle of a thick wood which abutted on the railway. *En route*, Eyre discovered a ford, but as his force had already passed it, he proceeded, followed up pretty closely by a large body of infantry and cavalry, being raw levies of Koonwar Singh; while the three mutineer regiments pursued a course parallel to his own on the opposite side of the stream. On reaching the railway, it became necessary to halt the force and assume a defensive attitude, until the mutineers could be dislodged from the wood, from which they opened a very galling musketry fire. For a whole hour the force was hotly engaged at a great disadvantage, owing to the abundant cover which screened the enemy. Twice, during this period, the muti-

neers, seeing the guns left almost without support (L'Estrange's infantry being occupied in skirmishing), rushed impetuously upon them, and were driven back by discharges of grape. At this juncture, Hastings brought word to Eyre (who, having no subaltern, was obliged to remain with the guns), that the 5th Fusileers were losing ground, and that our position was becoming critical. Eyre, therefore, resolved on trying what a charge of bayonets would do, and despatched Hastings with an order to L'Estrange to that effect. Unable immediately to find L'Estrange, Hastings at once collected every available man, and himself most gallantly led them on; L'Estrange promptly joining on learning the order which had been given. Rushing forward with a cheer they cleared the deep stream (now confined within narrow banks), at a bound, and charged impetuously on an enemy twenty times their own number. Taken completely by surprise, the mutineers fell back in the utmost disorder, the guns opening fire upon their retreating masses, and in a few minutes not a man of them remained to oppose the passage of the force. Thenceforward an open road was available, which skirted the railway to within four miles of Arrah, where, a little before nightfall, the force was compelled to halt by an impassable torrent. The night was employed in endeavouring to bridge this over, by casting into the stream large piles of bricks, that had been collected on the bank by the railway engineers,

by which means the stream was narrowed sufficiently to allow the construction of a rude sort of bridge formed from country carts, over which the guns and baggage marched, without further opposition, into the station of Arrah, and the relief of the beleaguered garrison was accomplished. After their defeat at the railway, the mutineers and Koonwar Singh had fled back with precipitation to Arrah, to remove their valuables to the jungle stronghold of that chief at Jugdespore.'

Among the slain were sepoy of nine different regiments; a sufficient proof that, in this action, Eyre's small force encountered, besides the Dinapore regiments, a formidable number of other trained soldiers of the regular army. We may remark here, *en passant*, that the scene of Eyre's action on the banks of the Bunas, is the identical spot where Major Munro, on October 12, 1764, first encountered the troops of Shooja-ood-dowlah, following them up from thence to Buxar, where he so signally defeated them in a pitched battle on the 23rd of that month.

Eyre continues :—' The relief of the garrison proved to have been most opportune, for their position had been so effectually mined, that a few hours' delay must have ensured their destruction. They numbered sixteen European civilians, and fifty of Rattray's Sikh police. The position, which they had so miraculously defended against the three mutineer regiments, aided by Koonwar Singh's levies, was a small upper-roomed



house of substantial masonry belonging to Mr. Boyle, district railway engineer, by whose skill it had been fortified, and provisioned, in anticipation of some such crisis. But the strongest position is of little avail where stout hearts and an efficient leader are wanting to defend it, and, in the present case, such hearts and such a leader were forthcoming. To Mr. Wake, as civil magistrate of Arrah, who possesses in a rare degree some of the highest qualities of a soldier, no less than to the unflinching fortitude with which his able efforts were supported by his brave associates, may be attributed the salvation of the garrison. During eight days and nights they were incessantly harassed, and so closely watched that not a loophole could be approached with safety. At one period their water failed, and they owed their supply to the prompt energy of the Sikhs, who, in one night, contrived with most inefficient tools, to dig a well on the ground-floor twenty feet deep, whereby abundance of good water was obtained. During the last three or four days their position had been rendered doubly perilous by the fire of some guns of small calibre, which the enemy had mounted within fifty yards of the house, the walls of which were perforated by their balls in all directions. The defence of Arrah may be considered one of the most remarkable feats in Indian history.\*

\* Mr. G. O. Trevelyan, in the fourth chapter of 'Competition Wallah,' thus truly and graphically describes the Eyre of Arrah: 'The English troops at Buxar were certainly a mere handful. But there was a man

Although martial law had been proclaimed in this district, Eyre left the execution of justice in the hands of the civil authorities, except in the case of certain native officials who had transferred their services to Koonwar Singh, and had been taken prisoners in arms against the State. These men were tried by drum-head court-martial, composed of the judge, the magistrate, and two captains, Eyre himself presiding over

there who was neither a novice nor a pedant, neither a young soldier nor an old woman. Wherever hard knocks had been going on within the last twenty years—and during that period there was no lack—Vincent Eyre had generally managed to come in for a liberal allowance. In the Affghan war, the roughest of schools, he had learned to preserve an equal mind in arduous circumstances. When the intelligence of the outbreak, travelling with the proverbial speed of bad news, reached the station of Buxar, Eyre at once made up his mind to march, without waiting to hear whether an expedition had started from Dinapore. Perhaps he was unwilling to leave the fate of the garrison entirely dependent on the energy and promptness of General Lloyd. Perhaps he thought that a good thing like the relief of Arrah would bear doing twice over. His force consisted of a hundred and fifty and four English bayonets, twelve mounted volunteers, and three field-pieces with their complement of artillerymen. The distance to be traversed was fifty miles as the crow flies; and, as the waters were out over the face of the country, and the population was in a state of open hostility, the march proved long and formidable. On the way Eyre received tidings of the reverse sustained by Dunbar's detachment. It seemed foolhardy indeed to advance to the attack of an enemy who had just cut to pieces a force twice as strong as his own. But, according to his view of the matter, this consideration did not in any wise affect the result of his reasoning. His axiom was that Arrah must be relieved. There was no one else now left to do the business, so of necessity it fell to him. He had not many soldiers, and would be glad to have more. He did not share the sentiment of King Henry at Agincourt. He would have been glad to see at his back a thousand or two of those men at Aldershot who did no work that day. But, as he had only a few, he must perform the work with those few. So on he went, nothing doubting.'

the court, and, being found guilty, were hanged as an example. The inhabitants of the city and its environs were ordered to deliver up their arms in camp within forty-eight hours, and long before that time had elapsed, a pile of 7,000 miscellaneous arms had been collected and broken up.

But, although the chief object of the expedition from Buxar had now been accomplished, there was important work still remaining to be done. Koonwar Singh, with a large body of mutineers and armed retainers, had fled to his stronghold at Jugdespore, distant about sixteen miles from Arrah, in the heart of a dense jungle. Captain L'Estrange, in reporting to army head-quarters, truly stated:—‘The difficulty attending the enterprise was, by universal report, very great. The roads were represented as being (at this season of the year) almost impassable; and the position of Koonwar Singh and his followers was deemed, by all who had any knowledge of the country surrounding him, as being inaccessible.’ He added, ‘under all the circumstances, a feeling of doubt, if not of apprehension, as to the success of our expedition, might easily have pervaded troops less confident than ours were, in the judgment, talent, and courage of our leader.’

Eyre, having been reinforced by two companies of Her Majesty’s 10th Foot and 100 of Rattray’s Sikhs from Dinapore, marched from Arrah on August 11, passing over his late battle-field *en route*, where the marks of bullets on the trees bore ample evidence to

the fierceness of the conflict. Next day, about 11 A.M., the enemy were found in strong position, having a river in their front, the town of Dulloor in their centre, partially protected by earthworks, and in their rear the formidable belt of jungle which covered the approach to Jugdespore. An advanced picket occupied the village of Narainpore, whence they were soon dislodged. The enemy's right was screened behind broken ground and low jungle, until the near approach of Captain Patterson's skirmishers drew forth their fire, whereupon Eyre opened upon them with grape, causing them to rise in confusion ; when a timely forward rush, accompanied by a loud cheer from the men of the 10th Foot, drove them panic-stricken into Dulloor and the adjacent jungle. Meanwhile, L'Estrange and Scott with the 5th Fusileers, assisted by a field-howitzer, held in check the enemy's left, consisting of Koonwar Singh's irregulars, horse and foot ; these now simultaneously gave way, and a hot pursuit ensued, terminating only at Jugdespore itself. The enemy, as they retreated through the jungle, maintained a dropping fire on their pursuers, and abandoned two field-guns *en route*. Koonwar Singh had barely time to effect his escape in the direction of Sasseram, leaving his stronghold in our hands.

Eyre followed him up ten miles as far as Peroo, when he received from Dinapore an order of recall to join General Outram, who had meanwhile arrived thus far in progress to take up his command for the relief of

Lucknow. Before leaving Jugdespore, Eyre, in order more thoroughly to destroy Koonwar Singh's prestige among the natives, blew up the palace and principal buildings, where he had established a manufactory of arms and ammunition, and had laid up large stores of provisions, and which, therefore, offered a tempting rendezvous for malcontents in such dangerous times. Koonwar Singh bent his course towards Rewah, with the ultimate intention of proceeding to Delhi; but eventually crossed into the Doab and thence to Oudh, where he carried on a desultory warfare for several months, until forced by the successes of the British arms in all quarters to retire to his native jungles, pursued by Sir Edward Lugard. In crossing the Ganges he received a mortal wound and perished miserably, though stout-hearted and defiant to the last.

On August 21, the gallant little Arrah field force was finally dispersed, having terminated its brief and adventurous career in a campaign of three weeks' duration, fruitful in important consequences to the Government of British India. When this force was first improvised by Eyre at Buxar, on his own responsibility, the entire province of Behar was in open insurrection, having proclaimed Koonwar Singh as their Rajah and ruler; the civilians of Arrah were besieged by the mutinous regiments of Dinapore without a hope of relief; our river communication between Bengal and the Upper Provinces was in danger of being interrupted

—a danger which imperilled the very existence of Havelock's small isolated force in the Doab; and Bengal itself showed symptoms of a general rising. What a change had Eyre's little campaign effected! Arrah relieved; the Dinapore mutineers twice defeated and dispersed; Koonwar Singh in full flight to the North-west; the district of Shahabad restored to order and tranquillity; and the route of the Ganges open for the safe transit of our steamers and troops.

On the night of August 20, Eyre was suddenly awakened from slumber to find the companions of his recent toils and successes standing round his bed to offer him the parting tribute of their esteem and gratitude. The feelings of the Arrah garrison had been embodied in some spirited verses by Dr. Halls, which that gentleman proceeded to read aloud whilst Eyre sate up in bed, half wondering whether the whole was not a pleasing illusion of the fancy. But three rounds of hearty cheers with which the interview terminated sufficed to assure him of the reality.

On August 19, General Outram thus encouragingly addressed Eyre:—‘I have only time to thank you for your very interesting letter of the 5th instant, which I have sent privately to the Governor-General. The official goes to-day to the Commander-in-chief officially. Both will, I am sure, most highly appreciate your glorious little campaign. What a refreshing contrast to the bungling that has prevailed elsewhere! Your

successes enable me to dispose of troops, who otherwise must have been detained here, and especially am I rejoiced that your troop is rendered available for even more important services. At Benares I shall have the pleasure of meeting you, when we can both talk over the measures I have in contemplation.'

So highly indeed did Outram estimate Eyre's services, that he even recommended that they should be rewarded by the Victoria Cross, in the following terms:—'In viewing the steady resolve of Major Eyre to effect the relief of Arrah, the perseverance with which he pursued his object, and the gallantry with which he led his small force to victory, even against such overwhelming numbers, I respectfully submit that Major Eyre established a special claim to distinction, and earnestly solicit His Excellency the Commander-in-chief to bestow on that officer the Victoria Cross.' And to Eyre himself he wrote, as we have already recorded:—'If acts of devotion to one's country entitle to the Cross, then surely the devotion which you displayed at Arrah to your country, and the advantage that resulted to the country from that act, ought to secure it to *you* of all men.'

It arose from no lack of appreciation of Eyre's services that the Commander-in-chief withheld the Cross, considering a Companionship of the Bath the more suitable reward. Congratulatory letters poured in upon Eyre from all quarters, including the highest

Government officials,\* and the Governor-General in Council conveyed to him officially his special thanks, accompanying them with an expression of 'admiration for the zeal, judgment, and resolution with which Major Eyre and his little force encountered and overcame the formidable obstacles opposed to them.'

It was to be expected that, under Outram's command, Eyre would not long remain idle. Accordingly, on the advance from Allahabad to Cawnpore, he was entrusted with a small expeditionary force to intercept, and, if possible, destroy, a formidable party of insurgents from Oudh, who, with 400 men and four guns, had crossed the Ganges to operate in Outram's rear, and cut off his communications with Allahabad. Eyre's force consisted of 100 infantry of Her Majesty's 5th Fusileers, 50 of Her Majesty's 64th Foot, and two guns; and he was joined in the wood by 40 of the 12th Irregular Horse. Marching by night, the town of Khoondun-puttee was reached a little before daybreak. The villagers reported the rebels to be

\* 'Although,' wrote Mr.—now Sir—Cecil Beadon to Eyre, 'I have not the honour of being known to you, I will venture to claim your forgiveness for the liberty I take in expressing the gratitude and admiration which, in common I suppose with every Englishman, I feel for the prompt decision with which you resolved upon effecting the relief of the Arrah garrison, and organised a force for the purpose, and for the admirable skill and bravery with which you and your little army withstood, and completely routed, an overwhelming force of the rebels, and finally effected your object with comparatively little loss.' The expression of 'gratitude and admiration' from one who was Foreign Secretary to the Government, indicates most clearly the feeling of intense relief which Eyre's victory produced in Government circles.



near at hand, if not actually within the walls of the place; their boats being moored about a mile off. Eyre therefore ordered the cavalry to gallop ahead to guard the gates of the town, and should the rebels have fled, to pursue them to their boats, and hold them in check until the infantry and guns should come up.

All turned out exactly as had been foreseen, for the rebels, hearing of Eyre's approach, had already begun to retire in hot haste to the river, and the cavalry, pursuing, reached the bank just in time to prevent the boats leaving their moorings. On the arrival of the infantry and guns, Eyre gave immediate orders to board, and an obstinate resistance was made, terminating in a desperate attempt on the part of the enemy to blow up the boats with all therein; failing to effect which, they threw their guns overboard and precipitated themselves into the river, where they were destroyed by discharges of grape from the guns, and a fusilade from the infantry, none so much as asking for quarter, and only three of the whole number escaping alive. Thus Outram's instructions were fulfilled to the very letter.

Another large party of marauders from Oudh, who had landed about four miles higher, taking warning by the fate of their companions, abandoned their project, and re-embarked before Eyre's cavalry could intercept them. The blow thus decisively struck was considered by Outram to have 'prevented a general insurrection in the Doab,' and in forwarding Eyre's despatch, he

wrote:—‘ I now consider my communications secure, which otherwise must have been entirely cut off during our operations in Oudh, from which evils, having been preserved by Major Eyre’s energy and decision, that officer and the detachment under his command are, I consider, entitled to thankful acknowledgments from Government, which, I am confident, will not be withheld. His reputation as a successful leader had already been so well established, that I purposely selected him for this duty, in the perfect confidence that he would succeed.’ This elicited a further recognition from the Governor-General in Council.

Outram, having joined forces with Havelock on September 16, Eyre exchanged his light field-guns for heavy iron 18-pounders drawn by bullocks and elephants, and rendered further good service on the advance to Lucknow, which took place immediately after. On the death of Brigadier Cooper on September 26, while forcing a passage through the city for the relief of the beleaguered garrison, Eyre succeeded to the command of the Artillery Brigade, which he continued to hold until the final capture of the city by Lord Clyde, in March 1858. Shortly after joining the Lucknow garrison, he was prostrated by brain fever, brought on by exposure and fatigue, and owed his life to the tender care of Martin Gubbins and his wife.

Subsequently, he took part, as Brigadier of artillery and cavalry, in all the active operations of the force,

and was repeatedly mentioned honourably in the despatches of Havelock and Outram, the latter styling him in one of his despatches as ‘the gallant Brigadier Eyre, whose victories at Arrah and Jugdespore have already given him an European reputation.’

During the final siege of Lucknow, Eyre’s artillery was mainly instrumental in repelling an attempt of the enemy’s cavalry and infantry to break through the position at Alumbagh, which, if successful, must have exposed Lord Clyde’s flank and rear to their attacks, besides intercepting his communications with Cawnpore. The affair was, however, for certain reasons best known to the Head-quarter Staff, hushed up as unworthy of notice; and, what is stranger still, when Sir Archdale Wilson, commanding the artillery at Lucknow, sent in his final despatch, making honourable mention of Eyre and his artillery subordinates at Alumbagh, it was brought back by a staff officer with an order for its erasure, as ‘*the Alumbagh had nothing to do with Lucknow.*’

Nevertheless, by a strange inconsistency, when Eyre and Colonel Turner were ordered to proceed to join their new appointments, a complimentary order was published to the army at Lucknow wherein it was stated:—‘His Excellency parts from them with the greatest regret, and takes the opportunity of testifying the high opinion he entertains of them. *They have been specially retained with this force till now, in con-*

sequence of that opinion.' Still, even this could scarcely make amends to Eyre for the total omission of his name from the final despatch, which mentioned by name almost every other artillery officer who had so much as pointed a gun. The generous-minded Outram, ever disdainful of injustice, afterwards remonstrated against the omission, and wrote to Eyre as follows :—' I was as much disappointed as you could be on seeing the Commander-in-chief's despatch in print to find no acknowledgment was made of the services of the troops at Alumbagh, and especially of yourself.'

But, whatever mortification Eyre suffered thereby, he was amply compensated by a letter from Outram himself, who thus expressed his feelings on the close of the campaign, wherein they had been so long associated together :—' I avail myself of one of the few leisure moments allowed me to thank you for the able, zealous, and invaluable service you have rendered me ; to give utterance to the strong feelings of admiration with which I regard you as a man, a soldier, and an officer ; and to assure you of the warm affection I bear to you as a friend. Your future career I shall continue to watch with deep and affectionate interest, and if at any time, or in any manner, I can be of the slightest service to you, I shall esteem it alike a personal favour and an honour to be permitted to aid you. But you are now far above the necessity for help from anyone, for you have well and fairly earned the highest

position the service affords, and doubtless will obtain it when opportunity offers.'

Thus terminated Eyre's active services in the field. His remaining years in India were passed in comparative seclusion at the gunpowder agency of Ishapore—where he twice received the thanks of the Secretary of State for India—and latterly in the more laborious and important post of Inspector-General of Ordnance in Calcutta. During his residence here, Eyre warmly advocated in the editorial columns of the *Friend of India*, the establishment of military colonies in the Himalayan mountains, and found a supporter of his views in Sir Hugh Rose. The subject has very recently been taken up in England by Dr. F. Mouat, and been ably handled in two lectures delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, at which Eyre presided by special invitation.

He also took occasion while at Ishapore to give a practical demonstration, in the presence of Lord Canning and Sir Hugh Rose, of the adaptability for military purposes in India of the metallic floating waggons, on which he had lectured when in England, for pontoon purposes on the rivers of India. Two of these waggons being lashed together, were launched on the Hooghly, and found capable of floating a nine-pounder field-gun and its full proportion of gunners. Such was the impression made on the minds of the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief, that he was at once appointed President of a special Pontoon

Committee, which entered thoroughly into the subject, and whose report, it was hoped, would ere now have led to some remarkable practical results in the re-organisation of our pontoon system for army purposes in India.

On the establishment of the 'Outram Institute,' at Dum-Dum, to commemorate that great and good man's services by carrying out his own benevolent views for the welfare of the British soldier in India, Eyre was selected as President of a Committee for the practical development of the scheme, which, under the auspices and leadership of the Rev. Mr. Norman, may be said to have eclipsed all other attempts of a similar kind theretofore made; although the example has since been followed with remarkable success in other military stations.

He was selected by Lord Canning as a member of the Army Amalgamation Commission in 1861, and it is now well known that, had the suggestions of that Commission been attended to by Sir Charles Wood, that minister would have saved himself and his country from the shame and trouble brought upon both by the incessant complaints, wherewith every subsequent year has teemed, of injustice and bad faith;—complaints which have at length wrung some tardy concessions from his successor.

In the spring of 1863, the state of his health having obliged Eyre to repair to England, he became a Major-General on the full pay retired list, and his active

career in India having thus terminated, he was recommended by Sir Hugh Rose to the Home Government for further honours. These, however, have not yet been conferred, although backed by the Governor-General in Council, and by the Home Council of India; neither has his name been included in the list of good service-pensions, for which he was equally eligible with other retired officers of artillery, who have received that reward, and whose services cannot be said to have surpassed those we have here recorded. Nor, to the universal surprise of the Indian public, as evinced in many a newspaper article no less than in conversation amongst military men, was the Knighthood of the Star of India conferred upon the man who had contributed far more than most recipients of the honour to maintain the connection of India with England.

England, indeed, sometimes acts strangely in such cases. She makes heroes of officers who leave their posts during an action; she bestows prize-money upon men who were hundreds of miles from the place of capture, whilst those by whose daring efforts and brilliant victories in the vicinity, that capture was made possible, are left unrewarded; she showers with an indiscriminate hand crosses and decorations; whilst an action which in any other country in the world would have raised its originator to high command and great honours, which in France was regarded as the brilliant action of the mutiny campaign, is in England

rewarded with a decoration, such as is ordinarily given to military men for the most ordinary services.\*

Of all men in the world, however, Vincent Eyre can best afford to remain undecorated. His deeds need no adventitious prop, no tinsel ornament either to support or to commend them to his fellow-countrymen. They speak for themselves to contemporaries, as they will speak to posterity. The neglect which he has experienced will only cause those actions to be enquired after, which stamped his name on the history of a crisis during which the British power was brought down to a lower ebb than it had ever known before. It will never be forgotten that it was Vincent Eyre, who first dealt the most fatal and deadly blow to the rebellion, at whose hands the mutineers first received a retribution as prompt as it was effective. That successful march to Arrah acquires greater lustre from the fact, that it followed immediately upon the defeat of double the number of European soldiers under another leader; that it was made in the face of men trained in our school, whose hands were yet red with the victory they had achieved over a larger force, who knew that with the defeat of Eyre they would gain possession of Behar—would be in a position to march upon Bengal. Looking at men as they are, we may well assert that there are few who would have taken upon themselves the responsibility at which Eyre so

\* Two months subsequently, in May 1867, General Eyre was nominated Knight Commander of the Star of India.



eagerly clutched. There was no tarrying, no delay, no telegraphing for instructions, no sheltering himself under the wing of others. On the contrary; not only did he show himself able to think and act at the same moment—one of the highest attributes of a man,—but he was ready to take all responsibility—the responsibility of everyone joining his force—upon his own shoulders,—to give orders in writing,—to do anything, in fact, to insure movement and action. When we think how rare such qualities are in the world;—that other men, who from interest or from their official position, obtained a factitious reputation during the mutiny, showed when brought into action that they possessed them not,—we must the more honour the man who not only possessed but used his great gifts to such purpose—to the saving of British interests in India. For, however much in these days of peace and security some people may be inclined to undervalue the effect of the great success of Arrah, this we know for a fact, that at the time it was regarded as the turning point of the mutiny, as the death-blow to rebellion in Behar, as so strengthening the hands of Government, as to enable it to turn its undivided attention to affairs in the North-west. What if Eyre had not succeeded? Where then would have been Havelock? Where the beleaguered garrison of Lucknow? In what a position would have been the Commander-in-chief, with the whole country between Allahabad and Calcutta in insurrection? Who can

doubt that Ghazeepore would have gone, that Patna would have gone, that Calcutta itself would have been sorely threatened? It was not possible, indeed, that a Lloyd or a Hewitt should have occupied the place of an Eyre. Men of that calibre are not the adventurous to whom alone adventures are possible. It needed for such an expedition a leader who laughed at responsibility when it might affect his action; who was cool, determined, resolute; who possessed the brain to contrive, the nerve to carry out, his daring plans. Such leaders are rarely met with now-a-days,—but such an one the Arrah field force possessed in Vincent Eyre.

The warm personal feelings which we entertain towards the subject of this sketch, knowing as we know how much there really is to admire in his character, have prompted us to the task—the pleasing and inspiring task—of laying his deeds, just as he accomplished them, before the readers of this ‘Review.’\* We have done this, of design, barely, almost nakedly. We have avoided everything but a recital of facts as they occurred, preferring to our own comments, the comments of such men as Lord Canning, Sir James Outram, Sir Cecil Beadon, and others whose testimony cannot be doubted. We have given the simple outline of a career of a British officer in India, commencing in the steady performance of his duty; he himself aiding that performance by constant study; and culminating

\* This article appeared in the ‘Calcutta Review’ for March 1867.

in an expedition and a victory, both of which testified to the excellence of the seed sown, to the fertility of the soil in which it had taken root. How true indeed is the apothegm, that a life of preparation will not fail of glory ;—how still more true, if possible, the maxim that the opportunity will not fail the man, if the man only fit himself for the opportunity.

*MADHAJEE SINDIA.*

(WRITTEN IN 1869.)

THE Mahratta power, raised to such a height by Sivajee, seemed as if it were about to melt away under the rule of his dissolute and incapable successors. His son Sambajee, taken prisoner by the Moguls, after a disastrous reign of nine years' duration, was put to death with the most excruciating tortures in the presence of Aurungzebe in 1689. His son, again, Saho Rajah, a prisoner at the time, was released on the death of Aurungzebe, only to find his claims to the headship of the Mahrattas disputed by his cousin, Sivajee, son of Rajaram. Thenceforth there were two parties and two dynasties amongst the Mahrattas. The elder or legitimate branch established itself at Sattara, and from it is descended, by Hindu law, that prince whose claims to the throne of Sattara have been so much canvassed within the memory of the present generation. The other branch' fixed upon Kolapore, about sixty-five miles south-by-east of Sattara, now the capital of a district of the same name, lying in the Concan, partly below the Syhadree range and partly in the elevated land within the Ghauts. Here, in

1760, died the last lineal descendant of Sivajee; but there still remain, in quasi-independent sovereignty, the descendants by adoption of that once dreaded conqueror.

The representative of the elder branch, Saho Rajah, was content to live a life of ease and pleasure, even to acknowledge himself a vassal of the Mogul, leaving his State affairs to be managed by his chief minister, who from the time of Sivajee was called the Peshwa. In 1714, Balajee Biswanath, a Brahmin, was appointed to that office, receiving at the same time a grant of the pergunnah of Poona, and the fort of Poorendur. He, by his intrigues and ability, contrived to concentrate all the real power in his own hands, leaving to the Rajah the title only of sovereignty. He made Poona the real seat of power, the centre of all authority; and, what was of equal importance to him, he caused the office of Peshwa to be made hereditary in his family.

Amongst the dependants of Balajee Biswanath were two men who were destined to become founders of dynasties which exist to the present day. These were Mulharjee Holkar and Ranajee Sindia. The latter, the descendant of a decayed Rajpoot\* family of Kunnerkheer, a village fifteen miles east of Sattara, had been reduced to such a state of poverty, that he had entered the service of the Peshwa as slipper-bearer. It is related, and the story is jealously pre-

\* Grant Duff, vol. i. p. 480.

served by the family, that, when in this capacity, a circumstance, trifling in itself, led to his being employed on higher duties, and, in this way, to his further advancement. One day, when Bajee Rao, who had succeeded to the office of Peshwa on the death of his father in 1720, came, after a long audience, from the presence of Saho Rajah into the ante-room, he found his slipper-bearer lying on his back, fast asleep, with the slippers clasped with both hands to his breast. It appeared to the Peshwa that a man who could be so careful in small things was likely to be zealous and faithful in matters of greater moment. He accordingly promoted him from the menial office he had till then held, to be a trooper in his body-guard. His rise was rapid. The administration of Bajee Rao was signalised by almost unremitting warfare. Again the Mahrattas became the terror of the declining empire of the Moguls. Bajee Rao ravaged Guzerat, conquered Malwa, and a portion of Bundelkund; then, after a brief sojourn in his own territories, he marched to the gates of Delhi, surrounded the Nizam, who was advancing to the assistance of the Emperor, and compelled him to sign a convention constituting him Viceroy of Malwa. Again he marched into the Dekkan, and returning thence directed his steps to the North-west, when, on April 28, 1740, he died, leaving a name which is still recollected with pride by the descendants of the warriors he so often led to victory.

In all these expeditions Ranajee Sindia took a prominent part. We hear of him in 1725 so far advanced in rank, as to be looked upon as one of the leaders of the army. In that year deeds were granted to him, to Holkar, and to Udajee Powar by the Peshwa on the part of Saho Rajah, to levy *Chouth*\* and *Surdeshmukhee*,† and to retain half the *Mokapa*,‡ for the payment of their troops. At Delhi, in 1736, when the moderation of the Peshwa was attributed by some of the Emperor's courtiers to fear, and a body of eight thousand men came to attack the Mahrattas, it was Mulharjee Holkar and Ranajee Sindia who fell upon this body with their daring horsemen, killed and wounded upwards of six hundred, and captured two thousand horses and one elephant. In the action with the Nizam in February 1738, which compelled him to remain within his lines and afterwards to agree to the convention of which we have already spoken, Ranajee Sindia was one of the three principal officers who led the Mahratta troops into battle. To the treaty made in 1743 with Mahomed Shah by Balajee Rao, the eldest son and successor of Bajee Rao, Holkar, Sindia, and Peelajee Jadow were securities for the Peshwa, declaring that should he recede from the engagement

\* *Chouth*, a fourth part of the revenue.

† *Surdeshmukhee*, an exaction levied by the Mahrattas on the Mogul territories, and formally recognised by Mahomed Shah, as a right of 10 per cent. upon the whole revenue of six Subahs (provinces) of the Dekkan.

‡ *Mokapa*. equal to 66 per cent. of the whole revenue.

he had contracted, they would quit his service. At the time of his death, about the year 1759, Rañajee had come to be regarded as one of the most powerful and trusted servants of the Peshwa.

At this time Ranajee Sindia possessed in jaghir nearly half Malwa, with a revenue of sixty-five and a half lakhs of rupees. Under his successor, of whom we are now about to speak, these possessions developed into the kingdom of Gwalior, but Ranajee himself held them only as a dependant of the Peshwa.

Ranajee Sindia left behind him five sons—three by Meenah Bai, a woman of his own tribe, to whom he was married in the Dekkan; and two by a Rajput woman of Malwa. Of these two only one survived him. This was Madhajee Sindia, the founder of the real greatness of the family.

Madhajee did not, however, immediately succeed to the chiefship. Though greatest in ability, he was youngest in order of birth, and he was not born in wedlock. It does not appear that he ever attempted to dispute the more legitimate claims of his brothers. Of these, the eldest, Jyapa, was, on his father's death, at once confirmed in his jaghir; the other two, with Madhajee, received important commands under the Peshwa.

The ten years that elapsed between 1750 and 1760 witnessed the elevation of the Mahratta power to its highest point of prosperity. From the first of those dates, immediately after the death of Saho Rajah in



1749, Poona had become the virtual capital of their empire. The successor of Saho, Ram Rajah, agreed, soon after his accession to the throne of Sivajee at Sattara, to transfer all real power to the Peshwa, retaining only the nominal sovereignty over the possession of his ancestors. He remained, in fact, by the actual deed of his grandmother, Tara Bai, and the tacit consent of the Peshwa, a close prisoner in the fort of Sattara till the death of the former in 1761. But even after that till his own death sixteen years later, though not in actual confinement, he was still kept a prisoner at large.

The action taken by the Mahrattas in the period between 1750 and 1760 may be divided into two distinct branches. The Peshwa himself acted in the Dekkan and on the western coast; his brother, Ragunath, and his lieutenants, Holkar, Sindia, and others, acted in Hindustan. The action of the Peshwa himself may be first briefly summarised. His chief contests were with the Nizam. At first, when the latter was strengthened by the French under Bussy, the hitherto unconquered squadrons of the Mahrattas recoiled before French discipline and French valour, and it seemed as though by a bold effort Mohammedan supremacy might have been again asserted in the Concan. But discord and division prevented all real concert in the councils of the Nizam, and a peace on equal terms was agreed upon. Later, after Bussy had been recalled by the well-meaning but inexperienced and

obstinate Lally, the Mahrattas were able to extend their conquests. In 1760, a treaty was signed with the Nizam, by which territory valued at an annual revenue of sixty-two lakhs of rupees was ceded. This territory included Ahmednugger, the province of Beejapore, and the greater part of the province of Ahmedabad. In this campaign, 1759, the army of the Peshwa was commanded by his cousin Sudaseo Bhao, of whom we shall hear something further on. It had likewise been strengthened by the accession of the corps of Ibrahim Khan Gardée, a Mohammedan, who had been trained under Bussy, and whose knowledge of artillery was far in advance of that possessed by the Mahrattas.

In the North-west, during the same period, the lieutenants of the Peshwa had achieved even greater triumphs. In 1751, Sufdar Jung, Viceroy of Oudh and Vizier of the Emperor Ahmed Shah, found himself compelled to call in the aid of the Mahrattas, to assist him in putting down the Rohillas, by whom he, unassisted, had been defeated. Mulhar Rao Holkar, Jyapa Sindia, and Sooraj Mull, the chief of the Jâts, joined him with a large portion of their forces, and completely defeated the Rohillas. As a reward for these services, several districts of Rohilcund were assigned to them to plunder.

From this they were recalled to assist the Peshwa in his operations against the Nizam; but, in 1753, Holkar and Sindia received a pressing summons from

Ghazee-ud-deen, the Commander-in-chief of the imperial army, who was engaged in a contest for power with Sufdar Jung, the Vizier, by whom he had been raised to his dignity.

For six months Delhi had been in a state of anarchy. Every night the streets were deluged with blood by the contending parties. To political fury was added the bitterness of religious hatred, for Sufdar Jung was a Shiah, and Ghazee-ud-deen was the champion of the Sunis. Before the Mahrattas could arrive, however, Sufdar Jung had given up the contest and retired to Oudh. On his retirement Ghazee-ud-deen caused a relative of his own to be appointed Vizier, and went, aided by the Mahrattas, to attack Sooraj Mull, chief of the Jâts. Whilst engaged in this attack, the Emperor marched out to observe, and, in case of a favourable conjuncture, to attack him. Whereupon Holkar, without consulting anyone, marched against the emperor's camp, threw it into confusion, plundered the baggage, and took possession of Delhi. Ghazee-ud-deen, who joined him there, then deposed Ahmed Shah, put out his eyes, and raised to the throne a grandson of Jehandah Shah, by the title of Alumgeer II.

After this, satiated with plunder, the Mahrattas retired. But in 1756, the ambition of Ghazee-ud-deen, who had constituted himself Vizier, urged him to attempt, by an act of treachery, the recovery of the provinces of Lahore and of Mooltan, which had been severed from the Delhi empire eight years before by

Ahmed Shah Doorani. Successful for the moment, he only provoked the vengeance of Ahmed Shah, who, marching at once from Cabul, not only recovered the Punjab, but sacked Delhi and Muttra. He then returned to Cabul, leaving a Rohilla, Nujeeb-ud-dowla, as Vizier. But no sooner had Ahmed Shah retired than Ghazee-ud-deen recommenced his intrigues, and again invoked the assistance of the Mahrattas.

Then followed the most brilliant campaign in which that nation of warriors had ever been engaged. The Peshwa detached his brother Ragunath Rao \* to the north-west, and he, summoning Holkar and Sindia and other chiefs to his aid, marched on Delhi (1758). Delhi was taken almost without a blow, and Ghazee-ud-deen was reinstated as Vizier. At this crisis, when nothing more seemed to remain for him to do, Ragunath received a tempting invitation from Adina Beg, who had revolted against the Viceroy appointed by Ahmed Shah, to march on and take possession of the Punjab. He marched accordingly, and defeated, in a pitched battle, the Affghan Governor of Sirhind, moved without opposition on Lahore, of which he took possession in the month of May, and then occupied the whole of the Punjab, which was evacuated by the Dooranis without a battle. Leaving the government to Adina Beg, supported by a body of Mahrattas, Ragunath himself returned to Poona. But Adina

\* In the English accounts of the history of this period, Ragunath Rao is generally styled Ragoba.

Beg dying soon after, the government devolved upon Shahjee, a relation of Sindia.

On Ragunath's return to Poona from the dazzling campaign which brought a new and distant province under the Mahratta yoke, he was met with remonstrances on the part of the prime minister, Sudaseo, on account of the heavy expenses he had incurred without adequate return. This was the first victorious expedition undertaken by the Mahrattas, which had not only brought no money into the treasury, but had not paid its own expenses. In the course of his remonstrances, Sudaseo made some allusion to the profitable results of his own campaign in the Dekkan. This enraged Ragunath to such a degree that he offered to change places with his cousin, and take charge of the home administration, whilst Sudaseo should become commander-in-chief. Sudaseo at once agreed to the proposal. This exchange, at a critical moment, of a man trained in civil employ for a tried soldier, had a most disastrous influence on the campaign that followed.

Sudaseo set out in the first instance against the Subadar of the Dekkan. This prince, no longer supported by the French, and weakened by the loss of the artillery corps under Ibrahim Khan Gardee, trained by Bussy, and whom the Mahrattas had enticed into their service, was entirely out-manœuvred, and worsted in a combat which had all the importance of a battle, in the beginning of 1760. In consequence of this, the

Subadar sued for peace, but he obtained it only by the surrender of the important fortresses of Dowlatabad, Sewneree, Asseergurh, and Bijapore, the city of Ahmednuggur, and other districts yielding a total annual rental of sixty-two lakhs of rupees. The treaty, however, had scarcely been concluded, when intelligence reached the Peshwa that Ahmed Shah Abdali, marching from Cabul, had recovered the Punjab, and having out-manœuvred Duttajee Sindia, had crossed the Jumna, and attacked and completely defeated that chieftain at Rudber, near Delhi, leaving Duttajee himself and his brother Juttobah dead on the field of battle, and with them two-thirds of the army. Madhajee Sindia, who fought gallantly in the action, managed to escape. Jyapa had previously been assassinated; Tookajee had died; this action, therefore, left Madhajee the sole surviving son of Ranajee Sindia. His nephew, Junkajee, son of the eldest brother, Jyapa, still remained the head of the family—a position he had occupied ever since the death of his father.\* Mulhar Rao Holkar, who had formed the advanced guard of the combined Mahratta force, on hearing of this disaster, had retreated precipitously to Secundra,

\* In stating that Juttobah, the youngest brother, was killed at the battle of Rudber, we have followed Grant Duff. Malcolm records that he died at Kamber near Deeg, but whether before or after the action he does not state. Kasi Rai Pundit only mentions Duttajee as having been killed on that occasion, but no subsequent mention is made of Juttobah: he probably fled from the field and died of his wounds, for nothing more is heard of him.

destroying one of the enemy's convoys on his way. Here, however, he had been surprised by a party of Affghans, completely defeated, and had fled to the camp of the Peshwa on the river Manjera.

On receiving these tidings, Sudaseo Bhao, flushed with his recent victory over the Subadar, obtained the Peshwa's permission to set out to repair the losses sustained, and to strike a great blow for the entire conquest of Hindostan. Everything seemed to favour this project. The Mahratta power was at its zenith; the Mogul empire, a prey to internal dissensions, would most certainly succumb to a well-delivered blow; nor, powerful as was Ahmed Shah Abdali, was he, with good management, an adversary to be really feared, for he fought for plunder rather than conquest, and his previous invasions had shown that he sought rather to be the king-maker than himself the sovereign of Hindostan.

On receiving from the Peshwa the charge of the direction of the expedition against Ahmed Shah, the first act of Sudaseo was to obtain the permission of the same, high authority that his son, Wiswas Rao, then seventeen years old, should accompany the force as its nominal commander. This was strictly in accordance with Mahratta custom. He then set out, accompanied by the representatives of the principal Mahratta families, who, not having gained for themselves quasi-independent sovereignties, were content to follow the fortunes of the Peshwa. As he neared

the Chumbul, he was joined by the heads of the great Mahratta houses, since famous in the history of Hindostan. There came to him Mulhar Rao Holkar, Junkajee Sindia, and his uncle Madhajee, Dummajee Guickwar, Jeswant Rao Powar, Appajee Rao Attowlay, Antajee Mankesir, Govind Punt Bundelay, and others, at the head of considerable forces. By the mediation of Mulhar Rao Holkar, moreover, Sooraj Mull, chief of the powerful tribe of the Jâts, joined him with 30,000 men. As he passed through Rajpootana and the district adjacent, the Rajpoots flocked to his standard. There was scarcely a Hindu chief, however exalted or however low his rank, who did not consider the cause of the Mahrattas his own, and exert himself to aid it by all the means at his disposal. It ought to be mentioned that his own force, originally 30,000 strong, of whom two-thirds were the flower of the Mahratta cavalry and the remaining 10,000 a picked corps of artillery and infantry under Ibrahim Khan Gardee, was thus increased to about 90,000 regular troops. Including camp-followers, the numbers with him have been variously estimated at from 200,000 to 500,000 men.

But a short time elapsed, however, before Sudaseo Bhao showed very clearly not only his incompetency to direct operations in the field, for that might have been supplied, but his utter ignorance of the art of managing mankind. It happened that on this occasion, the Mahratta camp presented a striking



contrast to the camps of previous days. Then, all that was not necessary had been discarded; tents had been rarely seen; it had been the object of the Mahratta warrior to take all that he required with him on his horse's back, and, due consideration having been had to the purpose for which the horse was required, the burden had ordinarily been but a light one. But on this occasion the Mahratta victors seemed to have taken from the Moguls, whom they had defeated in the Dekkan, an example which threatened to change the character of their movements. Their tents were costly, magnificent, and numerous; the dresses of the chiefs and officers were made of the richest material; not only they, but many of the soldiers, had their families with them, and the amount of baggage made the army of the Bhao more resemble a Mahratta force returning with its booty after a successful campaign than any camp previously known to Mahratta story. These *impedimenta* interfered greatly, one and all, with the movements of the army.

At the first council of war held after the arrival of Sooraj Mull, that wary and experienced chieftain pointed out these defects to Sudaseo. He told him that though his army might be more expeditious than the troops of Hindostan, it was not equal in that respect to the Affghans: he advised him, therefore, to leave the women, the children, the baggage, many of the followers, and even the heavy artillery, in the fortresses of Gwalior or Jhansie; or should that arrange-

ment not be approved of, he offered to place at his disposal any one of the three fortresses of Deeg, Combeir, or Bhurtpoor, for the purpose, and to join him himself with every available man. This sage advice was strongly supported by Mulhar Rao Holkar, and the other chiefs of the Mahrattas who had recently come in contact with the troops of Ahmed Shah. But the Bhao would not listen to it. On the contrary, priding himself on his birth as a Brahmin, and on his elevated position, he reproached Mulhar Rao with having outlived his activity, and Sooraj Mull with giving advice fit for a Zemindar like himself, but utterly unsuited to the consideration of one so much his superior. This conduct very much disgusted all the chiefs, but the sense of the necessity for union prevailed, and they submitted to the decision of their commander, although so great was the suspicion shown by Sudaseo with respect to Sooraj Mull, that he placed a body of troops to prevent his escape from the camp.

The Mahrattas then advanced upon Delhi and laid siege to it. The city, after a brief defence, surrendered. The capital of the Moguls had thus easily fallen into the hands of their new rivals for empire, and Sudaseo Bhao was anxious to signalise the capture of so important a place by proclaiming Wiswas Rao, the son of the Peshwa, Emperor of Hindostan. It was believed by the Mohammedan chieftains, who had grown great and powerful under the Mogul dynasty, that this step would certainly follow the entry into the

imperial city. It would have been a bold, but if followed by decided military action, a sagacious, and, probably, a successful course. It would have drawn a strong line of demarcation between the Hindus and Mohammedans, and, as the former had then recently been rapidly rising in importance, whilst the latter had been falling in the same proportion, that alone would have constituted a valid reason for its adoption. It certainly would have animated the Mahrattas, Rajpoots, Jâts, and other Hindu followers of the Bhao, with a spirit such as the prospect of a great end to be attained—and to be attained only by the exercise of the highest qualities of our nature—alone can bestow. That he entertained it, showed that the Bhao understood all the importance of such a move; but that he delayed it, until after he should have conquered the Abdali, demonstrated not less certainly that he lacked the power of seizing an opportunity, of striking at the moment when to strike doubles the force of the blow—a talent rarely bestowed except upon men of the very highest capacity.

He entered Delhi, however, in great triumph: seized upon a great part of the royal effects he found in the palace; stripped off the silver ceiling of the Dewan-i-Am, the value of the metal of which alone amounted to seventeen lakhs of rupees, and despoiled the peacock throne. Against these acts both Holkar and Sooraj Mull strongly protested. They were fatal to the policy which alone could justify the invasion of the Mahratt-

tas, who appeared thenceforward before the people of Hindustan, not as a nation fighting for empire, but rather as depredators bent mainly upon plunder. The protests, however, were disregarded, and Sooraj Mull, with the concurrence of Holkar and other disaffected chiefs, quitted the camp, and returned with all his troops to Bhurtpore.

This disaffection little affected the Bhao, as, contrary to his true policy—to the only policy which had a chance of succeeding, the uplifting of the national standard of the Hindus—he had at the time entered into negotiations with the Shuja-ud-dowla, the Nawab Vizier of Oudh, and the most powerful of the Mohammedan nobles. But this chieftain was too politic to entertain proposals from men whom he knew to be the necessary enemies of his race, and whose victory must be fatal to Mohammedan supremacy. Rather than that, he compounded his quarrel with his rival Ghazee-ud-deen, and entered into confidential relations with Ahmed Shah. The better to deceive the Mahrattas, he continued, nevertheless, his correspondence with the Bhao.

Up to this time Ahmed Shah had remained encamped at Anoopshahr, on the frontiers of Oudh. But on being assured of the co-operation of Shuja-ud-dowla, he broke up his camp and marched, though it was the middle of the rainy season, to Shahdéra, on the banks of the Jumna, opposite the city of Delhi. He had with him 28,800 horse in 24 regiments, each 1,200 strong; 2,000 camels, each carrying 2 musketeers, armed with

zumburucks, or pieces of a very large bore ; 40 pieces of heavy artillery, and several swivel guns. His Rohilla ally, Nujeeb-ud-dowla, brought to the field 20,000 Rohilla infantry, 6,000 horse and some rockets ; Doondy Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan, 15,000 Rohilla infantry, and 4,000 horse ; Shuja-ud-dowla 2,000 horse, 1,000 foot, and 20 pieces of cannon. These, with other minor detachments, brought up the numbers of the army to 41,800 horse, 38,000 foot, and between 70 and 80 pieces of cannon.\* The Jumna being still swollen, Ahmed Shah was prevented from at once crossing to attack the Mahratta army.

Meanwhile, the Bhao, still neglectful of his true policy, and still hopeful to gain Shuja-ud-dowla, declared Mirza Jewan Bukht, son of the Emperor Shah Alum, to be Emperor of Delhi, and Shuja-ud-dowla to be his Vizier ; then, leaving a garrison in Delhi, he marched against Kunjpoora on the Jumna, about sixty miles above Delhi, then garrisoned by about 10,000 Rohillas. His object was to secure a place by which he might safely cross the river, and fall upon the Dooranis.† He succeeded in storming this place about the beginning of October. Instead, however, of

\* These figures are taken from Kasi Rai's narrative, who writes :— ' This I know to have been precisely the state of the Mussulman army, having made repeated and particular enquiries before I set it down, both from the muster-office and from those by whom the daily provisions were distributed.' He adds :— ' But the numbers of irregulars who accompanied those troops were four times that number ; and their horses and arms were very little inferior to those of the regular Dooranis.

† So called after their leader, who changed his title of ' Abdali ' into that of ' Doorani.'

at once seizing the advantage he had gained, he left a garrison in the place, and returned to Delhi. Ahmed Shah took advantage of this mistake. He left his encampment with his whole force on the 17th, and marched to Baghput, about twenty miles above the city, where he had been told he would find a ford. He spent three days in searching for it, the Bhao leaving him all the time unmolested. At last, having found it, he began to cross on the 23rd, and completed the operation on the 25th, before the Mahratta leader knew even that he had entertained the idea. Making the most of his advantage, he marched at once in the direction of the Mahrattas.

The Bhao, as soon as he could realise the startling fact, returned to his camp at Kunjpoora. But here he found himself assailed by two opposite advisers. Mulhar Rao Holkar, with the true instinct of a Mahratta leader, pressed upon him the expediency of adopting purely Mahratta tactics ; of hovering on the flanks and rear of the enemy with his cavalry, of cutting off their supplies, of devastating the country in front, in rear, and all around them. Such tactics, he urged, must in the end exhaust the resources of an enemy far from his own country, who meditated rather a raid than a serious conquest, and must leave him, famished and debilitated, an easy prey to an army which would have all its resources at its back. On the other hand, Ibrahim Khan Gardée, with all the pride of an artilleryman, trained in the then new and successful school of warriors of Europe—of an artilleryman, who, when

serving under Bussy, had seen the grand army of the Peshwa dispersed by successive rounds fired from guns served by Frenchmen in the manner he had learned from them—strongly advised the Bhao to assume an entrenched position, from which he could use his guns to the greatest advantage. The dispute between them became so warm that Ibrahim Khan threatened to turn his guns upon Holkar, if his advice were not followed. The Bhao, who hated Holkar, and who had imbibed a more than superstitious reverence for artillery trained after the European model, decided ultimately upon following the advice of his Mohammedan councillor, and gave orders accordingly to retreat on Paniput, there to dig an entrenched camp for his army.

This order was obeyed, and, followed closely by Ahmed Shah, the Mahrattas retired to the walled town of Paniput, and began at once to throw up entrenchments. The army encamped amounted to 55,000 cavalry, 15,000 infantry, and 40 guns. Of the several bodies of cavalry, the largest, consisting of 10,000 men, was furnished by Junkajee Sindia, with whom was his uncle, Madhajee. In numbers, then, Ahmed Shah possessed a considerable advantage, but there can be little doubt that the composition of the cavalry and artillery of the Mahratta force was far superior to that of the corresponding branches of the Doorani army.

That army halted about five miles distant from the position taken up by the Mahrattas at Paniput, and

began likewise to throw up abattis and other entrenchments. Skirmishes now took place daily, mostly to the advantage of the Dooranis. An attempt made by the Bhao to cut off his enemy's supplies, though at first promising success, failed, because it was not followed up with vigour. For three months did the skirmishes continue. By degrees the superior numbers of the Dooranis made themselves more and more felt. At last they succeeded in hemming in the Mahratta camp on every side, and, wasting the country all around, in preventing it from receiving supplies. They succeeded, in the end, in reducing it to the condition to which Mulhar Rao Holkar had looked forward to reducing the Dooranis. Throughout this period, the conduct of Ahmed Shah was that of a skilful and prudent leader. His Hindustani allies were constantly pressing him to give a general assault; but he replied always to the effect that it was necessary to have more patience, for that every day would render the enemy more surely his prey.

The Mahrattas were now reduced to a state of distress so great that it could be borne no longer; and the Bhao, who up to this moment had still trusted to his negotiation with Shuja-ud-dowla, became convinced at last that it was necessary to hazard the fortunes of the campaign and the glory of the Mahratta Empire on a single battle. His mind once made up, he directed his whole energy to carry the plan to a successful issue.



One hour before daybreak, on January 6, 1761, he moved out with his whole force. He commanded the centre in person, Wiswas Rao, the son of the Peshwa, being at his side. On the extreme left was posted Ibrahim Khan Gardee, with the main body of the infantry. Sindia held the extreme right, and next to him was Holkar. The artillery covered the whole line. In this order they advanced boldly, with every sign of the determination of desperate men, towards the camp of the Dooranis.

Ahmed Shah, on his side, was not negligent. Intelligence of the movements of the Mahrattas had been conveyed to him as soon as they were descried by his scouts. He at once ranged his men in order of battle, and, with true military sagacity, did not allow them to wait the attack, but advanced to meet the enemy. His Vizier, Shah Wali Khan, commanded the centre, with which were the Affghans; the Rohillas under Doondy Khan and Hafiz Rahmat Khan, supported by some Persian troops, were on the right; whilst on the extreme left the Rohillas under Nujeeb-ud-dowla, and the troops of Shuja-ud-dowla, were supported by a chosen body of Affghans. It will be noticed that whilst Ahmed Shah composed his centre of the troops upon whom he could most rely, he strengthened both his wings by detachments of the same quality. He himself took up a position in rear of the army, overlooking the field.

Upon the result of the battle now about to ensue it

depended whether the main course in which events had run for the previous five hundred and sixty years should or should not be completely turned aside; whether the yoke, which the Mohammedan chiefs of various families had imposed during that period on the indigenous population of India should still remain fixed, or be broken off for ever; whether, in fact, the rule of India should continue in the hands of the descendants of its foreign conquerors, or revert to those of the Hindu children of the soil. For to this, in spite of the vacillating conduct of the Bhao, it had come at last; though, thanks to that vacillating conduct, he had lost the advantages which an earlier profession of the real point at issue would undoubtedly have secured for him. It was a contest for empire between the Mussulman and the Hindu.

The battle began, about an hour after sunrise, by a furious and well-sustained attack by the left wing of the Mahrattas, under Ibrahim Khan Gardee, upon the right wing of the enemy, composed mainly of Rohillas. The contest here was very fierce, and raged with doubtful fortune for about three hours. Almost simultaneously with the first shock of attack, the Bhao charged the centre of the enemy's army with great impetuosity. Success seemed to shine upon him. He pierced through the main body of which it was composed, completely breaking them as he did so. Only about 400 horse, and a few zumburuck-bearing camels, rallied about the Vizier, who had himself

dismounted to fight on foot. This small body of men alone stood between the Bhao and complete victory ; for, the centre once completely pierced, nothing could have saved the Dooranis. It wanted but a continuance of that onward movement which had, till then, carried all before it.

But it was not made. Whilst the Vizier himself believed the battle lost, and sent to both his wings for aid, the Bhao apparently did not see that its issue was in his hands. One more charge and it was gained. Instead of charging, his men halted to fire, and during that halt events occurred which restored the lost fortunes of the Dooranis.

For, whilst the events we have recorded were progressing on the centre and right of their army, the troops on its left were not the less threatened by the flower of the Mahratta army, under Sindia and Holkar. Here, if anywhere, the Mahrattas might hope for victory ; for the name of Mulhar Rao Holkar was famous over India, and the energy of the representatives of the house of Sindia had made itself felt on many a contested field. And, in truth, never did the chiefs of that famous house more distinguish themselves than on this day. But Mulhar Rao—whether it was that this tried warrior had been so disgusted with the treatment he had received from the Bhao, that he determined not to exert himself, or whether he had a secret understanding, as some have asserted, with the enemy, this at least is certain, that he dis-

played a cautious reserve such as he had never shown before on the field of battle. Nevertheless, thanks to the daring valour of Sindia's warriors, the battle was maintained with at least equal advantage on the right wing of the Mahrattas.

At noon the state of affairs was nearly as follows. On their left wing, the Mahratta troops under Ibrahim Khan Gardee had gained a decided advantage over the enemy, yet not so great as to be in any way decisive; on their right, the balance of advantage was also on the side of the Mahrattas; in the centre, the Bhao had gained a very decided superiority. For, although the Doorani Vizier had sent to his two wings for aid, none could thence be spared, for those wings were themselves hard pressed; he had indeed rallied some fugitives, encouraged by the unaccountable halt made by the Bhao, and he had sent pressing messages to Ahmed Shah: unless these should be promptly responded to, any forward movement on the part of the Bhao must be his ruin. We can easily see, with both wings gradually pressed back, what must have been the certain result if the Bhao had only succeeded in breaking through the few men that still constituted the centre of the army.

It was just at this time, when the intelligence that the battle was going against him reached Ahmed Shah, that great prince showed himself, in this decisive moment, well worthy of his reputation. He first despatched a body of horse to turn the fugitives and stragglers; he then ordered 4,000 men to charge

Ibrahim Khan Gardee, who was pressing his right flank very hard; whilst 10,000 were sent to support the centre, and not to support it only. Their leader received strict orders to charge the Mahrattas in close order, sword in hand, at full gallop. Instructions were also sent to the Affghan cavalry on the left wing, which was maintaining its ground better than the others, to charge the flank of Bhao at the same time that the others should attack him in front. These orders were executed to the letter. The effect was what it must always be, whenever a body in repose is attacked by a body in swift and rapid motion. The Mahrattas, indeed, made a gallant resistance. Wiswas Rao, the son of the Peshwa, was terribly wounded, and could not sit his horse; he continued, nevertheless, to animate his men from the back of an elephant. The Bhao, still on horseback, fought like a common soldier at the head of his own men. But all would not do. He had missed his great opportunity. He could not expect the Fortune with which he had dallied for more than two hours to grant him a second chance on the very same day. The Dooranis, on the contrary, were resolved to make the most of theirs. For more than an hour after their powerful attack, the Bhao and his followers made head against the enemy. After that, every minute their defence became weaker. Not only was it that the lighter frames of the Mahrattas were less capable of sustaining continued fatigue than those of the northern horsemen, but these latter

were continually reinforced by the fugitives from the first attack. At length they could bear it no longer; they gave way and fled in confusion, closely and hotly pursued. No victory could be more complete. It has been computed that of the entire occupants of the Mahratta camp at Paniput, including women and children, and amounting to 500,000, nearly all were destroyed; nearly all the prisoners taken were murdered in cold blood, and the Hindu chronicles relate that in the Doorani camp on the following morning every tent, with the exception of those of the Shah and his principal officers, had heads piled up before the door. Wiswas Rao died of his wounds. Junkajee Sindia, severely wounded and taken prisoner, was murdered in camp, in pursuance of the machinations of Nujeeb-ud-dowla who hated all his race; Ibrahim Khan Gardee, also wounded and taken prisoner, was treated by Ahmed Shah with insolence and cruelty, so much so that he died seven days after; the dead body of the Bhao was found upon the field of battle.\* Mulhar Rao Holkar, Dummajee Guickwar, and some other chiefs fled from the field of battle and escaped.

\* This, at least, is the general belief. But many years after, a man made his appearance who declared himself to be the Bhao. The mystery, which excited great interest at the time, has never been cleared up; many believing him to be the Bhao, others regarding him as an impostor. The supposed Bhao was confined for many years in the fort of Chunar, but was released by order of Warren Hastings, in 1781. He died soon after at Benares. He left a manuscript history of his life behind him, which would have aided to clear up the truth of his claims, but it was not taken proper care of by the English Resident to whom it had been entrusted, and was destroyed by vermin.

We have been particular in detailing the history of the campaign of which the battle of Paniput was the crowning incident, because, although apparently unconnected with the rise of the house of Sindia, its result greatly affected the fortunes of that family. Had the Mahrattas proved victorious at Paniput, there can be no doubt whatever that the following day Wiswas Rao, or his father, Balajee Bajee Rao, would have been proclaimed Emperor of Hindustan; Junkajee would have remained head of the house of Sindia, and succession would have continued in a direct line from him, to the exclusion of the illegitimate but more able Madhajee; and who can say what position Junkajee and his successors would have occupied under the government of a prince who would himself have aspired to regard all the provinces of Hindustan as constituting one empire subject to himself? The defeat of Paniput had a material effect, then, on the fortunes of the house of Sindia. Though the immediate results of it were to despoil that family of its possessions, and to cut off all the members of the family save one illegitimate offshoot; yet, in the end, all these apparent misfortunes proved advantageous; they were the discipline which led to its greatness. The power which it ultimately acquired, overshadowing that of the Peshwa himself—the position it maintained in the early part of the present century, and which enabled it to dispute for the empire of India with the British—may all be traced to the defeat at Paniput.

At that battle, it is only recorded of Madhajee, that he commanded there under his nephew Junkajee, and that they both signalised themselves by their valour. The distinguished part taken by Sindia's contingent in that famous battle has been already noticed. Notwithstanding the lukewarm support of Mulhar Rao Holkar, who left the field before the action had been irrevocably decided, the two chiefs of Sindia not only lost no ground, but maintained their position on the right with advantage, until the complete defeat of the centre of the Mahratta army left them exposed to destruction. The defeat was so crushing that it involved with it the immediate overthrow of the wings as well. Junkajee, wounded, was, as we have seen, taken prisoner; but Madhajee formed one of the throng of fugitives. He was mounted on a fine Dekkany mare, which had carried him throughout the action, and he trusted to her speed to escape. But the mare had been engaged in desperate exertions for about nine hours, and was already fatigued. She obeyed nevertheless the indications of the rider's hand, and exerted herself to take him out of the reach of the enemy. Her fine shape had, however, been marked by an Affghan trooper, and Madhajee had scarcely cleared himself from the ruck when he turned round and saw himself followed by a man, mounted on a strong, ambling, and apparently fresh animal, bent evidently on pursuing him. In vain did Madhajee exert all the arts of a well-skilled horseman to evade



the pursuit. In vain did he endeavour, when some distance ahead, to rest his mare; whenever he turned his head, his eye rested on the same trooper, going at the same steady pace, and his gaze fixed upon himself. At last his mare could go on no longer. Endeavouring to clear a ditch, she fell into it, Madhajeel falling with her. Before he could recover himself, the Affghan was upon him, and striking at him with his battle-axe, caught him on the knee, and felled him to the earth with a wound which deprived him for ever after of the use of his right leg. Where he fell, there was he left to lie, the Affghan being content with stripping his person of some ornaments, and taking away the mare. Incapable of moving, Madhajeel was found there some hours after by a water-carrier, also one of the fugitives, who placed him upon his bullock, and carried him towards the Dekkan.\*

The news of the disaster at Paniput crushed for a time the Mahratta confederacy to the dust. To the Peshwa, Balajee Bajee Rao, who had been long ailing, it was the final award of destiny. He survived the intelligence but a few days. His eldest son, Wiswas Rao, had perished. The succession devolved, there-

\* Malcolm, from whom this story is taken, adds, that the Madhajeel used to relate that the circumstance of the flight and pursuit made so strong an impression upon him, that he could not for a long time sleep without seeing the Affghan and his clumsy charger pacing after him and his fine Dekkany mare. He further states that the service of the water-carrier was gratefully rewarded; he was raised to high commands in the army, and afterwards loaded with favours.

fore, upon the next in order of birth, Madho Rao Bullal, then in his seventeenth year.

To the wars with the Subadar of the Dekkan, and the disputes for supremacy at the Court of the Peshwa which followed, we propose to allude only so far as they affect the fortunes of Madhajee. It will suffice if we mention that during the first four years of his reign, the difficulties with which the new Peshwa, then a minor, had to contend, were caused by the ambition of his uncle, Ragunath Rao, who was too anxious to draw into his own hands all the power of the State. The penetration and tact of Madho Rao, however, foiled all his plans.

On arriving at Poona, wounded and lamed for life, after the disastrous day of Paniput, Madhajee applied to be recognised as the chief of the house of Sindia. That house had, indeed, lost all its possessions in Hindustan and Malwa by the issue of the battle, but in those days that which was lost one day might be regained the next, and it was certain that with Madhajee at its head, the reputation of the house of Sindia would not be long in recovering, and more than recovering, the lustre it had lost. His pretensions were opposed on two grounds: the one, because he was illegitimate; the other, because there still survived a grandson of Ranajee, the son of Tookajee, brother to Madhajee by the same mother. The claims of this lad, whose name was Kedarjee, were advocated by Ragunath Rao, who suggested that Madhajee

should act only as guardian during the minority of his nephew. But Madhajee very justly pointed out that the objection which barred the succession to himself, barred it equally to his nephew; that nephew being the son of his own brother and illegitimate like himself. The Peshwa, Madho Rao, recognised the force of this argument, and, notwithstanding the strong opposition of his uncle, conferred the headship of the family upon Madhajee. The opposition offered by Ragunath Rao was never forgotten by Madhajee.

Madhajee was appointed, in the first instance, to command the household troops of the young Peshwa. His first employment after obtaining this office appears to have been as commandant of one of the divisions of the army sent by the Peshwa into Malwa in 1764. In this campaign he laid the foundation of the means for attaining to future greatness. 'He had succeeded,' says Malcolm,\* 'to all those assignments of lands made to his father to pay the troops of the family; and both in Central India and in Hindustan, Rajah after Rajah was laid under contribution, and district after district added to the territory he governed in the name of the Peshwa; and although the share of the latter in these possessions was only nominal, his commands were made the pretext for exactions and conquests from which his own territories were not exempt, for Madhajee took full advantage of the dis-

\* Malcolm's Central India, vol. i. p. 121.

sensions that occurred in Poona after the death of Balajee, to usurp, as far as he could, the rights and lands of the head of the empire to the north of the Nerbudda.'

This expedition into Malwa in 1764 must not be confounded, as it has been by some writers, with a later expedition under Visajee Krishna into Hindustan, for a purpose hereafter to be described. From the first expedition we find Madhajee returned to Poona in 1766, occupying still the office of commandant of the household troops of the Peshwa, and possessing considerable influence at the Court of Poona. An event just then occurred which put that influence to the test. In 1766, Mulhar Rao Holkar died. His demise was followed almost immediately by the death of his grandson, Mallee Rao. Ragunath Rao, then all-powerful at the Peshwa's court, and who was actually in command of the army in the field, supported the Dewan of the deceased prince in an endeavour to effect an arrangement by which the widow of his late son, Koondée Rao, the famous Ahalya Bai, would have been dispossessed of her inheritance, and the power of the Holkar family materially reduced. The generous mind of the youthful Peshwa revolted against the perpetration of such an injustice, and he found a strong supporter in Madhajee and in Janoojee Bhonsla, both of whom positively refused to act against Ahalya Bai, if any attempt were made to coerce her. Ragunath Rao accordingly gave in, and the administration

of Ahalya Bai afforded a spectacle of enlightened rule, such as the natives of India can refer to with pride, and which contrasts favourably with the rule of many European princes even of our own time.

Nothing very materially affecting the fortunes of Madhajee occurred till the year 1760, when we find him in command of 15,000 horse, forming a division of the army which, under Visajee Krishna, the quarter-master-general of the Mahratta armies, was destined to march into Hindustan, and avenge the defeat of Paniput. The occasion was singularly propitious. The battle of Paniput, fatal as it had proved at the time to the Mahrattas, had been scarcely less so to the representative of the house of Timour, the Emperor Shah Alum. The victory had benefited Ahmed Shah Abdali, and his allies, Nujeeb-ud-dowla the Rohilla, and Shuja-ud-dowla the Vizier of Oudh. But Ahmed Shah, laden with plunder, had long since returned to Cabul. Of the two others, Shuja-ud-dowla had engaged in hostilities against the English, had been beaten at Buxar, and after losing some of the districts of his province, had been recognised by that people as Vizier of the Empire. He had since remained principally in his province. The other, Nujeeb-ud-dowla, had taken up his position at Delhi, there to govern in the name of the Emperor. His position, however, gave him no real power; he was dependent mainly on the Rohillas; the Emperor, then absent with the English, chafed under his supremacy,

and he was engaged in constant affrays with the Jâts and roving bands of Mahrattas, some of whom had even the audacity to threaten Delhi. The intelligence of the approach of a grand army of the same warriors under Visajee Krishna threw Nujeeb-ud-dowla into dismay; in vain he attempted to negotiate.

There was a man in the Mahratta army, who had fled from Paniput, and who saw that the time had now arrived to recover almost all the power and influence then so fatally lost. That man was Madhajee Sindia. This chieftain not only by virtue of his position took a high place in the councils of the Commander-in-chief, but by reason of his character he directed the entire policy of the campaign. Visajee would have treated, but Madhajee would not. Whilst negotiations in the true Oriental style were pending, Nujeeb-ud-dowla died.

It was deemed advisable in the Mahratta camp to take advantage of this incident to conquer and ravage the country of the Rohillas, even to threaten Shuja-ud-dowla and Oudh, before making any attempt upon Delhi. The result showed the wisdom and prudence of this policy. The Emperor Shah Alum, anxious to be rid for ever of the family of Nujeeb-ud-Dowla, whose son, Zabita Khan, had taken his father's place at Delhi, determined to leave the English, and throw himself under Mahratta protection; whilst Shuja-ud-dowla was made to feel that his security depended upon his abstaining from all interference. Even the

English in Bengal anticipated for a moment that ~~they~~<sup>they</sup> might have to contend, in the infancy of their power in that Presidency, with the full force of the Peshwa. But for them the contest was postponed.

The Emperor Shah Alum, escorted by Madhajee Sindia, entered the city of his ancestors in the month of December 1771. The Mahrattas then, secure of the capital, poured into Rohilcund. The attempts made by the hereditary chieftains of that province were futile. The country was nearly entirely overrun. To save the remainder from subjugation, the Rohillas, in the month of June 1772, concluded a treaty with Shuja-ud-dowla, the Vizier of Oudh, and the only remaining representative of independent Mohammedan authority in Hindustan. But before this alliance produced any practical result, an event occurred which changed for a time the position and prospects of the Mahratta protectors of the Emperor Shah Alum.

On November 18, 1772, the Peshwa, Madho Rao, died. Narain Rao, his brother, who succeeded him, sent orders to recall the army from Hindustan, but before they could be carried out, Narain Rao himself had fallen a victim to a murderous conspiracy. The office of Peshwa then devolved upon his uncle, the famous Ragunath Rao, the enemy of Madhajee. Soon after his accession, the main army under Madhajee arrived from Hindustan, having left, however, a portion under the Commander-in-chief and Tookajee Holkar to maintain Rohilcund. This portion had to meet a con-

spiracy formed by the Emperor Shah Alum to emancipate himself. In a pitched battle, fought near Delhi in December 1772, the Emperor was defeated, and was forced to submit to the terms imposed upon him by the conquerors; the principal of which was the appointment of the Peshwa as his Commander-in-chief. The Mahrattas then returned to Poona.

The whole of the reign of Ragunath was signalised by internal contentions and foreign wars. Madhajeel took advantage of the first of these to consolidate his power, and to obtain a firm possession of the lands he had by various methods acquired, especially those north of the Nerbudda. He did not come in contact with the new Peshwa after his accession to power in 1773, until the month of May 1774—a period when the power of Ragunath was waning, and when he appeared to be in as great danger from the intrigues of his internal enemies as from the open opposition of Nizam Ali. It formed, however, no part of Madhajeel's plan to countenance the pretensions of the Mohammedans of the Dekkan and, accordingly, he gave openly on this occasion all his support to the Peshwa; but at the close of the same year, the affairs of Ragunath seemed desperate. As a last resource, he had begun to negotiate with the English through the Resident at Poona. His downfall now appeared certain. To precipitate it, Madhajeel Sindia and Tookajeel Holkar suddenly declared against him, and on November 27 marched to attack, and, if possible, to take him prisoner. Ragu-



nath, however, was apprised of their movements in sufficient time to retreat to Guzerat. Here he concluded a treaty with the English, by which he ceded to that nation Bassein, Salsette, and other important districts, in exchange for an agreement to supply him with material aid in men and money. Thenceforth the history of Ragunath is linked with that of the rise of British power in the Western Presidency.

To understand the policy of Madhajee at this and subsequent periods, the reader must bear in mind the circumstances of his position, and the great end to which all his efforts were directed. Madhajee was bent on founding a dynasty—a kingdom, compact and powerful, which should devolve naturally on his successors. To this end all his thoughts, all his energies, all his actions were directed. The Peshwas, the Holkars, the Bhonslas, the Rohillas, the Moguls, the English, were treated by him with friendliness or hostility, solely according to the view he took of their desire and their ability to aid or to threaten him in this great plan. He had no personal animosities—he never indulged in revengeful feelings; everything would be forgotten and forgiven, if he thought the offender were able to be useful to him, even indirectly. Hence it was that he was at one moment on friendly terms with the Peshwa, at another at open war with him. In a word, he marked out a great object to be attained;—he marked the road leading to that object, and no temptation induced him to swerve a hair's

breadth from following it. This was the secret of his success. It is a course, in fact, which a man of really lofty feelings could scarcely follow: but it is one, nevertheless, which, with time, with health, and with patience, must invariably lead to worldly success. Fortunate is it for mankind that there is something beyond mere worldly success—something more enduring even than the complete attainment of human ends, to be striven for on this earthly sphere. ‘Thy success!’ writes Carlyle in immortal words, ‘*If the thing is unjust, thou hast not succeeded.*’

No thought of this nature stopped for a single instant the ambitious career of Madhajeel. Although Ragunath Rao had been declared Peshwa, and had been generally acknowledged as such, the widow of the murdered Narain Rao had, a few months after her husband’s death, given birth to a male child, and on this infant the hopes of the most powerful of the Mahratta families were concentrated. Prominent amongst those who supported his interest was the famous Nana Furnawees, the ablest of the Mahratta statesmen of the period. Between these families and Ragunath, Madhajeel held at this period an apparently neutral position, being secretly allied with the former, but desirous to instil confidence into the breast of Ragunath until he could break with him with an effect that might be decisive. He had attempted this, as we have seen, in concert with Holkar, in November 1774, but had failed. His failure, however, only caused him to re-

assume the mask, and he had assured Ragunath of his friendly intentions. He continued to maintain this doubtful attitude, whilst the negotiations between Ragunath and the Bombay Presidency, and the altercation regarding those negotiations between that Presidency and Warren Hastings, continued: but when, in 1776-77, the cause of Ragunath appeared irretrievably lost, he openly united with Nana Furna-wees. Ragunath, with a few followers, threw himself into the arms of the English, who, under the command of Colonel Egerton, shortly succeeded by Colonel Cockburn and Mr. Carnac, were advancing upon Poona. Madhajee and the Nana thus found themselves in open opposition to the British nation.

Their first experience of this warfare was, strange to record, favourable to the Mahrattas. The slow and ill-concerted measures of the English, caused partly by divided counsels, partly by the natural incapacity of their commanders, gave Madhajee ample time to assemble a very sufficient force of tried and chosen warriors to oppose them. By a great show of strength and by skilful manœuvres, he so cowed the spirit of the English invaders, that nearly three thousand British troops, aided by a considerable native contingent, not only retreated before some 25,000 Mahrattas, but destroyed their heavy guns and burnt their stores, so as to be able the better to conduct that retreat in silence and in safety. The retreat, however, was quickly discovered, and was followed up with vigour

and energy. The English were attacked all the way to Wargaum; their loss, especially in officers, being particularly heavy. At Wargaum, deeming further retreat impossible, they sued for terms. They were granted, but they were of a shameful and humiliating nature. The negotiators not only yielded all the acquisitions ceded by Ragunath, but gave up, in addition, the revenues of other districts; they agreed to countermand the advance of other troops from Bengal, and they bestowed upon Madhajee the English share of Baroach, and a present of 41,000 rupees. A more disgraceful treaty was never signed by a British plenipotentiary. Our commanders were spared the further disgrace of giving up their ally, Ragunath, as that chief surrendered privately to Madhajee. From this date—January 14, 1779—may be reckoned the unquestioned rule of Madho Rao Narain, son of the murdered Narain Rao, as Peshwa.

By the conclusion of the treaty of Wargaum, not less than by the events leading to it, Madhajee obtained an immense accession of power and influence. To his bold and judicious conduct, the success, thus far, of the campaign, was attributed by his countrymen. It gave him a *locus standi* in the Mahratta confederacy, such as neither Holkar, nor Nana Furnaweess, nor even the Peshwa, could claim. By it the foundations of the house of Sindia were fixed so firmly as to justify all his ambitious expectations, and to make him feel assured of the ultimate result. Thenceforth till his

death he occupied, not nominally, but in very deed, the first place among his countrymen.

Meanwhile, the Government of India, directed by the firm hand and iron will of the illustrious Warren Hastings, determined to wipe out, as speedily as possible, the stain inflicted upon the British name by the convention of Wargaum and the events preceding it. A force under Colonel Leslie had been previously despatched to co-operate with the little army, which, under Mr. Carnac and Colonel Cockburn, had been defeated by Madhajee. But Colonel Leslie was as unfit for the task of commanding a force as his Bombay comrade, and frittered away in trifles time which might have been employed with effect. He was consequently speedily replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Goddard. This able officer assumed the command in October 1778, and at once directed his course to the south-west. It is worthy of remark that, among all the Native States through which he passed, he received real and effectual support only from the little principality of Bhopal, then and ever afterwards the firm ally of the British. On January 30, he arrived at Burhanpore in the Bombay Presidency, and here he first received contradictory accounts of the events at Wargaum. This made him only push on, and in twenty days he reached Surat, a distance of 300 miles, by this celerity avoiding a body of 20,000 Mahratta horse, sent to intercept him.\* From Surat he hastened to Bombay to concert

\* Grant Duff.

measures with the Council of that Presidency. At first negotiations were opened with the several Mahratta chiefs. But whilst these were pending there broke out that war with Hyder Ali, which, from the outset to its close, tried to the utmost the resources of the Madras Presidency, and reduced that Government to its greatest straits. Shortly after it had broken out, a correspondence between that famous leader, the Mahrattas and the Subadar, Nizam Ali, was discovered—all pointing to an alliance for the destruction of the British. Upon this, Goddard, then appointed a Brigadier-General and invested with full powers, crossed the Taptee, and invaded the territories of the Peshwa (January 1780).

Meanwhile, Madhajee had been pursuing his ambitious designs. In order to bring into existence a counterpoise, which, though not sufficient to overwhelm himself, might yet prevent too great a development of supreme authority on the part of Nana Furnawees, he connived at the escape of Ragunath Rao, when on his way to life-imprisonment at Jhansie. At the same time he opened secret negotiations with the English, Hyder Ali, and the Subadar, intending naturally to throw in his lot with that party by which he might conceive his own interests would best be advanced. The hostile movements of Goddard forced him, however, to take a side, and joining with him Tookajee Holkar, he prepared to do battle for his nominal master, Madho Rao Narain, Peshwa.

He still maintained, however, a friendly communication with the English, hoping to keep them inactive till the rains should fall. But he had to deal with a man who was proof against evasions, and who was resolved to bring the question of peace or war to a decisive issue. Madhaje's proposals all tended to the concentration in his own person of the supreme authority at Poona. Goddard, not considering such an arrangement desirable, resolved, if possible, to bring about an action. On April 3, accordingly, he attempted to surprise his enemy's camp near Baroda. But Madhaje, though really surprised, drew off his troops with consummate skill, and suffered little practical loss. A second attempt, made on the 19th of the same month, was even less successful, Madhaje skilfully avoiding an action. By this line of conduct he effectually gained his end—the prolonging of hostilities until after the commencement of the rains. He lost, however, almost immediately afterwards, the fortress of Gwalior, then reputed impregnable, but which succumbed to the skill and daring of Captain Popham in August of that year.\* Unable to pursue his operations against Sindia in the interior, Goddard transferred his operations to the coast, and laid siege to Bassein. On December 10 he defeated the Mahratta force sent to relieve it, and the place surrendered on

\* A detailed account of Major Popham's movements, from the pen of the late Major William Stewart, Governor-General's agent at Benares, appeared in the extinct 'Benares Magazine' about twenty years ago.

the following day. Other operations, with varying fortunes, ensued, no great success, however, being attained, and the army on one occasion, April 23, 1781, suffering a defeat. These operations gave Madhajee the opportunity he coveted, of planting his own power firmly in Central India. General Goddard at last perceived that, by confining his attack upon the Mahratta possessions to those districts farthest from the possessions of Sindia, he was in reality playing the game of the man, who, whilst he was the mainstay of the Mahratta power in the field, cared nothing regarding the nation at whose expense his own possessions were extended. A resolution was accordingly arrived at to attack Sindia in his own territory.

The attempt was first made by a British force under Lieutenant-Colonel Carnac. The operations of Madhajee, on hearing of this movement, stamp him as a military genius of no common order. Learning that Colonel Carnac's force was small, he resolved to overwhelm it before it could be reinforced. He hastened at once with a large body of troops in the direction of Seepree, but, too late to save that place, he came up with Carnac at Seronje, and surrounded him. The English force was reduced to great straits by famine. Added to this a cannonade of seven days' duration made considerable havoc in its ranks. Feeling that a further continuance in his position would inevitably lead to his destruction, Carnac resolved to retreat, having previously sent to the nearest division of British



troops earnest requests for reinforcements. For seventeen days the retreat continued, our troops being followed up and harassed by Madhajee. But on the eighteenth day, the Mahratta chieftain, for the first time in his life, allowed himself to be completely outwitted. As the only means of escape, Colonel Carnac, at the dead of night, on March 24, attempted to surprise his enemy. His movement was entirely successful. Madhajee was completely defeated, and forced to give up the pursuit. A few days later, Colonel Carnac was joined by a force under Colonel Muir. Madhajee, however, with the energy and spirit of a true Mahratta, soon recovered from his mishap; and by his superiority in cavalry he speedily reduced the English force to a state of inactivity. A few months later, Madhajee, perceiving that he had everything to lose from a contest carried on within his own territory, concluded a treaty with Colonel Muir, by which he bound himself to neutrality, agreed to exercise his good offices to bring about a general peace, recovered all his territory except the fortress of Gwalior, and obtained from the English a promise to recross the Jumna.\*

This treaty was concluded just at the right time for the interests of Madhajee. The Government of India was, for many reasons, anxious to conclude the war with the Mahrattas, to prevent it from attaining the pro-

\* Grant Duff, to whom we are indebted for these details.

portions of a deadly struggle for existence. The defection of Madhajeel from the confederacy was hailed, therefore, by them with the liveliest satisfaction, and prepared them to show towards that chieftain a consideration such as, under other circumstances, would undoubtedly have been denied him. Nothing could have more advanced the views of Madhajeel at this conjuncture than a recognition of him on the part of the English as an independent prince. Besides the great moral advantages flowing from that recognition, it would give him that of which he then stood greatly in need; it would give him time; time to consolidate his conquests, to give them a compact form, to gain for himself an independent footing amongst the several rulers of Hindustan; time, moreover, to watch the opportunity for recovering, free from any interruption on the part of the English, the stolen fortress of Gwalior. That fortress the English had made over, after its capture, to the Rana of Gohud, to be by him held solely on the condition of good behaviour. It required but a little arrangement on the part of Madhajeel to bring about the apparent infraction of a condition so easy to set aside.

But, before he attempted this, he had been a consenting party to that treaty of Salbye, between the Peshwa and the English, which restored peace to every part of India but the Carnatic. Mr. Hastings was urged to the conclusion of this treaty by the doubtful fortunes of the struggle between Hyder Ali and the

coast army, and by the fear lest a man so ambitious as Madhajee might influence the Mahratta nation to cast in its lot with the great adventurer of Mysore. Nana Furnawees was anxious for peace, not less on account of the presence of English troops in the Mahratta territories, than of jealousy of the increasing power of Madhajee; whilst Madhajee himself, after long hesitation, after coquetting with Hyder Ali, and even obtaining the sanction of the Nana to a plan for the invasion of Bengal, came to the conclusion, for reasons already stated, that peace with the English would, for the moment, best advance his interests. The treaty of Salbye, whereby, in addition to the former territories secured to him, he obtained the cession of Baroach, promised him after the capitulation of Wargaum, had scarcely been signed, when he realised the wisdom of the course he had followed. The signature took place on May 17, 1782: the treaty was ratified on June 6 following, and was exchanged with the Peshwa on February 24, 1783. In the interval between the first signature and the final exchange, events had occurred at Delhi which opened out to Madhajee Sindia a prospect, the realisation of which had ever been one of his fondest hopes, and had, nearly twenty years earlier, led to the campaign which ended on the fatal field of Paniput.

Ever since the retreat of the Mahrattas to their own country in 1773, the Imperial Government had been carried on under the auspices of Mirza Nujjuf Khan,

the leader of the anti-Rohilla party in the state. His rule had, on the whole, been vigorous and successful. He had made the voice of the descendant of Timour once more respected at home and abroad, and under his energetic sway the empire seemed likely to attain a position such as it had not occupied since the death of Aurungzebe. But on April 22, 1782, Nujjuf Khan died. His death was the signal for anarchy and intrigue, for divided factions and contending rivals. This was the opportunity for which Madhajee had been longing. It seemed to him that the occupation of imperial Delhi, with the connivance of the English, opened out to him better prospects than an alliance with Hyder Ali, for the destruction of that nation. And when, towards the close of 1782, he received from Warren Hastings an assurance that the English would not interfere with his plans on Delhi, he made up his mind, and at once put in action the means he had so plentifully at his command.

Whilst these intrigues were pending, he made himself, in the first instance, secure in his own acknowledged dominions. To protect them the more effectually, he contrived a quarrel with the Rana of Gohud, and forced him to surrender Gwalior,—the English, occupied after the death of Hyder with his son Tippoo, not caring to interfere. Everything having been placed upon a footing of order in his own territory, he caused himself, by means of his intrigues with one of the contending factions at Delhi, to be

invited to that city in the name of the Emperor. The timely assassination of one of the leaders of the contending factions made Madhajee arbiter of the situation. Meeting the imperial court near Agra, he accompanied it to Delhi, where, refusing for himself and for the Peshwa the office highest in name and in repute—that of Amir ul Amrah, or prime minister—he accepted for the Peshwa that of Vicegerent of the empire, and for himself that of Deputy to the Peshwa; thus, at the same time, acknowledging his fealty to the chief of the Mahrattas, whilst retaining in his own hands alike the power and the right to exercise it. From this period till the defeat of the armies of Doulut Rao Sindia, by Lord Lake in 1802, the imperial districts of Northern India were, some brief intervals alone excepted, administered and governed by the Mahrattas, acting in the name of the imprisoned Emperor.

For the five years following Madhajee's assumption of power at Delhi, he was engaged in a continued struggle to maintain it. It was scarcely to be supposed that the Mohammedan factions would acquiesce tamely in his elevation. The country, moreover, was exhausted, and the necessity for raising a certain amount from its inhabitants did not increase his popularity. The Rajpoots, the Jâts, the Sikhs, and some of his own followers, too, disputed his supremacy. Yet Madhajee was resolved not lightly to resign the imperial power. He enlisted two battalions of regular infantry under a foreign adventurer, named De Boigne,

and as opportunity offered, he largely increased this force and added greatly to its efficiency.\* He improved likewise the irregular troops, enlisting amongst them not only Rajpoots, but Mohammedans, and organising them on the basis of a disciplined force. His own energy and force of character not only inspired his men, but supplied even the losses occasioned by the treachery and misconduct of some of his adherents. Thus, after the battle of Jeypore, lost by the desertion of his regular infantry, Madhajeelost not a moment in securing his strong places, and, effecting a junction with a considerable force of Jâts, sent a fresh army into the field under Rana Khan and De Boigne. Though this army was defeated near Agra on April 24, 1788, Sindia so far rallied it as to meet the enemy, and completely beat them on June 18 following. The

\* Grant Duff, quoting from General Palmer's despatches, thus notes the growth of De Boigne's two battalions:—'The most important of all the changes introduced by Sindia was the well-organised regular force, which he, about this time, raised, by augmenting the two battalions of De Boigne into a brigade, which was subsequently, at different periods, increased to three brigades. A brigade consisted of eight battalions, of seven hundred men each. Attached to every brigade there were 500 horse, and to each battalion five pieces of artillery—two six-pounders, two three-pounders, and a howitzer. To provide for the regular payment of these troops, he made over assignments of land to the charge and management of De Boigne; to whom he allowed two per cent. upon the net revenue, independent of his regular pay, which was Rs. 10,000 a month. A select body of irregular infantry was attached to De Boigne's force. . . The augmentation of De Boigne's army was gradual, as was his train of artillery, which consisted at last of upwards of 200 pieces of artillery, of different calibres. . . His officers were Europeans of all nations, many of them British, and men very respectable by birth, education, and character.'

Moguls, under the ferocious Ghulam Kadir, committed after this event those terrible atrocities upon the unhappy descendant of Timour and his family, as well as upon the inhabitants of Delhi, which have made his name for ever infamous in history. His triumph was shortlived. On October 11, Delhi was occupied by Rana Khan and De Boigne, and a few days later Madhajee himself seated the blinded Shah Alum on his recovered throne. His power and authority were subsequently confirmed and consolidated by a great victory obtained by his army on June 25, 1790, over Ismael Beg, the last remaining Mohammedan noble possessing sufficient power and influence to interfere with his ambitious views. A second victory over Ismael Beg's allies, the Rajpoots, was gained on September 12, in the following year; and Madhajee, sensible of the expediency of conciliating rather than driving to extremity that warlike people, granted them peace on easy terms.

In the first war with Tippoo, 1790-92, Madhajee took no part. He was strongly of opinion that complete victory in such a contest would only be advantageous to the English, from whom a violent and persistent enemy would thus be removed, whilst the maintenance of Tippoo at Mysore was by no means inconsistent with Mahratta interests. He condemned, therefore, strongly the conduct of Nana Furnawees in aiding the British on such an occasion. He continued, then and subsequently, to consolidate his own authority

in Hindustan, to meet the open efforts of Tookajee Holkar and the secret efforts of Nana Furnawees to overthrow him, and to prepare against any attack from the North-west, constantly threatened as it was by the grandson of the Abdallee. He found, however, in the course of time, that, having placed his dominions in Hindustan on a footing of tolerable security, the best, and indeed the only efficacious mode of thwarting his Mahratta rivals, was to proceed direct to Poona. Could he become the minister of the Peshwa as well as the holder of the power of the Mogul, what a vista would open to him! He would then wield a power such as neither Aurungzebe nor Sivajee with all their efforts had ever attained. To unseat Nana Furnawees, always plotting against him, and to occupy his place, became then the fixed and settled purpose of his mind. For no lighter purpose would he have left his territories in Hindustan and Central India, the seat of his real power. But the end he proposed to himself was so vast, so full of promise, so magnificent, that it seemed to him worth while to encounter even a dangerous risk. He set out for Poona, and marching slowly, ready at any moment to retrace his steps, he reached that city on June 11, 1793.

There was naturally an ostensible reason for his journey. He was to invest the Peshwa with the insignia of the office of Vicegerent of the Mogul Empire, conferred upon him by the Emperor. This he did, despite the secret opposition of Nana Furnawees, with



great pomp and ceremony.\* His secret object, however, was to gain the young Peshwa, Madho Rao Narain. This, too, despite of the opposition, open as well as secret, he would, had he lived, undoubtedly have accomplished. Everything seemed to favour his purpose. Whilst at Poona he received intelligence of the complete defeat of the fast adherent and supporter of Nana Furnawees, Tookajee Holkar—a defeat by which the army of that rival chieftain was almost entirely destroyed; he learned too of the capture of Ismael Beg, his sole Mohammedan adversary. He found, in fact, that he wielded, unchecked, the whole power of Northern and Western, and a great part of Central Hindustan. The spirit of the young Peshwa, too, chafing long under the austere guardianship of the Nana, inclined, more and more every day, to the genial warrior, who encouraged him in his aspirations after the sports of the field and the pleasures of the chase. Notwithstanding all the efforts of his prime minister, the youthful Peshwa would, there is every

\* Sir John Malcolm informs us that when he came to Poona, Madhajeo dismounted from his elephant at the gates of the city, placed himself in the great hall of audience below all the hereditary nobles of the State; and when the Peshwa came into the room, and desired him to be seated with others, he objected on the ground of being unworthy of the honour, and, untying a bundle that he carried under his arm, produced a pair of slippers, which he placed before Madho Rao, saying: 'This is my occupation; it was that of my father.' Madhajeo, at the moment he said this, took the old slippers the Peshwa had in use, and, wrapping them up carefully, continued to hold them under his arm; after which, though 'with apparent reluctance, he allowed himself to be prevailed upon to sit down.'

reason to believe, have been gained over, and Madhajee would have attained a position never before approached by any Mahratta, when he was attacked by fever and died. His death took place on February 12, 1794, in the vicinity of Poona. He had no children, nor had he made any adoption. He had, however, expressed a wish that his grand-nephew, Dowlut Rao, grandson of his co-illegitimate brother, Tookajee, might succeed to his possessions; and this wish, after some opposition on the part of his widow, was carried into effect.

The sketch we have given of the career of the real founder of the house of Sindia is but a bare and meagre outline. To fill it up as it should be filled up would be an interesting task, but it would require much labour and many articles. Rather than submit to the delay which the preparation for such labour would necessarily involve—rather, in fact, than indefinitely postpone all notice of the most illustrious of the Mahratta chieftains—we have deemed it advisable to be content, in the first instance, with the outline alone. We have been the more inclined to this course, because we are certain that none but students of Indian history have any but the most cursory knowledge of Madhajee, and because we believe, therefore, that the publication of this' brief notice will draw attention to a subject regarding which little is generally known. When we call to mind the position of the present representative of the house of Sindia, his high character amongst Asiatic rulers, the transcendent services

rendered by him during the mutiny ; when we reflect that he, the most powerful representative of the Mahratta warriors, was faithful among the faithless—that, possessing the power greatly to annoy us, he incurred risk and danger of no common character to befriend and to assist us, there are few thoughtful men who will not care to know something of the founder of the family, something of the man, the rise of whose power was synchronous with that of our own. In the modern and more true acceptance of the term, Madhajee Sindia may not be considered entitled to a niche among the statues of really great men. But compare him with his Asiatic contemporaries, and he towers above them all. He was a greater warrior, a greater statesman, far more generous and liberal, than Hyder Ali of Mysore ; he had none of the cruelty or the habitual and senseless perfidy of Nizam Ali of Hyderabad ; amongst the Mahrattas not a single man approached him : he was infinitely more far-sighted than all of them. Alone amongst his countrymen of that day he foresaw the necessities of the English position, the life-struggle that must ensue between them and the native princes. Whilst, in the first Mahratta war, he had displayed no mean qualities as a general, his experience of the English had convinced him that to beat them it was necessary to concentrate against them all the resources of Hindustan. Bearing this in mind, he refused to aid them in their contests with

other native princes, however little sympathy he may have felt for the latter ; for he well knew that each such single contest would make it more difficult for the remaining independent princes to ward off the inevitable blow. At one time of his life he seriously contemplated the formation of a general alliance with Hyder and Nizam Ali against the English ; and it is evident that he was diverted from this solely by a sense of the insecurity of his own position, and by the necessity under which he lay, in the first instance, to consolidate his power. After his experience of the first Mahratta war, he carefully avoided any premature or single contest with our countrymen. When his power had been consolidated in Hindustan, he still felt the uselessness of embarking in a life-struggle, so long as he had the doubtful support of the Peshwa, and the open opposition of his minister and feudatories. To prevent that—to secure unity of action in the North-East and the West—he made that journey to Poona, which ended, at the moment of its brightest promise, in his death. There is no room to doubt but that the great object of his latter life was to bring about a general league against the English, before the power of the latter should be too firmly consolidated. Looking at this policy by the light of later events, who will say that, in a Mahratta point of view, it was unsound or unwise ?

In other respects, Madhajee Sindia was at least on a par with the best of his contemporaries. He could

read and write well, was a practised accountant, and well versed in revenue matters. He was generous, liberal, and just. His habits and tastes were simple. He had no great vices ; and if he was apt to give way to passion, it was a fault which he must share with many to whom the opportunity of profiting from the great lessons inculcated by the Gospel has been liberally vouchsafed.

*SIR BARTLE FRERE.*

WE recollect to have heard Indian statesmen spoken of as men who, whilst they can write an admirable minute, are unable to make a very ordinary speech; who are rather good writers of despatches than men of action; and who seem to regard the mere writing of such despatches as the end and aim of work, without any regard to the business which they were intended to accomplish. Now, whilst we are willing to admit that there is truth and force in this description, that, in fact, it does apply to the second order of Indian officials, we emphatically deny that it delineates the characteristics of the Indian statesman of the first rank. To take only those of our own day, for example, who would assert that such a description is applicable to Lord Metcalfe, Lord Lawrence, Sir George Clerk, Lord Napier of Magdala, Sir Herbert Edwardes, or General Nicholson? These were all men—and the list is not exhausted—who really comprehended the lofty positions in which they were placed, who looked upon writing merely as the means whereby great ends were to be accomplished, and whose repu-

tation rests upon the basis of their accomplished actions, rather than upon their faultless minutes. That there is a tendency in India to fall into the error charged generally, as we have said, upon all Indian statesmen, we admit. And it is brought about, we believe, in this way:—There are two roads to promotion to the highest administrative offices in India; the one lies through the secretariat, the other through administrative work performed in the districts, in close contact with the natives of India. Now, it may be safely asserted, as a rule, that the tendency of training on the first road is to narrow the mind, to exaggerate the importance of mere writing, to regard the composition of minutes as the end of statesmanship; the tendency of the second training is directly contrary: whilst the first rears clerks, the second turns out statesmen.

The training on the second road is, in fact, so thorough, so practical, that, when entered upon by an intellect of the first order, it cannot fail to produce not only a statesman, but a statesman capable of standing the severest test. This has been repeatedly illustrated. When Lord Metcalfe returned from his successful government of Canada, the late Lord Derby expressed his surprise that the country did not at once insist upon his being made Prime Minister. Lord Lawrence is another case in point. Not less confidently can we adduce the names of General Nicholson—equally great as a civilian and a soldier—of Sir Herbert Edwardes, of Lord Napier of

Magdala. These were men trained, not in bureaux, but amongst the people. They were men who, to natural abilities, added the knowledge gained by actual experience, by mixing with the various classes amongst whom their lot was cast. When called to govern, they came to the post armed from head to foot. Their armour had not, indeed, been veneered by the glittering varnish of routine, but it had been tried in the real fight, and, so tried, it enabled them to make way even against the darts of adverse fortune.

The principle we have laid down is not new. It is one which has been recognised all over the world. Sir John Malcolm, if informed, when visiting a district, that the officer in charge of it could write an excellent report, was in the habit of replying: ‘Can he tell me the haunts of the tigers and deer in his district? If he cannot do that, it is clear that he knows little of the people.’ Lord Bolingbroke, in his immortal essays, dwells repeatedly on the same points. ‘Genius,’ he says, ‘without the improvements at least of experience, is what comets once were thought to be—a blazing meteor, irregular in his course, and dangerous in his approach; of no use to any system, and able to destroy any. Mere sons of earth, if they have experience without any knowledge of the history of the world, are but half scholars in the science of mankind. And if they are conversant in history without experience, they are worse than ignorant, they are pedants, always incapable, sometimes meddling and presuming.



The man who has all three is an honour to his country and a public blessing.'

Amongst those who have illustrated this truth, we cannot recall one whose career more merits to be studied than does that of Sir Bartle Frere. Of all the men who have ever belonged to the Civil Service of India, we have never heard of one who united more completely in his person the knowledge and faculty of dealing with men, the fruits of his Indian experience, with the large views, the conciliatory and persuasive manner, the capacity for affairs, which, born with him, ripened with his growth to manhood. He was not favoured by a single adventitious aid in his struggle through life. Not one sensational opportunity offered itself to his clutch. Even in the great mutiny, the part which he had to play, noble and self-denying as it was, most beneficial to the general welfare, was lost sight of in the glare and glitter of military triumphs. Yet though 'no blaze of bonfires, no trumpet-tongues of leading articles,' announced his achievements to the world, those achievements were, not the less, in the highest sense of the word, glorious. It is his pride, and a proof also of the statesmanlike tone of his mind, that he has been a successful administrator, a valued and confidential councillor, and, again, a farsighted and successful Governor. This result we believe to be due to the working of experience in dealing with men on a clear and well-prepared intellect. His Indian training was not bureaucratic. His intellect thus escaped the

danger of shipwreck on a rock fatal to so many. The naturally capacious mind, unfettered by questions of red tape and routine, accustomed itself then, in the arena of active life with which it was occupied, to expand still wider. In all the vicissitudes of his career he never separated himself, in sympathy, from the interests of those with whom he was brought so constantly in contact. And it is worthy to be recorded that he owed his great popularity with the natives of India not less to this, than to that complete abnegation of self which was a very principle of all his actions. To many, not natives of India, there appeared something strange in this self-negation, or rather, of this absence of any idea of self-interest or self. To the mass of men, his competitors and rivals, it seemed so strange, so new, so unaccountable, that they did not believe it. In whatever he did, however simple and natural it might really be, they endeavoured to discover an *arrière pensée*. The question has frequently been put, 'What can be Frere's object in doing this?' when in reality there was no other object but the simple one patent to the world. To these men, the idea of a man of ability not being self-seeking, either in an open or roundabout way, was simply incomprehensible; and as it was clear that the object of their wonder was not the first, they grasped at the conclusion that he must be a subtle edition of the second. Their minds could not realise the simple truth that there could be an able man who, though he might place before him as an axiom of life

that God's will should be done on earth, and the best things done in the best manner for the good of the majority, should yet regard the carrying out of that axiom as the 'all in all' of his existence, satisfied only that the work should be done, and without a thought or care regarding self in the performance. Yet such a man, emphatically, is Sir Bartle Frere, and it is because he is such a man that his career presents so many points worthy of study.

Though Sir Bartle Frere had, from his landing in India, to fight his own way, unaided, to the front rank, he had still hereditary claims to distinction. The fifth son of Mr. Edward Frere, belonging to a family settled in Norfolk and Suffolk since the time of the Conquest,\* he was nephew to Mr. Hookham Frere, the friend of Canning and the Wellesleys, a writer in the *Anti-Jacobin*, and known as one of the wittiest men and best conversationists of the day. At the age of twelve years young Frere was sent to King Edward the Sixth's Grammar School at Bath, then kept by the Rev. James Pears, rector of Charlcomb, and a friend of Wilberforce. At this time he knew a little Latin, a little French, and was well up in the fairy lore prevalent in the wild part of Wales in which he had been born. He had perused with avidity all the books of travel upon which he could lay hand, as well as *Don Quixote* and *Shakspeare*. At the Grammar

\* His grandfather, M.P. for Norwich, had been Paley's rival at Cambridge for the senior wranglership in 1763.

School he was thoroughly well grounded in his studies: indeed the thoroughness of this grounding manifested itself in a very remarkable manner. Nominated to Haileybury in 1832, he had the mortification to find himself last but one in the entrance examination, a mortification which must have been enhanced in his eyes by the fact that amongst his competitors were many young men who had distinguished themselves at Eton and at Shrewsbury, and whom he could scarcely hope to pass in the race of learning. Yet so excellent had been his grounding, so great was his perseverance, and so superior his natural powers, that at the close of the first term he had gained the position of second on the list. In the following term he changed that position for the first, and this he never afterwards lost.

It testifies to the spirit and enterprise of the young civilian that, on learning he had been appointed to the Bombay Presidency, he at once applied to proceed thither by the overland route. In the present day, and, indeed, since 1843, that route has been the regular mode of communication with India. But in 1834 it had not even been established. There were no steamers beyond Malta, no recognised mode of transit across the desert, none from Alexandria to Cairo. Even had the traveller arrived safely at Suez, he would have been utterly at a loss how to proceed thence to Aden and Bombay. But Mr. Frere's application, though it betokened love of enterprise,

savoured not at all of rashness. He had heard that the then Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, had written to the home authorities proposing to send a new steamer, recently built for the Indian service, to Suez, to meet there any adventurous persons coming from England, so that the feasibility of the much-questioned overland route might thus be decided. Great was the astonishment of the East India Directors to find, foremost amongst these adventurers, the newly appointed writer—the first of his term at Haileybury. Grave were the doubts as to whether so unprecedented an application should be granted. By the interest, however, of Mr. Butterworth Bayley, who had a hereditary regard for Mr. Frere's family, the necessary sanction was accorded; and, armed with this, Mr. Frere left Falmouth for Malta in the month of May, 1834.

At Malta Mr. Frere stayed some weeks with his uncle, Mr. Hookham Frere. His intimate friends have often heard him speak of this visit as a very bright spot in his existence. He found his uncle surrounded by a few affectionate friends, but otherwise with little companionship beyond his books. It was no ordinary pleasure to the young civilian, just starting in life, to listen to 'the old man eloquent,' as he discoursed of his early recollections of Pitt, and Burke, and Fox, and rolled out stories of the schoolboy days of Canning and the Wellesleys. Here, too, Mr. Frere became acquainted with the adventurous traveller,

Dr. Wolff, who, in addition to amusing him by his vivid descriptions of Central Asia, aided him in his studies in Arabic, pronouncing him, finally, 'fit to scold his way through Egypt.'

From Malta Mr. Frere proceeded in a Greek brigantine to Alexandria, and met there four gentlemen, acquaintance with one of whom he had made at Malta, and who were also bound for India. In company with these gentlemen he made his way, in spite of many difficulties, to Cairo. But here no tidings regarding the steamer could be obtained.\* The travellers determined, accordingly, to find their own way to Cossier. They took the route of Thebes and Upper Egypt, struck across, on camel back, from Kenné to Cossier, and thence proceeded in open boats to Yambo, Jedda, and Mocha, learning nothing regarding the missing steamer at any of these places. From Mocha they determined to proceed in an Arab 'buggalow,' conveying pilgrims to Surat. It was little to them that the crew were entirely Arab, and that the 'buggalow' was wholly destitute of conveniences, for they had left all their servants at Cossier, and after quitting that place had been forced to cook for themselves—excellent training, by the way, for the modern Anglo-Indian. The 'buggalow' proved a very safe vessel, and though she ran short of provisions and nearly starved our travellers, she landed them safely at Bombay on September 23, 1834, after a voyage of

\* She did not proceed further than Ceylon.

nineteen days. Here, however, Mr. Frere's difficulties only commenced. He had to prove his identity. The idea of a young civilian proceeding to India by the overland route appeared more startling to the authorities in Bombay than it had seemed to the Court of Directors. For a servant of Government to sail down the Red Sea in an open boat exposed to the terrible heat of August and September, and to cross the Arabian Sea in an Arab buggalow during the monsoon month, was a circumstance entirely without official precedent in the then quiet annals of the Bombay Presidency. The officials then in power might indeed have divined that such an adventure presaged the arrival amongst them of one whose intellect was too keen to allow his action to be fettered by the bands of routine. But they could not comprehend the love of enterprise which had prompted the undertaking.

The real work of life now began for Mr. Frere. First, he had to pass an examination in the Hindustani language. This he successfully accomplished within three months of his landing, following it up by acquiring the Mahratta and Guzerat languages. This result achieved, and his love of adventure having been stimulated rather than restrained by the incidents of his journey from England, he asked Lord Clare, then Governor of Bombay, to send him to Belgaum, as he had heard much of the bison shooting there! But Lord Clare demurred to compliance with a request

which probably seemed to him to partake too much of a passion for field sports. He replied that he thought it better for Mr. Frere to go to Poona, where, under Mr. Mills, a most distinguished revenue officer, he should have every facility for learning his work.' Nor was this the only blight his early hopes were destined to receive. On his arrival at Poona, he found himself the third supernumerary to a principal collector, who, besides the supernumeraries, had his full establishment of four regular assistants. Under these circumstances he was scarcely surprised at being assured, by the first civilian he met after his arrival at Poona, that it was clearly impossible he could gain a step of promotion for ten years ! It may be encouraging to others to note, that notwithstanding these drawbacks at starting, in spite of the fact that he had then a longer list of men above him than has ever been before a young civilian, he reached the summit of promotion in about thirty-three years, in the natural course of things. This, too, without any adventitious aid ; for it is a fact that the request to go to Belgaum, to which we have adverted, was the first and last request he ever made with regard to any appointment or position for himself.

Though the work at Poona was of a very elementary kind, there was plenty to occupy the young civilian. The city and the people were, too, a source of infinite interest. For the city was the ancient capital of the Peshwas, and almost every elderly man in it had lived



under their rule, and remembered Mountstuart Elphinstone and Sir John Malcolm. Unrestrained intercourse with such a people could not fail to have a deep effect on an intelligent mind.

At that time Mr. Williamson Ramsay was the sole Revenue Commissioner of the Bombay Presidency. In the early part of 1835, his assistant, Mr. Goldsmid, had been deputed to inquire into the land assessment of Indapore. Mr. Goldsmid soon ascertained that the system of collection of revenue had been marked by great cruelty and oppression; and, as the inquiry promised to be of an intricate nature, he begged that Mr. Frere might be sent to assist him in its prosecution. The request was granted, and a new life at once opened before Mr. Frere. With Mr. Goldsmid as his companion, he completely studied every nook and corner of the district in which they were employed, living during the rains in temples or houses for wayfarers, or in a tent roughly thatched over. This was the way to a real acquaintance with the people. Coming daily in contact with them in their own homes, he had opportunities of seeing them as they were, of diving into the depths of their character, and probing the latent thoughts of their hearts. For one destined to govern the country of which these people constituted the rural population, no training could have been so efficacious.

Subsequently succeeding Mr. Goldsmid as assistant to the Revenue Commissioner, he travelled over every

part of the Bombay Presidency, the Southern Mahratta country alone excepted, and in the course of these rambles arose opportunities to indulge in that passion for sport which had prompted Mr. Frere's early request to Lord Clare. He joined in the lion-hunting, which was then still to be had in Kattyawar, besides the more ordinary sport of hog-hunting, tiger, bear, bison, and sambur shooting in the jungles of the Concan and Candeish. We recollect well to have heard how the late Sir James Outram used to speak of his first meeting with Mr. Frere, at the close of an exciting boar chase; and there are many still living who can testify to the cool courage he displayed in these expeditions against the rival monarchs of the forest. It was often remarked that with increasing danger he displayed a more than corresponding increase of nerve and coolness.

But it was not all sunshine. Mr. Frere had not been long in Candeish before he was laid low by severe jungle fever. He recovered. But—and it may be a consolation to many a weakly recruit to learn—on recovery he was told by the ablest medical officers in Bombay, that it would be useless for him to attempt to stay in India, as his constitution could not stand the climate. Few men probably have gone through more mental and bodily work in India than the gentleman to whom that information was imparted! It is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a general rule of life in India suitable to every constitution; but

there can be little doubt that Mr. Frere owed his subsequent excellent health and capacity for work in a trying climate to his active habits, his capacity to dovetail his love of horse exercise and sport with mental occupation. An early riser, he was able to return from his morning ride with a freshened zest for the day's labours.

For five years Mr. Frere was engaged in assisting the Revenue Commissioner to reform the assessment of other provinces besides the Dekkan. We have already stated that Mr. Goldsmid had, in the course of his enquiries, discovered that in the collection of revenue great cruelties had been perpetrated: we may be pardoned, then, if we briefly refer to the events which had led to so unsatisfactory a state of affairs, and the nature of the remedy applied.

The territories conquered from the last Peshwa, Bajee Rao, in 1818, did not at first experience the full benefit of their transfer. Prices fell, and the rough assessments fixed by those who succeeded Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone had borne with undue severity on the people. Unable to pay their assessments, and reduced by the processes instituted for their enforcement to great misery, the peasantry had allowed their lands to go out of cultivation, and had abandoned themselves to despair. Their wretched condition had been rendered still more wretched by the conduct of the native subordinates of the Government, who, under the pretext of collecting the revenue, had filled their own

pockets by means of a tyranny which did not stop short of torture. It will easily be believed that, under these circumstances, the blessings of British rule were not fully appreciated by the people of the Mahratta country. Yet this state of things continued unredressed, and under the implied sanction of the British Government, from 1819 to 1834, a period of fifteen years. We do not affirm that attempts had not been made to remedy the disorder, but these had all failed, principally, we believe, because the Government of the day had not apprehended the principle that to sacrifice an assessment which few could pay, in favour of a smaller assessment within the means of all, was a policy as financially sound as it was politically just. Mr. Goldsmid and his associates, notably amongst whom was Captain, now Sir George, Wingate, however, did proceed upon that principle. They proposed to introduce a system based upon a low assessment, careful surveys, and fixity of tenure. Sir Robert Grant, then Governor of Bombay, 'than whom,' to use an expression publicly made three years ago by Sir B. Frere, 'a more able statesman or larger hearted philanthropist has never been at the head of the Government of any Presidency,' sympathised with these views, and charged Mr. Ramsay, the Revenue Commissioner, to carry them out. The task of preparing a plan for the survey and settlement of the Government lands was deputed by that officer to Mr. Goldsmid, who was aided by Captain Wingate and

Mr. Frere. The plan they drew up, based on the largest and most philanthropic principles—the plan of recognising existing rights and conferring them where they did not exist; of fixing a separate assessment for each property, however small, and recognising in the occupant of that property at the time of settlement the actual owner, with complete liberty to ‘sell, mortgage, transfer, or use it for any purpose whatever;’ of fixing the first assessment for thirty years, but declaring the right of the occupant to the land to be permanent, subject only to the payment of the assessment; of allowing every occupier on the close of each year to give up to the State any portion of his property, subject to a previous intimation of his intention so to act; and, above all, of rating the assessment according to the actual value of the land—this plan, we say, was accepted and carried out. To Mr. Goldsmid, aided by Captain Wingate and Mr. Frere, fell the task of showing how these general principles were to be practically applied in Indapore, the first district of which the assessment was revised.

The system has since been extended throughout the whole of the Bombay Presidency and Sinde, and into the neighbouring provinces of Berar and Mysore, and everywhere the results have been marvellous. A contented and independent population, cultivated lands, the punctual payment of assessments, an improved system of agriculture—these were the material consequences. But there was another, even higher

and better. For the first time since their country had been brought under British rule, the people felt and acknowledged the benefits to themselves that resulted from the connection. 'From being the most wretched, depressed set in the Dekkan,' wrote Mr. Frere to Mr. W. Ramsay in 1849, in a letter read before the Committee of the House of Commons by Sir George Wingate in 1858, 'they have become thriving, independent fellows, thoroughly grateful for what has been done for them.' To have co-operated in bringing about such a result was something to stir the heart of a man zealous to perform his duty, bent above all things to see that, under all circumstances, the work of the Government was done, and done in the best possible way.

In other respects the five years thus spent constituted no bad school for a man of intellect and ability. The acquaintance then formed with natives, the conversations with respect to points especially calculated to bring out their character, the daily association, connected often by friendly and sympathising intercourse, could not but add greatly to the knowledge of all others most useful to a statesman, the knowledge of men. To a man of Mr. Frere's nature such knowledge was invaluable. But a change in his position now awaited him. In 1842 General Sir George Arthur was appointed Governor of Bombay. The gentleman whom he had selected as private secretary died on the voyage out, and, on the advice of the late Sir George Anderson, Mr. Frere was appointed to succeed him.

The office of Private Secretary to a Governor or Viceroy in India is far more important than its designation would seem to imply. Of all the advisers of the Governor, the Private Secretary is the most confidential. And as it generally happens that the Governor comes to India unacquainted practically with the country and its people, he is forced at first to depend for accurate information regarding the several points connected with both on the gentleman whom he may nominate to this post. It follows that to fulfil with the highest satisfaction the duties of this office, the private secretary should be a man of character and tact, well acquainted with the country and its people; that he should be accustomed to deal with men, ready with his pen, accessible, and courteous. It is scarcely too much to say that, upon the efficiency of his private secretary, depend often the comfort, and even the credit, of the governor.

Reversing the arrangement, we may also say that few schools are more beneficial to an Indian official than connection with a tried English statesman. Such a connection cannot fail to give to the neophyte a wider view of the political arena, a deeper conception of the fitness of things, to prevent the gradual glissade of the mind down to a narrow local groove, than which nothing can be more fatal to the attainment of real statesmanlike ideas. In Sir George Arthur Mr. Frere met a man of high character and ability, great experience, and accustomed all his life to deal with

men. After a distinguished service in the army, Sir George Arthur had filled the post of Lieutenant-Governor of Honduras in troublous times; from 1823 to 1837 he administered the government of Van Diemen's Land, and from that date till 1841 he had filled the post of Lieutenant-Governor and Commander of the Forces in Upper Canada. His conduct during the rebellion was of material service to the British cause; indeed, it so gained the approval of his superiors on the spot, and of the home government, that when his command was abolished by the union of the two provinces, he was requested to remain for some months in the administration of his former government. He acceded to the request, upon the express stipulation that for the service so rendered he should receive no emolument whatever. In 1842 he was, as we have seen, sent to Bombay as governor.

The year following Sir George Arthur's arrival in Bombay witnessed an event which, in its long and troubled course, tried to the utmost his capacity for dealing with men. In 1843 Sir Charles Napier conquered Sind, and that province was annexed by Lord Ellenborough to British India. Now there was in Bombay a large and influential party, comprising the leaders of the Civil Service, and a great many soldiers, prominent amongst whom was the late Sir James Outram, by whom that annexation and the battles that led to it were condemned as unjust, unnecessary, and immoral. There ensued then a controversy extremely



bitter, conducted with very great warmth and asperity on both sides, and which, besides, was of so personal a nature that it had the effect of dragging into the one camp or the other almost every person of note and weight in India. The Governor-General himself was regarded by the anti-annexationists as a *particeps criminis*, whilst, perhaps unconsciously for that very reason, almost the entire civil service of India took up the cudgels for Major Outram. Under such circumstances it argued very great tact, judgment, and discretion on the part of Sir George Arthur, that he, on the very edge of the crater, was not dragged into the flames; that he maintained throughout a dignified attitude of neutrality, preserving to the last the esteem of Sir Charles Napier, and the respect of Sir Charles Napier's opponents. It may be well conceived that, to accomplish such a result was beset with difficulty. Sir George Arthur was in constant communication with Napier, had to keep him supplied with officers, with stores, and with the thousand and one necessary adjuncts of a military expedition. But here his own experience came into action. His military service in Egypt, in Holland, in the West Indies, in Van Diemen's Land, and in Canada, enabled him to comprehend at a glance all that was wanted. He threw his best energies into the cause; and whilst the partisans of Major Outram could find no fault with his action, Lord Ellenborough and Sir C. Napier evinced their appreciation of his firmness in supporting the re-

quirements of the Supreme Government with respect to Sindé.\*

As Sir George Arthur's private secretary Mr. Frere was naturally his confidant in all the measures taken during that eventful period. It is scarcely possible to imagine a better school for the ripening of the previously acquired experience. Here was an experienced English administrator face to face with a great local difficulty. How did he meet it? Whilst all the men about him made this difficulty the signal for a display of partisan feeling, he dealt with it with tact, determination, and success. He, in a word, acted as a statesman, and not as a partisan. Up to this time Mr. Frere had gathered his experience from the natives of India, but to watch from the recesses of Government House the mode in which an English statesman dealt with a case so delicate and yet so difficult as that of the Sindé controversy, gave him an insight into a different world, and, we may be sure, left a deep impression behind it.

In 1844 Mr. Frere married the second daughter of Sir George Arthur, and in the following year took his furlough to England, visiting Malta *en route*, and travelling thence through Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. He returned to India after an absence of eighteen months. The year following his return he was selected for a post worthy of his abilities—

\* So highly was Sir George Arthur esteemed by the Home Ministry, that the provisional appointment of Governor-General of India, in the event of anything happening to Lord Hardinge, was conferred upon him.

that of Resident at Sattara. The position was, in many respects, peculiar. The ex-Rajah of Sattara, Pertâb Singh, a descendant from Sivajee, had been convicted of many offences against the paramount power in India, and, on his refusal to agree to certain conditions tendered for his acceptance by the British Government as the price of forgiveness, had been removed from power and exiled to Benares. His place at Sattara was then occupied by his brother, Appa Sahib, known also as Shahjee. It was to the court of this brother that Mr. Frere was deputed as Resident, in succession to Colonel Outram.

But Mr. Frere had scarcely taken up his office before there ensued new complications, requiring the exercise of great tact and discrimination to overcome. Towards the close of the year 1847 the ex-Rajah, Pertâb Singh, died, leaving no male issue, but having adopted, it was asserted, his cousin, Bala Sahib Sénaputtee, as his heir. The adoption, however, had not been, and never was, recognised by the British Government. It served, nevertheless, to keep alive the pretensions of Bala Sahib amongst the partisans of the ex-Rajah. On April 5 following, the Rajah, Appa Sahib, died. He, too, left no natural heirs, but, during his last illness, he had nominated as his adopted heir and successor Venkajee Rajey, also a member of the family. As the first article of the treaty of September 25, 1819, engaged the British to cede in perpetuity the district called Sattara to the 'Rajah, his heirs and successors,' without any limitation as to the meaning to

be attached to the words 'heirs and successors,' it followed that Venkajee Rajey became, on the death of Appa Sahib, lawful Raja of Sattarah. So, at least, thought the Resident, Mr. Frere. It soon transpired, however, that the Government of India did not share these views, but that they considered that the Sattara states had lapsed to the paramount power, in consequence of the failure of heirs lawfully begotten. Mr. Frere, on his side, regarded annexation on such grounds as a distinct breach of the treaty of 1819. But he had no power, as representative of the British Government at Sattara, to impose his own ideas upon his superiors in authority. So strongly did he feel, nevertheless, upon this point, that he addressed a letter to Lord Falkland, then Governor of Bombay, suggesting that Captain Grant Duff, who signed the treaty, and Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay at the time of its signature, should be appealed to for their opinion as to the construction to be placed on the first article. When Mr. Frere proposed this reference he was not aware that both the gentlemen referred to had already expressed their opinion that the annexation of Sattara would be a distinct violation of the treaty they had themselves made with the ex-Rajah, twenty-eight years previously.\* His letter, too, was written and sent in after the publication of the annex-

\* Their opinion was, however, known to the Governor-General, and to the majority of the Court of Directors, before they expressed their approval of the annexation.

ation edict of the Government of India, and the appointment of Mr. Frere himself as commissioner or chief administrator of the province. His remonstrance, therefore, militated against his own interests; for as commissioner, he would occupy a position far more responsible than as resident or envoy. But the motto 'Be just and fear not' has always commended itself to Mr. Frere throughout his career. It was his belief that adherence to our engagements required the recognition of their adoption, and he wrote accordingly.\* His letter, however, met no favourable recognition from the Supreme Government. Indeed, it was regarded as so inopportune, that but for the Governor of Bombay, Lord Falkland, who, though differing from Mr. Frere on the subject of annexation, had a high opinion of his ability and a great trust in his judgment and nerve, he would have been removed from his commissionership. Happily this extreme measure was not resorted to. The people of Sattara were then in a position similar to that of the subjects of the Peshwa in 1819, and it would have been a matter of everlasting regret had they, at the period of their transfer to British rule, been deprived of the services of the man who had been instrumental in reconciling those subjects to our sway. Mr. Frere remained, fortunately, commissioner of Sattara, and succeeded in introducing

\* A gentleman calling on Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone in 1859 happened to mention Mr. Frere's name. 'Ah,' said the old statesman, 'tell me about him; he is a man after my own heart.'

into it that revenue system which had answered so admirably in other parts of the country.

For nearly two years and a half did Mr. Frere continue to govern Sattara. Into the details of his administration it is unnecessary to enter. It will be sufficient to observe that if, at the moment of the absorption of the province by the paramount power, the people doubted for an instant regarding their future, the doubt lasted but for that instant. There was no such misery of transition as that felt for fifteen years by the ex-subjects of the Peshwa. Not in vain had Mr. Frere studied the people in their villages, their jungles, at their festivities. The knowledge thus acquired, directed by a sympathising nature and a keen intellect, bore its fruit at once. The change, far from rousing the people into dislike, commended itself alike to their affections and their interests. The system has been since steadily pursued, and the inhabitants of Sattara have remained as well affected to the British Government as those of the most remotely conquered province in the country.\*

\* The first tunnel ever made in India was made by Mr. Frere when at Sattara.

There was a fertile valley the other side the town of Sattara, from which it was separated by a mountain spur—a portion of the Ghât ridge—over which there was a track (no road); and round the base of which a tedious, and circuitous, and ill-made road wound.

At the time of the Rajah of Sattara's death, the natives subscribed a sum to be devoted to a memorial of him; and, at the instance of Mr. Frere, this sum was spent in making a short tunnel through the narrowest portion of the hill.

A tablet at the entrance mentions the object with which it was made. And the only condition bargained for by the native subscribers was,

In December 1850 Mr. Frere was promoted from Sattara to the higher office of Chief Commissioner of Sinde. This province, conquered, as we have had occasion to state, by Sir Charles Napier in 1843, had been confided to the charge of that famous soldier by Lord Ellenborough. For four years Sir Charles Napier continued to govern the province. Whatever may have been asserted by his political opponents regarding the morality of the conquest, there never has been the smallest question as to the manner in which Sir Charles Napier carried out the duties entrusted to him. Energetic, painstaking, indefatigable, a stern lover of right and justice, the conqueror of Sinde contrived not only to instil into his subordinates a right conception of the nature of the work he wished to be performed, but to inspire them likewise with a portion of his own spirit in the performing of it. His instruments were rough and ready, but admirably adapted for his purpose. He would have no expensive machinery, no men on large salaries signing their names to work done by their subordinates. He chose rather to select from the officers of the native regiments which had aided him in his conquest, those who showed the brightest promise; and these he invested with the powers necessary for the performance of civil duties. It was an admirable experiment—afterwards partially followed by Lord Dalhousie in the Punjâb and Oudh

that it should be made lofty enough to allow of an elephant, *with a howdah on and all his trappings*, to go through! which condition was complied with.

with striking success. In Sindé, superintended by the still active and clear-headed governor, bent on making the administration of his province successful, its effect was wonderful. In four years the province, which had ever been regarded as the most misgoverned and oppressed of all the provinces of India, ranked with the best governed and best administered of the whole. This had been accomplished by the following means. In the first place, Sir Charles Napier so distributed his troops as to maintain a firm military grasp of the country, in order thus to prevent the possibility of disturbance during the introduction of the new system. His next care had been to establish an efficient police. In this his efforts were wonderfully successful, and the Sindé police came to be regarded as the model police for the whole country. He then secured the adherence of the chiefs and large landowners by making absolute the security of their estates. Not less careful for the lower classes, he caused the assessments on the cultivators to be lightened, and eager to improve trade, he devised a system whereby traders were exempted from imposts. Besides all this he laid down the germs of an excellent canal system, and settled the principles upon which a good revenue and judicial system for the province should be established. In fact it may be asserted, without any disparagement to the successors of Sir Charles Napier, that there are few great improvements which have been introduced into Sindé up to the present day, of



which the idea did not originate with him. Those successors have had the merit, and it is a great one, of carrying out his ideas, but the germ of them will be found in the conceptions of the first great administrator of the province.

Few men probably held in greater admiration the organising genius of Sir Charles Napier than did Mr. Frere. He did justice to it, and he was prepared to nurture to maturity the seedlings his predecessor had planted. Of all the qualities which characterised the new Chief-Commissioner not one was more striking than his utter absence of self-love in his performance of duty. Placing a great end before him, his only care was to see that the end was properly arrived at. Thus he was ever ready to listen to capable men, to receive their suggestions, to weld, as it were, all the intellect of the province into the Government machine. It was one of the results of the policy of the conqueror of Sind, that the institutions which had sufficed for the province in 1844 required further development in 1851. To this end Mr. Frere applied all his powers. In Upper Sind, on the suggestion of General John Jacob, who during the preceding five years had had charge of the Sind frontier, and was thoroughly acquainted with the capabilities of the ground, he enlarged the Bigarree Canal. But before recommending the scheme for adoption he visited the part of the country for which the improvement was destined, and saw that to carry it out, to deepen and widen the

canal, could not fail to benefit the people, to give them the means of fertilising their fields, and thus to make them to a great extent independent of the seasons. It was his policy to encourage great works which might be useful to the people and remunerative to the Government. The roads of the province, the harbour of Kurrachee, and ultimately railroads, received at his hands the most prompt attention. The harbour of Kurrachee, as it now is, was mainly his own work; for though Sir Charles Napier had marked the spot as one which was destined to become the outlet of the Punjaub, it was left to Mr. Frere to carry out the design, to make a harbour sufficiently capacious to receive large ships, and to place the steam navigation of the Indus on a thoroughly efficient footing.

The policy pursued on the frontier may be described in one word—it was a policy of justice. If the Beloochees attacked a village in our territories, committing murder and lifting cattle, it was not considered expedient to adopt the Franco-Algerian system of burning, in revenge, unoffending villages on their side. The retribution demanded was simply the punishment of the malefactors—of the men who had committed the outrage. The result of this policy has been that the popular sympathies, which were formerly entirely against the law, have completely changed to agreement with the law; and this not only in the case of important national matters, but likewise of family hereditary blood feuds—not only within the border, but beyond it.

The effects of his efficient administration were quickly manifest. The trade of Kurrachee increased greatly ; European merchants came to settle there. To the people prosperity was assured by the fixing of a regular settlement on the plan which had given so much satisfaction in the Dekkan, viz. by reserving to them proprietary rights and fixity of tenure. The population, almost entirely Mohammedan, and numbering upwards of two millions, expressed their satisfaction with our rule, and Sindé figured as one of the thriving provinces of the Empire.

But an unlooked-for event was about to test these appearances. In the early part of 1856 Mr. Frere paid his second visit to England, this time on account of his health. During that absence Lord Canning had succeeded Lord Dalhousie as Governor-General, and the little Persian war had broken out and been brought to a conclusion. On his return in March 1857, Mr. Frere found another danger looming in the future. He heard everywhere of the strange excitement which pervaded the minds of the sepoy generally, especially those of Bengal, on the subject of greased cartridges. As many of the Bombay native regiments received recruits from the province of Oudh, the necessity of maintaining a careful watch over the conduct of the men of the native army had already presented itself to the authorities in Bombay. Still, up to the time of Mr. Frere's return, in March 1857, no overt act of mutiny had been committed, nor indeed had anything

transpired to indicate that any such act was in contemplation. The air, however, was charged with rumours, and it was evident, that, in Lower Bengal especially, mistrust ruled powerfully in the native mind. When Mr. Frere left Bombay to return to his charge in the beginning of May, the surface, however, still remained unbroken.

Scarcely, however, had he set foot in Kurrachee, when he received a telegram conveying an account of the revolt of May 10, at Meerut. Mr. Frere at once comprehended the magnitude of the crisis. He, at least, did not regard the emotions called forth by this glaring act of mutiny 'as a passing and groundless panic.' He realised, at a glance, the fact that a crisis had arrived which would test to the utmost the resources of the Empire. What then did he do? Taking a rapid survey of the position all over India, he saw that the fate of the country must depend upon the attitude of the Punjaub. Should the warlike inhabitants of that province declare against the British, it seemed to him that all the North-western provinces of India must be lost. Reasoning thus, he asked himself how he, as Commissioner of Sindé could best aid in preventing such a catastrophe. He had with him two weak European regiments—one of them little more than half its normal strength—a troop of horse artillery, four native regiments, two battalions of native artillery, the Sindé Horse, and the mutinous 6th Bengal Cavalry. With such a force, composed of such diverse materials, the question he had to decide was

this. Supposing that the mutiny at Meerut should merge into a general uprising of the entire population, how could he, having only the two European regiments, the horse artillery, and the Sind Horse to depend upon, effectually overawe the native regiments, keep in subjection the two millions of Mohammedans, and yet serve the general interests of British India? Mr. Frere solved this difficult question in a manner in which few, in that day, would have dared to meet it. Only a few hours after the receipt of the telegram, announcing the revolt at Meerut, Mr. Frere, acting upon his own responsibility, without awaiting a reply from the Government of Bombay—for even an hour's delay might have had fatal results—ordered off his strongest regiment, the Bombay Fusileers, to Mooltan! As for the population, Mohammedans though they were, he, in his own fearless way, dared to trust them: the weak regiment it was necessary to keep, to act in case of a rise of the sepoys or to guard the frontier.

Of all the acts of Mr. Frere's official life, not one shows more strongly the firmness and strength of his character than this despatch of his only strong European regiment to the Punjaub. Endowed by nature with a gentle disposition, and a most courteous and winning manner, no man can be more daring, more determined, than he. As for responsibility and routine when they might interfere with the carrying out of the line of action he might deem essential to the

public good, he knows not what they mean. In the case we have cited we see, too, a remarkable example of his adherence to his most cherished maxim, that the best thing should be done in the best way, without thought or care of self. An ordinary man would have thought he had done well, if, with the means at his disposal, he could save his own province. Even an average man would have considered it necessary to obtain the sanction of the Bombay Government before he denuded his province of Europeans. But Mr. Frere knew that no one could so accurately judge his own position as himself. He knew that the Bombay Government, with the cares of other provinces on its shoulders, would be inundated with telegrams. He was responsible for the safety of his province, and he assumed the responsibility of risking that safety to aid in the preservation of the Empire. Mooltan, garrisoned mainly by native troops, was one of the keys of India. Mr. Frere risked Sinde to secure that key, and he succeeded. The corps he sent from his own province held Mooltan, and Ferozepore, during the worst days of the revolt. The whole history of the mutiny does not record a deed of more sublime self-denial.

Under such circumstances, indeed, boldness is synonymous with success. Though he did risk his province to aid in saving the Empire, he did not lose his province. Though, in the course of the autumn, outbreaks did occur at the three larger stations in Sinde, they were suppressed on the spot, without

external aid. The military police, established by Sir C. Napier, behaved on every occasion with tried fidelity and zeal. Not a mutineer escaped capture. Nor, in their trial, was the law, as it existed before the mutiny, in a single instance altered or strained. The mutineers were tried by regular courts, composed entirely of native officers, and full justice was meted out to them without any extraordinary measures of severity.

These revolts having been suppressed, even indeed whilst they were being suppressed, the whole resources of Sind were placed at the disposal of the Empire. Additional European troops were despatched to the Southern Mahratta country, and the 1st Beloochee regiment to the Punjab.\* But not only her troops, but her rivers, her canals, her deserts even, were made available for the general purpose. In a word, there was an infusion of self-denial throughout all the departments of the province.

These services were recognised in England. In 1848, Mr. Frere received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament for his services in Sind. The proposal of these thanks in the House of Lords was accompanied by a circumstance which could not fail to be gratifying to him. The proposer of the vote, Lord Panmure,

\* When the 1st Beloochees were sent away from Kurrachee, Mr. Frere wrote to Lord Elphinstone that 'when the head and heart were threatened, the extremities must take care of themselves.' He sent them off, though, had he looked to his own interests only, he would have been only too glad to keep them at Kurrachee.

was naturally but little acquainted with the details of Mr. Frere's services of twenty-four years, and he made therefore but a cursory allusion to them. It was then that Lord Falkland, a nobleman who seldom took a part in debate, rose in his place, and bore testimony to the value of the services he had known and appreciated. It was the best of all testimonies, the testimony of the heart. In the following year, Mr. Frere was nominated a Civil Knight Commander of the Bath, and, on this occasion, the Prime Minister, the late Earl of Derby, moved a second vote of thanks to the recipient of the honour in his warmest manner and his happiest style.

In 1859, Sir Bartle Frere was nominated a member of the Supreme Council of India. He at once left Sind, and reached Calcutta during the winter of 1859-60. It is a very remarkable fact—a fact that cannot have failed to impress itself on those who have watched his career—that Sir Bartle Frere has always taken up a new appointment at a critical period. It was so at the time of the settlement of the Dekkan; it was so when he was nominated Secretary to Sir George Arthur; it was so when he was sent to Sattara; scarcely less so when promoted to Sind; much more so when he returned to that province in 1857. His nomination to the Supreme Council formed no exception to the rule. Probably never since the mutiny had affairs in Calcutta worn so critical an aspect as that by which they were marked in 1859-60, and



during the two years that followed. Sir Bartle Frere arrived in Calcutta to find the imperial finances in terrible disorder, showing an annual deficit of three millions, and the ruling powers hopelessly at sea as to the best mode of meeting it; he found the military expenditure greater by one-half than it had been before the mutiny, and still increasing; he found the three communities—the official, the European non-official, and the native—all on the worst terms one with the other, divided on all important questions, and especially so on the subject of the financial difficulty; he found Lord Canning at the height of his unpopularity, denounced by the organs of local European opinion as the real author of the deficit; he found the army in as bad a state as it well could be, the European portion of the Company's troops dissatisfied, and the native portion in a state of semi-disorganisation. In a word, at the time of his arrival, India was in the worst throes of a crisis. The mutiny had been put down, but chaos had supervened.

We regret that our space will not permit us to do more than give a general view of the line of conduct adopted by Sir Bartle Frere at this conjuncture. But, indeed, the general view is all that is necessary to make us thoroughly understand and appreciate the character of the man. In fact, in such a crisis as that which we have noted, with all the elements of society in disorder, a noble character constitutes a greater power than ability, however eminent, based

upon ideas which are neither great nor lofty. A mere member of the Supreme Council, however able he might have been, could of himself have effected little. The pivot upon which the government machine moved was the Viceroy. Now, mere abilities were not sufficient to win Lord Canning. He had seen undoubted talent collapse under difficult circumstances. But that which abilities could not do, character did effect. Sir Bartle Frere had not been long in Calcutta, as the colleague in Council of the Viceroy, before he became his most trusted counsellor; consulted upon every point; and his advice always cherished. From that time to the date of Lord Canning's departure from India in 1862, he occupied this position. Lord Canning's was a very trusting character. There was something about him noble and chivalrous to an extent in these days rarely witnessed. No one more than he appreciated a gentleman. If there was one fault in a man he could not forgive it was meanness, or, to speak more correctly, the smallest divergence from the narrow footpath of honour. Open opposition, when he believed it to be based upon sincere motives, he cared not for: he even appreciated the sincerity that prompted it. The writer has personal knowledge of this, for he, too, during the mutiny, attacked Lord Canning's Government in a pamphlet, which, had it been published in Prussia, would have procured for him confinement for life in Spandau, but which, written as it was in sincerity and good faith, with the

sole view of rousing the attention of the Home authorities to, what the writer considered, the laxity of the system pursued in the crisis of the mutiny, drew from Lord Canning no expression of displeasure. On the contrary, it caused him to watch the career of the writer, to test him in difficult employments, and, finally, when satisfied that public spirit alone had prompted his action, to accompany the advice which he gave him with the kindest expressions of his confidence. Such was the man with whom Sir Bartle Frere was associated in the government of India from 1859 to 1860.

The measures adopted to raise India from the slough of despond in which she had sunk to an apparently hopeless extent may thus be briefly noted. First as to finance. Two months before Sir Bartle Frere arrived in Calcutta, Mr. James Wilson had landed in India with the avowed intention of evolving order out of chaos. In the process of time he stated his plans. From some high officials in India these plans met with the most determined opposition. But Sir Bartle Frere from the first gave Mr. Wilson a hearty and loyal support; not indeed, as he said, that his schemes were not free from difficulty and even risk, but because he considered that difficulty and that risk ‘as nothing compared with the certain ruin of drifting into bankruptcy by remaining as we are.’ In his speeches on the occasion of the introduction of this measure he took upon himself his full share of the responsibility attending it;

and it may be safely affirmed that by his example and expressed confidence—Lord Canning at the time being absent from Calcutta—he conciliated, in favour of Mr. Wilson's scheme, many who would otherwise have opposed it. His difficulties were greatly increased by the fact that the Governor of Madras protested openly against the measure. But, on the other hand, the Governor of Bombay, Sir George Clerk, though he regarded the imposition of an income tax as unnecessary, gave it, when it had been decided upon, his most loyal support. Still, it required the presence in Council of a man of tact and determination, ready to sacrifice himself, in case of need, to the public service, to carry the bill through.

In the autumn of 1860 the lamented death of Mr. Wilson cast upon Sir Bartle Frere for a time the duties of the financial department. In this capacity he had to superintend the reform of the military expenditure, entrusted to a commission the soul of which was Sir George Balfour. The nature of the services of this commission may be best attested by the fact, that they resulted in an annual saving of three millions, whilst its members, and especially its president, General Balfour, received from Lord Canning, and afterwards from Lord Elgin, the warmest commendations. To the commission Sir Bartle Frere gave his undeviating support, and it may be said that he was its firmest prop. The difficulties it had to encounter can scarcely be overstated.

To Mr. Laing, Mr. Wilson's successor, Sir Bartle Frere accorded likewise his cordial support. And when, after holding office for six months, that gentleman was forced by ill-health to return to England, Sir Bartle Frere resumed the vacated position, and contributed by his tact and energy to pass into law those remedial measures which, inaugurated originally by Mr. Laing, restored an equilibrium to the Indian exchequer.

But perhaps the practical turn of Sir Bartle Frere's mind was best evidenced in the attempts which he made to smooth away the differences existing between the various classes of the community in Bengal. There can be no question now that those differences arose partly from the view entertained by one section of the community, that its members were, as a race, superior to those of the other section ; and that, under no circumstances, should the members of the superior race be insulted by having to submit to the jurisdiction of the inferior, and partly from the high-handed proceedings of the local governments with respect to those whom they regarded as aggressors on the rights of the natives. Now, it was a very strong axiom with Sir Bartle Frere, that all men were equal before the law. He held a very decided conviction that a man was entitled to honour, not on account of his colour, his purse, or his caste, but solely with reference to the mode in which he might discharge the duties devolving upon him as a member of society or as a public servant. But in a period of excited national feeling it was difficult to

enforce such views. He did not, however, the less manfully assert them. His house, during the whole of his residence in Calcutta, was the neutral ground where the representatives of both parties could meet. To no one was admittance denied. Here, listening to all patiently, he formed his own opinion deliberately, and to that opinion, whatever it might be, he gave utterance in the Council of India. It has often been observed that, in the long run, Englishmen are not unjust. The truth of this axiom was exemplified in the instance of Sir Bartle Frere. His impartiality, the breadth of his views, his earnestness, his love of truth for its own sake, speedily made their way. Gradually he acquired the confidence of all parties, and, that confidence once gained, it was comparatively easy to mitigate the extreme feeling on either side, and to inspire a belief in the impartiality and love of justice characterising the proceedings, relative to the many points in dispute, of the Government of India.

The question of the reform of the army was not one of those with which it devolved upon Sir Bartle Frere to deal. To Lord Strathnairn, the Commander-in-chief, he gave, however, his fullest support in the measures which he adopted to root out the evil spirit to which we have adverted, and which was seething when he assumed command of the army. In the great question of the amalgamation of the Indian army with the British, Sir B. Frere's voice was always raised to ensure that a measure so unexpected and so novel

should be carried out with the least possible injury to the interests of the officers concerned.

Of the later measures of Lord Canning's administration—those, for instance, which opened out waste lands to the settler, which encouraged the irrigation of lands, and which tended to the encouragement of self-government in the minor Presidencies,—Sir Bartle Frere was the constant supporter. We boldly assert that to him is it mainly due that the feeling with regard to Lord Canning changed during the last two years of his reign from dislike to veneration. The truth is that Sir Bartle Frere was never on the stilts. He was absolutely free from the pride of office, or the vanity of selfish ambition. He never thought of himself. With the idea before him of bringing about the best results, no matter from whom the advice or the idea might emanate, he could not imagine that he was derogating from his high position when he asked the opinion of non-official men regarding matters which constituted to them the business of their lives. He felt that there was good in all men, and in all genuine ideas of men, and that nothing was so likely to promote the public benefit than to induce men of different opinions to explain their views fairly and openly to one another. These convictions acted upon by Lord Canning account for the marked and decided reaction of Indian public opinion in his favour during the two last years of his reign.

In the month of March 1862, Lord Canning was

succeeded as Viceroy by the Earl of Elgin. Lord Canning had scarcely left before Sir Bartle Frere was appointed to succeed Sir George Clerk as Governor of Bombay. The accompanying extracts from Canning's letters with reference to that high office cannot fail to be interesting, inasmuch as they express the real sentiments of the man with whom he had been for more than two years associated in the government of India, who had been deeply impressed by his views, and who felt for him a deep regard near akin to that which had united the father of the one and the uncle of the other—George Canning and Hookham Frere—in the early days of the century.

Lord Canning, on the 6th of April, 1862, wrote thus, whilst on his homeward voyage:—‘I have barely time for one line, but it must be written. I have just seen in the Overland Mail your appointment to Bombay. . . . I do not know when I have read anything with such unmixed pleasure. It has given me a fillip, and a new start in the interest for India which I carry away with me. God grant you health and strength to do your work in your own noble spirit.’

In the same sympathising spirit he wrote his last letter from Alexandria:—‘I did not say half of what was in my mind when I wrote from Aden. I do hope that now that you have got the chief burden to bear on your own shoulders, you will take more care of yourself, and not run risks from overwork. It will be



inexcusable if, with the help of Poona and Mahableshwur, you do not so husband yourself as to be able to work out your full line of usefulness. I wish Lady Frere had overtaken me (as she threatened to do). I should so like to congratulate her.' This was his last letter. We will not weaken the effects of the parting words of that noble spirit by any comments of our own.

Sir Bartle Frere was now Governor of Bombay. To recount in full detail the history of his administration of that Presidency would require a paper devoted solely to that subject. A few of its salient acts may, however, be referred to.

The first we would notice is Education. To encourage this Sir Bartle Frere devoted all the energies of his mind. He did a great deal, but we are bound to add that he could not have accomplished one-half of that which he did accomplish but for the warm interest Lady Frere also took in the subject. Following the example of her mother, who had been the first lady occupying the position of wife of the Governor who showed a deep interest in the education of native ladies, Lady Frere devoted herself to the cause with all the ardour of her nature. The times in which she lived enabled her to do more than Lady Arthur had been able to effect. To her example and exertions may be attributed the great advance made during her husband's five years' rule, in the civilisation and education of the female community of Bombay. She it was who first opened

the doors of Government House to the female relatives of the Parsees and other native gentlemen of the Presidency. She it was who visited them in their own houses, endeavouring to convince them of the advantages which must accrue from the adoption of a more liberal training. Nor were her labours fruitless. In respect of female education Bombay is greatly in advance of the other Presidencies of India.

Amongst other great works undertaken by Sir Bartle Frere we may mention the building of the Dekkan College, the Poona Engineering College, the Elphinstone College, and the Sassoon College; during his tenure of office the Bhore Ghât, the Tull Ghât Incline, and the Ahmedabad railways were opened, the ramparts surrounding Bombay were pulled down, and a municipality was organised.

The establishment of the municipality in the year 1865 was the commencement of a new era for Bombay. It became the means of reducing the annual mortality from an average of 35·04 per thousand, in 1864, to an average of 19·20 per thousand, in 1868.

The census taken in the year 1865 gave extraordinary results regarding the population of Bombay. It established that in point of population Bombay was the second city in the British Empire, ranking next to London, and being equal to two Manchesters. It was shown that in its most crowded parts the people were four times as crowded as in the most crowded parts of London; that in whole districts of the town

no children were reared, owing to epidemics consequent upon overcrowding and want of air. It was in consequence of these discoveries that the municipality was established. Its working has been, as we have seen, most beneficial to sanitation. According to the latest returns, Bombay is the most healthy city, next to Dublin, in the British Empire.

It was the fate of Sir Bartle Frere that in his government of Bombay, as in his other scenes of action, he was destined to meet a crisis. But this time it was a crisis caused by the overtrading and overspeculation of the commercial community—a crisis, the effects of which he was as powerless to prevent as to mitigate. Had the American war lasted but one year longer, it is not improbable that the commercial prosperity of Bombay would have been placed upon a durable basis. But it was not to be. Even before the crisis came, Sir Bartle Frere had done all in his power to remedy the evils arising from the worst features of speculation. He passed the Cotton Frauds' Act and the Time Bargains' Bill, both strongly opposed by a portion of the mercantile and official community—yet both alike required to prevent the further spread of a great scandal—and as early as the 16th November, 1864, he issued a Government notification, warning officers of Government against share speculations. The panic and the crash did come in 1866; but such things have come under all governments and in all parts of the world,

and for their coming no sane man has ever yet held a government responsible.

But Sir Bartle Frere was Governor of Bombay to govern the natives of that Presidency ; and we boldly affirm that none of his predecessors understood natives better, and not one was more appreciated by them.

It was his great object to legislate in their interest ; to open out to them legitimate paths of ambition, and thus to wean them from the intrigues in which their forefathers indulged, and in which an openhanded policy of confiscation had tended to confirm them. We recollect well meeting a few months ago one of the ablest natives in the country, one of those who had been decorated by Lord Canning for his eminent services in the mutiny. The first question, after the usual greetings, asked by this gentleman was after Sir Bartle Frere. This having been replied to, he expressed his regret that India was about to lose one who had shown so well his capacity to govern her children, and who, he said, in the most critical period subsequent to the suppression of the mutiny, had proved himself ‘ the right hand of Lord Canning.’

In addition to the other qualities we have mentioned, Sir Bartle Frere possesses that of being a pleasing and impressive public speaker, and an admirable debater. He could take a native audience by storm, nor was he less effective when, almost unsupported, he pleaded in Calcutta for the government measures, in opposition to the tried eloquence of the judges of the

Supreme Court. We have heard it stated against him that he oftener promises than performs. But we do not hesitate to say that this charge is based solely upon the hope that rises irrepressible in the breast of the Indian officer. Possessing a warm heart and a manner that always charms, Sir Bartle Frere is, no doubt, always unwilling to wound the feelings of those who apply to him for appointments. In numberless cases the applicant has mistaken the kindness that would soften the abruptness of a refusal into a sort of consent, and has loudly expressed his anger when he has found his expectations unfulfilled. It is very difficult indeed to deal with such gentlemen. A distinguished official once remarked to us: 'If you are civil to applicants, and yet give them nothing, they call you insincere; if you are plain and downright, they stigmatise you as a bear.'

Very imperfectly have we given this sketch of the career of one of our foremost Indian Statesmen; probably, taken altogether, the ablest man that ever came to India in the civil service. It is curious that, great as has been his success in India, it is in the ranks of his own service alone that the greatness of the qualities that led to it is not fully admitted. The fact is, that men trained in the Indian groove, and who have not risen above the prejudices of their training, are unable to appreciate that union of qualities which enables a man to sympathise at one and the same time with the native and the settler, and to gain

golden opinions from both. The great principle of one law for all, independently of caste or creed, has been the guiding-star of Sir Bartle Frere in his varied employments, and from this straight and narrow path he has never swerved a single inch. To encourage commerce to the utmost, yet to enforce the same justice on the two great classes of Her Majesty's subjects in India; to foster private enterprise, and yet to see that the rights of the children of the soil were scrupulously maintained, have been objects of which he has never lost sight. The result is shown in the universal esteem and affection with which he is regarded in India.

His career even up to the point which it has at present reached will no doubt act as an incentive to many to go and do likewise. 'It is something to have accomplished, that thus starting in India without a friend, he should have gained the entire confidence of 180,000,000 of natives, and the warm affection of his own countrymen; that he should have filled some of the most important offices in India, stopping short only of the highest. Whether he is destined to exercise once again a prominent influence on the affairs of the great country of Hindustan, this at least is certain, that his name will ever be linked with the history of the period of the lowest depression of British fortunes, and with the measures that tended to re-establish them in that country, and that the children and children's children of the present generation will learn to bless the name

of him who, for the thirty-three years he was with them, showed himself emphatically one of them, whose heart ever sympathised with distress, whose natural characteristic it has always been to judge his fellow-men—not by their birth, their fortune, or their patents of nobility, but by the spirit which animates them in their pursuits,—by the earnestness, the energy, the fidelity, they bring to bear in the performance of their duties.

### *DYCE SOMBRE'S ANCESTOR.*

WHEN the French settlements in Bengal were broken up by the capture of Chandernagore in 1757, the members of the French detachments scattered over the province found themselves under the necessity of either surrendering to the English, or of entering the service of the princes of the country. Amongst those who followed the latter course was the serjeant of a detachment stationed at Dacca. The real name of this man was Walter Reinhard. He was a native of Strasbourg, a carpenter by trade, and had come out to India in that capacity in 1754-5. His first station had been Chandernagore. Almost immediately after his arrival there he changed his profession of carpenter for that of soldier, by entering the military service of the Company of the Indies. Being a man of some mark, he speedily rose to the grade of serjeant. From his gloomy disposition and frowning features he soon received from his comrades the nickname 'Sombre.' The epithet stuck to him, and, after his entry into the service of the native princes, he was never known by any other.

It would not appear that for the two or three years



following the adoption of this course Sombre rose above a very humble grade. He seems to have wandered from one petty prince to another, changing service without much profit to himself. In the year 1760 he found himself, in this way, in the employ of the Nawab of Purnea, in an inferior position, and, apparently, with no prospects before him. But there then occurred one of those crises which make opportunities for adventurers. On July 2 of that year, Meerun, the son of Meer Jaffier, Nawab Nazim of Bengal, was struck dead by lightning when in pursuit of Sombre's master, the Nawab of Purnea. The death of this prince rendered it necessary to select another heir for the debauched and incapable Meer Jaffier; and, after many intrigues, his son-in-law, Meer Kassim, was nominated to that important office. But this selection, far from satisfying the ambition of Meer Kassim, instigated him to new schemes of self-interest. Having been permitted to proceed to Calcutta, for the avowed purpose of arranging with the Council regarding the payment of sums said to be due to the Anglo-Indian Government, he seized the opportunity to treat for the deposition of Meer Jaffier, and the immediate transfer to himself of supreme power. He found the members of the Council, bound as they were to Meer Jaffier by the most solemn engagements, extremely impressionable to his silvered arguments. It was speedily arranged that in return for the cession to the East India Company of the districts of Midnapore,

Burdwan, and Chittagong, and *for a present to the members of Council of twenty lakhs of rupees*, to be paid on the occasion of the investiture of himself, or shortly afterwards, a pretext should be assigned for deposing Meer Jaffier, and for transferring the government of the province to Meer Kassim. In accordance with this plan, Meer Jaffier was worked upon to resign, and upon his yielding to pressure, Meer Kassim was nominated Nawab Nazim of Bengal.

But the new ruler was a man of far shrewder character and of a more resolute nature than his father-in-law. To great energy, very considerable ability, and an indefatigable industry, he joined a cold, vindictive, unscrupulous disposition, utterly careless of the means, so long only as he could obtain his end. He disliked the English with all the intensity of bitter and brooding hatred. He had good reason. He had bought his sovereignty from them at their own price; and although, to pay them the bribe which alone had induced them to acquiesce in his elevation, he had exhausted all his resources in the way of raising money, he still found himself unceasingly subjected to the irritating pressure caused by the interference in his administration of the agents of the Company, and by the right they assumed to dictate to him on every occasion the line of policy he must adopt. Meer Kassim had seen the evil effects of this interference in the time of Meer Jaffier, and he determined to leave no stone unturned to put an end to all pretext for it in

the time to come. To be farther from the English—to be distant alike from their *espionage* and their interference—he removed the seat of his government from Moorshedabad to Monghyr. Here, after having paid off all his obligations to the Company, he began to form a standing army. He had witnessed the advantages derivable from European discipline, and he well knew that, without it, no native army would stand for a moment against the English. He, therefore, sought out European adventurers, particularly Frenchmen and other foreigners, of whose dislike to the English he had knowledge. He invested these persons with high rank in his army, and gave them a recognised position at his court. Many wandering outcasts, eager for service and adventure, flocked to his standard, and amongst them came the Alsatian, Reinhard, under his then universally recognised name of Sombre, or Sumroo. Sombre soon attracted the attention of the Nawab by his assiduity and perseverance, and by the care he took to place the troops under his charge on an effective footing. He was, in consequence, soon appointed to the command of a separate brigade.

Pursuing steadily the course he had marked to himself, Meer Kassim had, by the end of the year 1762, established his revenue system on a profitable basis, had set up a large foundry for casting cannon, and had trained and armed in the European fashion a force of 25,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry, and a corps

of excellent artillery. But it was at this time that the great cupidity of the Company's agents induced them to resort to measures of a most unjust and arbitrary character towards Meer Kassim and his subjects. The cheeks of every Englishman must tingle as he reads the account of the policy adopted by the leading men amongst his countrymen in India a century since. The authorities of Calcutta, to enrich themselves, had passed an enactment whereby goods destined for Europeans descended the river free of transit duty, whilst those imported by natives were heavily taxed. This exemption acted most hardly on the people of the country generally, and especially on that portion of it governed by the Nawab. Such was the oppression resulting from this shameful system that whole districts were becoming impoverished, and the entire trade of the country disorganised, whilst, as a natural consequence, the revenues of the Nawab were steadily diminishing. Under these circumstances, Meer Kassim, anxious to preserve his independence, even to make considerable sacrifices for that end, and at the same time to prevent the entire undermining of his resources, arranged an interview with Governor Vansittart. At this interview he put forward the extremely moderate proposition, that whilst the natives should pay twenty-five per cent., the English should only pay nine, on all goods passing his boundaries. Mr. Vansittart, satisfied that under this scale an immense advantage would still accrue to the English, accepted it at once. But

the Council at Calcutta, more greedy of gain, refused to ratify it, insisting that the trade carried on by the English should be subject to no duty whatever—the article of salt alone excepted—and upon this they expressed a willingness to pay a duty of two-and-a-half per cent. The Nawab, naturally incensed at the grasping nature of this demand, well aware likewise that it would entail his utter and absolute ruin were he to accede to it, replied by the legitimate exercise of an act of sovereign power. He abolished all import duties whatever, and established free trade throughout his territories.

This bold and prudent measure—for even if judged by the result, an immediate overthrow was preferable to the lingering torture to which the policy of the Calcutta Council would have subjected him—and perfectly within the competence of the Nawab to order—roused all the worst passions of the corrupt clique reigning in Calcutta. For want of a better reason, they declared that their own trade was affected by the new edict, and that the Nawab possessed not the power to issue laws, which though nominally applicable to his own territories, really affected their trade. They sent two of their members, Messrs. Hay and Amyatt, to inform the Nawab of their opinion on this point. Whilst these gentlemen were with him at Monghyr, intelligence reached the Nawab, that Mr. Ellis, a notoriously violent servant of the Company, was making preparations to take possession of his city of Patna. Still

unwilling to have recourse to hostilities, and hoping so to strengthen the garrison of Patna as to deter Mr. Ellis from attacking it, as well as to retain possession of a guarantee against a sudden and treacherous attack, he at once ordered off a strong body of troops to Patna; and, whilst detaining Mr. Hay as a hostage, requested Mr. Amyatt to proceed to Calcutta to represent the cruel position in which the measures of Mr. Ellis had placed him. But before Mr. Amyatt could return to Calcutta, matters had reached a crisis. Mr. Ellis, believing that Messrs. Hay and Amyatt had left Monghyr, and inferring, or seeming to infer, that their departure left him free to act as he pleased, moved against Patna on June 24, and attempted to surprise the city, before the reinforcements sent by Meer Kasim could reach it. He so far succeeded, that he obtained possession of the town, with the exception of a stone building within it and the citadel. Instead of attempting these, he returned to his camp to breakfast, whilst the Europeans dispersed to plunder. The Nawab's troops meanwhile evacuated the remainder of the city, and retreated towards Monghyr. They had not, however, marched more than a few miles, when they met the reinforcements which had been sent by the Nawab, headed by an Armenian in his service, named Markar, who, hearing that two strong places still held out, and that the English had dispersed to drink and plunder, determined to attempt the recovery of the city. He effected this with great gallantry,

charging and capturing the English guns that were posted at the gate of the town, scattering the panic-stricken infantry, and pursuing them to their factory, to which he laid siege. Mr. Ellis, finding it after a few days untenable, abandoned it, and, crossing the river, commenced a movement towards Chupra, hoping to gain Oudh. But the Nawab had no sooner heard of the recapture of Patna, than he despatched Sombre with his brigade to Buxar to cut off the English should they retreat from their factory, whilst Markar should follow them. With an enemy thus in front and rear, harassed by the rains which had just set in, the case of the English detachment seemed hopeless. The resources to which alone they might have trusted, those of daring and energy, appear to have been conspicuously wanting. Their only hope of security lay in making a daring onslaught on one of the divisions of the enemy's army. But, instead of doing this, they waited to be attacked. And although on this occasion (July 1, 1763), they displayed their wonted bravery in the field, they were overpowered by numbers, and, after having lost their commanding officer, Colonel Carstairs, and eight other officers, proposed to surrender. The offer was accepted, and they were conveyed prisoners to Patna.

This brought matters to a crisis between the Nawab and the English. The latter, who had been, it will be recollected, bribed by Meer Kassim to consent to the deposition of Meer Jaffier, now accepted other bribes

from Meer Jaffier to consent to his reinstatement at the expense of Meer Kassim. As the ally of Meer Jaffier, also, they bound themselves to expel his rival. It is not necessary to give a full detail of the campaign. Never did native troops fight better, or with a more earnest desire to exterminate the foreigners, than on this occasion. But, on July 17, Meer Kassim's army was repulsed on the banks of the Adjee river by a force under Lieut. Glenan, and, on the 19th, it was defeated, after a most obstinately contested battle at Kutwah, by Major John Adams. Here the battle was long doubtful, and for a considerable time seemed to favour Meer Kassim. Victory indeed was in his grasp, but the jealousy his native commandants had for one another prevented that concert so necessary to success, and enabled the English commander to make a movement that proved decisive. On the 24th, Moorshedabad was occupied by Meer Jaffier, and, on August 2, a decisive, and for a long time very doubtful, battle was fought between the main armies of the belligerents. In the beginning of this battle the brigade commanded by Sombre occupied a prominent position. It was, however, handled in a manner indicating rather a desire to save the lives of the men composing it than to destroy the enemy. Certainly, had Sombre shown the same energy as a general which he afterwards displayed as an assassin, the British power in Bengal might have been temporarily extinguished on the field of Gheriah. As it was, though occupying a



prominent position, he forbore to make a movement, which, when the left of the English had been broken, would probably have decided the day. Instead of this, he moved his brigade out of fire, and then used it only to prevent the defeat from becoming a rout. It may here be observed that, by his contemporaries, Sombre was always described as a man whose object was directed rather to save the lives of his troops than to employ them so as to gain a battle. ‘He was always,’ wrote an English officer of that day, ‘remarkable for his excellent retreats. He made it a rule in every action to draw out his men in a line, fire a few shots, form a square, and retreat,’—a line of conduct which made it easy for him to boast, as to the end of his life he was in the habit of doing, that he had never lost a single gun.

After the victory of Gheriah, the English gradually advanced along the course of the river. On August 11, thanks to the treachery of a deserter, they succeeded in driving the Nawab’s army from a strong position on the Oodwah Nullah; and on October 1 they occupied Monghyr. The fall of this last place seems to have irritated Meer Kassim beyond all power of control, and, combined as it was with other misfortunes, which, like that at Monghyr, he attributed to treachery, to have determined him to take the terrible revenge of slaughtering the prisoners held by him in Patna. He accordingly issued orders for their massacre. But, to their honour be it recorded, all his native generals

refused to obey, observing that 'they were soldiers and not assassins.' The Nawab did not conceal his rage. At this moment Sombre offered his services. They were gladly accepted, and to this European was entrusted the task of massacring his fellow-Europeans. So, on October 5, Sombre, on the pretext of giving the European prisoners an entertainment, sent to them for the loan of their knives and forks. These were at once given up. He then proceeded with two companies of his brigade to the house in which they were confined. Having surrounded this house, he sent for Messrs. Ellis, Hay, and Lushington. On their approach, accompanied by six other gentlemen, they were, on an order from Sombre, cut to pieces, and their bodies thrown into a well. The sepoys then ascended to the roof of the house, which had a square court in the centre, and poured down a concentrated and continuous fire on the Europeans assembled there. Those who escaped this fire took shelter in the inner rooms. Here, however, they were attacked by the sepoys left below. The English, arming themselves with bottles, bricks, and pieces of furniture, defended themselves with all the energy of despair. It is said that the sepoys were so struck with their gallantry, that they requested arms might be furnished them, as they were soldiers and not executioners; but that Sombre struck down those who objected, and compelled the others to continue their work until all were slain. Captain Broome, from whose excellent history of the

Bengal army the account of the massacre has been mainly taken, adds: 'Neither age nor sex were spared, and Sombre consummated his diabolical villany by the murder of Mr. Ellis's infant child.' Upwards of fifty civil and military officers, and a hundred European soldiers, perished on this occasion. One officer, Dr. Fullarton, who had gained the esteem even of Meer Kassim, had been withdrawn from the garrison the previous day; and four serjeants who had been sent to the Nawab in a boat overpowered the crew and escaped. But of the occupants of the house at the time of the assault not one was saved.

The massacre, which in one respect surpassed in horror that of Cawnpore in 1857, in that the director of it was a European, was the turning point in the fortunes of Sombre. From that moment he could expect but one fate from the English. Thenceforth his life was a purgatory. He constantly carried about with him poison, determined to die rather than fall into the hands of those between whom and himself there was a sea of blood. His action of October 5 drew him nearer, on the other hand, to the Nawab. But the fortunes of the Nawab were now on the wane, Patna was captured by the English on November 6, and Meer Kassim, accompanied by Sombre and a respectable force of all arms, took refuge in the territories of the Nawab Vizier of Oudh.

The Vizier, Shuja-ud-Dowla, one of the heroes of Paniput, received Meer Kassim with great apparent

cordiality. At an interview, held at Allahabad, he expressed his admiration of his troops, drawn up in review order under Sombre, and gave him hopes of espousing his cause. Meer Kassim was presented the same day to the Emperor, Shah Aulum, who gave him the same flattering assurances. But all this time, and previously, the Emperor and the Vizier had been in correspondence with the English and Meer Jaffier, and had even congratulated them on their successes. They had no fixed intention, therefore, of making common cause with Meer Kassim. But so persuasive were the arguments of the latter, so vividly did he paint the ambition and unscrupulousness of the European invaders of their common country, that he succeeded in bringing over the Emperor and the Vizier to his views, on the sole condition that before they openly declared against the English, he should, with his own troops, bring the revolted Bundelas to subjection. This, with his disciplined brigades, he easily accomplished; and then a joint attack against the English was organised. In the beginning of April 1764, the combined forces of the Emperor, the Vizier, and Meer Kassim crossed the Ganges, and advanced towards Patna. They arrived before this city on May 2, and found the English and the troops of Meer Jaffier, the whole commanded by Captain Carnac, in a strong position covering it. The allies at once determined to attack this position. Their plan was well conceived, and by a portion of their troops, the

Rohillas and the men of Oudh, admirably sustained. But the want of firm resolution displayed by Meer Kassim, and the backwardness of Sombre, who, after exchanging volleys with the English, withdrew his brigade out of shot distance, combined to render the efforts of the others fruitless, and the attack was repulsed. Negotiations were then opened between the belligerents, but as the English demanded, as an indispensable preliminary, the surrender to them of Meer Kassim and of Sombre, they came to nothing, and the allies, moving northwards, took up a position at Buxar.

Whilst here, Meer Kassim, finding himself unable to continue to pay his troops, sent for Sombre, and, having stated this, requested that he would make over the arms and accoutrements of his men, as well as the guns, to an officer whom he named. Sombre was, in fact, relieved from his command. But this adventurer was not the man to give up anything he could hold by force. The state of Meer Kassim's finances had long been known to him, and he had already entered into a secret engagement with the Vizier of Oudh. He at once, then, boldly declared that the arms and accoutrements belonged to those who had them in possession, and that he was resolved to keep them. Immediately striking his camp, he took up a position in that of Shujah-ud-Dowla. Here, on October 23, the combined force was attacked by Major Munro at the head of between 7,000 and 8,000 men. The brigades of Sombre and Madoc

occupied the centre of the Nawab's line, and they fought for a time with great resolution. Alarmed, however, at the repulse of the cavalry under Meeah Issah, and their dispersion consequent upon the death of that leader, Sombre, true to his resolution never to leave a gun on the field, drew off with Madoc at a very critical moment, and thus enabled the English to gain a complete victory. After this defeat the Vizier opened out fresh negotiations with the English. The latter, however, still demanded the preliminary surrender of Meer Kassim and Sombre. It was scarcely in the Vizier's power to surrender the first, for, after having been plundered of all that still remained to him, he had been placed the day before the battle on a lame elephant, and turned out of the camp.\* But Sombre was still with him, and was, next to himself, the most important man in his camp. He commanded those brigades which, if they had done little for him, were capable of effecting a great deal against him. To proceed against Sombre by open violence was, therefore, impossible, but there were other methods of getting rid of him. One of these the Vizier did not hesitate to suggest to the English. He proposed to invite Sombre to an entertainment, and to have him there assassinated in the presence of anyone whom the English leader might depute to witness the deed. The proposal, it need scarcely be stated, was refused.

\* He died in extreme poverty at Delhi, June 6, 1777, his last shawl being sold to pay for his winding sheet.

Meanwhile Sombre, ever with an eye to his own interests, had observed the discontent of the Vizier, and his disinclination to carry on the war, and had consequently already entered into secret negotiations with the Jâts. The war, however, was prolonged till August 1765; the position of Sombre, during the whole of that interval, being one of entire independence. But at length it became necessary for the Vizier, humiliated by repeated defeats, to get rid of him at any cost, if only to enable him to make peace with the English. He therefore sent him his dismissal. As this dismissal, however, was unaccompanied by any payment of arrears, Sombre was little disposed to attend to it. He at once moved upon the place occupied by the Begum of Oudh and her family, took possession of it, and made the payment of every rupee due to himself and his soldiers the price of their liberation. He then moved off with his force, and entered, as an auxiliary, into the service of the Jâts.

Of the career of Sombre with the Jâts there is no record. It is only known that after a short time he quarrelled with their leader, and moved into the territories of the Rajah of Jyenugger. Here, however, he did not stay long, but, resuming his intercourse with the Jâts, again joined them, and remained with them as long as they could pay him. It was whilst in their service that he purchased a dancing-girl of Delhi, by name Zerbonissa, afterwards so notorious as the Begum Sombre. She was a woman of great talent,

vast influence over all with whom she came in contact, and utterly without scruple. In cleverness, adroitness, and ability to seize an opportunity, she was unmatched even in those days. Her courage was considerable. There is nothing to show, however, what sort of influence it was which she exercised over Sombre. He, though nominally in command of a force of three battalions of infantry, two hundred horse, and fourteen guns well mounted and horsed, appears often to have been in great danger from his own men. Sir W. Sleeman asserts that these were in the constant habit of placing him under arrest, torturing him, and even threatening his life. From another account we learn that he lived in constant dread of being delivered up to the English: that his life, therefore, was a perfect purgatory; that he carried poison about his person to prevent his ever falling alive into the hands of the British. However this may be, it is certain that he kept his men well together and commanded a considerable influence. This is evident from the high value set upon the retaining of his services by native princes. He could always name his own price. When tired of service with the Jâts, for the second time, after their defeat at Bursana, he accepted an invitation from the Court of Delhi, then represented by the Mirza Nujjuf Khan. This was in 1776. Nujjuf Khan was more than once invited to deliver up his bloodstained lieutenant to the English, but his feelings of honour made him proof against all their offers. Indeed, to



such an extent did he carry this refusal, that when, in 1777, the English pressed their alliance upon him—an alliance much coveted and of great prospective advantage to himself—naming as their main condition the surrender of Sombre, he still honourably refused. It was about this time that the Court of Delhi made to Sombre the gift of the principality subsequently known—from the name of the place where Sombre fixed his residence—as Sirdhana. This territory, estimated as yielding an annual rental of six lakhs of rupees, was nominally granted for the payment of the troops under Sombre's command; but, upon his death, it passed to his widow, the slave girl Zerbonissa, whom he had married, as guardian for his son by another concubine, Aloysius Reinhard, otherwise known as Zuffer Yah Khan, and though at one time she lost it by the fortune of war, she subsequently recovered, and held it till her death, on January 29, 1836.

Sombre himself died the year succeeding that in which he received possession of his fief. It is stated that this event occurred May 4, 1778, peaceably, in his camp, not far from Delhi. Thus this adventurer, starting in life as a carpenter, then becoming a soldier, then an assassin, died, in the service of the Emperor of Delhi, in the peaceable possession of a principality yielding 60,000*l.* per annum. His rise is a proof of how easy it was for a man of no great ability, but who possessed the one quality of boldness, added to an utter absence of scruple and principle, to rise in those

turbulent days. Sombre had no merits, scarcely even that of animal courage. Major Polier, writing from Delhi to a friend at Belgaum in 1776, a time when Sombre was in the Imperial service, gives the following graphic description of his character:—‘As to his capacity and character,’ he writes, ‘Sombre is illiterate to the full extent of the word; he can neither read nor write, but, when necessary, makes his mark. He is, however, versed in the Persian and Moorish tongues, both of which he speaks fluently and accurately enough. He is, as may be judged from his conduct at Patna, of a cruel and merciless disposition, several instances of which he has given in the exercise of what he thought justice and authority, but which could not be called by any other name than murderous and bloody acts. As to the fair side of his character, he is a plain man, both in his dress, equipage, and way of life: not disowning or attempting to conceal his mean origin, and the humble state in which he had formerly been. His principal merit is his prudence. It is that which has hitherto kept his party entire and unbroken in the several engagements in which he has been. . . . He is much afraid of the English; he dreads their very name, and not without reason. This makes him keep ever on his guard; no person can enter or approach his camp without having been stopped or examined; in short, his whole deportment shows he is under apprehensions lest he should be seized and delivered up. . . . He has entirely adopted the manners

and customs of the country. He wears the Mogul dress, has a zenanah, and has absolutely dropped all thoughts of returning to Europe.'

In submitting the character of this adventurer to a critical examination, it is difficult to discover in it one redeeming quality, unless we deem such the strength of will which enabled him to bend circumstances, however apparently hostile, to his own personal advantage. He was not, as we have said, even brave; and the prudence to which Major Polier refers, which enabled him to keep his little force together, was generally shown by retiring from the field at the very crisis of a battle, whenever the result of the battle appeared to him to be at all uncertain. Such prudence was far from advantageous to the cause Sombre was paid to uphold, and is scarcely entitled to commendation. The cold-blooded cruelty which induced him to propose the assassination of the English prisoners at Patna, and to superintend in person that murderous deed, stamps him as the possessor of a heart and a conscience alike callous and incapable of feeling. Probably in this, as in all else he attempted, his motive was simply self-aggrandisement. By that deed he became a master-spirit in the eyes of Meer Kassim. He scrupled as little to cast aside Meer Kassim when that prince was no longer able to be useful to him; and, after that, he chose his service according as the nature of it might affect his fortunes. All his actions were prompted by one and the same motive; the

determination to push himself forward. To attain this end he cared nought as to who might be his employer. He succeeded. But what was the secret of his success? Simply this. Any man, with an iron will, and no conscience or scruple, who, setting before him a pre-determined end, bending all his energies to attain it, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left, deterred by no inner feeling from crime, is almost certain to attain his goal. Happily for mankind, not only are such men rare, but even their success is accompanied by circumstances which make it the reverse of attractive to the multitude. Sombre, the carpenter, the common soldier, did indeed obtain possession of property yielding 60,000*l.* a year before he arrived at the age of fifty; but at what a cost? Not only had he earned the horror of his countrymen by the deeds of blood through which he had waded to attain his position; but, ever since the bloody deed of Patna, that is, for fifteen years, he had lived in hourly terror of being betrayed, carrying poison about his person, and guarding the approaches to his domicile. Is it possible to imagine an existence more wretched? Further—scarcely is the estate gained, scarcely is he the confirmed possessor of the prize for which he toiled, than he dies—he dies leaving behind him an infamous name, a name devolving ultimately upon a descendant,\* whose aberrations of intellect, brought

\* As above recorded, Sombre left behind him a son, Aloysius Reinhard, *alias* Zuffer Yah Khan. This son died, leaving a daughter,

into prominence by the wealth he inherited, and the temptations to which, by that wealth, he was exposed, sentenced him to an existence even more miserable than death. Never was there a more striking example of the sins of the father being visited on the third and fourth generations! The career of Sombre, then, rightly understood, adds one proof to many others that success so called, when obtained by means at which morality and religion alike revolt, is not really success; it is simply the raising of the individual to a dizzy and temporary height that his fall may be greater—the warning more unmistakable.

Sombre was buried at Agra. There, in the ancient Roman Catholic burial ground, near the large houses in the civil lines, may his tomb still be seen. It bears the following inscription in the Portuguese language:—

‘AGVI TAZO WALTER REINHARD, MORREO  
AOS 4 DE MAYO, NO ANNO DE 1778.’

(Here lies Walter Reinhard, died on the 4th of May, in the year 1778.)

Juliana, who, adopted by the Begum Zerbonissa, eventually married Mr. George Dyce, Commandant of the Begum's forces. Of this marriage there were two daughters and a son. The latter, Mr. David O. Dyce, known as Dyce Sombre, married, it is well known, in England. One of the daughters married Major Troup of the Bengal Army, the other the Baron Solaroli.



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